Evaluation of the Teacher Professional Development System on Student Results in Chile

Abstract

During 2017, Law No. 20,903 came into force, which modifies the Statute of Education Professionals, implementing the Teacher Professional Development System (SDPD) in the Chilean Educational System.

Among the modifications introduced is a system of economic incentives for teachers, which can substantially modify their salaries. The postulate on which this increase is based lies in the theory of incentives and international evidence that points to a direct relationship between the salary of teachers and the results of their students throughout their school career, in addition to a recognition of the teaching function and its social importance widely desired by the country's teachers.

Using a difference-in-differences estimation, with data from the SIMCE language and mathematics test from the 2016 and 2018 cohorts, the impact of the incentive policy derived from the SDPD was analyzed. For various estimates, null or negative results are obtained on the results of students whose teachers are part of the policy.

In 2017, Law No. 20,903 came into force, to modify the Statute of Education Professionals, implementing the
Teacher Professional Development System (SDPD) in the Chilean Education System. Among the modifications introduced is a system of economic incentives for teachers who belong to the public system, which can substantially modify their remunerations. The system is based on recognizing the social importance of teaching work and the theory of incentives. In this sense, international evidence points to a direct relationship between teachers’ salaries and the results of their students during their school career in standardized assessments. Through a difference-in-differences estimation, with SIMCE language and mathematics test data of the 2016 and 2018 cohorts applied to fourth-grade and sixth-grade students nationwide, respectively, the impact of the incentive policy derived from the Teacher Professional Development System on teachers in the public system was analysed, in contrast to those in the subsidized private sector. Thus, for various estimates, null or negative results are obtained on the results of students in standardized tests, whose teachers are part of the analysed policy, evidencing a more statistically robust effect in cases where the result variable is the mathematics evaluation. After reviewing the results of the different estimation models, it seems pertinent to maintain monitoring regarding the effects of the policy and its generated incentives for teachers. In addition, it is important to incorporate insights from similar strategies implemented in other systems, for example, the cases of performance incentives that are not permanent and are constantly evaluated to maintain and renew them.

Keywords: Incentives, academic achievement, wage, public policy, evaluation.