Rama and Cordero: Who are the losers of the economic crisis? Explaining the vote for right-wing populist parties in Europe after the Great Recession

ABSTRACT

Right-wing populist parties (RWPP) have obtained outstanding electoral results during the Great Recession in Europe. While some authors have adopted a macro level approach to explain this success highlighting the relevance of the context of crisis, others have focused on micro explanations to analyse how the “losers of globalization” (the elderly, less educated and lower class) comprise the main electoral base of these parties. However, RWPP have performed much better in countries less affected by the crisis and, in certain contexts, the so-called “losers” of globalization have not been their main electoral base. Using individual data for 12 Western European countries provided by the European Election Studies (2014) database, in this paper we demonstrate that the combination of these two sets of explanations (at the macro and micro levels) is necessary not only for empirical reasons, but also for conceptual ones to understand the phenomenon. While the general profile of this family of voters tend to be older, less educated and belonging to the lower class, in countries most affected by the crisis RWPP voters tend to be younger and better educated.

Keywords: Great Recession, immigration, populist parties, right-wing populism, electoral behavior.

RESUMEN

Los partidos populistas de derecha han obtenido unos resultados electorales sin precedentes durante la Gran Recesión en Europa. Mientras que algunos autores han adoptado una aproximación a nivel agregado para explicar su éxito, subrayando la importancia del contexto de crisis, otros se han centrado en explicaciones a nivel micro para analizar cómo los «perdedores de la globalización» (los mayores, con menor nivel educativo, y de clase social baja) comprenden la principal base electoral de estos partidos. Sin embargo, el éxito de estas formaciones ha sido mayor en los países menos afectados por la crisis y, en ciertos contextos, los llamados “perdedores” de la globalización no han sido la base electoral de estas formaciones. Utilizando datos individuales de doce países de Europa Occidental, provenientes de la base de datos European Election Studies (2014), en este trabajo demostramos que la combinación de estos dos conjuntos de explicaciones (a nivel macro y micro) es necesaria no solo por razones empíricas, sino también conceptuales, para poder entender el fenómeno. Mientras que el perfil general de esta familia de votantes tiende a ser de mayor edad, con menor nivel educativo y perteneciente a clases sociales bajas, en los países más afectados por la crisis los electores de los partidos populistas de derechas tienden a ser más jóvenes y con un nivel educativo más alto.

Palabras clave: Gran Recesión, inmigración, populismo, partidos populistas de derecha, comportamiento electoral.

Citation / Cómo citar este artículo: Rama, J. y Cordero, G. (2018). Who are the losers of the economic crisis? Explaining the vote for right-wing populist parties in Europe after the Great Recession. Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 48, 13-‍43. Doi: https://doi.org/10.21308/recp.48.01

Copyright © 2018:  Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal. 

INTRODUCTION[up]

Social scientists have been interested in right-wing populist parties (RWPP) for a long time ( ‍Betz, Hans-George. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. London: McMillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23547-6.Betz, 1994). According to Cas Mudde, “the populist radical right constitutes the most successful party family in post-war Western Europe” (2013: 1-‍19). Three waves of populism have been identified in Europe, with the third one taking place in the eighties ( ‍Beyme, Klaus von. 1985. Political parties in Western democracies. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Beyme, 1985). These three consecutive impulses are at the roots of an extensive literature on the study of these parties. Numerous works have focused on the supply side, analysing the complex concept of populism ( ‍Laclau, Ernesto. 1977. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: New Left Books.Laclau, 1977: 172-‍173;  ‍Canovan, Magaret. 1999. “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy”, in Y. Mény et al., Democracies and the Populist Challenge. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Canovan, 1999: 3;  ‍Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, 39 (4): 541-‍63. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.Mudde, 2004: 543), or the speeches made by populist parties and leaders (see, for instance, the recent study of  ‍Van Kessel, Stijn. 2015. “Dutch populism during the crisis”, in Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas (eds.), Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR Press.Kriesi and Pappas, 2015), while others have paid attention to the demand side describing RWPP voters’ electoral behavior or attitudinal profile ( ‍Van Hauwaert, Steven M. and Stijn van Kessel. 2018. “Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support”, European Journal of Political Research, 57 (1): 68-‍92. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12216.Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018;  ‍Bakker, Bert N., Matthijs Rooduijn and Gijs Schumacher. 2016. “The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany”, European Journal of Political Research, 55: 302-‍320. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12121.Bakker et al., 2016).

The recent electoral advance of this set of parties in Europe during the Great Recession has revived interest in the discipline. Parties such as the National Front (FN) in France, the Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom, the Danish People’s Party (DF), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Alternative for Germany (AfD), or the Golden Dawn (XA) in Greece, have been some of the most recent successful recent examples. One of the main interests of this last boost in the literature on populism has been in the macro explanations behind the success of these parties ( ‍Brückner, Markus and Hans Peter Grüner. 2010. Economic growth and the rise of political extremism: theory and evidence. Available at: https://bit.ly/2qPo3Y8.Brückner and Grüner, 2010;  ‍Funke, Manuel, Schularick Maurice and Christophe Trebesch. 2015. Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crisis, 1870-‍2014. CESIFO Working Papers, 5553 (Category 7: Monetary policy and international finance).Funke et al., 2015;  ‍Hernández, Enrique and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. “The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 55 (2): 203-‍224. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12122.Hernández and Kriesi, 2016). Although there are case-specific explanations of these triumphs, such as the change in the discourse and leadership in the French FN ( ‍Stockemer, Daniel. 2017. The Front National in France. Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. Ontario: Springer.Stockemer, 2017) or the Eurosceptic discourse in times of crisis by UKIP in the UK ( ‍Kaufmann, Eric. 2017. “Levels or changes? Ethnic context, immigration and the UK Independence Party Vote”, Electoral Studies, 48, 57-‍69. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.05.002.Kaufmann, 2017), these individual explanations do not cast light on the macro explanation of this success across Europe.

According to some of these works, the economic crisis Europe experienced since 2008 following a period of economic expansion, generated an increase in economic voting that firstly led to punishment of national governments ( ‍Bartels, Larry. 2012. “Elections in hard times”, Public Policy Research, 19 (1): 44-‍50. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-540X.2012.00681.xBartels, 2012;  ‍Bermeo, Nancy and Larry Bartels. 2014. Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357505.003.0001.Bermeo and Bartels, 2014;  ‍Magalhaes, Pedro. 2014. “Financial Crisis, Austerity, and Electoral Politics”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 24 (2): 125-‍133. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2014.887090.Magalhaes, 2014). After that first phase, the decrease in support for democratic institutions —parliaments, governments, and parties, among others— led to support for fringe parties, with RWPP among them ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2010. “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy”, West European Politics, 33 (6): 1167-‍1186. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2010.508901.Mudde, 2010: 1175;  ‍Mudde, Cas. 2014. “Fighting the system? Populist radical right parties and party system change”, Party Politics, 20 (2): 217-‍226. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813519968.Mudde, 2014: 218). However, the best electoral results achieved by these parties did not occur in the countries most affected by the economic crisis, but in Austria, Denmark, and Germany, among others. If we take this into account, what has been the impact of the economic crisis on the voters’ electoral behavior.

While some of these contributions have focused on macro explanations, some other authors have highlighted the role played by sociodemographic and attitudinal profiles of certain voters in these parties’ success ( ‍Arzheimer, Kay and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. “Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success”, European Journal of Political Research, 45: 419-‍443. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.xArzheimer and Carter, 2006;  ‍Evans, Jocelyn A. 2005. “The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing Populist Party Support”, Comparative European Politics, 3: 76-‍101. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110050.Evans, 2005). In this respect, these works have evinced that the sociodemographic sectors of the population most affected by modernization (the “losers of globalization”

The term “losers of globalization” refer to those voters (the elderly, less educated, and lower class) that resulted most affected by the modernization and denationalization process that most of the Western European countries experienced in the recent decades.

‍[1]
, see  ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Roman Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheus Frey. 2006. “Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared”, European Journal of Political Research, 45: 921-‍956. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00644.x.Kriesi et al., 2006;  ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Roman Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheus Frey. 2008. West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790720.2008;  ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger, Swen Hutter and Bruno Wüst. 2012. Political Conflict in Western Europe. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139169219.2012;  ‍Bornschier, Simon. 2010. Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right. The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Bornschier, 2010;  ‍Teney, Céline, Onawa Promise Lacewell and Pieter De Wilde. 2014. “Winners and losers of globalization in Europe: attitudes and ideologies”. European Political Science Review, 6: 575-‍595. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773913000246.Teney et al., 2014) are the biggest supporters of these parties. Thus, the least educated, people belonging to the lower classes and the least wealthy would be among the electoral base of these parties. However, while during the Great Recession in some countries the main electoral support for these parties is found among the oldest and those without university education (this is the case of Denmark and United Kingdom, see  ‍Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2017. “What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties”, European Political Science Review, 10 (3): 351-‍368. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773917000145.Rooduijn, 2017: 11;  ‍Ford, Robert and Matthew J. Goodwin. 2014. Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain. London: Routledge.Ford and Goodwin, 2014), in other countries these supporters are the youngest and best educated (as in Greece and France, see  ‍Teperoglou, Eftichia, Emmanouil Tsatsanis and Elias Nicolacopoulos. 2015. “Habituating to the New Normal in a Post-earthquake Party System: The 2014 European Election in Greece”, South European Society and Politics, 20 (3): 333-‍355. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2015.1068377.Teperoglou et al., 2015: 348-‍350;  ‍Stockemer, Daniel. 2017. The Front National in France. Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. Ontario: Springer.Stockemer, 2017).

