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La **Revista Española de Sociología (RES)** es la revista oficial de la Federación Española de Sociología (FES). Es una publicación de la principal asociación científica de los profesionales de la sociología de España, independiente de los poderes públicos y al servicio de la comunidad sociológica.
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*The **RES** is a peer review journal, it publishes original research work on the theory, practice and methods of sociology along with research notes about sociological issues as well as other related fields. The RES also has a section about controversies, state of the art articles together with monographic issues and other contents of special interest for the sociological community.*
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Peer review is undertaken with a particular emphasis given to exceptional quality and current relevance.

Sumario / *Contents*

RES 29, Número 1, Enero 2020

Special issue. Southern European Societies / *Monográfico. Sociedades del sur de Europa*

Special Issue in collaboration with "Sociologia *On Line*", the official journal of the Portuguese Sociological Association (available at http://revista.aps.pt/) and "Sociologia Italiana. AIS Journal of Sociology", the official journal of the Italian Sociological Association (available at http://sociologiaitaliana.egeaonline.it/)

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Introduction to the Special Issue. Connecting sociological research with social problems and public policies: implications for Southern European Societies / *Presentación del monográfico. Conectando la investigación sociológica con los problemas sociales y las políticas públicas: implicaciones para las sociedades del sur de Europa*

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BACKGROUND

Europe is facing new and radical challenges that demand extraordinary resilience from EU members, especially southern European societies, because of their outlying position and specific social problems in comparison with their EU neighbours. The difficulties of building a united Europe in the wake of the economic, financial and political crisis have exposed divergences in EU governance. In this context, sociology is an important tool to inform public policies and to provide the general public with an understanding of current challenges. The uses of sociology have social, political and practical implications in fields that are especially significant for southern European societies, such as welfare, work and employment, education, migration, social cohesion and political participation.

However, the usual tensions in the organization of scientific research are now particularly intense in terms of how the sociological knowledge utility is understood and communicated. The trend toward internationalization in current research systems forces research communities to compete in a global market of scientific production, where English is the dominant language, and to publish results for an academic audience. Simultaneously there is a pressing need to make sociological knowledge relevant and applicable to regional and local problems.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THIS SPECIAL ISSUE

The RES is the official journal of the Spanish Federation of Sociology. This Special Issue has been released jointly by *Sociologia On Line*, the official journal of the Portuguese Sociological Association (issue not available yet), and *Sociologia Italiana. The AIS Journal of Sociology*, the official journal of

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the Italian Sociological Association, and whose Issue can be found here: http://www.sociologiaitaliana.it/it/21/archivio-rivista/rivista/3435505.

This Special Issue of RES offers articles in both Spanish and English. They come from three different countries involved in this Special Call: Spain, Portugal and Italy. It means an interesting approach to the currents situation of social problems en their sociological analysis in Southern Europe.

The Guest Editors of the Special Issue in *Sociologia Italiana*, Consuelo Corradi and Paola Borgna, express the goal of this coordinated experience as follows (see the website cited above). This twined experience "illustrates the framework of scientific cooperation between the sociological associations of Southern Europe". Thereby, the three Journals try to explore "issues that are particularly significant for Southern European societies, such as changes in the welfare state, work and employment, education, migration, social cohesion and political participation". The website mentioned above offer the papers published in the Italian Journal.

AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE

Holding this background in mind, this special issue will discuss the challenges and dilemmas of different sociological orientations in order to complement internationalization and academic research with the uses of sociology aimed at solving social public problems in specific territorial contexts. Participants are invited to send papers on the relevance of sociological knowledge in recent years as a means to understanding southern European societies, at a local, regional and international level. We have focused especially on some key topics as follows:

— Empirical and conceptual approaches on social problems in Southern European societies, specially related to knowledge transfer and their use in public policies.

— Impact of the economic crisis on the social reality of Southern Europe. Transformations in institutions, social movements and forms of coexistence.

— Analysis and evaluation of European policies and their impact on different European realities.

— Knowledge transfer in sociology: conceptual approaches, organizational modes and research.

— The role of sociology as an academic and scientific discipline to detect social problems and contribute to the design of public policies in Europe.

The call was widely supported by an interesting representation of around 60 proposals that arrived for their consideration to RES. The four coordinators of this Special Issue had to do a great work of blind evaluation of the proposals, searching for the closest works to the aims of the call. Many good pieces of research were refused for this particular Special Issue. The result is introduced in the section below.

THE PAPERS THAT COMPRISE THE SPECIAL ISSUE

The nine papers that compose this Special Issue have been organised according to their level of generalisation of the focus they propose in their analysis in relation to the aims of the proposal. Therefore, the first paper, titled *Public Sociology and Southern European Societies: a Critical View*, has been elaborated by Andrea Borghini, from the University of Pisa (Italy). According to the author, the article tries to analyse the role public sociology can play in approaching Southern European societies from a proper reformed view, by which he means a public sociology that is reflective and aware of some limits, which are highlighted across the paper. Southern European societies refer to countries like Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece, which are globally considered closer to the South of the world than to the North. The paper is organised in three parts. First, it draws on Burawoy's proposal. Second, it focuses on communication, ethical-political and epistemological dimension to denounce the dualism that runs through them. Third, the risk of leaving an empty space between sociologist and public, reflective and professional sociology, local and global knowledge, or North and South epistemology, are discussed. The article finishes with a proposal of solution defended by the author.

The second paper is written by Juan Arturo Rubio Arostegui, from the University Antonio de Nebrija, and Joaquim Rius-Ulldemolins, from the Universy of València (both in Spain), and its title is *Cultural Policies in Southern Europe after the Global Crisis: Impact on Cultural Participation*. The authors of this article consider Southern Europe cultural policies after the global crisis since 2008, in order to analyse its impact on cultural participation in this European area. According to them, the last third of the 20th century has made possible the beginning of the convergence between the cultural policies of this area compared to the North, while the global crisis has caused a decline of cultural participation. This has led to a breakdown of the trend towards the Europeanization of these policies. Based on this thesis, and from a comparative approach, the article analyses how the institutional density of non-formal artistic education, the formal educational system and the type of governance of cultural facilities contribute -in addition to the public cuts in education- to explain the phenomenon of the greatest fall of cultural participation in the model of Southern European cultural policy in relation to the liberal, Nordic and central European models.

The third of the papers of this Special Issue is signed by Eduardo Bericat, from the University of Sevilla, and Rubén Martín-Gimeno, from the University Pablo de Olavide (both in Spain), and it is titled *The Societal Quality of Southern European Mediterranean Countries.* The authors draw on the wide and deep empirical data about the 28 EU countries (72 focalized compound indicators that make up the Quality Index System of European Societies), in order to analyse the societal quality of the Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) from a holistic, multidimensional and comparative perspective. They first present the position the Mediterranean countries occupy in the European rankings of societal quality. Second, after proving that the Mediterranean countries form a cluster on their own in relation to the Typology of the Five Europes, Mediterranean countries societal characteristics are analysed. Third, the authors offer a diagnosis based on the 14 societal quality domains from the index system to compare the quality of Mediterranean countries with that of other European countries. They assert that this structural diagnosis -endogenous and exogenous- offers an approach that can be of interest for both social researchers and policy makers.

The forth paper is titled *Movilización colectiva, transformación democrática y resistencia contra la crisis y la austeridad en el sur de Europa: La experiencia de Portugal y de España*. It is signed by Ana Raquel Matos and Jesús Sabariego, from the University of Coimbra (Portugal). The authors argue that, since 2011, and due to the crisis substantial, several transformations have taken place in the field of social movements and forms of collective action over the world. The so-called "Arab Spring" and "Spring of the movements" show the global nature of the this phenomenon. The use of digital means and expressions can, the authors assert, develop the conceptualization of a new subject of study within the theory of social movements. According to them, the movements that took place in Spain and Portugal are paradigmatic for this new proposal that challenges the dominant conceptions of social movements in recent decades, from the emergence of these new political actors and the new forms of mobilization and activism that have contributed to the redefinition of the relations between the State and civil society, as well as the classic understandings about political participation and democracy.

The fifth paper is titled *The role of Sociology in the promotion of actions aimed at social innovation in the Mediterranean area.* It is signed by Emiliana Mangone, from the University of Salerno (Italy). The author argues that the change in contexts and their complexity, especially in the Mediterranean area, has raised the need to start reflecting on modernizing innovative actions able to provide social responses to the real needs of citizens and, moreover, able to combine resources and quality. This is necessary since the expansion of rights is associated with a decreasing public funding capacity. The future challenge, she continues, will surely be a retrenchment in public spending, orienting it towards the threefold structure of choice (need, preferences, goods) overcoming the rational choice model (preferences, goods). In a context characterized by these features, Mangone considers that sociological knowledge becomes paramount for reading social phenomena. The role of sociology is, thereby, to produce “knowledge” through which society can observe the occurring phenomena and recognize their problems, thus allowing for a continuous, on-going improvement.

The sixth paper is written by María Dolores Martín-Lagos y Mónica Luque, from the University of Granada (Spain). It is titled *Support and educational participation of families in the countries of Southern Europe: a comparison between Spain and Portugal*. This paper presents the results of a research about the levels and forms of support university students receive from their families in three Southern European cities: Granada and Melilla in Spain, and Lisbon in Portugal. A set of features that influence the daily interactions of their inhabitants is identified through a comparative research in these Southern Europe countries. This analysis of parents - sons/daughters relationships in education has allowed us to understand better the impact of the economic crisis on education at home, whether or not the gender division of roles is still true, the extent to which the daily life of school has repercussions on the Spanish homes and, finally, the emotional experience of students throughout their time in education. In order to unravel these discourses and experiences we adopted a qualitative methodology.

The seventh paper is titled *Ageing in Southern Europe. Emerging Perspectives and Challenges for Sociology* and is written by Francesco Marcaletti, from the International University of Cataluña, Tatiana Iñiguez, from the University of Zaragoza (both in Spain) and Emma Garavaglia from the University of Milano-Bicocca (in Italy). The process of transitioning to an ageing population has occurred later, but nevertheless more intensely, in Southern Europe than in other regions. These countries have been forced to politically, socially and economically adapt to this significant challenge. Sociologists play an important role in identifying and understanding social trends and issues, as well as in contributing to the design of public policies across Europe. However, research has tended to explore issues of ageing populations in Northern Europe, in spite of the notable demographic shifts and contextual specificities of Southern Europe. The study has a dual objective: first, to collect the theoretical and methodological contributions of authors from or focusing on Southern Europe, and second to explore the originality of studies that belong to Southern European sociological traditions.

The eighth paper of this Special Issue is signed by Mar Venegas, from the University of Granada, Alicia Villar-Aguilés, from the University of Valencia (both in Spain), and Sofía Almeida Santos from the University of Porto (in Portugal). The paper is titled *Sex and Gender Equality Policies in Education in Southern European Societies: the three cases of Andalusia and the Valencian Community (Spain) and Portugal.* Gender mainstreaming is an international strategy in Europe towards gender equality dealing with new challenges for sexuality and diversity in education, from an intersectional approach. In this context, this paper aims two goals. First, to analyse sex and gender equality policies in education since the 2000s in three Southern European Societies: Andalusia and the Valencian Community, in Spain, and Portugal; second, to arrive at some comparative conclusions about the recent developments in sex and gender equality policies in education in these three societies. The authors end up with some comparative conclusions. First, there is the political orientation of the government that seems to be of relevance. Second, the policies and plans reviewed show a move from (binary) gender equality to a more inclusive gender equality that intersects with sexuality and diversity. Sexuality education, already available in Portugal, is still missed in Spanish schools. These three experiences can inform European public policies.

Almudena Martínez del Olmo, from the University Antonio de Nebrija (in Spain), signed the ninth paper, called *The housing system of southern Europe: continuity or rupture?,* in which the author sets that the strong impact the crisis has had on housing has questioned the continuity the residential system presents in Southern Europe. It puts the discourses that proclaim the universal implementation of a liberal housing system into question too. Thereby, this paper analyses the residential dynamics in Spain since the beginning of the 21st century, within a framework that encompasses key countries of Southern Europe, in order to verify to what extent its system remains in force with respect to the European Union. According to the data, and despite some alterations, the paper concludes that its uniqueness continues, which reinforce the importance of examining residential system in order to understand the functioning of housing, residential practices and their problems.

Matilde Massó and Nazaret Abalde, from the University of Coruña (in Spain), have written the tenth paper, titled *The importance of attitudes towards risk to explain indebtedness in Southern European countries*. In this paper, the authors analyse the sociodemographic determinants and individuals' attitudes towards risk to explain indebtedness in Southern European countries. This analysis is done within the context of an increasing process of financialization of individual behaviour. We use the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), drawn up by the European Central Bank between 2009 and 2011. The methodological plan consists of a combination of a multiple correspondence analyses in order to identify the various household debt models and a logistic regression analysis in order to detect the explanatory variables that best explain the differences between indebtedness models. The main contribution of this paper is the identification of those variables that explain the economic differences in household debt levels. Results are showing a relevant influence of individual attitudes to explain indebtedness in Southern Countries in detriment of sociodemographic variables which are not relevant explanatory factors.

All the ten papers collected in this Special Issue, from a quite international setting, will help readers interested in Southern Europe current trends to approach a sociological insight of some outstanding social phenomenon. As seen above, we start with a reflection on the role of public sociology in Southern Europe. We then move to cultural policies. After that, we analyse societal quality in Southern European Societies. Then, we focus on mobilisation and resistance against the crisis and austerity in this part of Europe, where the crisis has been suffered more. After crisis, innovation becomes a crucial issue. The three following papers are dedicated to three great areas of production of knowledge in sociology, such as the family, ageing and gender and sexuality, the three of which identify current social tendencies in Southern Europe. The, residential and indebtedness models are approached. All the ten papers illustrate how sociological knowledge can inform public policies to improve democracy, equality and social justice in the Southern side of the European Union in a historical moment in which the social, economic and political idea of Europe as a community, this is the very idea of the European Union itself, is put into question from some political positions emerging all over Europe, and making sociological analysis and knowledge even more necessary than ever before. We really hope to have contributed to reach this aim somehow with the articles gathered in the following pages. We, coordinators of the Special Issue, thank all the authors and reviewers of these papers to have made it possible. We really appreciate that the Spanish Journal of Sociology (RES) had trusted us for this nice venture.

