Constitution-making (without) constituent power. On the conceptual boundaries of the power to replace or amendment the Constitution

Authors

  • Carlos Bernal Pulido

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/aijc.22.03

Keywords:

Constitution-Making, constituent power, constitutional change, constitutional replacement, constitutional revision and constitutional amendment.

Abstract

This article makes a case against the wide-spread conception of the constitution-making power as constituent power. A conceptual analysis of the power to replace or revise the constitution shows that this understanding is incorrect. Instead, the article advances a socio-ontological conception of the power to replace or revise a written constitution, as a limited deontic power of citizens’ political proxy-agents, who are collectively intentionally recognized as having the status of constitution-makers for performing the function of institutionalizing constitutionalism. This conception illuminates a clearer approach to understand the constitution-making power, and to evaluate the legitimacy of its exercises.

Issue

Section

STUDIES