How can these counterintuitive and/or contradictory findings at the contextual and individual levels be explained? Our main argument relies on the unequal distribution of the economic consequences of the Great Recession across countries and voter profiles. Previous works have demonstrated that globalization has especially affected the middle-aged, less educated and low skilled workers, given their position of vulnerability in a complex and global labor market ( ‍Häusermann, Silja and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2015. “What do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual Preferences and Party Choice”, in Pablo Beramendi, Pablo, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.), Politics of Advanced Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316163245.009.Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015: 214). These citizens could find appealing the RWPP discourses that seek to defend labor security in traditional sectors of the economy against the pressures of migrations and globalization ( ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Roman Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheus Frey. 2006. “Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared”, European Journal of Political Research, 45: 921-‍956. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00644.x.Kriesi et. al., 2006: 929). Not only RWPPs have a discourse against immigrants, Ivarsflaten finds that “restrictive immigration and asylum policies are believed to be a way of preserving cultural unity also where no elites are around to make that case” ( ‍Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2005. “Threatened by diversity: Why Restrictive Asylum and Immigration Policies Appeal to Voters in Western Europe”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 15 (1): 21-‍45. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13689880500064577.2005: 41).

However, macro data shows that among the countries hardest hit by the 2008 economic crisis, the traditional “losers of globalization” have not suffered the worst effects of the economic recession and, as a consequence, could conform a different profile of RWPP voters.

See, for instance, the Council Recommendation on April 2013, for a “Youth Guarantee”. Online Access: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:120:0001: 0006:EN:PDF.

‍[2]
The labor market flexibility and the relevant increase in the temporary contracts and unemployment for the younger in poorer countries (such as Greece or Italy) contrasted with Austria, and Germany, with moderate temporary contracts, lower levels of unemployment and legislations favoring school-to-work transition ( ‍O’Reilly, Jacqueline, Werner Eichhorst, András Gábos, Kari Hadjivassiliou, David Lain, Janine Leschke, Seamus McGuinness, Lucia Mýtna Kureková, Tiziana Nazio, Renate Ortlieb, Helen Russell and Paola Villa. 2015. “Five Characteristics of Youth Unemployment in Europe: Flexibility, Education, Migration, Family Legacies, and EU Policy”, Sage Open, 5 (1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015574962.O’Reilly et al., 2015). In the latter group of countries, the younger and better educated people improved their situation in the labor market during the Great Recession, whereas in the former group of countries these people worsened significantly their positions ( ‍O’Higgins, Niall. 2012. “This Time It’s Different? Youth Labour Markets during ‘The Great Recession”, Comparative Economic Studies, 54: 395-‍412. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/ces.2012.15.O’Higgins, 2012: 407). This marked deterioration among the younger and better educated in contexts where the crisis was deeper, could have attracted this profile of voters to populist discourses, generating an alternative electoral base for RWPP. Following this argument, can we assume that the classical explanation about the “losers of globalization” being the main electoral supporters of RWPP is still valid in the context of the Great Recession in Europe?

The goal of this paper is to analyse the demand side of the of RWPP’s success

It is relevant to clarify that by “RWPP” (Right-Wing Populist Parties) we are not referring to “radical right parties”, “radical right populist parties”, “far-right parties” or “extreme right parties”. We refer to a set of parties that share both a rightist and an anti-elite leaning, emphasizing issues related to the defence of their culture with a discourse against immigration. The main characteristics of these parties are their populist message and their position in the right wing of the ideological spectrum, being more or less extreme in different countries and cases. Although every classification is questionable, we consider the one of Mudde (

Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2007:44
) well established in the literature and follow his criteria. We also justify the inclusion of each one of these parties with previous literature at the bottom of table A1.

‍[3]
, using a combination of two sets of explanations: those related to the context (how the 2008 economic crisis affected to different countries) and those related to the voters’ sociodemographic profile (to what extent the “losers of globalization” are the main supporters in each of those contexts). By doing so, we shed some light on the individual traits of citizens who, among the broader ‘party supply’ of right-wing parties in a particular context, decide to vote for a RWPP. Thus, after the Great Recession, in places where the economy is improving, the losers of globalization are RWPP’s main supporters (the oldest, belong to the working class, and have lower levels of education). However, where the economy is in decline (with a notable increase in unemployment rates), the main electoral support for RWPP does not come from the losers of globalization, but from the young people, those who belong to the middle classes and are more educated.

This article is structured as follows: the next section reviews the literature and outlines the hypotheses; secondly, we present the data and methods; then, we comment and discuss the results of the empirical analyses; and finally, we end up with some conclusions.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS [up]

A broad range of definitions of populism have been provided by different authors, although the one proposed by Cas Mudde ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, 39 (4): 541-‍63. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.2004) is probably the most extended in the literature. Mudde offers a general definition of populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (ibid.: 543). Despite most of definitions of populism consider that the ideology of these parties is weak, the RWPP conform to a widely accepted party family with its own characteristics ( ‍Betz, Hans-George. 1993. “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe”, Comparative Politics, 25 (4): 413-‍427. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/422034.Betz, 1993: 413). In this sense, and as Rydgren ( ‍Rydgren, Jens. 2007. “The sociology of the Radical Right”, Annual Review of Sociology, 33: 241-‍262. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752.2007: 244) has pointed out, these new parties are characterized by the priority given to sociocultural issues; in particular, their core message revolves around feelings against immigration as a threat to national identity —not in vain, the study conducted by Ivarsflaten ( ‍Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2008. “What Unites the Populist Right in Western Europe? Reexamining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases”, Comparative Political Studies, 41 (1): 3-‍23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/001041 4006294168.2008) has pointed out that only immigration results a key explanatory factor to understand populist right parties’ success. Among these features, their nationalist and nativist profile is often highlighted, and they are thus conceptualised as authoritarian and xenophobic parties ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Mudde, 2007: 15-‍20).

The specialized literature has not been consistent on the use of these concepts, placing the same parties under different labels —parties that Funke et al. ( ‍Funke, Manuel, Schularick Maurice and Christophe Trebesch. 2015. Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crisis, 1870-‍2014. CESIFO Working Papers, 5553 (Category 7: Monetary policy and international finance).2015) label as radical parties, are considered populists by Hernández and Kriesi ( ‍Hernández, Enrique and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. “The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 55 (2): 203-‍224. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12122.2016) or “extreme right” by Carter ( ‍Carter, Elisabeth. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press.2005), while Treib ( ‍Treib, Oliver. 2014. “The Voter Says no, but Nobody Listens: Causes and Consequences of the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Elections”, Journal of European Public Policy, 21 (10): 1541-‍1554. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.941534.2014) classify them as Eurosceptic. In fact, and assuming that these interchangeable labels may have introduced noise in the study of populism, it seems necessary to clarify here that we understand populism 1) as a discourse, strategy, or style, and 2) as an ideology ( ‍Gidron, Noam and Bard Bonikowski. 2013. Varieties of populism: Literature review and research agenda. Harvard University: Weatherhead Center for International affairs, 13-‍0004.Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013). As a discourse, populism is “an anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign people” ( ‍Aslanidis, Paris. 2016. “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective”, Political Studies, 64 (1): 88-‍104. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/ 1467-‍9248.12224.Aslanidis, 2016: 96) and a “manichaean discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite” ( ‍Hawkins, Kirk A. 2009. “Is Chavez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Political Studies, 42 (8): 1040-‍1067. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009331721.Hawkins, 2009: 1042). As an ideology, the above mentioned definition by Mudde is the most commonly used in the literature.

However, what is the “window of opportunity” for the electoral success of these populist parties? Following Mudde ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, 39 (4): 541-‍63. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.2004: 547), this kind of parties can only experience success with a combination of political resentment and a perceived challenge to “our way of life”

Mudde also mentions the presence of “an attractive populist leader”, although the analysis of the supply side (such as the study of RWPP leaders); discourses; or the presence of other populist parties in the party system, is not the goal of this article.

‍[4]
. The Great Recession, with its combination of economic crisis, widespread political distrust and migratory pressure provides an excellent opportunity to test this argument. This environment creates a context where some citizens perceive immigration as a problem for the economy and a threat to the “national way of life”, generating the perfect breeding ground for these parties.

According to this argument, support for RWPP should be higher in contexts most affected by the economic and political consequences of the Great Recession, such as Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy and Spain, where ‘political resentment’ is higher if we consider indices such as support for democracy and confidence in political institutions ( ‍Cordero, Guillermo and Pablo Simón. 2016. “Economic Crisis and Support for Democracy in Europe”, West European Politics, 39 (29): 305-‍325. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1075767.Cordero and Simón, 2016). However, the best results of RWPP are concentrated in some of the economies least affected by this crisis, such as Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, among others. Although the idea of a positive relationship between a profound crisis and the rise of populist parties may sound intuitive, there is no a widespread agreement on this fact in the literature. Not in vain, only a few empirical studies have shown a positive relationship between crises and the growth of populism ( ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter and Takis Pappas (eds.). 2015. European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR.Kriesi and Pappas, 2015;  ‍Hernández, Enrique and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. “The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 55 (2): 203-‍224. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12122.Hernández and Kriesi, 2016;  ‍Dalio, Ray, Kryger Steven, Rogers Jason and Gardener Davis. 2017. “Populism: The Phenomenon”, Bridgewater: Daily Observations, 203: 226-‍303, Available at: http://www.obela.org/system/files/Populism.pdf.Dalio et al., 2017), while others find a weak relationship ( ‍Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: Economic Have-nots and cultural backlash. Faculty Research Working Paper Series.Inglehart and Norris, 2016) and some even find an absence of correlation ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Mudde, 2007: 206). Most of these works have analysed the effects in RWPP support of aggregate economic variables, despite the fact that some recent studies show that it is the perceptions of the relative evolution of the economy that matter most in the development of populist attitudes ( ‍Anduiza, Eva and Guillermo Rico. 2016. “Economic correlates of populist attitudes: An analysis of nine European countries”. Paper Presented in a Conference in the Central European University. Available from: https://bit.ly/2hVrcBP. Anduiza and Rico, 2016). Some other authors have analysed not only the evolution of the economic situation, but also its relationship to unemployment levels and the presence of immigrants to explain the success of these parties, especially those with an anti-immigration discourse most of which, as we know, fall within the RWPP category ( ‍Boomgaarden, Hajo G. and Rens Vliegenthart. 2007. “Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigrant Parties: The Role of News Media Content in the Netherlands”, Electoral Studies, 26 (2): 404-‍417. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2006.10.018.Boomgaarden and Vliengenthart, 2007: 414;  ‍Jesuit, David and Vincent Mahler. 2004. “Immigration, economic well-being and support for extreme right parties in western European regions”. Paper presented at the LIS Conference, Luxembourg. Available at: http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wps/liswps/391.pdf.Jesuit and Mahler, 2004).