Artículos / ***Articles***

Public sociology and southern European societies: a critical view / *Sociología pública y sociedades del sur de Europa: una visión crítica*

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ABSTRACT

The aim of our paper is to analyze the role that a properly reformed public sociology can play in enhancing the perspective of southern European societies. By properly reformed public sociology we mean a public sociology that is reflective and aware of some limits, which we will try to highlight. By southern European societies we mean an area of southern Europe, made up of countries like Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece, which —for historical, economic, political and social reasons— the post-colonial debate and that on indigenous sociology consider similar to the countries of the South of the world rather than those of the North. The paper is organized in three parts. In the first part, we summarize the main aspects of Burawoy's proposal, developed from 2004 to date, while in the second part we will focus on three dimensions (communication, ethical-political and epistemological dimensions), detecting the *fundamental dualism* that runs through them and which we will try to clarify. In the third part we emphasize the substantial analogy of the three forms of dualism that characterize Burawoy's proposal —which share the risk of leaving an empty space between sociologist and public, reflective and professional sociology, local and global knowledge, or North and South epistemology— and suggest hypotheses of the solutions that have been promoted in the international debate; we will introduce our work in progress hypothesis of solution in accordance with the solution proposed for the epistemological dimension.

Keywords: public sociology; epistemology; south of the world; social point of view; dualism.

RESUMEN

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el papel que puede desempeñar una sociología pública, debidamente reformada, para mejorar la perspectiva de las sociedades del sur de Europa. Por sociología pública debidamente reformada nos referimos a una sociología pública reflexiva y consciente de algunas limitaciones que trataremos de resaltar. Por las sociedades del sur de Europa nos referimos a un área del sur de Europa, formada por países como Portugal, Italia, España y Grecia, que el debate poscolonial y sobre la sociología indígena considera, por razones históricas, económicas, políticas y sociales, similares a los países del sur del mundo, en lugar de los del norte. El artículo se encuentra dividido en tres partes. En la primera parte resumimos los aspectos principales de la propuesta de Burawoy, desarrollada desde 2004 hasta hoy, mientras que en la segunda parte nos centraremos en tres dimensiones (comunicación, dimensión ético-política y epistemológica), detectando el dualismo fundamental que las atraviesa y que trataremos de aclarar. En la tercera parte sugerimos las hipótesis de soluciones que han sido promovidas por el debate internacional, enfatizando la analogía sustancial de las tres formas de dualismo que caracterizan la propuesta de Burawoy, cuyo elemento común es precisamente el riesgo de dejar un espacio vacío entre sociólogo y público, sociología reflexiva y profesional, conocimiento local y global, o entre la epistemología del Norte y del Sur; e introduciremos una hipótesis de solución en progreso, de acuerdo con la solución propuesta para la dimensión epistemológica.

Palabras clave: *sociología pública; epistemología; mundo del sur; punto de vista social; dualismo.*

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INTRODUCTION

In our contribution, we analyze the role that a properly reformed public sociology can play in enhancing the perspective of southern European societies.

The public sociology proposal, (re)launched by Michael Burawoy in 2004 at the ASA in San Francisco, is a perspective that has its roots in the history of sociological thought, particularly in the work of classic authors such as Wright Mills and Gouldner, and was introduced in 1988 by ASA's 78th President Herbert J. Gans, who first spoke explicitly in a presidential address about public sociology. The merit of Burawoy is undoubtedly that of relaunching it and making it popular, through a very heartfelt appeal in a historical phase marked by the crisis of sociology. In the intentions of the author, the perspective aspires to constitute itself as a sociological point of view that opposes "categories, theories and concepts that have been formulated and enacted within Anglo-European metropoles in the interest of those metropolitan societies". Burawoy wants to promote a new "global sociology" that transcends the provincialism of the sociology of our time and invites social theory "to shift its analytic focus from Europe to the entire 'world-system' to the various 'civilizations' and 'multiple modernities' that traverse the world-system, or to the 'connected histories' by which modernity has been constituted" (Go, 2016: 1). It is only by placing itself within this critical framework that public sociology can become a voice for the point of view of the South of the world and, within it, of southern European societies, that is, of countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. According to Sousa Santos (2016), due to the recent economic crisis, and also for historical, geographical and social reasons, these countries are considered to differ from the rest of Europe, subordinated to the processes of globalization and characterized by a history of subjection to northern Europe and the Global North in general. In order to respond effectively to the ambitions that the author attributes to it, namely to constitute a global sociological perspective, Burawoy's proposal —which has given rise to numerous criticisms and a broad debate— should, in our opinion, be aware of certain limitations that characterize it and which we intend to highlight, looking in particular at three dimensions: the communicative, ethical-political and epistemological dimensions. We will attempt to discuss these dimensions, emphasizing the substantial analogy of the three forms of dualism that characterize Burawoy's proposal, which share the risk of leaving an empty space between sociologist and public, reflective and professional sociology, local and global knowledge, or North and South epistemology.

For each dimension we will outline the hypotheses of the solutions that have been promoted, based on critical literature. We will then introduce a work in progress hypothesis of a solution, based on the adoption of a construct of mathematical analysis and inspired in particular by the debate on the epistemology of the South versus the North, able to suggest a peculiar way out for going beyond the dualism we have identified. In fact, if the author we refer to in the final part of our contribution, J. Go, formulates the hypothesis of the *Southern standpoint of analysis*, we will proceed further, suggesting that the notion of *neighborhood of a point* be operationalized in the social field. In fact, in our opinion, through a mathematical formalization, this notion helps to constitute a middle ground that is sufficiently flexible and at the same time a defined concept, epistemologically founded and value-free, and able to delimit, from time to time, an area of social space from which to look at more complex phenomena, without falling into forms of absolutism or relativism. In the specific case of the topic we are dealing with, this will also give an epistemological and cognitive foundation to that intermediate point of view, necessary for public sociology in order to connect the local dimension to the regional and global dimensions.

Our contribution is organized in three parts. In the first part, we summarize the main aspects of Burawoy's proposal, developed from 2004 to date, highlighting some of the critical issues of his proposal, while in the second part we will focus on the three dimensions (communication, ethical-political and epistemological dimensions), detecting the fundamental dualism that runs through them and which we will attempt to clarify. Finally, in the third part, we suggest the hypotheses of solutions that have been promoted in the international debate and we will introduce our work in progress hypothesis of solution, in accordance with the solution proposed for the epistemological dimension.

THE PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY OF BURAWOY. ORIGINS, FOUNDATION, CRITICAL ASPECTS

The proposal for a public sociology, launched in 2004 by Michael Burawoy in his presidential address at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association[1] in San Francisco, caused quite a stir in the world's sociological community, where it acted as a positive shock. This is demonstrated by the fact that this address has led to a broad debate —conferences, forums, seminars— and to the publication of numerous books and articles widely distributed during these 15 years[2]. Public sociology is an expression which is now part of the language of sociologists, a term that immediately recalls a certain kind of *practice of* sociology, a *sociological style* born with the aim of reviving the place of sociology, of revitalizing its moral fiber and of making it capable of affecting the living flesh of the problems of Western societies and non-Western societies. Over time, the moral thrust of this proposal has not failed, and the awareness that public sociology can assume the features of a global sociological proposal, going beyond the nation state and provincializing the point of view of the United States, makes it the best proposal in order to represent the point of view from below, that is the point of view of civil society. As the author himself said, in fact, "the standpoint of sociology is civil society and the defense of the social. In times of market tyranny and state despotism, sociology —and in particular its public face— defends the interests of humanity" (Burawoy, 2005: 24) and, more recently, "without abandoning public engagement, sociology's challenge today is to go global" (Burawoy, 2016: 950).

Based on these first notes, it is evident that public sociology runs the risk of being the victim of a paradoxical destiny. Its diffusion and its success, in fact, risk nullifying its moral and innovative impact, particularly should it be institutionalized, thereby becoming something similar to the professional sociology of today which, on several occasions, Burawoy describes as the cultural, historical and moral betrayal of sociological tradition[3], the mortification of the nature and soul of sociology, particularly in respect of the original proposal formulated by the classics (Durkheim, Weber, Bourdieu, Du Bois, Mills, etc.).

If we have correctly grasped the original intention of the author, public sociology —and the public sociologist— should resemble the Socratic horsefly of Athens[4], who seeks truth through constant dialogue with the interlocutor, crumbling previous certainties.

Clearly Burawoy does not oppose professional sociology per se, but the drift it has taken. So much so that public sociology intertwines with other forms of sociology —professional, policy and criti-

1 For an instructive description of the atmosphere in which this presidential address was pronounced see Ollion, 2009.

2 Burawoy himself offers extensive evidence of this debate on his website (http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/PS.Webpage/ps.mainpage.htm). See also http://sociologicalimagination.org/resources/public-sociology-bibliography.

3 And we would also add generational, if we reflect on the following piece by Burawoy: "So equally we must appreciate the importance of the non-careerist underpinnings of careers. Many of the 50 % to 70 % of graduate students who survive to receive their PhD, sustain their original commitment by doing public sociology on the side —often hidden from their supervisor. How often have I heard faculty advise their students to leave public sociology until after tenure— not realizing (or realizing all too well?) that public sociology is what keeps sociological passion alive. If they follow their advisor's advice, they may end up a contingent worker in which case there will be even less time for public sociology, or they may be lucky enough to find a tenure track job, in which case they have to worry about publishing articles in accredited journals or publishing books with recognized university presses. Once they have tenure, they are free to indulge their youthful passions, but by then they are no longer youthful. They may have lost all interest in public sociology, preferring the more lucrative policy world of consultants or a niche in professional sociology. Better to indulge the commitment to public sociology from the beginning, and that way ignite the torch of professional sociology" (Burawoy, 2005: 15).

4 See Plato, *Apology of Socrates.*

cal— and therefore it does not reject professional sociology but completes it: “Herein lies the promise and challenge of public sociology, the complement and not the negation of professional sociology” (Burawoy, 2005: 4). At the same time, though, it would increasingly be characterized as something that escapes an absolute definition, and which strives to reinvigorate sociological tradition, to overcome cultural barriers and material and symbolic borders, developing, bottom-up, a global approach to social issues, against the tyranny of the market (and of the state): “The success of public sociology will not come from above but from below [...]. I envision myriads of nodes, each forging collaborations of sociologists with their publics, flowing together into a single current. They will draw on a century of extensive research, elaborate theories, practical interventions, and critical thinking, reaching common understandings across multiple boundaries, not least but not only across national boundaries, and in so doing shedding insularities of old” (Burawoy, 2005: 25).

It is therefore a question of developing a public sociological style made up of severe criticism, open-mindedness and the construction of a common path with the various publics which such a proposal not only contributes to engaging in debate, but also to creating[5].

Although reiterating in the text the need to safeguard the reflective dimension of sociology, threatened by the instrumental one —“I believe it is the *reflexive* dimension of sociology that is in danger, not the instrumental dimension. At least in the United States professional and policy sociologies —the one supplying careers and the other supplying funds— dictate the direction of the discipline” (Burawoy, 2005: 18)— on several occasions the author argues that “despite the normalizing pressures of careers, the originating moral impetus is rarely vanquished, the sociological spirit cannot be extinguished so easily” (Burawoy, 2005: 5).

Therefore, a proposal emerges which, in our opinion, rests from the outset on the following pillars:

a) The recovery of the most clear and direct sociological tradition, with authors such as Durkheim, Du Bois, Mills, Bourdieu, which acts as a moral ideal for the younger generations of sociologists.

b) The importance of the category of public, intended both as the opposite of private and as the public towards which and with which sociologists must operate: “The interest in a public sociology is, in part, a reaction and a response to the privatization of everything. Its vitality depends on the resuscitation of the very idea of ‘public’, another casualty of the storm of progress” (Burawoy, 2005: 7).

c) A clear-cut standpoint in favor of civil society, defended and valued by Public Sociology against State and Market: “If the standpoint of economics is the market and its expansion, and the standpoint of political science is the state and the guarantee of political stability, then the standpoint of sociology is civil society and the defense of the social. In times of market tyranny and state despotism, sociology —and, in particular, its public face— defends the interests of humanity” (Burawoy, 2005: 24).

d) Because of its tradition and the notion of public, the need for public sociology to overcome the limits of methodological nationalism —Beck is another author often quoted by Burawoy— or of US parochialism in order to link up with other sociologies, helping both European and American sociologies to emerge from their provincialism, and non-European countries to rise from their minority status, through, as stated in a 2008 contribution, the protagonism of the local, regional and national dimension reconciled within a global synthesis: “Contesting domination at all levels depends on the valorization of local, national and regional sociologies, allowing voices from the periphery to enter into debates with the center” (Burawoy, 2008: 443),

5 In a passage he affirms: “Indeed, part of our business as sociologists is to define human categories —people with AIDS, women with breast cancer, women, gays— and if we do so with their collaboration we create publics. The category woman became the basis of a public —an active, thick, visible, national nay international counter-public— because intellectuals, sociologists among them, defined women as marginalized, left out, oppressed, and silenced, that is, defined them in ways they recognized [...]. It is clear that public sociology needs to develop a sociology of publics” (Burawoy, 2005: 8).

and thus becoming both champion of global civil society and global proposal.

As regards this last point, retracing the debate and the production collected over the years, as well as Burawoy's self-same standpoints —including a 2016 article with the significant title *The Promise of Sociology*— we can say that basically, right from the beginning and even more so in recent times, he wishes to contribute to a debate concerning the role of sociology in the global arena, an aspiration which is totally consistent with the assumptions of his original proposal. We saw previously that sociology is the guarantor and expression of civil society: either it is global or it is not.

