How to control German power? Mendès France, Mitterrand and European integration

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, there were two moments when France had to face a dramatic increase of German power: the first one corresponded to Pierre Mendès France’s tenure as Prime Minister, who had to deal with German rearmament; the second moment was coincident with François Mitterrand’s presidency, when the question of German unification was again on the table. Traditionally, it has been asserted that French attitude concerning these problems had been merely reactive and incapable of exerting any significant influence on the course of events. However, during the last years a new literature has emerged which emphasizes the importance of French contribution to the evolution of institutional continental architecture. In this article, there has been implemented a comparative study on the reaction of both French leaders and their influence on European integration. Its conclusions are closer to the latter view, because Mendès France was decisive to enhance the Anglosaxon compromise in the defence of the continent, with a division of labour between the European Communities and NATO. For his part, Mitterrand’s action helped to anchor united Germany in Europe more closely, even though his ability to influence the events was narrower. Finally, France evidenced in both moments its reluctance towards federalism, and preferred intermediate solutions. These solutions provided Paris with a certain autonomy of action, a result that was coherent with its objective of preserving its world power status.