How do judges vote?: An integrated model of judiciary elections applied to the Supreme Court of Ecuador

Authors

  • Santiago Basabe-Serrano
  • Pablo Valdivieso Kastner

Keywords:

Judicial decision making models, Supreme Court, Ecuador, strategic vote

Abstract

This paper proposes an integrated model that identifies the variables that explain judicial decision-making in Latin American Supreme Courts. As a case study considering the individual votes of the judges of the Fiscal and Tax Chamber of the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, the article finds empirical evidence that the characteristics of the cases, judges’ time remaining time on the bench, the government’s political strength, and the performance of the economy are good predictors of judicial vote. Unlike research suggesting that judges vote sincerely –according to their own ideological preferences –this article provides evidence that such actors decide cases strategically.

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How to Cite

Basabe-Serrano, S., & Valdivieso Kastner, P. (2015). How do judges vote?: An integrated model of judiciary elections applied to the Supreme Court of Ecuador. Revista De Estudios Políticos, (164), 183–209. Retrieved from https://recyt.fecyt.es/index.php/RevEsPol/article/view/39430

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ARTICLES

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