This is certainly an ambitious and acceptable program, especially for a discipline such as sociology; one which is young compared with other disciplines, and subject to a constant danger of being colonized, or to other internal proposals of self-reform[6]. A program which —and Burawoy is absolutely aware of this— lends itself to two types of danger. In addition to the danger we previously underlined —institutionalization of the proposal and therefore weakening of its moral fiber— also to the criticism and widespread skepticism which his proposal would have raised and something which then duly occurred.

Obviously, during these years, Burawoy engaged in a fierce intellectual battle to defend his proposal and the replies that he elaborated against his critics have been many, an unequivocal sign, once again, of the vitality of a debate concerning the foundation of sociology in our time triggered by the American sociologist.

Among the many criticisms[7] that have been addressed to Burawoy, it should be remembered first of all that his proposal is not original, insofar as the term public sociology was coined at the time by H. Gans and presented during his presidential address at the ASA in 1988; not only, it has a long history and other protagonists such as Agger (2000). The merit of Burawoy certainly consists in having recovered the term and having made it popular at a critical moment for the discipline. Another problematic aspect regards the way in which Burawoy deals with certain categories, such as those of state, civil society, market and professional sociology. The impression, in fact, is that he treats them as homogeneous and basically ahistorical concepts, counterposing, for example, civil society —of which public sociology makes itself defender— to the state and the market; or public sociology to professional sociology. In actual sociological practice, in fact, professional sociology develops —contrary to Burawoy's claims— in civil society more than in universities.

Likewise, according to Prentice, the idealization of civil society leads Burawoy to some excesses and contradictions. First of all, "Burawoy's rejection of the state [...] makes some sense in the context of a liberal welfare regime. It is, however, surprisingly unhelpful where nation-states act differently and so —as both cause and consequence— publics engage differently with the state. Burawoy is 'thoroughly hostile' to the state. He demonizes the state largely as a counterpoint to his celebration of civil society [...]. He valorizes civil society through a rhetorical and conceptual opposition to state-focused activism and thus dismisses sociology that engages critically with public policy. European social scientists have developed strong relationships with public policy and the many movements that target the state".

Moreover "Burawoy reproduces the neoliberal conviction that the state is always and only beleaguering, coercive, and despotic [...]. Beyond demonizing the state, Burawoy also romanticizes civil society" (Prentice, 2014: 143).

A similar reasoning can be made for the concepts of globalization and neoliberalism, taken as monolithic and absolute concepts. Reasoning in these terms, there emerges an underlying limit of his proposal, namely the idea that public sociology responds more to an invocation, a call to romantic arms, a vague revolutionary calling for change, instead of coherent arguments that would seek to reform the sociological discipline epistemically.

6 On several occasions, in his contributions Burawoy talks about the attempts to reform Sociology, among which he quotes the one suggested by Wallerstein of breaking-up sociology into social sciences (see Burawoy, 2008).

7 Obviously, the critical bibliography is extremely broad and can be summarised in the expression used by Burawoy: *public sociology wars* (Burawoy, 2009). Among the most critical we can mention Deflem (2005) and Tittle (2004).

As has been stated, "Burawoy's text often reads more like an emotive manifesto or an urgent appeal to our sociological conscience, rather than a fully-fledged rational argument or account of the current climate in which sociology is practiced and made" (Fatsis, 2014: 50).

Finally, a non-secondary limitation of his proposal lies in the contradiction between the will to overcome provincialism and American parochialism and, secondly, in the fact that public sociology is typically an American proposal —Burawoy himself says it— which demonstrates the cultural power of the United States throughout the world, precisely the power which Burawoy would like to resize and provincialize!

According to Prentice, "Burawoy's model fails to recognize its Americanism, even as he calls for a '21st century public sociology of global dimensions' and encourages the decentering of America. While acknowledging that the very term 'public sociology' is an American invention, Burawoy misrecognizes the scope of the phenomenon [...]. He takes his own national context for granted" (Prentice, 2014: 141).

And she continues: "The fourfold division of sociology makes sense in only some settings, and is far from a transnational reality, an assumption relied upon by Burawoy and many of his adherents" (Prentice, 2014: 142).

In a very recent contribution, Lozano states that "Burawoy admitted that this term is an 'American invention' —I assume he meant a US invention— unnecessary in other contexts where it is taken for granted that intellectuals will engage their expertise in public debate beyond academic boundaries [...]. He is aware of that and acknowledges that when he speaks about public sociology outside the US [...], the common reaction is that 'my audiences look at me nonplussed. What else could sociology be, if not an engagement with diverse publics about public issues?' [...]. He also recognizes the hegemonic role of US sociology, and its enormous impact upon other national and regional traditions [...]. He is obviously aware of these problems, but I think that they continue to shape his own work; to a great extent, he reproduces what he criticizes by seeking to universalize a concept based on the particular experience of US sociology" (Lozano, 2018: 97-98).

Lozano emphasizes an aspect that many non-American sociologists have very clear: for them, public sociology in their respective countries, is an everyday reality, and has been practiced for a long time, without it being necessary to theorize it.

In the end, therefore, the question of public sociology seems to be more an American preoccupation than a question of world sociology.

Despite the numerous criticisms, almost no one questions the relevance of the Burawoy proposal and the ambitions that inspire it.

For our part, we believe that in order that the ambitious program should not fail, it is necessary for public sociology to aim at reforming itself by taking on a reflexive role —*i. e.* reflecting on itself, its epistemological foundation, its purposes— and that it needs to become aware of some of the problematic nodes that the critical debate aroused over time has gradually brought to light. In our opinion, it can be traced back to what we call the *fundamental dualism* that runs through it and which we will try to clarify.

This fundamental dualism may be found in three different dimensions:

a) The communicative dimension, *i. e.* the distinction between sociologists and the public.

b) The ethical-political dimension, the distinction between the instrumental and reflective dimensions of sociology so dear to Burawoy.

c) The epistemological dimension, the distinction between local and global sociological practices, between an epistemology of the North of the world and one of the South.

This dualism risks, in particular, frustrating the global and democratic aspirations of public sociology, and not being of help to those regions of southern Europe which the recent global economic crisis has revealed to be countries that belong to the South of the world rather than the North. As Sousa Santos argues, because of their history they are in a condition of subjection to the countries of the North: "The Global South is not a geographical concept [...]. The South is rather a metaphor for the human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism on the global level, as well as for the resistance to overcoming or minimizing such suffering.

It is, therefore, an anti-capitalist, anti-colonialist, anti-patriarchal, and anti-imperialist South. It is a South that also exists in the geographic North (Europe and North America)" (Sousa Santos, 2016: 18).

Let us start now with analysis of the three dimensions.

THE COMMUNICATIVE DIMENSION

Burawoy draws a distinction between two types of public sociology, based on two distinct publics. He immediately avoids the trap of a first explicit dualism, underlining how these two sociologies are in close contact, arguing that "between the organic public sociologist and a public is a dialogue, a process of mutual education. [...] Traditional and organic public sociologies are not antithetical but complementary. Each informs the other" (Burawoy, 2005: 8). His proposal, however, does not elude a second type of dualism which is implicit and deeper. In order to introduce this we must first define, according to Burawoy, the two sociologies from the point of view of a public.

He defines its traits and purposes thus: "In [...] what I call *traditional public sociology* we can locate sociologists who write in the opinion pages of our national newspapers where they comment on matters of public importance [...]. With traditional public sociology the publics being addressed are generally invisible in that they cannot be seen, thin in that they do not generate much internal interaction, passive in that they do not constitute a movement or organization, and they are usually mainstream. [...] There is, however, another type of public sociology - *organic public sociology* in which the sociologist works in close connection with a visible, thick, active, local and often counter public [...]. The recognition of public sociology must extend to the organic kind which often remains invisible, private, and is often considered to be apart from our professional lives. The project of such public sociologies is to make visible the invisible, to make the private public, to validate these organic connections as part of our sociological life". And he goes on to say that "we should not think of publics as fixed but in flux and that we can participate in their creation as well as their transformation" (Burawoy, 2005: 7-8).

The critical debate immediately highlights the risks that derive from such a distinction. They reside not so much in the distance between the two types of public sociologies —a risk which Burawoy avoids by affirming the complementarity between the two types— but in the distance, in the empty space which could originate between each type of sociological discourse —and therefore scientific— and the public, between the sociologist and his audience, as the latter often lacks the skills to understand the sense of sociological language.

If in fact it is already difficult to communicate and to be understood by a public of university students —the *par excellence* audience of professional sociology— it is even more so if we think of the public that is generated by the two types of sociology which Burawoy is talking about. At this point, either a solution which reconciles the two parts is found, or there is the risk that scientific sociology will be watered down with the risk of losing its scientific criteria, betraying in some way that classic tradition which inspires it.

Burawoy obviously does not admit this risk, but its presence can be deduced from the critical debate we were referring to and which developed, in relation to this specific communicative aspect, in two directions. On the one hand, the insistence with which some authors have emphasized the need to simplify the matter of sociological language, on the other, the attempts made by others to try to overcome this implicit dualism.

As concerns the first point, the question of language is undoubtedly fundamental, *i. e.* the choice of a simple and direct language. An author like Furedi (2009) claims that the public sociologist must "resist the prevailing anti-populist prejudices that inform the thinking of the cultural elites. Respect for the public is important" (p. 182), while Gans claims that "the abstracts of our journal articles and the summaries of our academic books [should] be written in non-technical English [and not] in 'Sociologese'" (social jargon) (as cited in Mayrl and Westbrook, 2009: 153). Furedi (2009) argues that "language and attitude to language is crucial. One of our tasks is to convey complex ideas in a simple —not simplistic!— form. Nor is it simply the case of taking our sociology to a wider audience. It is also a question of developing a sociology that is open-ended and able to yield to new experience" (p. 183).

As concerns the second point, the hypotheses formulated are among the most varied. We start from the notion of *amphibious sociology* (Garavito, 2014: 157), a "sociology capable of breathing in the two worlds of academia and the public sphere, of synthesizing the two lives of the sociologist into one, without drowning in the process. In making the case for amphibious sociology, I single out the need to increase the types of texts and forms of diffusion of sociological work in order to take advantage of a world that is increasingly multimedia and, thereby, advance the project of public sociology".

He seems to perceive the dualism ("I believe that one of the principal reasons for which public sociologists suffer from dispersion and burnout is that the valid formats for the academic world —indexed journal articles and books in university presses— have a language and communication codes that differ markedly from those that their other audiences expect —such as readers of newspapers, social movement leaders, marginalized communities, television viewers or the anonymous public of social media—. The distance between these formats is so great that to be relevant in different worlds one must live two (or more) parallel lives") and the need to deal with a language which is increasingly affected by the presence of internet and in general of social media, to the point of proposing his solution: "In the face of this dilemma, one solution is to cultivate intermediate genres of writing and diversify the formats in which the results of public sociology are disseminated. The first implies producing texts that are legible for a wider audience, without losing academic rigor. The second means that public sociology must be a multimedia sociology. As an amphibious animal moves from one natural medium to another, so the amphibious sociologist translates his or her work products to different publication media, from books and articles to videos, podcasts, blogs and online classes. In both cases, the goal is to synthesize his or her efforts in products that can be circulated in both academic audiences and the public sphere" (p. 163).

Further on, he translates this amphibious sociology into practical advice: "The opportunities to fill this gap are multiple. For example, the fact that internet users spend more than 80 % of their time online watching videos creates a valuable opportunity for amphibious sociology. Given that public sociologists have access to situations and people that are interesting for broad audiences, all they need to do is incorporate a video camera into their toolbox, along with the tape recorder and notebook. In this way they can generate valuable images that can be used in classes, training courses for marginalized communities, evidence in legal proceedings, or as accompaniments to texts that result from the research" (p. 164).

Garavito mentions the difficulty of being understood by the public, a difficulty which each of us, in our capacity as professor and scholar of sociology, can daily measure in our sociological practice[8].

He also refers to the role of the media. In this last case, it consists of a field of analysis, themed by some authors, whose proposals are also aimed at the theming and possible overcoming of the dualism to which we referred. In short, social media as an intermediary tool. For example, after underlining the novelty represented by social networks "and Internet as a communicative tool, which is a completely new medium to reach the public", Schneider (2014) points out that "the problem is to build an 'e-public sociology' —a form of public sociology that through the use of social media merges traditional and organic forms of public sociology, allowing sociologists to become simultaneously both a generator and interlocutor of dialogue with publics" (p. 206).

Schneider claims that "sociologists are at a crossroads. The emergence and proliferation of social media in the past few years prompt us to reexamine our roles and commitments as sociologists and teachers. Are we obligated simply to study the impact of these media upon society, or might we also consider utilizing these media to disseminate knowledge and interact with various publics, including our students? What function do

8 The writer tried his hand at a home-made practical experiment of public sociology in prison, thereby inferring the risks and what we are discussing.

these media now play in our role as professional sociologists? Critical sociologists? Policy sociologists? Public sociologists? The use of social media connects the traditional and organic forms of public sociology where the sociologist is vehicle for generating dialogue within and among publics as well as public sociology in which the sociologist is the interlocutor. Social media consist of a hybrid of traditional and organic forms of public sociology, a form of social media interaction among publics that can be either public or private" (p. 208).

He concludes: "I refer to this form as e-public sociology where the distance between organic and traditional public sociology is pragmatically exceeded by the network's own configuration: Social media *bridge* the two genres of public sociology, advancing a new component, one that consists simultaneously of both organic and traditional elements of public sociology, or e-public sociology" (p. 218).