Mols and Jetten ( ‍Mols, Frank and Jolanda Jetten. 2016. “Explaining the Appeal of Populist Right-Wing Parties in Times of Economic Prosperity”, Political Psychology, 37 (2): 275-‍292. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12258.2016) use an experimental approach to demonstrate that RWPP are also appealing in times of economic prosperity. This approach is especially relevant to explain why these parties are successful in contexts affected by the economic crisis but, in relative terms, among the least affected by the Great Recession. According to Mols and Jetten, RWPP leaders can “turn objective relative gratification into perceived relative deprivation” ( ‍Mols, Frank and Jolanda Jetten. 2016. “Explaining the Appeal of Populist Right-Wing Parties in Times of Economic Prosperity”, Political Psychology, 37 (2): 275-‍292. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12258.2016: 275). Following this argument, in a situation of economic hardship people tend to blame particular minorities who compete for (real or perceived) access to scarce resources. In fact, both authors have more recently found no relationship between economic downturn (measured by GDP per capita and unemployment) and support for populist anti-immigrant parties ( ‍Mols, Frank and Jolanda Jetten. 2017. The Wealth Paradox. Economic Prosperity and the Hardening of attitudes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139942171.Mols and Jetten, 2017: chapter 4). Indeed, as they argue, RWPP can do remarkably well in times of economic prosperity, as well as among voters with above-average incomes.

As we have discussed, analyses of the contexts that facilitate the success of the populist parties remain inconclusive. Is this lack of satisfactory explanation at macro level also present at individual level? Or, on the contrary, is there a general pattern by which people with a specific sociodemographic profile tend to vote for RWPP? Until the “third wave” of populism in Europe in the eighties, the profile of the RWPP voter used to be defined as older, belonging to the petit bourgeois, and well educated. However, since the eighties these parties have become successful thanks to a change in their voter’s profile, as it is younger people, blue collar and self-employed who have changed their vote ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Mudde, 2007). Some other authors have pointed to a change not only in sociodemographic profiles, but also in values generating a new cleavage due to different processes such as globalization, denationalization and the opening of national borders ( ‍Kriesi, Hanspter. 2010. “Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values”, West European Politics, 33 (3): 673-‍685. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402381003654726.Kriesi, 2010: 677). However, despite some attempts by the previous works, the findings are far from unanimous ( ‍Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2017. “What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties”, European Political Science Review, 10 (3): 351-‍368. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773917000145.Rooduijn, 2017). This inconsistency is clear at least referring to the sociodemographic factors. Thus, while some authors find a “U shape” effect on age, with the youngest and the oldest most likely to vote for RWPP ( ‍Arzheimer, Kay and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. “Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success”, European Journal of Political Research, 45: 419-‍443. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.xArzheimer and Carter, 2006), others have found that only the youngest are among these voters ( ‍Evans, Jocelyn A. 2005. “The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing Populist Party Support”, Comparative European Politics, 3: 76-‍101. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110050.Evans, 2005) and, more recently, Inglehart and Norris ( ‍Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: Economic Have-nots and cultural backlash. Faculty Research Working Paper Series.2016) have demonstrated that, against the previously held view, age has a positive effect on this vote. Neither is there widespread agreement on the effect of education and social class. The most widespread conclusion on the effect of this variable shows that those without university education and those belonging to the lower and middle class show higher percentages of support for these parties ( ‍Bornschier, Simon and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2012. “The populist right, the working class, and the changing face of class politics”, in J. Rydgren (ed.), Class Politics and the Radical Right. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012;  ‍Oesch, Daniel and Line Rennwald. 2010. “The Class Basis of Switzerland’s Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right”, Swiss Political Science Review, 16 (3): 343-‍371. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2010.tb00433.x.Oesch and Rennwald, 2010;  ‍Evans, Jocelyn A. 2005. “The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing Populist Party Support”, Comparative European Politics, 3: 76-‍101. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110050.Evans, 2005).

Thus, the RWPP voter’s profile before the eighties was very different from the one since the nineties. It was at this point that the third wave of populism took place in Europe, when this family of parties obtained unprecedented electoral results. As Kriesi et al. ( ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Roman Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheus Frey. 2006. “Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared”, European Journal of Political Research, 45: 921-‍956. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00644.x.2006;  ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Roman Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheus Frey. 2008. West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790720.2008) pointed out, a social divide generated two groups of voters: “The ‘losers’ and the ‘winners of globalization’”. According to Hernández and Kriesi ( ‍Hernández, Enrique and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. “The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 55 (2): 203-‍224. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12122.2016: 208) this division is still valid to explain the vote for RWPP during the Great Recession in Europe: “[…] the low-skilled, nationalistic ‘losers of globalization’, are mainly mobilized by parties of the populist right, whereas high-skilled, cosmopolitan winners of globalization, are mainly mobilized by green, liberal and centre-left parties”. By doing this, the Great Recession may have intensified this social division between “winners” and “losers” of globalization, and new and existing parties (most of them belonging to the RWPP category), have renewed this cleavage since 2008.

However, we cannot take for granted that these voters are homogeneous across Europe. The Great Recession affected different European countries in very diverse ways, and the severity of the crisis was not homogeneous in these countries. While among the wealthier countries the consequences of the economic crisis especially negatively affected those who were worst positioned in the global labor market (the “losers of globalization”), in those countries hardest hit by the crisis the profile most affected by the recession has been the young and more educated population

See the ECB report: “The Impact of the Economic Crisis in Euro Area Labour Markets”. Online Access: https://bit.ly/2ytWjuH.

‍[5]
. This is why we argue that the “losers of globalization” are not the main electoral support of RWPP in every context during the Great Recession. According to Eurostat, ‍[6] unemployment trends were more pessimistic for those with tertiary education in the poorest countries. In Greece and Italy, the probability of being unemployed for those with tertiary education was, respectively tripled and doubled between 2008 and 2014, while in Germany this probability decreased and remained stable in Sweden and the UK. A similar story can be told if we analyse the relationship between age and employment. While between 2008 and 2014 the employment prospects of the population under 25 improved (Germany) or remained stable (Austria and Sweden) in the richest countries, the rate of unemployment among the youth population increased dramatically in Greece (35.4; while unemployment of the older population increased by 18.0) Italy (24.8, vs. 5,4 among the older) and Belgium (9.8 vs. 1.0). In this context of deep recession, the population who suffered or felt most threaten by the poor work and economic conditions (the younger and better educated) could feel attracted by populist discourses, generating a different profile of RWPP.

According to Mudde ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.2007: 201), the combination of macro and micro explanations is necessary to understand the object and avoid problems of ecological fallacy. This seems compelling if the unequal effects of the economic crisis among countries and profiles are considered, since such a diversity could generate different losers depending on their economic environment. That is why we also argue that explanations at micro and macro level should be combined in order to analyse the success of RWPP.

This article tries to assess the extent to which RWPP voters during the 2008 Great Recession are what the existing literature has defined as “losers of globalization” in different countries ( ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Roman Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheus Frey. 2008. West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790720.Kriesi et al., 2008;  ‍Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: Economic Have-nots and cultural backlash. Faculty Research Working Paper Series.Inglehart and Norris, 2016). In this respect, our main objective is to examine the contexts where the RWPP voter tends to coincide with the above-referred profile or otherwise; and we do so by combining explanations at individual and aggregate levels.

In this sense, and following Roberts’ recent contribution ( ‍Roberts, Kenneth. M. 2017. “Party politics in hard times: Comparative perspectives on the European and Latin American economic crises”, European Journal of Political Research, 56: 218-‍233. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12191.2017: 228), according to which “it is possible [...] that the anti-immigrant [...] ‘welfare chauvinism’ of far-right, nativistic populism is more likely to emerge in contexts of unified labor markets, universalistic welfare states and prosperous economies”, it might be expected that the so-called “losers of globalization” would be attracted by RWPP in the context of a relatively prosperous economy. From here, a first hypothesis can be derived as follows:

H1. In contexts with a better economic situation the elderly, people with a lower level of education and belonging to the working class will be more prone to support RWPP rather than other right-wing parties.

