The limitation of presidential power in Colombia through Judicial Review of constitutional amendments

The judicial politics behind the presidential re-election and peace agreement cases

Abstract

Since the dawn of constitutional democracies, it is commonly believed that the judiciary is an inherently weak branch of government and, hence, its ability to impose meaningful constraints on its elected counterparts would be quite limited. Nevertheless, the case of the Colombian Constitutional Court casts doubts on this conventional wisdom. In several decisions, this Court has managed to curb the power of the presidential office through the review of certain constitutional amendments which were central pieces of the governmental agenda (like presidential re-election and peace). This article aims to explain the legal and political reasons that made judicial review of amendments in Colombia an effective tool to constrain presidential power. More specifically, this document argues that the existence of a sensible constitutional design, propitious political-cultural circumstances, and a prudent judicial strategy allowed the Court to restrain the power of a mightier actor such as the president.