Eficacia y eficiencia en la reforma italiana de la Administración pública (la llamada reforma Brunetta). De las medidas para la optimización de la productividad del empleo público a la «acción por la eficiencia»

Abstract

This paper analyzes the Italian public administration reform issued in 2009 (also named Brunetta reform), consisting in the d.lgs. 150/2009 and the d.lgs. 198/2009. According to the theory. The first decree aims at improving the performance of public officials without increasing costs and provides an incentive system if results are achieved, otherwise sanctions are put in place. The improvement of labour productivity, given the number of employees, produces an external performance improvement of the administrative activity. The final objective is an increased efficiency of administrative activity. The d.lgs. 198/2009 regulates the legal action for efficiency through which citizens can take legal action against the public administration to remove its malfunctions and to re-establish the standard levels of a public service or activity. The judge’s corrective intervention can occur without increased costs for public finances. Thus, even if the appelant aims at the efficacy, this indirectly leads to an increased efficency of the administrative activity. In conclusion, the measures introduced by the Brunetta Reform aim at the efficacy of the administrative activity, without the use of additional resources and with the increase of the productivity of those already employed. Finally, the achievement of the efficacy of a particular administrative activity is a consequence of its efficiency.