Elections, competitive clientelism and autocratization in Venezuela

Authors

  • Benigno Alarcón Universidad Católica Andrés Bello
  • Manuel Hidalgo Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/rep.200.09

Abstract

This paper analyzes the political-electoral clientelistic strategies used by an authoritarian regime to stay in power. To this end, it starts from a theoretical discussion on the role of elections in authoritarian contexts to extract a set of arguments that are examined in the 2020 legislative and regional-municipal elections of 2021 in Venezuela, based on several indexes, opinion polls and electoral observation reports. After identifying the Venezuelan political regime, particularly since the arrival of Nicolás Maduro to power (2013-present), the main problems of electoral integrity in the electoral processes during the Chavista era are described to understand what aspects change during the 2020-‍2021 electoral period. When applying the analytical framework, it is evident how the improvement of some aspects of integrity for the 2021 elections have been accompanied by an extensive use of competitive political-clientelist mechanisms, which have been effective in fragmenting and dispersing the opposition vote and increasing the levels of abstention to guarantee the continuity of the ruling élite in power. Based on the findings of this study and the nature of the regime, some projections are made on the relationship between electoral integrity and competitiveness of the Venezuelan authoritarian regime, in view of the presidential elections scheduled for 2024, and the difficulties in producing a democratic transition through elections.

Published

2023-07-06

Issue

Section

ARTICLES