Entes administrativos reguladores independientes y credibilidad institucional. Ineficiencia y peligros para la democracia latinoamericana advertidos desde el sistema norteamericano que los creó.

Abstract

This paper intends to show the challenges imposed by the independent agencies’ design upon the Latin American democratic system and to highlight the threat to the values of a democratic society by technocratic solutions. In Latin America, efficiency in regulation had been achieved mainly through technocratic solutions, in a system controlled by specialists and functionaries that spell out regulations using anti-democratic principles of secrecy and weak-speak. The justification given was the countries’ need for building credibility in their policies to show to international investors, silencing the deliberation of the common good and generating political unrest and unenviable regulatory failure due the lack of representativeness of the people’s interests in the regulation. We believe that regulation and democracy are not opposite terms, that both enhance each other when the intent is to create a more efficient regime, a regulation that takes into consideration the democratic values of a society is a more stable and consistent regulation, generating true credibility in the government’s policy implementation.