Constitutional Courts against “Civil and Political Rights”. A Look from Analytic Theory of Law

Authors

  • María Beatriz Arriagada Cáceres

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18042/cepc/redc.105.04

Keywords:

Liberal rights, fundamental rights, competence norms, regulative norms, constitutional jurisdiction

Abstract

Using two important distinctions from the analytic theory of law («regulatory rules-competence rules» and «material acts-normative acts»), this article highlights the basic distinctions and relations of the theory underlying the interpretative practice of constitutional provisions that enshrine the so-called civil rights. The identification of their two different meanings allows both to clarify the different functions that the courts with constitutional jurisdiction comply regarding each of these, and at the same time obtain conclusions about the possibility or impossibility to group them together, under the same analytical category, with the so-called political rights.