Truth and Constitution. An Incipient Dogmatic of the Constitutional Fictions

Abstract

This work realizes an analysis of the relation between truth and Constitutional law across the examination of the role of the truth and its find in the judicial processes and in the debate of the ideas in a process of public communication. The thesis of the author is that in the democratic Constitution and in its Law there is no space for the truth as ontological category. To find the truth is not the object of the judicial processes, and neither of the free debate of ideas, in which no message can adopt any privilege appealing to its condition of true message. The author does not deny the relevancy that the truth has for the Law System and Doctrine, in particular in judicial evidence or from a epistemologic perspective (conditions of validity of the law reasoning and decision). But he considers that when we talk about truth in a judicial process, specially in criminal trial, in fact we talk about de unique correct judicial decision about the case. Also, in the process of public communication, that the message is or not truth or a true message is irrelevant for its constitutional protection. This reflection allows him to put in question the thesis from which the Constitution must protect the truth, or the constitutional foundation of the «hate speech», or the hypothetical existence of a right to the truth.