Healey (2017) seems to move along a similar line of reflection when speaking of the question of disintermediation: "I return here to some of the decade-old themes in Burawoy's manifesto. I shall argue that one of social media's effects on social science has been to move us from a world where some people are trying to do 'public sociology' to one where we are all, increasingly, doing 'sociology in public'. This process has had three aspects. First, social media platforms have disintermediated communication between scholars and publics, as technologies of this sort are apt to do [...]. Second, new social media platforms have made it easier to be seen [...]. Thirdly, new social media platforms make it easier for these small-p public engagements to be measured. They create or extend opportunities to count visitors and downloads, to track followers and favorites, influencers and impacts. In this way they create the conditions for a new wave of administrative and market elaboration in the field of public conversation. New brokers and new evaluators arise as people take the opportunity to talk to one another. They also encourage new methods of monitoring, and new systems of punishment and reward for participation. Universities and professional associations, for example, become interested in promoting scholars who have 'impact' in this sphere" (p. 771).

Finally, Gans (2015) raises the problem of the different types of public and identifies the journalist as an intermediate element between students and those who have never heard of sociology: "The less educated public includes the rest of the population and the myriad of communication outlets that serve it, and it was once described as a mass audience and studied as mass communication. The so-called mass audience is hardest to reach, partially because it has often obtained only rudimentary instruction in social studies, but also because many sociologists are not trained to reach it. Status differences create yet further communication obstacles. Writing and creating content for this set of publics requires special skills that sociologists often lack. Consequently, most sociology that reaches this public takes the form of journalistic summaries". Public sociology "is any sociological writing or other product created by sociologists that obtains the attention of some of the publics that make up the general public [...]. Sociologists must understand how presenters make indirect and direct contact with their publics and when and why they try to present a sociological product as public sociology. Although some presenters keep in touch with a number of sociologists, others wait until they learn about something that calls for a sociologist. Presenters come in several varieties. The first and often initial presenters are teachers who assign sociological readings and now various digital products, some of which may have already attracted a general public. A second set consists primarily of journalists and their editors as well as columnists, op-ed writers, book reviewers and the like. The journalists are likely to be beat reporters who cover a social science, culture or lifestyle beat. They may also be free lancers who write about or draw on sociology and the social sciences for their work" (p. 7).

In our opinion, amphibious sociology, e-public sociology, disintermediation and the sociologist as a journalist all appear to be hypotheses ascribable to the risk that an empty space should open up, an unbridgeable hiatus between the producer of knowledge and the person(s) towards whom the scientific message is aimed (the publics). Mixing the cards, speaking of a knowledge generator who is also a user, identifying a new medium, ontologically new, which allows bridging the distance or the risk; identifying hybrid figures such as the journalist, all appear to be interesting and ingenious solutions to face a danger which is not easily avoided, as Gans (2015) admits: "All this is easier to propose than to practice, since the conditions under which journalists and sociologists work are so different that the virtues of one discipline are often impractical for the other" (p. 10); and —we may add— which questions the very meaning of the sociological discipline in the manner that it is interpreted, conceived and practiced by those who define themselves as sociologists.

THE ETHICAL-POLITICAL DIMENSION

This issue will be reflected in the relationship between values and politics, between what Burawoy calls the professional/instrumental dimension and the reflective dimension of sociology. As we know, it is a classification which helps Burawoy, on several occasions, to present as a unitary system the four types of sociologies which he proposes.

In this second case, a duality also emerges again, right between the instrumental and the reflective dimension. Following in particular Abbott's critique (2007), we see in what terms it re-proposes dualism and what solution Abbott hypothesizes. Although he recognizes the value of Burawoy's proposal, Abbott emphasizes his concern about "Burawoy's implicit association between critique/reflexivity and left politics" (p. 195). Burawoy's insistence on this almost Manichaean distinction distorts the real work of sociologists since it places them aprioristically in a political faction; on the contrary, "reflexive work is not necessarily left; it can also be to all intents and purposes apolitical. These facts raise problems for Burawoy because in the course of his analysis he more or less conflates the normative, the moral, and the political under the one head of the critical. By identifying critique with leftness, he equates [...] a particular politics with all of reflexivity. And since he attributes the legitimacy of critical sociology to its moral vision, he in effect also asserts that only opposition (*i. e.*, critique) is morally justified. It follows from this argument [...] that one cannot be in the professional mainstream and have moral vision or justification. Yet it is obviously possible to choose —morally, reflexively, and critically— to be in the dominant mainstream. One can be a heedless mainstream sociologist and even a cowardly one. But one can also be in the mainstream for moral reasons as profound as those that put others in opposition" (Abbott, 2007: 197).

This standpoint is based on a deeper one: "He is willing to separate instrumental and reflexive knowledge. I am not [...]. The division itself is both a cognitive mistake and a normative delict, because sociology is simultaneously a cognitive and a moral enterprise" (p. 217). Sociology is inevitably value-laden; it is a scientific enterprise that analyses the social world, which is also made up of values: "The value-ladenness of sociology thus lies not so much in the imposed values of the sociologists as in the fact that the social process is itself a process of values: not so much in the knower as in the known. There is, therefore, literally no such thing as 'professional sociology' —a sociology without any values in it—. Even the most apparently objective categories of analysis are just so many congealed social values [...]. I argue that sociology is at one and the same time a cognitive and a normative enterprise. When we pretend that it is not, our work becomes arbitrarily deformed [...]. If we recognize, then, that academic sociological research must inevitably be both instrumental and reflexive, we must ask what the right way is to enact this duality in practice. The simplest answer seems to be that cognitive and normative thinking must be perpetually succeeding phases in the research process. Any project and any scholarly life must see a continual succession of the one, then the other, then the one, and so on. We have to alternate between reflection —questioning our assumptions and in particular our value assumptions— and routine cognitive analysis" (pp. 199-202).

Burawoy's choice carries with it the risks of identifying a rigid hierarchy between values, and of attributing social action to that hierarchy, resulting in a political position. In contrast to this, Abbott proposes his idea of a *humanist sociology*: "The humanist sociologist is interested in understanding the social world (as a value enterprise) rather than in changing it. The humanist thinks it presumptuous of the sociologist to judge the rights and wrongs of others. [...] The project of understanding the social process —which is in itself a moral process and cannot be otherwise analyzed— is inherently a moral project, whether we go on to exercise our undoubted political right to urge change or not" (p. 204).

Once again, the proposal of a humanist sociology basically reflects the idea that the dualism of reflexivity/instrumentalism can be overcome by identifying an intermediate ground represented by the proposal itself, which is essentially based on the idea that professional aspects and values progress strictly intertwined. In the ethical-political field, dualism is a constant risk and it is overcome by means of a new approach, an approach which, by accepting the ideal and moral foundation of public sociology, rejects some maximalist positions and leads sociology back to the inextricable profession-value intertwining within the ordinary life of sociological practice.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION

This is the most delicate and interesting element of Burawoy's proposal because in his last reflections where he aspires to make public sociology a global sociology, the local, regional and global dimension of social problems must be reconciled. By taking a position in relation to this desired reconciliation, Burawoy sets himself within a debate which has been going on for some time concerning the role of social sciences —and sociology— in the age of global society, and on the juxtaposition —another dualism— between the sociology of the North of the world and of the South of the world, between the epistemology of the North and the epistemology of the South[9].

On several occasions, as we have seen, Burawoy underlines the global aspirations of (public) sociology and its vocation to become an interpreter and champion of civil society: "Without abandoning public engagement, sociology's challenge today is to go global. It can no longer be confined to a national container; it has to wrestle with the realities of global conflict and global inequality as they shape both its object of analysis and its practice as a science" (Burawoy, 2016: 950).

This program inevitably occurs, therefore, by abandoning the methodological nationalism and the provincialism of US sociology, and by giving value to other sociological voices, belonging to the countries of the South of the world. According to the author, it is necessary to develop a dialogue, once again, with other national sociologies, recognizing their local traditions or their aspirations to indigenize sociology: "We have to think in global terms, to recognize the emergent global division of sociological labor. If the United States rules the roost with its professional sociology, then we have to foster public sociologies of the Global South and the policy sociologies of Europe. We have to encourage networks of critical sociologies that transcend not just disciplines but also national boundaries"

9 With this term, Sousa Santos —one of the leading exponents of the contemporary debate on overcoming the sociological perspective centred on Western society— summarises his proposal of a thought that primarily invests the epistemological dimension and which identifies in some southern European countries realities similar to the countries of the South in general. In a recent contribution, Sousa Santos admits that through history "southern Europe became a periphery, subordinated in economic, political, and cultural terms to northern Europe and the core that produced the Enlightenment [...]. This has now become very visible with the financial crisis" (Sousa Santos, 2016: 17). Colonial domination is presented as a process which, among others, "involves the deliberate destruction of other cultures and the destruction of knowledge (besides the genocide of indigenous people); is what I call epistemicide: the destruction of the knowledge and cultures of these populations, of their memories and ancestral links and their manner of relating to others and to nature". Given that colonial domination passes through a multiplicity of strategies of destruction, including that of knowledge, he develops an analysis centred on epistemology: "That is why my thinking has increasingly turned to epistemological issues —that is, an engagement with the ways of knowing from the perspectives of those who have systematically suffered the injustices, dominations and oppressions caused by colonialism, capitalism, and patriarchy—. This is the definition I give of 'epistemologies of the South': a crucial epistemological transformation is required in order to reinvent social emancipation on a global scale. These evoke plural forms of emancipation not simply based on a Western understanding of the world" (p. 18).

(Burawoy, 2005: 22). Burawoy's ambition is to build "a 21st century public sociology of global dimensions" (Burawoy, 2005: 20).

The aspirations are obvious and can certainly be sustained. What seems less clear is how such a conciliation can actually be achieved, working to overcome another fundamental dualism running through Burawoy's proposal, of an epistemological nature, and similar to the previous ones. An empty ground, an empty space between the southern point of view and the northern one. The point of view of the North has dominated and now must be reduced and provincialized. But, to start from the perspective of the South risks re-proposing the same problems of unilateralism which were imputed to the North and making a common and not partial vision impossible, creating an empty space between the different points of view. Burawoy (2016) is aware of this difficulty ("the point, however, is to somehow do both to build ties to the local that sustains a critical engagement with the global. And this will be important not just for subaltern sociologies, but for the survival of sociology of and in the North, if it is to retain its relevance in an ever more globally connected world", p. 957) but does not seem to offer convincing solutions.

A HYPOTHESIS OF SOLUTION

In analyzing the three dimensions —communicative, ethical-political and epistemological—, a similar dualism emerged that undermines the effectiveness of action of public sociology: in other words, an empty space is created, a gap between apparently irreconcilable positions. For each area, criticism has become aware of this risk and has proposed some attempts at a solution. In particular, as regards the epistemological dimension, in which the dualism between the sociology of the North of the world and the sociology of the South of the world, between the epistemology of the North and the epistemology of the South, threatens to see the global aspirations of Burawoy's public sociology dashed, a hypothesis of solution has recently been formulated by J. Go (2016).

Let us briefly summarize Go's proposal, and then introduce our working hypothesis which tries to operationalize Go's proposal, particularly by using tools, categories and concepts typical of the hard sciences, in particular of mathematical analysis.

Starting from Burawoy's same purpose, *i. e.* the need for an intellectual revolution against the provinciality of social science, Go points out that "the premise of this revolution is that disciplinary sociology's concerns, categories and theories have been formulated, forged, and enacted within Anglo-European metropoles in the interest of those metropolitan societies, and so a new 'global sociology' that transcends this provinciality is necessary. [...] How can we craft sociologies that escape sociology's Anglo-European provenance?" (p. 1). After quoting Burawoy's proposal that "sociology should reach beyond its provincialism by scaling up the concept of civil society in order to analyze global civil society", he makes his own proposal, that is the *Southern standpoint*, grounded in a philosophical framework that he calls perspectival realism: "This is a social science from below; a sociology that starts not with the standpoint of the metropole but the standpoint of subjugated groups. There are two thus moves here: one, to explicate the basic idea of the Southern standpoint for overcoming sociology's provincialism, and two, rooting that strategy in an epistemological and ontological frame —perspectival realism— that renders this strategy feasible and desirable" (pp. 1-2).

This is obviously a proposal which introduces the Southern standpoint in order to avoid the risk of simply replacing the point of view of the North with that of the South —an intermediate point of view, although still belonging to the South— justifying it from an epistemological —and ontological— point of view through the use of a perspective such as that of scientific perspectivism which belongs to the philosophy of science (Giere, 2006).

"Perspectival realism as an ontology and epistemology upon which to mount the Southern standpoint approach" is attributable to the "scientific perspectivism in science studies and post-foundationalist standpoint theory as found in postcolonial and recent feminist thought" and has the merit of enabling us to "advance a Southern standpoint approach that draws upon the indigenous sociology and Southern theory movement without resorting to essentialism or relativism" (Go, 2016: 3).

This solution hypothesis arises from the awareness that the project of a global sociology, which appears to be a perspective to make sociology more adequate for a global setting although much debated and towards which the global sociological community seems strongly oriented, does not presuppose an easy solution to be reached: "But if there is agreement on the problem and the goal, there is less agreement on the route" (p. 7).

The "third stage" approach, studying the world from the standpoint of global civil society, has been criticized for globally replicating "theories constructed from and directed at the concerns and categories of Euro-American contexts [...] simply extending or scaling up prior categories and theories developed in relation to the Global North —such as 'cosmopolitanism' or 'civil society'"—; in its place an approach has been developed which pushes for an idea of sociology that is "native, turning to the experience, practices, and voices of subaltern populations and thinkers in the Global South to cultivate a more global sociology" (Go, 2016: 11). The problem, suggests Go, is that this approach risks falling into fallacies that are symmetrical to those of the North, so much so that although it has long been theorized it has never become established, and not only because the iron grip of the North maintains its material and symbolic hold on alternative points of view, but because it contains epistemological limits, precisely specular in relation to an epistemology of the North.

So, what, then, can be done? Go suggests drawing precisely from the Southern theory/indigenous sociology movement but articulate it with a distinct ontology and epistemology that can absorb the foregoing criticisms of the movement. He refers to this approach as the "Southern standpoint": "Standpoint theory highlights the social situatedness of knowledge [...]. By Southern standpoint, then, I mean a social position of knowing [rooted] [...] in geopolitics and global social hierarchy. It captures the position, and hence the activities, experiences, concerns and perspectives, of globally peripheral (*e. g.* colonized and postcolonized) populations. A Southern standpoint approach for global sociology would thus overcome metrocentrism by adopting the Southern standpoint as the beginning point for social theory, just as indigenous/Southern sociology would suggest" (Go, 2016: 14).

