The independence (as attribute) of the South American regulatory organizations: Special emphasis in the Peruvian case

Abstract

The objective of this article is to determine the level of independence of the regulatory bodies with respect to the political power and the different organs of the government administration, especially in the South American countries, particularly the Peruvian case. The author analyzes the foreign legislation in its two traditional systems (Anglo-Saxon and continental European) to, through a qualitative approach, analyze the reality in the Peruvian case and propose alternatives for improvement with respect to the current legislation on the subject, reviewing the different kinds of independence of the South American Regulatory Bodies, their powers and attributes, legal statutes, organization, parameters, similarities and differences, establishing the extent to which state controls affect their organization, operation and decision making, arriving at the discussion of results on the independence in question, with proposals for legislative changes to achieve a lesser interference of political power and ensure greater impartiality in their actions.