The Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) face to ECJ and German Federal Constitutional Court caselaw

Background and consequences of the BVerfG decision of 5 May 2020 (2 BvR 859/15)

Authors

  • Justo Corti Varela Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/rdce.68.03

Abstract

On 5 May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) declared the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), and hence ECJ’s Weiss preliminary ruling that had validated it, as ultra vires. It is a no return point in the so-called dialogue between both courts. Disagreements concerned ECB’s mandate (art. 127 TFEU), particularly how the principle of proportionality should be applied on monetary policy decisions, and different approaches on ECB’s independency and accountability on those decisions with indirect economic effects. All together led the BVerfG to declare that the EU had had exceeded its competences in a «structurally significant» manner. Keeping the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) in mind the BVefG accepted, with objections, the conditions imposed to the PSPP for fulfilling art. 123 TFEU (prohibition of monetary financing). Since the decision actually has had no direct effects on the programme in practice, damages on the principle of primacy of EU law would not deserve the initiation of an infringement procedure. This article starts analysing the BVerfG ultra vires doctrine (section II), the influence of monetarism in the design of the ECB mandate (III), how the ECJ understands the judicial control on it (IV) face to the positions of the BVerfG (V), the effects of the decision on the principle of primacy (VI) and it closes with some concluding remarks on the contributions of this «dialogue» for improving democratic legitimacy of the monetary policy.

Published

2021-04-26

Issue

Section

STUDIES