Institutional changes in EU macroeconomic and fiscal governance: towards a European constitutional mutation

Authors

  • Carlos J. Closa Montero

Keywords:

European macroeconomic and fiscal governance, European constitutional changes, EU institutions

Abstract

The measures approved for managing the fiscal and economic crisis have transformed EU institutional architecture for governance in these policy domains in four interrelated dimensions. First, changes have petrified (i.e. upgrading to a superior legal level) certain policy options (which belong usually to the domain of normal politics in domestic settings). Second, the EU economic constitution has turned towards a marked monetarist pattern with a parallel quasi-illegalization of Keynesianism. Third, the Commission has emerged as a dominant actor but with a strong technical profile whilst, four, parliaments (either national or the EP) have a very marginal role. Taken together, these changes imply a «constitutional mutation» of the EU.

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How to Cite

Closa Montero, C. J. (2015). Institutional changes in EU macroeconomic and fiscal governance: towards a European constitutional mutation. Revista De Estudios Políticos, (165), 65–94. Retrieved from https://recyt.fecyt.es/index.php/RevEsPol/article/view/39411

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ARTICLES

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