La evaluación del éxito de las sanciones internacionales: una nueva agenda investigadora

Autores/as

Palabras clave:

sanciones internacionales, metodología, evaluación, cumplimiento, eficacia

Resumen

Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, nº 125
Cuatrimestral (mayo-septiembre 2020)
ISSN:1133-6595 | E-ISSN:2013-035X
DOI: doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2020.125.2.39

 

La investigación sobre sanciones internacionales considera mayoritariamente que estas alcanzan el «éxito» cuando los destinatarios cumplen con las exigencias del emisor. Sin embargo, esta forma de evaluar es inadecuada porque: primero, no se ha desarrollado aún una metodología sólida que permita determinar si las sanciones generan cumplimiento; y, segundo, las sanciones persiguen metas que pueden diferir de las declaradas, e ir dirigidas a los destinatarios, al propio emisor o al sistema internacional. La evaluación debe identificar las diferentes metas, reconocer sus interrelaciones y medir su éxito con métodos interpretativos.

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Publicado

2024-03-13

Cómo citar

Jones, L., & Portela, C. (2024). La evaluación del éxito de las sanciones internacionales: una nueva agenda investigadora. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, (125), 39–60. Recuperado a partir de https://recyt.fecyt.es/index.php/cidob/article/view/104764