Following our previous argumentation, we expect that the RWPP voters will not be the “losers of globalization” under contexts of poor economic conditions. As macro-data demonstrates, people who suffered the worst economic conditions in countries most affected by the Great Recession were younger and better educated. Thus, the younger and better educated people (not the traditionally considered ‘losers of globalization’) could also feel attracted by populist discourses, which in turn generated a different RWPP voter profile in certain countries. As some case studies have demonstrated, in Greece and France —both countries experienced a deep downturn on their economies during the Great Recession— the main RWPP supporters were the youngest and best educated ( ‍Teperoglou, Eftichia, Emmanouil Tsatsanis and Elias Nicolacopoulos. 2015. “Habituating to the New Normal in a Post-earthquake Party System: The 2014 European Election in Greece”, South European Society and Politics, 20 (3): 333-‍355. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2015.1068377.Teperoglou et al., 2015: 348-‍350;  ‍Stockemer, Daniel. 2017. The Front National in France. Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. Ontario: Springer.Stockemer, 2017). For that reason, a second hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

H2. In contexts where the economy is performing poorly, young people and those with high education or belonging to the middle and higher classes will be more prone to support RWPP rather than other right-wing parties.

DATA AND METHODS[up]

As dependent variable, we use vote recall in the last National Elections from the European Election Studies database (EES-2014)

Online access to EES: http://europeanelectionstudies.net/european-election-studies.

‍[7]
for all the 12 Western European democracies with RWPP

We are conscious that the framing time of analysis could affect our results. Nevertheless, all of the general elections included in our analysis took place after the explosion of the Great Recession (2008), being the best scenario to answer to what extent the economic crisis conditioned voters’ electoral behavior. Further analyses could develop to what extent the profile of RWPP remain constant.

‍[8]
. In this sample are included countries where the 2008 economic crisis was deeper (Finland, Belgium, The Netherlands, France, Greece and Italy) as well as countries where recession was less pronounced (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Although populist parties can also be found on the left and centre of the ideological spectrum, the goal of this article is to analyseparties located on the right side of this scale. More specifically, our strategy of analysis is to study the vote for RWPP compared with other centre-right and right-wing parties

For the sake of simplicity, we will henceforth refer to these parties as “right-wing parties”.

‍[9]
.

Recent works have analysed how the shifts to the economic left of radical right parties had serious consequences for the composition of their electorate, because former center-left and left voters comprised the electoral support of these parties (see  ‍Harteveld, Eelco. 2016. “Winning the ‘losers’ but losing the ‘winners’? The electoral consequences of the radical right moving to the economic left”, Electoral Studies, 44: 225-‍234. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.08.015.Harteveld, 2016). This would lead us to include former left-wing voters in our dependent variable. However, it is not the aim of this article to analyze the electoral origin of these voters. The categorization of our dependent variable is more specific, given that our goal is to discover the features that can help to distinguish between voters for right-wing parties from voters who end up voting for RWPP. An alternative approach could be to analyze the vote for populist parties in general —without distinguishing between left and right— ( ‍Van Kessel, Stijn. 2015. “Dutch populism during the crisis”, in Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas (eds.), Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR Press.Van Kessel, 2015;  ‍Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: Economic Have-nots and cultural backlash. Faculty Research Working Paper Series.Inglehart and Norris, 2016) against the vote for non-populist parties, or the vote for right populist parties against other voters ( ‍Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2016. “Closing the gap? A comparison of voters for radical right-wing populist parties and mainstream parties over time”, in T. Akkerman, S. L. de Lange and M. Rooduijn (eds.), Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe. London; New York: Routledge.Rooduijn, 2016).

Nevertheless, we replicate the analyses implemented in this article by using the alternative dependent variable with values 1 for RWPP voters and 0 for other parties’ voters (also including centre-left and left parties) and abstainers. When using this broader and less conservative categorization, we obtain consistent results (see table A2 in the Appendix).

Table A1 shows the list of references that we have used to design our category of RWPPs. Vote recall

Year of National Election by country: Austria 2013, Belgium 2014, Denmark 2011, Finland 2011, France 2012, Germany 2013, Greece 2012, Italy 2013, Luxembourg 2013, Sweden 2010, The Netherlands 2012 and UK 2010 (EES data was collected in June 2014).

‍[10]
in the last National Elections has been selected as a dependent variable in the EES 2014 wave. The set of independent and control variables is presented in table 1. All the variables at individual level included in the models have been normalized (range from 0 to 1) to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients. In our models we have included four sets of variables. Among the usual sociodemographic factors (age, gender, work status, social class, educational level and habitat) we have also introduced individual economic and political variables. The economic evaluations (prospective and retrospective), and the main problems in a country (political, economic, unemployment, and immigration) are important factors that determine the support for a RWPP; thus, we include these in our models. As political factors we introduce political interest, ideology (from 0, left, to 1, right), confidence in the national parliament and party identification. Finally, we test the impact of economic contextual factors, GDP growth and unemployment growth

Information about GDP and unemployment growth provided by Eurostat (see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home). We calculate the differences between the levels of economic and social indicators between 2008 (the beginning of the Great Recession) and 2014 (when the EES interviews were conducted).

‍[11]
, in support for RWPP. In addition, we introduce the growth in the rate of immigration

Information about immigration growth provided by Eurostat (see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home). We calculate the differences between the percentage of immigration by country between 2008 (the beginning of the Great Recession) and 2014 (when the EES interviews were conducted).

‍[12]
in the country and the type of electoral system (proportional or majority) as control variables at the contextual level.

Table 1.

Description of variables included in the models

Variable N Mean S.D Min Max
RWPP vs RP 4520 0.17 0.37 0 1
Age 13463 0.42 0.22 0 0.98
Female 13481 0.52 0.50 0 1
University 12408 0.37 0.48 0 1
Unemployed 13481 0.07 0.26 0 1
City 13471 0.28 0.45 0 1
Working class 12900 0.32 0.47 0 1
Economy Retrospective 13219 0.46 0.26 0 1
Economy Prospective 12934 0.51 0.24 0 1
Problem Unemployment 11573 0.25 0.43 0 1
Problem Economy 11573 0.18 0.38 0 1
Problem Immigration 11573 0.08 0.27 0 1
Problem Political 11573 0.01 0.10 0 1
Political Interest 11573 0.53 0.32 0 1
Ideology 11700 0.50 0.24 0 1
Confidence Parliament 13148 0.60 0.49 0 1
Party Identification 13481 0.38 0.49 0 1
Δ GDP 13481 0.17 1.55 -3.20 4.20
Δ Unemployment 13481 3.13 5.08 -2.40 18.70
Δ Immigration 13481 0.10 1.09 -0.8 3.8
Proportional Electoral System 13481 0.81 0.40 0 1

Source: own elaboration based on EES 2014.

The main goal of our paper is to combine macro and micro explanations to determine the extent to which different contexts generate different profiles of RWPP voters, as proposed in hypotheses 1 and 2. For this reason, we make interact the variables at macro level (change in GDP and unemployment,) and the main socio-demographic variables at individual level (age, social class, and educational level). To do so, we run a multilevel logistic regression. The results of this model are shown in table 2 in the results section. Being aware that 12 countries may be few cases at the upper level for this kind of regression —despite we cover all the Western European countries with right-wing populist parties and although other studies using less than 12 cases in the upper level ( ‍Stegmueller, Daniel. 2013. “How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches”, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (3): 748-‍761. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12001.Stegmueller, 2013:749)—, we run the same models (including the interactions) using logistic regressions obtaining the same findings (see table A3 and table A4 in the Appendix).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION[up]

Is there a common RWPP voter profile among countries most and less hit by the Great Recession? The Additive Model (Model 0) in table 2

In order to prevent collinearity among our independent variables, both at the aggregate and at individual level (one of the assumptions of regression models), we have computed their correlations (see table A5 in the Appendix). While the threshold is usually considered to be 0.70, the highest correlation among our independent variables is 0.58 (“economic prospective” and “economic retrospective”).

‍[13]
shows that men, the youngest, those with higher education levels, the unemployed, those from urban areas and those who belong to the working class show a high probability of supporting RWPP rather than right-wing parties in National Elections. RWPP voters were especially critical of the political situation, showing lower levels of confidence in the National Parliament than right-wing party voters. In addition, the retrospective and prospective sociotropic economic variables are significant to vote for a RWPP against a right-wing party. This group of voters express more negative evaluations of their past economic situation than right-wing voters. “Considering immigration a problem for the country” is another significant factor explaining the vote for RWPP versus right-wing parties. All these results are consistent with the findings shown in table A2, where we use an alternative dependent variable that includes voters for centre and left-wing parties as well as abstainers.

Table 2.

Explaining the vote for Right Wing populist parties versus right parties in 12 Western European countries: a multilevel analysis with interactions between sociodemographic and contextual factorsa

Adittive Δ GDP Δ Unemployment
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Age -0.58

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.56

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.56

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.57

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.13 -0.55

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.57

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.35) (0.29) (0.29)
University 0.25

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.23

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.23

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.24

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.23

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.10 0.23

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12)
Female -0.60

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.60

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.60

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.60

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.60

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.60

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.60

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Unemployed 0.55

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.52

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.54

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.55

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.53

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.53

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.54

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
City 0.21

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.23

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.22

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.21 0.23

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.22

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.20
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Working class 1.03

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.06

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.05

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.05

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.05

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.05

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.19

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
Eco. Retrospective -0.86

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.88

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.85

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.85

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.86

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.84

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.85

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Eco. Prospective -0.88

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.90

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.86

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.88

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.89

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.86

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.90

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Pr. Unemployment -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.24 -0.22 -0.22
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Pr. Economy -0.28

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.30

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.28

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.27

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.29

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.28

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.27

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Pr. Immigration 0.56

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.55

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.57

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.57

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.56

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.57

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.56

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Pr. Politics -0.91 -0.98 -0.94 -0.90 -0.94 -0.92 -0.89
(0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78)
Political Interest -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Ideology 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.24
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Confidence Parl. -1.29

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.27

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.30

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.28

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.28

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.29

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.27

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Party Id. 0.18 0.18 0.19

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.18 0.18 0.19

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.18
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Δ GDP -0.92

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-1.24

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.88

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.95

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.94

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.93

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.92

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.52) (0.54) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52)
Δ UNEMPL -0.20

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.21

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.20

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.19

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.15 -0.21 -0.18
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Δ IMMIG -0.34 -0.33 -0.34 -0.35 -0.33 -0.34 -0.34
(0.50) (0.51) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50) (0.50)
Pr. SYSTEM -0.19 -0.19 -0.26 -0.15 -0.21 -0.21 -0.17
(1.11) (1.12) (1.11) (1.11) (1.12) (1.11) (1.11)
Age

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
0.68

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.12

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.22) (0.05)
Univ

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
-0.16

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.04

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.09) (0.02)
W. Class

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
0.10 -0.04

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.09) (0.02)
Cwwonstant 1.03 1.03 1.10 0.97 0.84 1.10 0.93
(1.17) (1.17) (1.17) (1.16) (1.18) (1.17) (1.17)
Constant 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Observations 3536 3536 3536 3536 3536 3536 3536
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Log lik. -1134.44 -1129.45 -1132.65 -1133.79 -1131.69 -1132.87 -1132.79
BIC 2448.63 2446.83 2453.23 2455.51 2451.31 2453.67 2453.52
AIC 2312.87 2304.90 2311.31 2313.58 2309.38 2311.74 2311.59
[a] Standard errors in parentheses; [+] p<0.1, [*] p<0.05, [**] p<0.01, [***] p<0.001.

