La disuasión en la zona gris: una exploración teórica
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21308/recp.59.03Palabras clave:
disuasión, conflicto en la zona gris, escalada, estrategias híbridas, estabilidad estratégicaResumen
Los estudios sobre disuasión han experimentado cuatro olas. Las tres primeras centradas fundamentalmente en la disuasión nuclear y la cuarta orientada a la disuasión del terrorismo y a los denominados «rogue states». Sin embargo, la disuasión por debajo del umbral de la guerra —es decir, del conflicto en la zona gris— apenas ha recibido atención. Este artículo propone un marco teórico exploratorio para disuadir la escalada dentro de los conflictos en la zona gris. En primer lugar, se presentan algunos principios fundamentales de la teoría de la disuasión aplicables a la escalada en la zona gris a partir de una revisión de la literatura tanto clásica como reciente. A continuación, se estudian el porqué y el cómo de la escalada en la zona gris. Seguidamente, se analizan los retos que plantea a la disuasión en los dos primeros escalones. Por último, el artículo presenta una serie de claves teóricas para la práctica de la disuasión en los conflictos en la zona gris.
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