We can highlight two elements of this approach:

1) It *saves* the point of view of the South and therefore constitutes a perspective of indigenous/Southern sociology without the limits which have been alleged for it.

2) In order to save it, it resorts to a revision/explanation of its epistemological/ontological foundation, resorting to the philosophy of science, appropriately revisited and introducing the social entry point of analysis as the epistemological foundation of the Southern standpoint.

In fact, Go (2016) sees it thus: "What I refer to 'perspectival realism' can be seen as an extension of 'scientific perspectivism' —an ontology of scientific knowledge and practice that emerges from science studies and philosophies of science. Scientific perspectivism offers us at least two important insights for our purposes. First, it enables us to find a *middle ground between the extremism of 'objective realism' on the one hand, and radical 'constructivism' in science on the other*[10]. While 'objective realism' insists that there are truths in the world to be discovered and that the truths primarily come in the form of laws, 'constructivism' holds that truths are discursively (*i. e.* socially) constructed by scientists [...]. Scientific perspectivism claims that what scientific inquiry and research actually shows us is that 'truths' are the convergence of the physical world on the one hand and the scientists' 'perspective' on the other and that, therefore, the perspective of the scientist-observer is paramount. The claim, in short, is that knowledge is always perspectival yet also objective. Knowledge arises neither from pure objectivity or subjectivity but from the convergence of the observer's perspective and the objective world" (p. 15).

This is a remarkable step forward in terms of theory of knowledge and epistemology because, as is indicated in the line in italics, it overcomes the realism-constructivism dualism by identifying a middle

10 Italics added by us.

ground between the two extremes, precisely that intermediate ground which, in our opinion, Burawoy's proposal greatly requires in order to be considered epistemologically and politically effective.

The next step, in Go's reasoning, is to adapt this perspective to social knowledge: "My proposition is that social knowledge is also subject to the same epistemological principles, and that recognizing this offers a warrant for a Southern standpoint approach. But to make this work, we must be able to extend scientific perspectivism to apply to social science [...]. So how can we translate it into sociology? In particular, we must ask: where do the different 'perspectives' that ultimately yield new knowledge come from? For Giere, the different perspectives arise from different 'means of observation' or instruments. What about social science? Drawing upon post-positivist standpoint theory [...] I argue that the social science equivalent to what Giere refers to as 'perspective' is the *social entry point of analysis*; or, in other words, the *standpoint of analysis*" (Go, 2016: 17).

In this case, Go suggests a politically neutral perspective which supports the Southern standpoint from an epistemological point of view.

It has many advantages: first of all, it eschews essentialism for the more basic sociological claim that all knowledge is shaped socially. Post-positivist standpoint theory replaces the biological determination of standpoints with a recognition of social determination. Whatever the type or form of "context", "the basic shared insight is that all knowledge is socially shaped in one way or another —it is socially-situated— and post-positivist standpoint theory extends this premise to society as a whole. It is not just that the dynamics of the fields of science or the lab shape knowledge, it is that different social positions within society each offer different perspectives or standpoints. Different social positions mean that different groups of individuals have different experiences, and different experiences contribute to different perspectives. What one sees is shaped by where one stands within society" (p. 19).

The second difference with conventional standpoint theory is that post-positivist standpoint theory eschews the belief in epistemic privilege. Post-positivist standpoint theory does not claim that certain standpoints offer superior, better, or more complete knowledge; only that "they offer different knowledge. [...] In other words, all knowledge is socially positioned; so-called objective reality can be differentially perceived —or 'known'— in the sense that different aspects of the same thing might be viewed or discovered as opposed to others" (p. 20).

Based on these assumptions, Go believes that "post-positivist standpoint theory and scientific perspectivism can be articulated together as a warrant for a subaltern standpoint approach that does not fall prey to the criticisms leveled against Southern theory and indigenous sociology. [...] Different social positions contribute to different perspectives —that is, different standpoints—. [...]. Different social identities are afforded distinct experiences and hence lenses by which to view the world. These different standpoints [...] offer respectively different perspectives. They each allow us to see in the world in a certain way, highlighting some things but not others, and helping us to interpret the meaning of some things in ways that might be different from the interpretations that other social experiences might afford" (p. 21).

The distinct lens or social experience constituting standpoints are the necessary bases for social knowledge and hence theory construction; they each offer the data or meanings that in turn enable us to theorize and understand. They enable us to construct a "map" of the social world based upon that original place avoiding any essentialism.

Moreover, "to admit of standpoints is to recognize that dominant social science knowledge —that is, the knowledge attendant with conventional disciplinary sociology or Anglo-European social theory— represents one standpoint (or perhaps a set of standpoints) among others; and that those other possible standpoints have too long repressed, excluded and marginalized. There is never a single totalizing map; only different maps representing different subject positions and hence offering different points of entry for social knowledge. Hence, a standpoint is a perspective that is, as perspectival realism insists, the only ground for even so-called 'objective' knowledge" (p. 22). Further, advocating for different maps does not necessarily mean that every map is right, because "the partial character of knowledge does not mean all knowledge is equally true: that is to say, the co-existence of different theories, rooted in different standpoints, does not necessitate epistemic relativism. Scientific pluralism permits multiple objectivities" (p. 23).

Go's conclusions resume the overall sense of his approach: "If it is widely accepted that some kind of global sociology is needed to advance social knowledge and transcend sociology's parochial origins, it is less clear how to do so. This essay follows the route paved by the indigenous sociology/Southern theory movement and completes it by advocating for a Southern standpoint approach. [...] This essay thereby suggests that the indigenous sociology and Southern theory movement has it right: one way to overcome social science's Northern provincialism and cultivate a more global sociology is to listen to voices from beyond social science's initial domain of metropolitan centers and root social theory in the experiences of other populations besides metropolitan elites in the Global North. But it also mounts the approach upon perspectival realism. This offers a number of advantages and pushes the project of Southern theory further along [...]. It allows us to listen to propose something akin to indigenous sociology/Southern theory without falling into the traps of essentialism. A standpoint is a relational position, not an essence [...]. Finally, perspectival realism as the epistemology and ontology of a Southern standpoint approach not only helps to absorb critiques that would otherwise plague indigenous sociology/Southern theory, it also gives an epistemic warrant to the project of globalizing sociology. It uniquely articulates the epistemic necessity of global sociology. [...]. A Southern standpoint approach, rooted in perspectival realism, [...] suggests that we need to open up sociology to voices from the global south for better knowledge. Theories, concepts and analyses based upon the Southern standpoint are thus needed not just for political, ethical or identity reasons but also for reasons that all social scientists can get behind: a larger repertoire of knowledge by which to think about and engage the social world" (pp. 33-34).

This hypothesis obviously aroused a broad debate[11]. For our part, we limit ourselves to supporting a proposal which moves in agreement with Go's and with his choice to draw on some constructs of hard sciences, in particular of mathematical analysis. Our work in progress hypothesis is inspired in particular by Go when he claims that "rooting the social point of analysis in an epistemological and ontological frame —perspectival realism— renders this strategy feasible and desirable" (Go, 2016, 2), *i. e.* a standpoint of analysis that acts as an intermediary element between different levels, a standpoint of analysis that represents a middle ground between the extremism of "objective realism" on the one hand and radical "constructivism" in science on the other.

Here, it seems to us that a similar role can be played by a concept of mathematical analysis named "neighborhood of a point (circle or complete neighborhood)". It is an open interval, centered in a real number. The reference point is called the center of the neighborhood, the half-width of the interval is called the radius of the neighborhood. The interval or neighborhood of a point can be opened to the left or to the right, and the radius can be specified or not, in which case we will talk about *Xo* and radius *e* as the set of *X* points which are less than *Xo*, to the left or to the right. In other terms, the neighborhood of a point is a useful concept to identify the idea of a point close to a limit, with borders and at the same time open, a reference point and an area around that point which acquires an own value and meaning thanks to this point.

What seems interesting to us is that it is a concept which, if translated on the social level (social neighborhood), has at the same time the characteristics of a point positioned in space and open to the right or left, therefore it is a fixed point which defines the points (real numbers in analysis) around it that are such by virtue of the point itself. The definition of closed neighborhood, open to the left or to the right, appears similar to Go's when he speaks of a standpoint of analysis, a point of view from which to look; or a social entry point of analysis, which therefore possesses those intermediate, partial and at the same time non-relativistic characteristics which allow a reconciliation of opposites. It attempts to operationalize the Go proposal for the following reasons:

11 See the debate included in *Sociologica*, 2016, 2.

1. It resorts to a neutral concept of mathematical analysis that can function as an epistemological foundation to social theorizations, in particular introducing in sociological analysis the notion of "neighborhood of a point" (circle or complete neighborhood), identifying the concept of an open set/range, but bounded by a radius and centered on a precise point. Transforming the mathematical notion of "neighborhood of a point" into the notion of "social neighborhood of a point" allows us to identify a sufficiently flexible range and at the same time defined concept in order both to look at and connect the local dimension to the regional and global dimensions.

It avoids the risk of falling into forms of essentialism or relativism, provides a flexible tool for sociological analysis and at the same time is sufficiently scientifically founded to apply it to all those conditions in which it is necessary to identify a portion of social space, delimited by a boundary, which is necessary as a starting or observation point to proceed in a broader reflection. Like the construct developed by Go, it functions as a reference system in social space, from an intermediate point of view, from a neutral position to which to anchor itself in order to proceed with the analysis and construction of broader cognitive perspectives, avoiding any subjectivism. In fact, taking up what Go says about his construct: "It is the standpoint that matters, not the identity of those who are standing" (Go, 2016: 33).

2. Although it is necessary to perfect this hypothesis, relying on certain constructs of the philosophy of science or of analysis (in this case) seems very useful, not to return to forms of positivism which are now outdated but to develop transdisciplinary analyses and to use particularly useful concepts in these fields.

3. Coming to the use that can be made of it, in the face of the limits of public sociology we have highlighted, this concept is a working hypothesis to be pursued to respond to the goal of making public sociology an instrument capable of responding to the need to make sociological knowledge relevant and applicable to global, regional and local problems. Combining this notion with Go's notion, it avoids the risk of making the viewpoint of the South of the world —and also of southern Europe— either a mere reflection of the North or of repeating the same self-referential error of what it wishes to eliminate (just the metrocentrism).

CONCLUSIONS

The main goal of our article has been to show how a properly reformed public sociology can contribute to the enhancement of southern Europe, including in this last definition all the countries which, for economic and historical reasons, can be assimilated to the South of the world.

In order to do that we engaged in a reflection organized in three parts. First of all, we have seen how Burawoy's proposal has achieved great success in recent years, but at the same time, precisely because it deeply questions the very meaning of sociological discipline and its practice, and because it aspires to offer itself as a global perspective, it has prompted a wide-ranging debate and provoked considerable criticism, substantially linked to the simplistic use of the categories, for example, of civil society, of professional sociology. Furthermore, this proposal is based on a contradiction: on the one hand it aspires to free itself from methodological nationalism, on the other it is the product of a national sociology like that of the United States.

In the second part, by fully drawing on the current debate, we have limited ourselves to highlighting an underlying dualism which we think runs through it, particularly within three dimensions: communicative, ethical-political and epistemological.

Regarding the first dimension, what emerges is the risk of an increasing distance, an empty space which could originate between each type of sociological discourse —and therefore scientific— and the public, between the sociologist and his/her audience, as the latter often lacks the skills to understand the sense of sociological language. Many attempts at a solution for bridging the gap have been formulated (the amphibious sociology of Garavito, the disintermediation of Healey, etc.), attempts in which awareness of a dualism between the producer of knowledge and the person(s) towards whom the scientific message is aimed (the publics) is clearly present. This is a dualism that questions the very meaning of the sociological discipline in the manner that it is interpreted, conceived and practiced by those who define themselves as sociologists.

Regarding the second dimension, the ethical-political dimension, a duality emerges again, precisely between the instrumental and the reflective dimension of the sociological practice. The solution suggested by Abbott and which we have briefly summarized, shows, through the idea of a humanist sociology, that we are facing a dualism analogous to the first, a gap, an empty space between two apparently irreconcilable positions and thus, in order to overcome this dualism, we need to identify an intermediate ground, represented in this case by Abbott's proposal, which is essentially based on the idea that professional aspects and value progress are strictly intertwined.

The third aspect we have treated concerns the global aspiration of a public sociology. Here we see how such aspirations can be frustrated by the difficulty in bridging the space between the sociology of the North of the world and of the South of the world, between the epistemology of the North and the epistemology of the South, not to mention the connection to be sought among local, regional and global dimensions. It is evidently and above all an epistemological and cognitive problem that the author followed in this last part and attempts to fill by using the construct of the *Southern standpoint of analysis*, based on a solid scientific perspective like that of perspective realism. Beyond the solutions formulated by the literature for every single aspect, we have shown in the third part how this dualism can be traced back to the same logic, *i. e.* the risk of leaving a gap between different analysis, proposal or perspective planes: the risk of misunderstanding between the sociologist and his/her public, what he/she says and proposes is not understood by the public, it falls on deaf ears; there is the risk of subordinating the sociological debate and the action of the sociologist to a Manichaeism between a reflexive and an instrumental dimension which once again prevents grasping the mixed nature of sociological practice; and finally the difficulty in identifying a solution to the attempt to reconcile the local, regional, national and global dimensions of sociology, allowing the proposal of a truly global sociology.

Starting from the epistemological dimension in particular, we have closely analyzed a mediating and overcoming suggestion which draws on the philosophy of science and on which we have grafted our work in progress proposal defined by the concept of *social neighborhood*. It brings together an epistemological and mathematical dimension with a posture/positioning which allows us to begin reflection from a point of view which is at the same time both open and circumscribed.