As discussed above, the best electoral results for RWPP are not found among people most hit by the economic crisis. However, the coefficient of the increase in GDP when predicting the vote for RWPP is negative (see Additive Model) —these parties have received substantial electoral support in countries which experienced relative (but not severe) economic contraction, such as Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands— as Kriesi and Pappas ( ‍Kriesi, Hanspeter and Takis Pappas (eds.). 2015. European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR.2015: 323) pointed out: “During the Great Recession populism in Europe increased notably”. In the same vein, countries that experienced an improvement in their labor market (with a reduction in the unemployment rate) are the countries where the RWPP obtained their highest probability of vote.

Thus, in line with previous works, our findings found no clear correlation between macroeconomic indicators and RWPP’s success ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Mudde, 2007). As discussed above, our results also coincide with those revealed by Mols and Jetten ( ‍Mols, Frank and Jolanda Jetten. 2016. “Explaining the Appeal of Populist Right-Wing Parties in Times of Economic Prosperity”, Political Psychology, 37 (2): 275-‍292. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12258.2016), who explain RWPP’s success in contexts affected by the economic crisis only in relative terms, where their supporters “turn objective relative gratification into perceived relative deprivation”, and blame particular minority groups for their economic situation.

However, the goal of our paper was to analyse the extent to which the Great Recession generated different RWPP voter profiles in countries most and least hit by the economic crisis. Following our argument, it seems necessary to examine the interaction between variables at macroeconomic and individual levels.

In table A2, models ranged from 1 to 3 show the interaction between our selected sociodemographic variables and GDP growth. Those ranged between 4 and 6 show the interaction between unemployment growth and age, educational level and social class

We have estimated the same models shown in this article by excluding the “extreme cases” (see table A6 in the Appendix). Using the “extreme” command, developed for Stata by Nicholas J. Cox (

Cox, Nicholas J. 2003. EXTREMES: Stata module to list extreme values of a variable. Statistical Software Components, S430801, Boston College Department of Economics.

2003
), we can identify and drop from our sample the extreme (highest and lowest) cases (in this case, those belonging to Luxembourg and Greece). Results partially confirm H1 and H2. The additional multilevel models’ results highlight that in a context of GDP growth the older are more prone to support RWPP whereas younger voters are attracted by RWPP in a context of unemployment increase (both interactions show a high coefficient and gains statistical significance). This underlines Ronald Ingleharts` (

Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies”, American Political Science Review, 65 (4): 991-‍1017. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/1953494.

1971
) thesis that suggests age as a new social divide.

‍[14]
. For the sake of simplicity, we show here the graphical representation of the statistically significant interactions of the model. Firstly, Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities for an elector to vote for a RWPP (vs. a right-wing party) by interacting age and educational level with GDP growth.

Figure 1 (left side) shows that the effect of age is moderately positive (see the interaction in Model 1, table 2). During the Great Recession, when the GDP grows the probability to vote for a RWPP in National Elections is higher among older voters. On the contrary, in a context of a fall in GDP, the youngest tend to support RWPP to a greater extent than they support right-wing parties. In the right side of figure 1, the interaction between educational level and GDP growth is negative and significant at the 0.10 level: with negative values in the GDP growth, voters with university education tend to support RWPP to a greater extent than those with lower levels of education. On the contrary, the least educated people tend to support RWPP in countries with a better economic situation.

Figure 1.

Interaction between age and education and GDP growth

media/image1.png

The interactions between the same socio-demographic variables (age and education) with the rate of unemployment at country level complements this profile, as shown in figure 2. The left side of the figure illustrates the interaction term between age and unemployment growth (model 4 in table 2): the effect of unemployment on age is negative, where unemployment has grown during the crisis, younger voters are more likely to vote for a RWPP. In this sense, in those countries where the economic crisis had a direct effect on unemployment rates, the “losers of globalization” and those more prone to support a party with a populist discourse are the young and not the old, as the literature has conventionally argued. The right side of the figure shows that the interaction between unemployment growth and educational level is positive: voters with a higher educational level in a context of unemployment growth show a greater propensity to give their support to a RWPP than to a right-wing party (see the interaction in model 5, table 2). Under these economic circumstances, voters with a high educational level are attracted by RWPP and tend to cast their vote for them.

Figure 2.

Interaction between age and education and unemployment growth

media/image2.png

Thus, figures 1 and 2 confirm our first and second hypotheses, complementing the previous literature on the profiles of RWPP parties. Where economic conditions have worsened during the Great Recession, the young and those with a higher educational level are more prone to support RWPP versus right-wing parties. Nevertheless, when economic conditions improve, the older and those with a lower level of education tend to support RWPP. Following the previous literature, globalization divided the electorate into two groups: the younger and high skilled voters (or “winners of globalization”), on the one hand and the older and low skilled voters (or “losers of globalization”), on the other. However, the Great Recession affected in a different way to these two profiles in different contexts. While in some countries (such as Denmark and Austria) the latter have been the main supporters of RWPP, in other countries (such as Italy, Greece, or the Netherlands), the former have comprise the electoral base for these parties.

These findings complement recent literature by pointing to the relevance of the contextual economic variables that necessarily interact with the voter’s characteristics to determine their electoral behavior. In general terms we show that during the Great Recession, in contexts of economic growth the older, those belonging to the working class and those with lower levels of education were more prone to cast a vote for a populist right-wing party than for a right-wing party, while where the economy was in decline, it was the young voter with university education who supported this kind of party, rather than other right-wing parties (interaction results shown in table 2 remain significant and with the same sign in table A3 using a logistic regression). Thus, unlike other previous studies, we demonstrate that during the Great Recession the traditionally considered “losers of globalization” have been the main electoral supporters of RWPP only in certain countries, while in those contexts most affected by the Great Recession this assumption is not valid.

CONCLUSIONS [up]

Works studying RWPP have been numerous in recent years and have had new impetus since the success of this party family during the Great Recession. This literature has focused on explaining the demand side of the phenomenon from explanations at micro (such as the characteristics and attitudes of their voters) and macro level (exploring various economic factors of success or failure of these parties). However, the combination of both types of explanatory factors as elements conditioning the vote for populist parties has been neglected so far.

Faced with this context, this article shows that focusing on either one of these sides provides only partial explanations and can lead to misleading conclusions. In this sense, we argue that studies stating that RWPP’s success during the Great Recession was possible thanks to the electoral support of the “losers of globalization” forget the fact that different economic contexts may generate different voter profiles. Specifically, in countries where GDP declined and unemployment increased, the younger and more educated (namely, people who suffered the deepest consequences of the crisis) showed a greater propensity to support RWPP. In such contexts of relative economic deprivation, loosening the labor conditions for young and well-educated people may generate a new RWPP voter profile, who may feel attracted by these parties’ populist discourses, moving thus away from traditional right-wing parties. On the other hand, support for RWPP is higher among the elderly and less educated people in countries less affected by economic recession, where these profiles correspond to the traditional “losers of globalization”.

Thus, we have emphasized that RWPP voters have different sociodemographic profiles in different contexts, depending on the effects of the Great Recession. While in some countries the effects of the crisis were more dramatic for the more educated and youth population, in other places the elderly and less educated became the main victims of recession. As a consequence, during the Great Recession, the traditional “losers of globalization” have remained the key RWPP electoral base only in countries less harmed by the crisis, while the RWPP voter profile was the opposite in countries more hit by the economic situation. These findings shed new light on the explanation of voting for RWPP parties in contexts of economic crisis. And they underscore the need to combine individual and contextual explanations and the need to apply different explanations to different contexts to understand RWPP’s success.

Notes[up]

[1]

The term “losers of globalization” refer to those voters (the elderly, less educated, and lower class) that resulted most affected by the modernization and denationalization process that most of the Western European countries experienced in the recent decades.

[2]

See, for instance, the Council Recommendation on April 2013, for a “Youth Guarantee”. Online Access: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:120:0001: 0006:EN:PDF.

[3]

It is relevant to clarify that by “RWPP” (Right-Wing Populist Parties) we are not referring to “radical right parties”, “radical right populist parties”, “far-right parties” or “extreme right parties”. We refer to a set of parties that share both a rightist and an anti-elite leaning, emphasizing issues related to the defence of their culture with a discourse against immigration. The main characteristics of these parties are their populist message and their position in the right wing of the ideological spectrum, being more or less extreme in different countries and cases. Although every classification is questionable, we consider the one of Mudde ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.2007:44) well established in the literature and follow his criteria. We also justify the inclusion of each one of these parties with previous literature at the bottom of table A1.

