Las consecuencias electorales de la corrupción.

Authors

  • BELÉN BARREIRO e IGNACIO SÁNCHEZ-CUENC

Abstract

The article analyzes two hypotheses about the effects of corruption on electoral behavior. According to the first hypothesis, citizens react to a greater exent to the government's reaction corruption scandals than to the scandals in themselves. This is consistent with the fact that the emergence of scandals escapes the government's control, whereas the reactions to the scandals are its own responsability. According the second hypothesis, corruption scandals cannot be reduced to an issue that could be located in the left-right axis of political competition, and henee these scandals tend to weaken ideological voting to the incumbent party affected by the scandals. The two hypotheses are tested with data comingfrom several surveys corresponding to the period of socialdemocratic government in Spain.

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Published

2008-04-21

Issue

Section

DOSSIER

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