We are convinced that it is necessary for Burawoy's proposal to take into account these dualisms, which should be corrected and attempted to be overcome if it wishes to maintain the effectiveness and the fascination that critics in any case acknowledge for it. This is why we reiterate how public sociology, aware of such methodological limits, can be a formidable tool for reviving the role of sociology as public knowledge, as an antidote to the neoliberal drift, and above all as a means for expressing the view of southern European societies without falling into the trap of an epistemology of the South which, criticizing the epistemology of the North, risks re-proposing the same dangers of self-referentiality that it wants to overcome, thus negating any global aspiration of public sociology.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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Artículos / *Articles*

Las políticas culturales en el sur de Europa tras la crisis global: su impacto en la participación cultural / *Cultural policies in southern Europe after the global crisis: its impact on cultural participation*

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RESUMEN

El último tercio del siglo XX supuso el inicio de un proceso de convergencia en la formulación y en la implementación de las políticas culturales de los países del sur de Europa con respecto al norte. Sin embargo, la crisis global ha conllevado un retroceso en los indicadores de participación cultural, rompiéndose la tendencia de la europeización de esta política pública. Analizamos desde un enfoque comparado, como la densidad institucional de la educación artística no formal, el sistema formal educativo y el tipo de gobernanza de los equipamientos culturales, determinan, además de los recortes públicos en la cultura, la mayor caída de la participación cultural en el modelo de política cultural sur europeo en relación con los modelos liberal, nórdico y centroeuropeo.

Palabras clave: modelo sur europeo de política cultural; europeización; participación cultural; consumo cultural; actividades artísticas.

ABSTRACT

The last third of the 20th century marked the beginning of a process of convergence in the formulation and implementation of the cultural policies of the countries of southern Europe with respect to the north. However, the global crisis has led to a decline in the indicators of cultural participation, breaking the trend of Europeanization of this public policy. From a comparative perspective, we analyse how the institutional density of non-formal artistic education, the formal educational system and the type of governance of cultural facilities determine, in addition to public cuts in culture, the greatest fall in cultural participation in the southern European cultural policy model in relation to the liberal, nordic and central European models.

Keywords: *south cultural policy model; europeanisation; cultural participation; cultural consumption; artistic activities.*

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INTRODUCCIÓN

Uno de los retos del campo académico que relaciona las investigaciones sobre política cultural y el consumo cultural es el de la supuesta relación entre una vida cultural participativa y su grado de correlación con un pensamiento crítico de la ciudadanía y unos valores cívicos y democráticos. Ciertamente, la literatura científica ha sido muy escasa a la hora de explicar cómo la participación cultural en todas su dimensiones (desde la más pasiva como es el consumo hasta la más activa, la de realizar prácticas artísticas) puede contribuir a la adquisición de una ciudadanía crítica (Ariño y Llopis, 2016). Sin embargo, pese al déficit académico, hay un interés por parte de los Estados europeos por vincular los valores democráticos de una ciudadanía activa e instruida con las prácticas culturales en las sociedades inclusivas. En este sentido el proyecto *The Indicator Framework on Culture and Democracy (IFCD),* desarrollado por el Consejo de Europa como resultado de una decisión de la Conferencia de Ministros de Cultura del Consejo de Europa de 2013, es una evidencia de ello.

Así, los estudios de Bourdieu sobre el consumo cultural en Francia fueron pioneros en la literatura internacional sobre el consumo cultural y a su vez servían de una retroalimentación a las políticas culturales democratizadoras del Ministerio de Cultura francés (Fabiani, 2007). Posteriormente, se ha desarrollado una escuela a nivel mundial de estudios del consumo cultural en ambas orillas del Atlántico. Los trabajos sobre el consumo cultural de Bourdieu y su escuela (Coulangeon y Duval, 2015; Coulangeon y Duval, 2013), los trabajos de Oliver Donnat a partir de las estadísticas francesas (2004) o los estudios de Roose y Lievens (Roose *et al.*, 2012) acerca de los cambios contemporáneos, DiMaggio y Mukhtar en Estados Unidos (2004), Chan y Goldthorpe en Gran Bretaña (2007), entre otros, permiten establecer ciertas teorías y regularidades empíricas acerca de las bases sociales del gusto y la prevalencia y fuerte vinculación con el nivel educativo. También, con otras variables que se correlacionan con la clase profesional-directiva de las capas profesionales y técnicas intermedias (*White collars*) y el entorno urbano. Asimismo, en el Estado español debemos resaltar los trabajos de Ariño (2010) y Ariño y Llopis (2016, 2017), como un paso fundamental en el estudio y actualización de las teorías del consumo cultural en el contexto español.

Sin embargo, este artículo pretende de manera tentativa analizar la participación cultural de forma holística vinculando el consumo, las prácticas artísticas, y los tipos de gobernanza en los equipamientos culturales según modelos de política cultural previamente establecidos en anteriores trabajos y considerar la variable educativa en este contexto institucional y no de manera aislada y prevalente, tal como se ha venido conceptualmente elaborando hasta ahora en la literatura sociológica. Ello lo hacemos contextualizando las prácticas artísticas y los consumos culturales de forma comparada por países en Europa en el contexto histórico de la crisis global, poniendo el acento en los países del sur como un modelo de política cultural.

Asimismo, partimos de la tesis de que la crisis de 2008 ha supuesto un parón en los procesos de convergencia europea en lo que se refiere a las políticas públicas (Verney y Bosco, 2013; Zambarloukou, 2015) y en el propio proceso de europeización de los países del sur de Europa, que abarca prácticamente el siglo XX. Definimos europeización en el campo de las políticas culturales partiendo de la definición de Sassatelli como la combinación de una convergencia en los objetivos de la política cultural de los países europeos que participan en la UE, con su mayor implicación con los proyectos desarrollados por la Comisión Europea que, finalmente, pretenden generar si no una identidad común europea sí una consciencia de "unidad en la diversidad" (Sassatelli, 2002; Sassatelli, 2007). Asimismo, se trata de un proceso histórico que se da tanto en Grecia, Portugal y España cuyo objetivo de ingresar en la entonces Comunidad Económica Europea desde la recuperación de las democracias conllevaba un afán por obtener los índices de calidad de vida y de participación democrática, que se correlacionan con la participación cultural en sus distintas dimensiones. La modernización de los países del sur de Europa debía consistir no solo en la integración económica de un mercado común europeo, cosa que se produjo en la década de los ochenta, sino también en alcanzar los indicadores de participación artística y cultural que se daban en los países del norte en un entorno democrático.

En este contexto, Europa aparece asociada a las ideas paradigmáticas de progreso y democracia ya antes de la constitución en 1957 del núcleo de la Comunidad Económica Europea. Posteriormente, esta voluntad de imitar el modelo europeo se ha ido construyendo y ampliando a partir de los procesos de institucionalización europea y la adopción de sus normas, sus formas y estilos de hacer política (Graziano y Vink, 2008). Así, podemos hablar de un proceso de europeización de los países del sur de Europa (K. Featherstone y Kazamias, 2001; K. Featherstone y Radaelli, 2003). Este proceso común fue liderado en estos países por gobiernos de color socialdemócrata que convirtieron la política cultural en un programa para fomentar la cohesión social y nacional así como un escaparate de los procesos de modernización y de reivindicación de una imagen nacional más positiva alejada de un pasado reciente muy asociado al atraso y el autoritarismo (Rubio-Arostegui, 2003; Zorba, 2009). En el caso de Grecia, Portugal y España, la década de los setenta coincide con la caída de las dictaduras militares y el inicio de una institucionalización de la política cultural a partir de la configuración de los Ministerios de Cultura y una tendencia centralista muy acusada en dichos países (Rubio-Arostegui, 2008). El caso de Italia presenta rasgos diferenciadores con respecto al ciclo histórico de la caída de la dictadura y el centralismo como consecuencia de la configuración de un país reunificado en el siglo XIX (Dal Pozzolo, 1999).

Como reconocíamos al comienzo, este trabajo es deudor de otro precedente acerca de la convergencia de la política cultural en los países del sur de Europa y de un modelo de política cultural con una cierta definición de rasgos comunes (Rubio-Arostegui y Rius-Ulldemolins, 2018) en el que se analizaban los siguientes ejes: *a)* ambición y nivel de intervención del Estado en la cultura (incluyendo el nivel de agencialización *vs.* control); *b)* nivel de centralización y articulación territorial de las políticas culturales, y *c)* orientaciones básicas respecto a la democratización *vs.* democracia cultural, tradición y patrimonio *vs.* nuevas orientaciones vanguardistas. Asimismo, los casos de Portugal, España, Italia y Grecia presentan el denominador común histórico basado en la influencia francesa en la formulación e implementación de las políticas culturales a partir de los setenta (Dal Pozzolo, 1999; García *et al.*, 2016; Konsola, 1988; Konsola, 1999; Rubio-Arostegui, 2005). Esta influencia inicial va perdiendo consistencia a partir de los años noventa en mayor o menor medida, comenzando a adoptarse algunos rasgos del modelo liberal de política cultural (Mangset, 2009) y los postulados de la Nueva Gestión Pública (Belfiore, 2004).

OBJETO, FUENTES DE INFORMACIÓN, METODOLOGÍA

El foco del análisis de este artículo está puesto, por tanto, en la cultura institucionalizada, la cultura objetivada, la cultura que promueve el Estado en sus distintos niveles de gobierno e instituciones culturales, que ha de ser socializada a través de un proceso de aprendizaje más o menos formal o no formal. Es evidente que en la sociedad global y la cultura digital es posible hablar de diferentes culturas más o menos populares e institucionalizadas o legitimadas. Pero las instituciones públicas europeas (los gobiernos multinivel) desde mediados del siglo XX con distintas orientaciones de política cultural que van desde la democratización a la democracia cultural, han tendido a converger en fomentar, cuando no a proveer directamente, la cultura institucionalizada: la protección y conservación del patrimonio histórico-artístico, artes escénicas, artes musicales, artes plásticas y visuales, y las industrias culturales clásicas: cine y libro. Estos lenguajes artísticos con una dimensión simbólica y mercantilizada se han ido institucionalizando no solo a través de las políticas culturales sino también en las propias instituciones educativas como la propia universidad[1]. Asimismo, no podemos des-

1 Algunos países europeos, como el caso de España y al final del franquismo, la formación de las bellas artes quedó integrada en el catálogo de estudios universitarios, incluso las artes escénicas que han tenido un periplo histórico más ligado a la educación no formal comienzan a integrarse en el espacio universitario con el proceso de Bolonia, si bien la educación superior artística (los conservatorios superiores cuentan con un estatus no universitario y diferenciado en el marco de la educación superior).

deñar el tránsito de esta cultura analógica al paradigma de lo digital en esta cultura legítima pues es evidente que la comunicación con los públicos de cualquier equipamiento hoy en día es a través de la tecnología digital tal como hemos analizado en los teatros públicos en España (Rubio-Arostegui y Rius-Ulldemolins, 2018).

Así, nuestro propósito es el de testar en primer lugar cómo el impacto de la crisis global ha afectado a la cultura promovida en los Estados europeos del sur que tienen un modelo propio de política cultural diferenciado (Rubio-Arostegui y Rius-Ulldemolins, 2018) del nórdico, central y liberal, ciñéndonos en la dimensión de la participación cultural, tratando de encontrar, en segundo lugar, cómo otras variables de la propia política cultural consolidan un entorno institucional constreñido que hace difícil un proceso de europeización en la vida cultural de los países del sur de Europa analizados. En la literatura sociológica sobre el consumo cultural (Ariño Villarroya, 2010; Coulangeon y Duval, 2013; Donnat, 2004; Roose *et al.*, 2012) hay un relativo consenso sobre qué variables son las que condicionan el consumo como en mayor medida es el nivel de estudios (capital educativo) y en menor medida, la residencia en entornos urbanos, el género y la ocupación profesional. En este artículo, por el contrario, acudimos a otras variables del entorno institucional que repercuten directamente en el consumo cultural como son en primer lugar, los índices de las prácticas culturales, la gobernanza y eficiencia de los equipamientos culturales, en segundo lugar, y el sistema educativo, en tercer lugar, no en tanto como recurso explicativo del consumo, como mostrar de modo muy limitado algunas características que ofrecen resistencias al cambio y al progreso en los países del sur y que pueden ser objeto de un análisis más profundo en trabajos futuros.

Aunque los recortes en las instituciones y programas culturales y las políticas de fomento básicas a través de la herramienta de la subvención han tenido lugar en toda Europa, podemos avanzar que los efectos y el impacto del recorte público son mayores en los países del sur de Europa que en la media de la Unión Europa. Tal como muestran los datos, la crisis de 2008 tiene un efecto correlativo en la participación cultural, profundizando si cabe las diferencias entre los países del sur de Europa sobre el resto de las democracias europeas occidentales. Si atendemos a una de las dimensiones de la participación como es el consumo cultural podemos observar a través de la construcción de un indicador sintético que la caída del consumo cultural tras la crisis global de 2008 es un fenómeno común en toda Europa, si bien es porcentualmente más decreciente en los países del sur. Este indicador sintético se ha construido a partir de las encuestas europeas (Eurobarometros de 2007, año anterior a la crisis y 2013) sobre la pregunta de la percepción de los europeos de al menos haber consumido al menos una vez en el último año sobre los siguientes campos de actividad[2]: *a)* visitas a galerías y museos; *b)* lectura de libros; *c)* visitas a las bibliotecas públicas; *d)* asistencia a conciertos; *e)* asistencia al teatro; *f)* asistencia al cine, y *g)* asistencia a la ópera y danza.