[4]

Mudde also mentions the presence of “an attractive populist leader”, although the analysis of the supply side (such as the study of RWPP leaders); discourses; or the presence of other populist parties in the party system, is not the goal of this article.

[5]

See the ECB report: “The Impact of the Economic Crisis in Euro Area Labour Markets”. Online Access: https://bit.ly/2ytWjuH.

[6]

See the Eurostat reports for 2008 https://bit.ly/2Pncvaw and 2010 https://bit.ly/2PMvPLf. See Bell and Blanchflower ( ‍Bell, David N. F. and David G. Blanchflower. 2011. “Young people and the Great Recession”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 27 (2): 241-‍267. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grr011.2011) for a detailed analysis.

[7]

Online access to EES: http://europeanelectionstudies.net/european-election-studies.

[8]

We are conscious that the framing time of analysis could affect our results. Nevertheless, all of the general elections included in our analysis took place after the explosion of the Great Recession (2008), being the best scenario to answer to what extent the economic crisis conditioned voters’ electoral behavior. Further analyses could develop to what extent the profile of RWPP remain constant.

[9]

For the sake of simplicity, we will henceforth refer to these parties as “right-wing parties”.

[10]

Year of National Election by country: Austria 2013, Belgium 2014, Denmark 2011, Finland 2011, France 2012, Germany 2013, Greece 2012, Italy 2013, Luxembourg 2013, Sweden 2010, The Netherlands 2012 and UK 2010 (EES data was collected in June 2014).

[11]

Information about GDP and unemployment growth provided by Eurostat (see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home). We calculate the differences between the levels of economic and social indicators between 2008 (the beginning of the Great Recession) and 2014 (when the EES interviews were conducted).

[12]

Information about immigration growth provided by Eurostat (see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home). We calculate the differences between the percentage of immigration by country between 2008 (the beginning of the Great Recession) and 2014 (when the EES interviews were conducted).

[13]

In order to prevent collinearity among our independent variables, both at the aggregate and at individual level (one of the assumptions of regression models), we have computed their correlations (see table A5 in the Appendix). While the threshold is usually considered to be 0.70, the highest correlation among our independent variables is 0.58 (“economic prospective” and “economic retrospective”).

[14]

We have estimated the same models shown in this article by excluding the “extreme cases” (see table A6 in the Appendix). Using the “extreme” command, developed for Stata by Nicholas J. Cox ( ‍Cox, Nicholas J. 2003. EXTREMES: Stata module to list extreme values of a variable. Statistical Software Components, S430801, Boston College Department of Economics.2003), we can identify and drop from our sample the extreme (highest and lowest) cases (in this case, those belonging to Luxembourg and Greece). Results partially confirm H1 and H2. The additional multilevel models’ results highlight that in a context of GDP growth the older are more prone to support RWPP whereas younger voters are attracted by RWPP in a context of unemployment increase (both interactions show a high coefficient and gains statistical significance). This underlines Ronald Ingleharts` ( ‍Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies”, American Political Science Review, 65 (4): 991-‍1017. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/1953494.1971) thesis that suggests age as a new social divide.

References[up]

[1] 

Anduiza, Eva and Guillermo Rico. 2016. “Economic correlates of populist attitudes: An analysis of nine European countries”. Paper Presented in a Conference in the Central European University. Available from: https://bit.ly/2hVrcBP.

[2] 

Arzheimer, Kay and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. “Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success”, European Journal of Political Research, 45: 419-‍443. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.x

[3] 

Aslanidis, Paris. 2016. “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective”, Political Studies, 64 (1): 88-‍104. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/ 1467-‍9248.12224.

[4] 

Bakker, Bert N., Matthijs Rooduijn and Gijs Schumacher. 2016. “The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany”, European Journal of Political Research, 55: 302-‍320. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12121.

[5] 

Bartels, Larry. 2012. “Elections in hard times”, Public Policy Research, 19 (1): 44-‍50. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-540X.2012.00681.x

[6] 

Bell, David N. F. and David G. Blanchflower. 2011. “Young people and the Great Recession”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 27 (2): 241-‍267. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grr011.

[7] 

Betz, Hans-George. 1993. “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe”, Comparative Politics, 25 (4): 413-‍427. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/422034.

[8] 

Betz, Hans-George. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. London: McMillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23547-6.

[9] 

Bermeo, Nancy and Larry Bartels. 2014. Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357505.003.0001.

[10] 

Beyme, Klaus von. 1985. Political parties in Western democracies. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

[11] 

Boomgaarden, Hajo G. and Rens Vliegenthart. 2007. “Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigrant Parties: The Role of News Media Content in the Netherlands”, Electoral Studies, 26 (2): 404-‍417. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2006.10.018.

[12] 

Bornschier, Simon. 2010. Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right. The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

[13] 

Bornschier, Simon and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2012. “The populist right, the working class, and the changing face of class politics”, in J. Rydgren (ed.), Class Politics and the Radical Right. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

[14] 

Brückner, Markus and Hans Peter Grüner. 2010. Economic growth and the rise of political extremism: theory and evidence. Available at: https://bit.ly/2qPo3Y8.

[15] 

Canovan, Magaret. 1999. “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy”, in Y. Mény et al., Democracies and the Populist Challenge. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[16] 

Carter, Elisabeth. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[17] 

Cordero, Guillermo and Pablo Simón. 2016. “Economic Crisis and Support for Democracy in Europe”, West European Politics, 39 (29): 305-‍325. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1075767.

[18] 

Cox, Nicholas J. 2003. EXTREMES: Stata module to list extreme values of a variable. Statistical Software Components, S430801, Boston College Department of Economics.

[19] 

Dalio, Ray, Kryger Steven, Rogers Jason and Gardener Davis. 2017. “Populism: The Phenomenon”, Bridgewater: Daily Observations, 203: 226-‍303, Available at: http://www.obela.org/system/files/Populism.pdf.

[20] 

Evans, Jocelyn A. 2005. “The Dynamics of Social Change in Radical Right-wing Populist Party Support”, Comparative European Politics, 3: 76-‍101. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110050.

[21] 

Ford, Robert and Matthew J. Goodwin. 2014. Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain. London: Routledge.

[22] 

Funke, Manuel, Schularick Maurice and Christophe Trebesch. 2015. Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crisis, 1870-‍2014. CESIFO Working Papers, 5553 (Category 7: Monetary policy and international finance).

[23] 

Gidron, Noam and Bard Bonikowski. 2013. Varieties of populism: Literature review and research agenda. Harvard University: Weatherhead Center for International affairs, 13-‍0004.

[24] 

Harteveld, Eelco. 2016. “Winning the ‘losers’ but losing the ‘winners’? The electoral consequences of the radical right moving to the economic left”, Electoral Studies, 44: 225-‍234. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.08.015.

[25] 

Häusermann, Silja and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2015. “What do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual Preferences and Party Choice”, in Pablo Beramendi, Pablo, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.), Politics of Advanced Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316163245.009.

[26] 

Hawkins, Kirk A. 2009. “Is Chavez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Political Studies, 42 (8): 1040-‍1067. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009331721.

[27] 

Hernández, Enrique and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2016. “The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, 55 (2): 203-‍224. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12122.

[28] 

Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies”, American Political Science Review, 65 (4): 991-‍1017. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/1953494.

[29] 

Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit and the rise of populism: Economic Have-nots and cultural backlash. Faculty Research Working Paper Series.

[30] 

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2005. “Threatened by diversity: Why Restrictive Asylum and Immigration Policies Appeal to Voters in Western Europe”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 15 (1): 21-‍45. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13689880500064577.

[31] 

Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2008. “What Unites the Populist Right in Western Europe? Reexamining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases”, Comparative Political Studies, 41 (1): 3-‍23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/001041 4006294168.

[32] 

Jesuit, David and Vincent Mahler. 2004. “Immigration, economic well-being and support for extreme right parties in western European regions”. Paper presented at the LIS Conference, Luxembourg. Available at: http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wps/liswps/391.pdf.

[33] 

Kaufmann, Eric. 2017. “Levels or changes? Ethnic context, immigration and the UK Independence Party Vote”, Electoral Studies, 48, 57-‍69. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.05.002.

[34] 

Kriesi, Hanspter. 2010. “Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values”, West European Politics, 33 (3): 673-‍685. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402381003654726.

[35] 

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Roman Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheus Frey. 2008. West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790720.

[36] 

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Roman Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheus Frey. 2006. “Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared”, European Journal of Political Research, 45: 921-‍956. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00644.x.

[37] 

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger, Swen Hutter and Bruno Wüst. 2012. Political Conflict in Western Europe. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139169219.

[38] 

Kriesi, Hanspeter and Takis Pappas (eds.). 2015. European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR.

[39] 

Laclau, Ernesto. 1977. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: New Left Books.

[40] 

Magalhaes, Pedro. 2014. “Financial Crisis, Austerity, and Electoral Politics”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 24 (2): 125-‍133. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2014.887090.

[41] 

Mols, Frank and Jolanda Jetten. 2016. “Explaining the Appeal of Populist Right-Wing Parties in Times of Economic Prosperity”, Political Psychology, 37 (2): 275-‍292. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12258.

[42] 

Mols, Frank and Jolanda Jetten. 2017. The Wealth Paradox. Economic Prosperity and the Hardening of attitudes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139942171.

[43] 

Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, 39 (4): 541-‍63. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.

[44] 

Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[45] 

Mudde, Cas. 2010. “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy”, West European Politics, 33 (6): 1167-‍1186. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2010.508901.

