Constitution, division of power and resilience to populism

Authors

  • Paloma Biglino Campos

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/redc.134.04

Abstract

The aim of these pages is to analyse whether our Constitution designs a power structure capable of controlling possible advances of populism. To this end, the two characters of populism are identified, namely the concentration and personalisation of power. Our fundamental law was drawn up precisely to avoid these risks, so the territorial division of power, the monarchy and parliamentarianism, among other guarantees, can serve as “speed bumps”. However, Article 6 of the Spanish Constitution does not prevent political parties from advocating authoritarianism, they are increasingly polarised and tend to concentrate power in the hands of their leaders. It is advisable to take these facts into account when assessing the interpretation of the Constitution and, above all, in order to evaluate proposals for legislative reforms which, instead of improving our democracy, they may work against it.

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Published

2025-08-04

How to Cite

Biglino Campos, P. (2025). Constitution, division of power and resilience to populism. Revista Española De Derecho Constitucional, (134), 105–121. https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/redc.134.04

Issue

Section

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