Dicho indicador promedia la caída del consumo en cada país analizado. Asimismo, estas siete variables se correlacionan precisamente con aquellos sectores culturales que históricamente son los más regulados y financiados por parte de los Estados europeos de su creación a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XX; aquello que comúnmente se ha denominado como el "corazón cultural" compuesto por las bellas artes y las artes visuales, las artes escénicas y la música, el patrimonio cultural histórico-artístico y las industrias culturales clásicas como el libro y el cine. Los datos comparados que obtenemos del Eurobarómetro 399 muestran en valores absolutos de consumo las pautas culturales de los países del sur de Europa (Figura 1) frente a otros modelos de política cultural (liberal, nórdico, central), lo que viene a redundar la tesis de un modelo de política del sur diferenciado del resto

2 Estadísticamente es el porcentaje de población más representativo que expresa un mínimo valor positivo de consumo ya que en muchos casos es mayor el porcentaje de los no-consumidores (p. ej., en el caso de la asistencia a Ballet, danza y ópera la media europea de los que no asisten nunca es del 81 % frente al 19 % que han asistido al menos una vez al año). Asimismo, no consideramos los casos de mayor consumo (más de cinco veces al año), si bien su análisis puede testar las tesis de omnivorismo cultural y su perfil cuantitativo en los países europeos.

RES n.º 29 (1) (2020) pp. 33-48. ISSN: 1578-2824

Figura 1. Perfil del consumo cultural. Porcentaje de la población que refiere consumir "al menos una vez al año" en Europa según modelos de política cultural.



Fuente: elaboración propia. Eurobarometro 399.

de los países europeos que se suma a las tesis de Rubio-Arostegui y Rius-Ulldemolins (2018). Ello se sumaría a otras características del modelo sud-europeo: una homogeneidad del porcentaje del PIB de los gastos culturales y porcentaje de los gastos culturales del gasto público en el sur de Europa con respecto a la media europea, una fuerte tendencia del gasto cultural al patrimonio histórico y cultural que es fijo y que no suele ser suficiente para cubrir las necesidades de protección de estos países y, finalmente, una rigidez en la gestión de los equipamientos culturales, ligada a una ineficiencia en la gestión de los grandes equipamientos culturales tal como muestran comparativamente en los teatros de ópera Rius-Ulldemolins y Hernández (2015). En este trabajo se evidencian los costes por espectador y coste público por espectador en los teatros del Teatro Real de Madrid y el Gran Teatre del Liceu de Barcelona frente a la Royal Opera House de Londres y la Opera National de París. El caso del Palau de les Arts de Valencia es considerado como un elefante blanco ya que triplica los costes con respecto a los casos mencionados.

Los datos más significativos de acuerdo con la figura son: la lectura de libros es la práctica cultural más extendida, si bien las diferencias entre los países del sur y del norte es de veinte puntos porcentuales. Este porcentaje es menor en el caso del cine, pero en general, en todas las prácticas analizadas se da una diferencia porcentual sensible entre el sur y el norte, si bien el modelo nórdico tiene una diferenciación a su vez entre el liberal y el centroeuropeo que también se correlaciona cuando analicemos las prácticas artísticas.

Pero la cuestión no está en analizar las dinámicas propias del consumo en los sectores culturales ni tampoco detenernos en esta regularidad empírica que es histórica, sino en tratar de evidenciar cómo la distancia en algunas formas de participación cultural y en el caso de la cultura promovida por el Estado se ha profundizado más como consecuencia de la crisis global. Así, observamos (Figura 2) cómo el indicador sintético de caída del consumo es mayor en los países del sur de Europa con respecto a la media europea y frente a otros países representativos de los modelos nórdico, liberal y centroeuropeo, si bien la caída es mucho más ponderada en España, respecto de Italia, y sobre todo, Grecia y Portugal, países donde la crisis económica ha sido más profunda en otros indicadores sociales y económicos y como constatamos en este trabajo presentan también

Figura 2. Indicador sintético de la caída del consumo cultural: 2007-2013.



Fuente: elaboración propia. Eurobarometros 2007 y 2013.

debilidades institucionales en el ámbito de la educación no-formal de las prácticas artísticas, que acaban afectando al consumo cultural. Sin embargo, podemos constatar por otro lado que, pese a los recortes en la cultura —que también han tenido lugar en el Reino Unido— el consumo no se ha resentido (valor 0) en el periodo de crisis analizado. El descenso también se produce en los países que representan el modelo centroeuropeo y el nórdico si bien de manera mucho menos significativa que en los países del sur de Europa. El consumo cultural, siendo menor en los países del sur de Europa, además ha caído porcentualmente más en el periodo de crisis global. Es esta una evidencia del proceso de no convergencia en las prácticas culturales del sur de Europa y a su vez un indicador negativo persistente de la orientación democratizadora de las políticas culturales.

Si atendemos a las razones por las que los europeos no consumieron más o no pudieron consumir, que se consideran en el Eurobarómetro observamos (Figura 3) que no hay diferencias significativas —salvo el caso de Portugal— entre la media de la UE y al resto de países del sur de Europa, si bien son ligeramente mayores que los países representantes del modelo liberal. De ello se deduce que la ausencia de una socialización con las artes no parece ser un elemento diferenciador de los países del sur de Europa frente al resto de modelos de política cultural. Es "la falta de interés" junto a "la falta de tiempo" las principales razones que aducen los europeos para no consumir más cultura, si bien esta última parece tener una connotación que remite a un relativo interés hacia la cultura que no es prevalente en todo caso en sus decisiones del consumo.

Donde sí, por el contrario, parece haber una diferencia mayor entre los países del sur frente al resto de los europeos es por el lado de la oferta, en el sentido de que la frecuencia de la respuesta es mucho mayor. En la encuesta referida, las respuestas que apuntan a unas condiciones deficitarias, escasas o en malas condiciones de la oferta cultural son porcentualmente menores que las que se refieren a falta de interés o falta de tiempo, pero tal como muestra la figura son porcentualmente mayores en los países del sur. Esta dificultad de acceso a la oferta cultural puede apuntar a una deficiente democratización territorial de la cultura de dichos Estados. En los casos representativos de los modelos centroeuropeo, liberal y nórdico el indicador sintético es menor del 10 % mientras que en los países del sur de Europa superan el 14 %, llegando casi al 20 % en el caso de Grecia. Si atendemos a los sectores, hay que reseñar los casos del teatro en Grecia (40 %), España y Portugal (31 %); en el cine el déficit de la oferta llega hasta el 42 % en España, Grecia (30 %) y Portugal (32 %). Estos datos deberían ser objeto de atención por parte de los gestores culturales y los responsables políticos.

Figura 3. Indicador sintético del promedio en las respuestas "Falta de interés" en no consumir cultura.



Fuente: elaboración propia. Eurobarometros 2007 y 2013.

Figura 4. Indicador sintético del promedio en las respuestas "oferta deficitaria o en malas condiciones" en no consumir cultura.



Fuente: elaboración propia. Eurobarometros 2007 y 2013.

LA PRÁCTICA EN ACTIVIDADES ARTÍSTICAS Y CULTURALES Y SU REPERCUSIÓN EN EL PROPIO CONSUMO CULTURAL

Del mismo modo que acontece en el consumo cultural, las prácticas artísticas de los europeos han descendido ligeramente en el periodo comparado. El Eurobarómetro clasifica el conjunto de la población en cuatro categorías (muy alta, alta, media y baja). Los porcentajes de la figura ilustran las diferencias cuantitativas significativas de los países del sur de Europa en relación con los modelos liberal, centroeuropeo y nórdico, en donde se evidencian variaciones entre los países que representan modelos diferentes de política cultural. Contrasta, por ejemplo, el caso de Dinamarca, país en el que la población con una práctica cultural alta y muy alta llegue casi al 40 % del conjunto de la población frente a los casos de Grecia, Portugal e Italia en donde la suma de ambas es irrelevante. Asimismo, ello supone un correlativo índice bajo de práctica cultural que se ensancha hasta más de la mitad de la población de los mismos países. También, tal como planteamos en el enfoque de este artículo, ello tiene una influencia directa en el propio consumo cultural y, por tanto, en los propios ecosistemas de las artes y las industrias culturales clásicas.

Tal como hemos abordado en el ámbito del consumo cultural, el efecto de la crisis global también se evidencia con una evolución ligeramente negativa que consiste en un trasvase de población de los niveles más altos de práctica cultural a los más bajos, como muestran los datos del Eurobarómetro, si bien como también acreditábamos en el caso del consumo cultural, el modelo liberal es el menos afectado por el efecto de la crisis global. En todos los países del sur analizados, la población con un índice bajo de práctica cultural es mayor que en la media europea, si bien hay que señalar que España presenta valores mucho más ponderados que Italia, Portugal y Grecia.

Si la literatura científica ha vinculado durante algunas décadas, ya desde los trabajos de Bourdieu, el consumo cultural con las bases sociales del gusto artístico, por el contrario, apenas podemos encontrar literatura que vincule el efecto de la práctica artística en el propio consumo. De hecho, el Eurobarómetro y otras encuestas sobre consumo y prácticas artísticas no relacionan el efecto que tiene el ejercicio de la práctica sobre el propio consumo, algo que podría evidenciarse en el diseño de la encuesta de forma sencilla. Así, partimos del axioma que es una inconsistencia conceptual entender la práctica y el consumo cultural de forma aislada y no relacionada. Además, entendemos

Figura 5. Porcentaje de la población según el índice de práctica cultural.



Fuente: elaboración propia. Eurobarometro 2013.

Figura 6. Porcentaje de la población con un índice bajo de práctica cultural e incremento en el periodo 2007-2013.



Fuente: elaboración propia. Eurobarometro 2013.

que en este binomio no se da una relación de tipo coordinada sino subordinada. Consecuentemente, los que practican algún tipo de actividad artística necesariamente son consumidores culturales y no la inversa. En otras palabras, la práctica artística contiene necesariamente un *a priori* que no es otro que un gusto por dicho lenguaje artístico. Dedicarle horas a la práctica amateur de un instrumento musical o al dibujo o la pintura indefectiblemente implica un tipo de vocación que incluye necesariamente una actitud, un interés hacia dicho lenguaje artístico y una consecuente predisposición necesaria y suficiente en consumirlo. Ni qué decir tiene que, si nos adentráramos en la percepción y experiencia estética de los que practican el arte, podríamos constatar la adquisición de ciertas claves y recursos que carecen los no-practicantes (Zakaras y Lowell, 2008). Por otro lado, esta relación conceptual subordinada entre práctica y consumo culturales no se da en sentido contrario pues es evidente que existen consumidores culturales que no practican ninguna actividad artística (también podríamos establecer analogías con la práctica deportiva y el consumo de espectáculos deportivos). La ineficiencia de las políticas culturales de orientación democratizadora (centradas en la oferta cultural) se ha ido paliando a través del desarrollo institucional del campo de la educación artística no formal (que sensibiliza la demanda de forma secundaria) y que tiene un efecto consecuente en el consumo cultural, si bien aún todavía no podemos precisarlo con exactitud. De este modo, si en el caso del consumo cultural la literatura ha puesto de relieve el determinismo del nivel educativo, en el caso de la práctica artística el factor más importante pasa más por la consistencia y densidad institucional de la educación no-formal que por los sistemas educativos, pues el papel de la educación artística en los sistemas educativos europeos (Robinson, 1996) ha sido históricamente muy débil y se encuentra además en retroceso si tomamos como referencia el número de horas semanales que tienen en el currículum de la enseñanza obligatoria en los países europeos[3].

3 De hecho, en España la LOMCE elimina la obligatoriedad de cursar Educación Artística en Educación Primaria, y Música en Educación Secundaria, otra cosa es que las Comunidades Autónomas en el papel que les corresponde hayan optado por mantener dicha materia.

Esta densidad institucional de la educación artística no-formal, que determina las prácticas artísticas es la variable que parece explicar que estén más democratizadas entre los países del norte y, particularmente, en los nórdicos. Un indicador fidedigno de calibrar las dimensiones de la educación artística no formal lo encontramos en el ámbito musical. Los datos disponibles, a pesar de las deficiencias en la comparación de los datos por países de la Asociación de Escuelas de Música Europeas (EMU, 2010) permiten establecer las diferencias institucionales entre los países del norte y el sur de Europa:

a) No hay representación por parte de asociaciones de escuelas de música de Portugal y Grecia, que son los países que presentan un índice más bajo en práctica artística, lo que indica una desconexión con los temas que afectan a la enseñanza musical, sus discursos sobre la sociabilidad de la música, las competencias profesionales de los docentes, entre otros temas, y, sobre todo, los discursos sociales del presente sobre la práctica de la música y otras artes conexas.

b) Los países representativos de los modelos de política cultural (Alemania, Dinamarca, Reino Unido) presentan indicadores muy superiores relativos acerca de las agrupaciones musicales surgidas de las escuelas (coros, *big bands*, grupos de pop, étnicos, etc., frente a los casos italiano y español.

c) Los porcentajes de alumnos jóvenes que practican música en las escuelas de música son muy superiores a los países del sur.

d) Las escuelas de música, sobre todo en el modelo nórdico y centroeuropeo, sirven asimismo como escuelas de danza, teatro y la digitalización musical. Ello explicaría la diversidad de prácticas artísticas del Eurobarómetro sobre todo en los países nórdicos, frente un modelo artístico menos diversificado y menos evolucionado en los países del sur.

e) Se constata una sensibilidad hacia los alumnos desaventajados social o económicamente o con diversidad funcional.

f) El porcentaje de la financiación de las escuelas por parte de las entidades locales es mayor en los casos de Dinamarca y Alemania que en los casos de Italia y España; no hay datos sobre Reino Unido. El resto de la financiación recae en la mayoría de los casos en la financiación por las tasas de matrícula de los padres. El papel de la Administración General del Estado en la financiación es muy débil o subsidiario en casi todos los países, salvo en algunos países excomunistas.

g) En algunos países nórdicos como el caso de Dinamarca la educación y la práctica musicales están protegidas por una ley educativa.

h) Las páginas web están actualizadas con actividad continua y presencia en las redes sociales en los países del norte de Europa. En el caso de la italiana y la española son menos dinámicas y no están actualizadas. Las últimas noticias de la asociación española son del año 2014.