[46] 

Mudde, Cas. 2014. “Fighting the system? Populist radical right parties and party system change”, Party Politics, 20 (2): 217-‍226. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813519968.

[47] 

Oesch, Daniel and Line Rennwald. 2010. “The Class Basis of Switzerland’s Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right”, Swiss Political Science Review, 16 (3): 343-‍371. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2010.tb00433.x.

[48] 

O’Higgins, Niall. 2012. “This Time It’s Different? Youth Labour Markets during ‘The Great Recession”, Comparative Economic Studies, 54: 395-‍412. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/ces.2012.15.

[49] 

O’Reilly, Jacqueline, Werner Eichhorst, András Gábos, Kari Hadjivassiliou, David Lain, Janine Leschke, Seamus McGuinness, Lucia Mýtna Kureková, Tiziana Nazio, Renate Ortlieb, Helen Russell and Paola Villa. 2015. “Five Characteristics of Youth Unemployment in Europe: Flexibility, Education, Migration, Family Legacies, and EU Policy”, Sage Open, 5 (1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015574962.

[50] 

Rydgren, Jens. 2007. “The sociology of the Radical Right”, Annual Review of Sociology, 33: 241-‍262. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752.

[51] 

Roberts, Kenneth. M. 2017. “Party politics in hard times: Comparative perspectives on the European and Latin American economic crises”, European Journal of Political Research, 56: 218-‍233. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12191.

[52] 

Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2016. “Closing the gap? A comparison of voters for radical right-wing populist parties and mainstream parties over time”, in T. Akkerman, S. L. de Lange and M. Rooduijn (eds.), Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe. London; New York: Routledge.

[53] 

Rooduijn, Matthijs. 2017. “What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist parties”, European Political Science Review, 10 (3): 351-‍368. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773917000145.

[54] 

Stegmueller, Daniel. 2013. “How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches”, American Journal of Political Science, 57 (3): 748-‍761. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12001.

[55] 

Stockemer, Daniel. 2017. The Front National in France. Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. Ontario: Springer.

[56] 

Teney, Céline, Onawa Promise Lacewell and Pieter De Wilde. 2014. “Winners and losers of globalization in Europe: attitudes and ideologies”. European Political Science Review, 6: 575-‍595. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773913000246.

[57] 

Teperoglou, Eftichia, Emmanouil Tsatsanis and Elias Nicolacopoulos. 2015. “Habituating to the New Normal in a Post-earthquake Party System: The 2014 European Election in Greece”, South European Society and Politics, 20 (3): 333-‍355. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2015.1068377.

[58] 

Treib, Oliver. 2014. “The Voter Says no, but Nobody Listens: Causes and Consequences of the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Elections”, Journal of European Public Policy, 21 (10): 1541-‍1554. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.941534.

[59] 

Van Hauwaert, Steven M. and Stijn van Kessel. 2018. “Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support”, European Journal of Political Research, 57 (1): 68-‍92. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12216.

[60] 

Van Kessel, Stijn. 2015. “Dutch populism during the crisis”, in Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas (eds.), Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR Press.

APPENDIX[up]

Table A1

List of parties by family

Right-wing parties RWPP
Austria The New Austria (NEOS) Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
Austrian People`s Party (ÖVP) Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO)
Belgium Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld) Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang-VB)
Reformist Movement (MR)
Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V)
Humanist Democratic Centre (cdH)
People`s Party (PP)
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)
Denmark Radical Party Danish People´s Party (DF)
Venstre-Liberals (V)
Liberal Alliance (l)
Conservative People´s Party (C)
Finland Christian Democrats in Finland (KD) True Finns (FS)
National Coalition Party (KOK)
Centre Party of Finland (KESK)
Swedish People´s Party (RKP)
France Union for a Popular Movement (UDF) National Front (FN)
Germany Free Democratic Party (FDP) Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
Greece New Democracy (ND) Independent Greeks (ANEL)
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)
Golden Dawn (GD)
Italy Union for Christian and Centre (Udc) The People of Freedom (PdL)
Brothers of Italy (Fdl)
Luxembourg Democratic Party (DP) Alternative Democratic Refor (ADR)
Christian Social People’s Party (CSV)
Netherlands Democrats `66 (D`66) Party of Freedom (PVV)
People’s Party for Freedom and (VVD)
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)
Sweden Liberal People’s Party (L) Sweden Democrats (SD)
Christian Democrats (KD)
Moderate Coalition Party (M)
Centre Party (C)
United Kingdom Liberal Democrats British National Party (BNP)
Conservative Party United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
Party of Wales Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

Source: own elaboration based on Mudde ( ‍Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.2007: 44) for the cases of FPÖ, VB, DF and FN; Mair (2013) for the case of BZO; Rensmann, de Lange and Couperus (2017: 155,156) for the cases of FS, AfD, ANEL, LAOS, PVV, SD, UKIP; Bobba and Roncarola (2018) for the cases of PdL (also Pappas, 2016:34) and Edl; van Kessel ( ‍Van Kessel, Stijn. 2015. “Dutch populism during the crisis”, in Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis S. Pappas (eds.), Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR Press.2015) for the cases of ADR and the BNP and Toloudis (2014) for the case of Greek GD.

Table A2.

Alternative analysis with a different dependent variable. Explaining the vote for Right Wing populist parties versus other parties and abstainers in 12 Western European countries: a multilevel analysis with interactions between sociodemographic and contextual factors

Standard errors in parentheses;

‍[a]

Additive Δ GDP Δ Unemployment
Model (0) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Age -0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.33 -0.03 -0.04
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.31) (0.25) (0.25)
University 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
Female -0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.46

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Unemployed 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
City 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Working class 0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.48

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.51

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.48

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.48

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.60

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
Eco. Retrosp. -0.87

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.88

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.86

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.86

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.88

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.86

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.87

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Eco. Prosp. -0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.45

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.45

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.47

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.45

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Pr. Unemmpl. -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Pr. Economy -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Pr. Immigration 0.71

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.70

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.71

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.71

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.71

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.71

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.71

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Pr. Politics -1.07 -1.10 -1.07 -1.07 -1.08 -1.07 -1.06
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74)
Political interest 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Ideology 3.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.26

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.26

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Confidence Parl. -0.99

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.99

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.99

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.98

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.99

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.00

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.98

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Party Id. 0.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Δ GDP -0.58

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.80

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.56

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.62

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.58

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.58

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.58

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Δ UNEMPL -0.12

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.13

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.13

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.12

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.09 -0.14

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.11
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Δ IMMIG -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30)
Pr. SYSTEM 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.13
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.67) (0.67) (0.66) (0.67)
Age

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
0.47

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.10

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.18) (0.04)
Univ

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
-0.08 0.03

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.07) (0.02)
W.Class

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
0.12

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.03

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.07) (0.02)
Constant -3.53

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-3.56

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-3.50

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-3.61

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-3.69

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-3.48

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-3.61

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.71) (0.71) (0.70) (0.71) (0.72) (0.70) (0.71)
Constant -0.34 -0.34 -0.35 -0.34 -0.33 -0.35 -0.34
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Observations 8939 8939 8939 8939 8939 8939 8939
N groups 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Log lik. -1716.52 -1712.78 -1715.83 -1715.08 -1714.11 -1714.88 -1715.10
Bic 3633.19 3634.82 3640.93 3639.42 3637.48 3639.02 3639.46
Aic 3477.03 3471.56 3477.67 3476.16 3474.22 3475.77 3476.20
[a] Standard errors in parentheses; [+] p<0.1, [*] p<0.05, [**] p<0.01, [***] p<0.001.
Table A3

Explaining the vote for Right Wing populist parties versus right parties in 12 Western European countries: a logistic regression analyses with interactions between sociodemographic and contextual factors

Standard errors in parentheses;

‍[a]

Additive Δ GDP Δ Unemployment
Model (0) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Age -0.88

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.83

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.87

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.87

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.68

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.86

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.88

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.27) (0.27)
University 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Female -0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.55

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Unemployed 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.35
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
City 0.20

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.21

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.21

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.18 0.20

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.20

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.18
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Working class 0.74

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.75

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.76

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.76

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.74

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.76

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.89

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
Eco. Retrospective -1.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.57

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.53

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.52

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.53

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Eco. Prospective -0.44 -0.44 -0.41 -0.46 -0.43 -0.42 -0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Pr. Unemployment -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Pr. Economy -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Pr. Immigration 0.43

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.42

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.44

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.42

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.43

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.43

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.42

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Pr. Politics -0.85 -0.90 -0.88 -0.83 -0.86 -0.85 -0.82
(0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.77)
Political Interest -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.24 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Ideology 0.67

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.67

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.63

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.70

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.68

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.63

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.70

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Confidence Parl. -1.36

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.35

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.37

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.35

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.36

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.37

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.34

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Party Id. 0.30

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.30

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.31

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.30

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.30

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.31

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.30

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Δ GDP -0.28

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.51

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.24

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.32

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.28

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.29

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.28

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Δ UNEMPL -0.10

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.10

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.11

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.10

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.08

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.12

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Δ IMMIG -0.21

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.20

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.20

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.22

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.21

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.21

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.22

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Pr. SYSTEM 0.48

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.50

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.39

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.54

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.48

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.46

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.50

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Age

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
0.52

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.06
(0.19) (0.05)
Univ

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
-0.20

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.05

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.08) (0.02)
W. Class

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
0.15

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.04

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.07) (0.02)
Constant 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.01
(0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35)
Observations 3536 3536 3536 3536 3536 3536 3536
Pseudo R2 0.183 0.186 0.186 0.185 0.184 0.186 0.185
[a] Standard errors in parentheses; [+] p<0.1, [*] p<0.05, [**] p<0.01, [***] p<0.001.
Table 4.

