The European Tentative Solution to the Euro Crisis and the (greek) Debt under the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. A brief comment of the Judgment of 07.09.2011

Authors

  • Antonio López Castillo

Keywords:

Aids measures for Greece, euro rescue package, Bundestag´s budget autonomy, constitutional identity, principle of democracy, interpretation in conformity with

Abstract

The Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of September 7, 2011 has decided that the Monetary Union Financial Stabilisation Act and the Act concerning the Giving of Guarantees in the Framework of a European Stabilisation Mechanism (interpreted Article 1.4 in conformity with the Basic Law) do not violate the right to elect the «Bundestag» under Article 38.1 BL and recognise its right to adopt the budget and to control its implementation. The Judgment, in the Light of the Maastricht-Lisboa Jurisprudence, determines that budgetary autonomy, as democratic principle, is a matter of constitutional identity in Germany. Insofar it takes as a limit of its economics decisions to aid and benefit of other States in the European monetary union. 

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How to Cite

López Castillo, A. (2015). The European Tentative Solution to the Euro Crisis and the (greek) Debt under the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. A brief comment of the Judgment of 07.09.2011. Revista De Derecho Comunitario Europeo, (39), 487–502. Retrieved from https://recyt.fecyt.es/index.php/RDCE/article/view/39466

Issue

Section

CASE LAW CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

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