Evaluating the success of international sanctions: a new research agenda
Keywords:
international sanctions, methodology, evaluation, compliance, efficacyAbstract
Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, nº 125
Quadrimestral (May-September 2020)
ISSN:1133-6595 | E-ISSN:2013-035X
DOI: doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2020.125.2.39
Sanctions scholarship generally considers sanctions to be “successful” when targets comply with sender’ demands. This form of evaluation is inadequate. Firstly, without a robust methodology it is hard to determine whether sanctions produce compliance. Secondly, sanctions tend to pursue goals beyond those announced, which may relate to the target, the sender itself or the international system. An evaluation of the effectiveness of sanctions must identify all these goals, recognise their interrelations and measure their success with the help of interpretative methods.
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