Alternative analysis with a different dependent variable. Explaining the vote for Right Wing populist parties versus other parties and abstainers in 12 Western European countries: a logistic regression analysis with interactions between sociodemographic and contextual factors

Standard errors in parentheses;

‍[a]

Additive Δ GDP Δ Unemployment
Model (0) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Age -0.18 -0.10 -0.16 -0.16 0.01 -0.16 -0.16
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.30) (0.25) (0.25)
University 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.16 0.01
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Female -0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Unemployed -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
City 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Working class 0.37

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.39

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.39

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.40

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.39

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.47

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Eco. Retrosp. -1.07

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.08

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.05

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.06

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.08

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.05

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.06

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Eco. Prosp. -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Pr. Unemmpl. -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Pr. Economy -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Pr. Immigration 0.59

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.58

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.59

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.58

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.59

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.59

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.58

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Pr. Politics -0.98 -1.00 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74)
Political interest 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Ideology 3.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.39

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.39

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.40

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.38

p<0.001.

‍[***]
3.39

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Confidence Parl. -1.01

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.01

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.02

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.00

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.01

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.03

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.00

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Party Id. 0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.44

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Δ GDP -0.26

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.46

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.23

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.29

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.26

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.27

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.26

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Δ UNEMPL -0.07

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.08

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.08

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.07

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.05

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.09

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.06

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Δ IMMIG 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Pr. SYSTEM 0.57

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.57

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.52

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.61

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.57

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.56

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.58

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Age

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
0.42

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.07

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.16) (0.04)
Univ

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
-0.13

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.04

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.07) (0.02)
W.Class

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
0.10 -0.02
(0.06) (0.02)
Constant -4.03

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-4.06

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-3.99

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-4.08

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-4.15

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-3.96

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-4.09

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
Observations 8939 8939 8939 8939 8939 8939 8939
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.152 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.152 0.151
[a] Standard errors in parentheses; [+] p<0.1, [*] p<0.05, [**] p<0.01, [***] p<0.001.
Table A5.

Correlation between independent variables

Age University Female Unemployed City Working Class Eco. Retrospective Eco. Prospective Prob. Unemployment Prob. Economy Prob. Immigration Prob. Politics Political Interest Ideology Confi. Parliament Party ID Δ GDP Δ Unemployment Δ Immigration Pr. System
Agae 1.0000
University -0.0854

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Female 0.0175

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0118

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Unemployed -0.1168

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0172

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0001 1.0000
City -0.0625

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0132

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0019 -0.0121

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Working Class 0.0693

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0651

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0040 0.1207

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0764

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Economic Retrospective -0.0108

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0229

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0594

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0706

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0354

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.1255

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Economic Prospective 0.0008 0.0217

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0497

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0670

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0180

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.1212

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.5858

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Prob. Unemployment -0.0161

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0065 0.0345

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0978

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0666

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0458

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0733

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0319

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Prob. Economy -0.0139

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0359

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0120

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0027 0.0055 -0.0171

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0214

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0200

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.2137

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Prob. Immigration 0.0285

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0230

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0053 -0.0210

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0095

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0069 0.0618

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0452

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.1133

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0675

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Prob. Politics -0.0222

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0158

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0065 0.0069 0.0439

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0141

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0214

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0131

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0881

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0501

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0156

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Political Interest 0.1360

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0101

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.1474

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0813

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0493

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.1781

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.1430

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.1363

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0651

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0127

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0009 0.0363

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Ideology 0.0128

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0041 -0.0135

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0207

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0094

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0870

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0566

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0668

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0362

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0064 0.0287

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0032 -0.0050 1.0000
Confidence Parliament 0.0566

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0334

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0264

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0878

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0022 -0.1677

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.2390

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.2558

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0452

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0478

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0220

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0357

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.2161

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0444

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Party ID 0.1188

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0339

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0490

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0287

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0054 -0.0645

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0616

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0668

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0171

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0015 0.0359

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0165

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.2731

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0052 0.1206

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Δ GDP -0.0560

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0656

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0048 0.0109

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0673

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0528

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.1539

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0717

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.1560

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.2214

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0335

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0264

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0367

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0594

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.1121

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0249

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Δ Unemployment -0.0005 0.0221

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0125

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0695

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0434

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0736

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.1136

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0637

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.1459

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.1950

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0500

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0235

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0576

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0458

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.2303

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0038 -0.5263

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
Δ Immigration -0.0069 -0.0921

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0003 -0.0678

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0170

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0545

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0360

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0216

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0971

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0850

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0851

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0384

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0381

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0145

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.1613

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0123

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.4299

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.4755

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.000
Pr. System -0.0016 -0.0085 -0.0187

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0961

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0380

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0604

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0536

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0525

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0658

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0136

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.1004

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.0327

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0400

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0216

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0716

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0441

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
-0.2096

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.1898

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
0.0152

p value < 0.05.

‍[*]
1.0000
[*] p value < 0.05.
Table A6.

Explaining the vote for Right Wing populist parties versus right parties in 10 Western European countries: a multilevel analysis with interactions between sociodemographic and contextual factors without extreme cases

Standard errors in parentheses;

‍[a]

Additive Δ GDP Δ Unemployment
Model (0) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Age -0.38 -0.78

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.39 -0.40 0.31 -0.37 -0.37
(0.31) (0.34) (0.31) (0.31) (0.48) (0.31) (0.31)
University 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.14
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13)
Female -0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.53

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.54

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-0.53

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Unemployed 0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.48

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.46

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.49

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
City 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Working class 1.18

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.18

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.18

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.29

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.17

p<0.001.

‍[***]
1.18

p<0.001.

‍[***]
0.89

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20)
Eco. Retrospective -0.84

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.89

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.84

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.84

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.85

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.84

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.85

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
Eco. Prospective -0.67

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.69

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.67

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.69

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.67

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.67

p<0.05,

‍[*]
-0.66

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Pr. Unemployment -0.25 -0.23 -0.25 -0.25 -0.23 -0.25 -0.25
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Pr. Economy -0.31

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.32

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.31

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.31

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.31

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.31

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.30

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Pr. Immigration 0.55

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.54

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.55

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.55

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.56

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.55

p<0.01,

‍[**]
0.56

p<0.01,

‍[**]
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Pr. Politics -0.88 -0.92 -0.88 -0.91 -0.85 -0.88 -0.95
(0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78)
Political Interest -0.15 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Ideology 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.16
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Confidence Parl. -1.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.24

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.25

p<0.001.

‍[***]
-1.24

p<0.001.

‍[***]
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Party Id. 0.20

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.21

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.20

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.21

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.21

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.21

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.20

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Δ GDP -0.36 -0.86

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.35 -0.27 -0.35 -0.36 -0.38
(0.44) (0.47) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Δ UNEMPL 0.32

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.32

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.32

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.33

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.50

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.34

p<0.05,

‍[*]
0.27

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16)
Δ IMMIG -0.70

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.70

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.70

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.72

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.67

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.70

p<0.1,

‍[+]
-0.73

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Pr. SYSTEM 0.44 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.45 0.44 0.40
(0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.85) (0.83) (0.84) (0.84)
Age

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
1.11

p<0.01,

‍[**]
-0.38

p<0.1,

‍[+]
(0.40) (0.20)
Univ

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
-0.05 -0.05
(0.16) (0.08)
W. Class

p<0.05,

‍[*]
Macro
-0.31

p<0.1,

‍[+]
0.17

p<0.05,

‍[*]
(0.17) (0.08)
Constant -0.31 -0.16 -0.30 -0.24 -0.70 -0.35 -0.13
(0.95) (0.95) (0.95) (0.97) (0.98) (0.96) (0.96)
Constant -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Observations 3157 3157 3157 3157 3157 3157 3157
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Log lik. -1015.84 -1011.86 -1015.79 -1014.20 -1013.95 -1015.66 -1013.67
Bic 2208.94 2209.04 2216.90 2213.71 2213.23 2216.64 2212.67
Aic 2075.68 2069.72 2077.58 2074.39 2073.91 2077.32 2073.35
[a] Standard errors in parentheses; [+] p<0.1, [*] p<0.05, [**] p<0.01, [***] p<0.001.

Biography[up]

[a]

Investigador doctoral en el Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, donde trabaja en su tesis doctoral con un contrato de formación del profesorado universitario. Recientemente ha sido investigador visitante en el Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research de la Universidad de Nottingham. Es máster en Democracia y Gobierno por la UAM y graduado en Ciencia Política y Administración Pública por la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, donde obtuvo el Premio Extraordinario Fin de Grado y el Premio de Fin de Carrera de la Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia en el año 2015. Sus principales líneas de investigación están relacionadas con los partidos y sistemas de partidos de los países de Europa Occidental.

[b]

Profesor ayudante doctor en el Departamento de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Anteriormente fue profesor e investigador postdoctoral en la Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), así como investigador predoctoral en el antiguo Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales de la Fundación Juan March (Madrid). Es máster en Democracia y Gobierno y doctor en Ciencia Política. Ha realizado estancias de investigación en la Universidad de Michigan, la Universidad de Essex, la Universidad de Montreal y la Universidad de Berkeley. Sus últimos artículos han sido publicados en American Behavioral Scientist, Parliamentary Affairs, South European Society and Politics y West European Politics, entre otras. Sus dos obras editadas más recientes son Democratizing Candidate Selection in Times of Crisis: New Methods, Old Receipts? (2018) y The Selection of Politicians in Times of Crisis (2018).

Enlaces refback

  • No hay ningún enlace refback.




Licencia de Creative Commons
Este obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional.

REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA. ISSN: 1575-6548 ISSN-e: 2173-9870 | Mapa del sitio