Is the extraordinary protection action an action or a resource in Ecuador? A perspective from the remand sentence and the replacement sentence

Abstract

The Constitutional Court of Ecuador has characterized the jurisdictional guarantee known as the extraordinary protection action —comparable to the remedy of amparo in Spain— as an action. Prior to accepting this notion as definitive, we propose initiating a discussion aimed at determining whether this categorization holds universally true. Our discourse will center on the comparison of two viewpoints:
the referral judgment and the replacement judgment. Initially, we will scrutinize the discourse engendered within the Ecuadorian context concerning the intrinsic nature of the extraordinary protection action. Subsequently, we will juxtapose the distinctions between referral and replacement judgments, pausing to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the latter. Following this, we will delineate the disparities between an action and a remedy. Ultimately, we shall ascertain, from each of the perspectives outlined, whether the jurisdictional guarantee should be classified as an action or a remedy, along with the respective role assumed by the constitutional organ in these diverse scenarios.