Constitutional theory in James Buchanan: Toward a model of constitutional economics

Authors

  • Gabriel Moreno González Universidad de Valencia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/rep.177.02

Keywords:

Constitutional economics, Public Choice Theory, catalaxia, ordoliberalism, economic gobernance.

Abstract

This article contains an analysis of the constitutional theory of Nobel Prize winning economist James M. Buchanan. It proceeds through an explanation of his main doctrinal inputs, breaking down those principles which are of interest for constitutional doctrine, and which can be used as a theoretical foundation for the “constitutionalisation” of economic governance mechanisms in Europe. The paper shows that Buchanan developed a complete and sui generis theory of Constitution from the neo-contractualist paradigm of the 70s, and under the parameter of his methodological individualism, which led him to defend the new constitutional categories and normative proposals, which were also not exempt from contradictions and criticisms.

Issue

Section

ARTICLES