The importance of accountability and private goods transfers in the voting decision: the case of FONDEN in Mexico, 2006-13
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21308/recp.47.01Keywords:
electoral behavior, retrospective vote, retrospective pocketbook, electoral shortsightedness, FONDEN, Mexico, natural disasters.Abstract
It is usually argued that short-term measures such as the delivery of transfers of tax reductions may be electorally rewarded, thus increasing the ruling party´s chances of being re-elected. The objective of this article is to determine whether governmental transfers of private goods are really sufficient to influence the voting decision process. To do so, I use data about all the transfers made by FONDEN in each emergency declaration in Mexico between 2006 and 2013. The results show electoral support in affected municipalities is between 0.3 and 4.9 percentage points lower than in unaffected municipalities. However, if the magnitude of the emergency is such that it requires the delivery of private goods to guarantee the population wellbeing, the electoral penalty may reach up to 8.8 percentage points. The conclusion is that voters are not short-sighted for, when deciding their vote, voters do not only consider the resources they have received. Emergency Declarations are accountability mechanisms, and they are interpreted by the voters as a signal of the governor´s bad performance.Downloads
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- Gráfico 1 Grupos de municipios que surgen tras la Declaratoria de Emergencia (Español (España))
- Gráfico 2 Porcentaje de voto del partido en el gobierno municipal, de acuerdo con la recepción de transferencias del FONDEN en una Declaración de Emergencia (Español (España))
- Gráfico 3 Porcentaje de voto del partido en el gobierno estatal, de acuerdo con la recepción de transferencias del FONDEN en una Declaración de Emergencia (Español (España))
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