Hacia una explicación de las coaliciones: una taxonomía de modelos formales de formación y colapso de los Gobiernos

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21308/recp.49.02

Palabras clave:

Modelos de coalición, taxonomía de modelos formales, formación del Gobierno, colapso del Gobierno.

Resumen

Las teorías de las coaliciones son uno de los campos que se ha beneficiado enormemente de modelos formales en la ciencia política. Desde la publicación del libro fundamental de William Riker (1962) se han desarrollado una variedad de modelos de coalición para explicar la formación y el colapso del Gobierno. Sin embargo, a pesar de la diversidad de modelos, la literatura parece juzgar su predictibilidad basándose únicamente en los test empíricos, usualmente derivando las hipótesis a partir de las premisas de los modelos y probándolos a través de modelos estadísticos. En este trabajo, examino modelos formales clásicos y otros más recientes en la teoría de coalición, demostrando como sirven para diferentes propósitos. Construyo una taxonomía de los modelos que reconoce estas funciones, y lo más importante, los papeles que juegan en la construcción de explicaciones sobre coaliciones. Identifico tres tipos de modelos: conceptuales, cuyo valor conceptual y teórico reside en las deducciones matemáticas del modelo; modelos cuasi-conceptuales, que formalizan explicaciones sobre regularidades en el mundo real, y modelos extrapolativos, que permiten realizar pruebas empíricas de los modelos formales por vía de una variedad de métodos estadísticos. Estos tres tipos de modelos coexisten, generando explicaciones y definiendo agendas de investigación.

Biografía del autor/a

Enzo Lenine, Universidad de la Integración Internacional de la Lusofonía Afro-Brasileña – UNILAB/Malês

Enzo Lenine es profesor de Relaciones Internacionales en la Universidad de la Integración Internacional de la Lusofonía Afro-Brasileña – UNILAB/Malês.

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Publicado

2019-03-26

Cómo citar

Lenine, E. (2019). Hacia una explicación de las coaliciones: una taxonomía de modelos formales de formación y colapso de los Gobiernos. Revista Española De Ciencia Política, (49), 43–62. https://doi.org/10.21308/recp.49.02

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