Ordinary Legal Interpretation versus Constitutional Interpretation

Authors

  • Dúber Armando Celis Vela Universidad de Antioquia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/aijc.26.12

Abstract

In this paper I present a reconstruction of the ordinary legal interpretation practice and propose arguments that reject its qualitative contrast with the constitutional interpretation. In contemporary constitutionalism it is often stated that constitutional interpretation is special compared to ordinary legal interpretation. Instead, I argue here that the existence of a material, rigid and guaranteed constitution implies changes in the ordinary legal interpretation. However, these changes do not imply that the interpretation of the constitution is a special modality of legal interpretation. Therefore, in contemporary constitutionalism, the defense of the special interpretation of the constitution has been supported by a simplified concept of legal interpretation that does not take into account the multiplicity of methodological, interpretative and argumentative tools shared in the legal culture.

Published

2022-12-29