Asimismo, cabe reseñar el caso de las escuelas de arte en el Reino Unido, que si bien forman parte del sistema forma educativo (educación formal), las mencionamos en este epígrafe por su papel decisivo en el ámbito informal. Frith y Howard (1987) analizaron cómo las escuelas de arte —que forman parte del nivel de la Educación Superior— tuvieron un papel destacado en la formación artística y cultural de los británicos desde la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Estas escuelas acogían a aquellos hijos de la clase obrera con talento, que fracasaban en la cultura escolar de la educación formal y encontraban en las escuelas de arte un entorno propicio para el desarrollo de su personalidad artística. Además de desempeñar un papel democratizador en prácticamente toda la segunda mitad del siglo XX, las escuelas de arte formaron el sustrato del desarrollo de la industria musical británica, ya que en ellas se gestaron buena parte de los grandes grupos pop de los años sesenta (The Beatles, entre otros) y de las vanguardias posteriores del pop (*glam, punk, indie,* etc.). Sin embargo, Banks y Oakle (Banks y Oakley, 2016) subrayan que tras la absorción por parte de las universidades de muchas de las escuelas de arte en el marco de las reformas de corte neoliberal de la educación en el Reino Unido, en el siglo XXI prevalece una lógica más elitista y menos democratizadora en el acceso.

EL SISTEMA EDUCATIVO: INDICIOS NEGATIVOS DEL PAPEL DE LAS ARTES EN EL CURRÍCULUM Y DESIGUALDAD SOCIAL PERSISTENTE QUE AFECTA A LAS PRÁCTICAS CULTURALES

Hemos referido que la literatura científica sobre el consumo cultural constata que el nivel de los estudios es el predictor de un mayor índice de las prácticas culturales. El objetivo en este epígrafe es el de ofrecer muy limitadamente algunas evidencias de que la ineficaz democratización cultural, orientación básica de la política cultural, que lleva implícita el valor de equidad social, se relaciona con algunos rasgos o indicios de los sistemas educativos nacionales, que constreñirían la igualdad de oportunidades en materia de participación cultural. Así, Fernández Enguita (2016) reitera que la influencia de la clase social en el logro académico es otra de las constantes empíricas en la literatura de la sociología de la educación y es un indicador clave que determina la permanencia en el sistema educativo. El corolario, según el autor, es que hoy en día el sistema educativo no satisface las expectativas de movilidad social. Ello parece cerrar esta lógica tautológica, es decir, el sistema educativo no cumple la promesa social de igualdad social, pese a la escolarización prácticamente universal en los Estados europeos, y tiene, por tanto, un consecuente efecto al no revertirse la desigualdad histórica en la participación cultural.

Esta polarización entre las clases sociales más y menos favorecidas y la influencia en la clase social de la procedencia que tiene en el rendimiento escolar se observa también en las expectativas de logro de los estudiantes, pues sabemos que las expectativas son socializadas en la familia y además la literatura de la sociología de la educación pone de manifiesto que las expectativas de los padres en el logro académico de los hijos es el indicador preponderante en los resultados académicos. Si acudimos a las expectativas de los alumnos de acuerdo a las categorías de modelos de política cultural, la figura muestra cómo entre aquellos estudiantes que quieren obtener un título universitario hay una mayor diferencia entre los procedentes de padres cuyos empleos son más

Figura 7. Diferencias porcentuales entre hijos de trabajos cualificados y no cualificados que esperan obtener un título universitario.



Fuente: elaboración propia. *PISA 2015 Results (Volume III) Students' Well-Being,*. OECD 2017.

cualificados (*white collar*) de aquellos padres menos cualificados (*blue collar*).

Tal como muestra la figura, hay una mayor polarización de las expectativas de los estudiantes de la educación obligatoria acerca de alcanzar un título superior en un futuro, siendo mayor en los países del sur que en la media de la OCDE y los países del sur de Europa. Las diferencias de las expectativas universitarias entre los hijos de los trabajadores cualificados con respecto a los menos cualificados tienden a ser menor en el norte de Europa que en el sur, lo que da una muestra de una mayor desigualdad de clases en los países del sur, pues las expectativas de obtener un título universitario son menores en las clases sociales más desfavorecidas. Ello, consecuentemente, tiene un efecto en las prácticas culturales de la vida adulta.

Por otro lado, hemos observado a través del Eurobarómetro de 2013, cómo el modelo liberal de política cultural (UK) es el que menos se ha resentido en un contexto de crisis global tanto en el consumo como en la práctica artística. Sin embargo, podemos encontrar ciertos indicios negativos de la presencia de las artes en el sistema educativo británico que se distingue de otros modelos europeos sobre todo del sur de Europa por su presencia y valor en el currículum. Así, en un informe de 2017 de la entidad no lucrativa *Cultural Learning Alliance* (CLA) muestra que la demanda de los alumnos de secundaria en Inglaterra está cayendo a los niveles más bajos en la última década. Entre 2010 y 2017 el descenso en las distintas promociones es de una media del –28 %, que se distribuye en: Arte y Diseño (–6 %), Danza (–41 %), Diseño y Tecnología (–43 %), Teatro (–24 %), Medios/Cine / TV (–30 %), Música (–17 %) y Artes Escénicas (–37 %)[4].

Desde hace más de veinte años se han sucedido diversos estudios comparados sobre el papel y el peso de la educación artística (Robinson, 1996; Eurydice, 2009) que muestran en Europa el estatus relativamente menor en el currículum. Los últimos datos comparados son los que aporta Eurydice (2009) en los que el peso de las artes en los contenidos curriculares, la mitad de los países europeos dedican entre cincuenta y cien horas por curso en el nivel de primaria y entre veinticinco y setenta y cinco horas por año en el nivel de la secundaria inferior. Además de las horas dedicadas en el curso, otro eje de análisis del estudio es la vinculación de la escuela con los agentes de las artes (equipamientos culturales, artistas, grandes proyectos educativos en las artes) aspecto clave a la hora de tener experiencias socializadoras de primera mano, algo crucial de cara a la socialización del arte en los niños. Habiendo diferencias entre los países del norte y del sur, destacan aquellos países con un ecosistema cultural coordinado, fluido con el sistema educativo de la educación obligatoria, en donde confluyen proyectos educativos promovidos por las instituciones culturales principales y por el conjunto más o menos extenso de la educación no formal en el campo de las artes y la cultura. Así, en el Reino Unido podemos encontrar evidencias de un conjunto de proyectos nacionales de educación artística en los últimos años con un impacto mediático en internet[5].

Otro indicador de la relevancia de la educación artística es su impacto e interés en el ámbito académico. En este sentido hay que destacar la numerosa producción en el Reino Unido a través de los Consejos de las Artes y en el conjunto de entidades no lucrativas cuyos fines son los de la educación artística. Asimismo, el fuerte desarrollo de los *cultural studies* en Gran Bretaña, ha tenido como consecuencia un incremento de la producción académica acerca de las artes, la cultura y la educación. También, en los países nórdicos hay una notoria investigación sobre la pedagogía de la creatividad, la investigación en la estética y su vinculación con la escuela si la comparamos con la escasez de referencias académicas en los países del sur tal como refiere un informe de la Agencia de la Cultura Danesa (2014)[6].

4 https://culturallearningalliance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Patterns-in-GCSE-entries-2010-to-2017-England-only.pdf.

5 Algunos de ellos disponen de evaluaciones acerca de su impacto social, artístico y educativo: Music Manifesto, Film Club, Learning Outside the Classroom, First Light, Mediabox, In Harmony, U.DANCE, Arts Awards, Artsmark, Music Standards Fund, Creative Partnerships, Find Your Talent, Reading Matters.

6 https://slks.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumenter/KS/Boern/Mapping_of_Nordic_Research_on_Culture_and_Creativity.pdf.

GOBERNANZA DE LOS EQUIPAMIENTOS CULTURALES SEGÚN MODELOS DE POLÍTICA CULTURAL: EFICIENCIA Y MODERNIZACIÓN *VS.* INMOVILISMO

Uno de los grandes instrumentos de la política cultural son los equipamientos culturales, en los que se condensan en gran medida los retos, logros y déficits de los modelos de políticas culturales. Sin embargo, estos han pasado de ser concebidos como un espacio de contacto entre el gran arte y la ciudadanía y, por tanto, un instrumento de democratización cultural a ser también una bandera de la regeneración urbana, la modernización y la creación de marca territorial o la atracción turística global (Evans, 2003). Por tanto, este elemento que ha sido común en todos los países avanzados se ha expresado de forma especial en los países del sur y, en especial en el Estado español, en los que los equipamientos culturales han sido a veces más pensados para el turista internacional que para los consumidores internos y la satisfacción de sus derechos de acceso y participación cultural (Rius-Ulldemolins *et al*., 2016).

Sin embargo, a nivel europeo podemos observar diferencias de partida y evoluciones muy diferenciadas que facilitan o bien dificultan la participación cultural. Así, en los países anglosajones y centroeuropeos los equipamientos culturales, a pesar de estar considerablemente centralizados en grandes ciudades, se han renovado en su gestión y se orientan a desarrollar espacios abiertos a la ciudadanía en términos arquitectónicos (grandes *halls*) dando cabida a la alta cultura, a las expresiones más subculturales o bien a programas orientados a la participación, bajo el impulso y la evaluación de la administración titular (Rius-Ulldemolins y Rubio-Arostegui, 2013). Por otra parte, en el modelo francés el Estado sigue desarrollando potentes redes de equipamientos, especialmente las *scénes nationales* y ofrecen una oferta cultural variada y rica en todo el territorio estatal. Por el contrario, en el Estado español y en otros países del sur hay una gran dificultad para reorientar los grandes equipamientos que siguen bajo una gestión burocrática, en gran medida indiferente a las necesidades del público y sin una orientación por parte de los gobiernos más allá de la reducción de gastos (Rius-Ulldemolins y Rubio-Arostegui, 2016). Así, en el sur muchos de los equipamientos más dinámicos (La Caixa en España, Gulbenkian en Portugal, por ejemplo) son impulsados por fundaciones privadas, aunque también suponen un reconocimiento de la debilidad del Estado y una omisión en responder a los derechos sociales y culturales cada vez más limitados por la crisis y los recortes (Rubio-Arostegui y Rius-Ulldemolins, 2018). En todo caso, la realidad de los equipamientos culturales del sur de Europa contrasta con el modelo nórdico en el que prima la participación en la cultura en un sentido especialmente integrador, tolerante e igualitario (Duelund, 2008). En este caso la institución cultural central de este modelo es la biblioteca pública como expresión del modelo de democracia cultural que, a pesar de que también ha asumido el rol de elemento bandera para la regeneración y el *branding* urbano, ha sabido combinarlo con una propuesta abierta al servicio la ciudadanía (Kangas y Vestheim, 2010). Estos equipamientos de gran éxito tienen amplios espacios, horarios con espacios abiertos e híbridos entre la ciudad y el espacio cultural y a los nuevos usos de la juventud y la infancia, con espacios de juego y lectura combinados. También contrasta con la gobernanza de los equipamientos y el papel de los patronos en el modelo liberal anglosajón en el que el patronato (*board*) responde a una representación pluralista de los agentes implicados en cada infraestructura artística o cultural y se complementa con una dirección artística y en donde se constata unos mejores indicadores de evaluación de la gestión y rendición de cuentas, frente al modelo de los equipamientos de sur de Europa, caracterizado por una gobernanza en la que no tiene cabida ni el pluralismo de los agentes ni la evaluación de la gestión (Rius-Ulldemolins y Rubio-Arostegui, 2016).

CONCLUSIONES

Las políticas culturales democratizadoras de los Estados europeos han tenido una cierta tendencia a la europeización. Los gobiernos multinivel han tendido desde distintas herramientas a fomentar la cultura y facilitar y democratizar el acceso a los ciudadanos desde la evidencia de una desigualdad basada en la clase social y el capital educativo. Se trata en todos los casos con sutiles diferencias de una cultura institucionalizada, la cultura objetivada, la cultura que promueve el Estado en sus distintos niveles de gobierno e instituciones culturales, que ha de ser socializada a través de un proceso de aprendizaje más o menos formal o no formal. Una de las herramientas democratizadoras radica en el apoyo más o menos directo por parte de los Estados a las profesiones artísticas (Menger, 2016), si bien se está erosionando como consecuencia de los recortes de los presupuestos públicos, el tránsito a la cultura digital, un incremento de los *outsiders* artistas frente a un mercado en contracción y una participación cultural menguante tal como demuestran las encuestas europeas.

Uno de los objetivos principales de este artículo es el de mostrar los efectos de la crisis global, de los recortes en la financiación en las instituciones y programas culturales y las políticas de fomento, algo generalizado en todos los países de Europa han afectado más a los países del sur de Europa que en la media de la Unión Europa, profundizando si cabe las diferencias entre los países del sur de Europa sobre el resto de las democracias europeas occidentales, siendo menos afectado el modelo liberal de política cultural anglosajón.

Este trabajo viene a reforzar la tesis de Van Heck y Kraaykamp (2013) al ir un poco más allá de establecer que la variable dependiente del consumo cultural está determinada por la independiente que es el nivel educativo, pues encontramos otros factores institucionales que afectan a la participación cultural tales como los propios modelos de política cultural, los recortes en los presupuestos públicos, la polaridad de las expectativas de logro educativo universitario entre los hijos de las clases medias y altas frente a las bajas, la densidad y dinamismo de la educación artística no-formal y, finalmente, la gobernanza de los equipamientos culturales. Estos factores institucionales constriñen y perfilan los modelos de política cultural europeos establecidos (Rubio-Arostegui y Rius-Ulldemolins, 2018) y tienen como efecto una divergencia en la vida cultural de los europeos en lo que respecta a la participación cultural en los países del sur de Europa, en los casos de Portugal, España, Italia y Grecia.

Tal como hemos observado en este trabajo, existe una homología entre aquellos países cuyo índice de práctica cultural es elevado con un consumo cultural más extenso y, por tanto, menos polarizado entre su población. Pero es importante subrayar la distinción conceptual subordinada de este binomio aquí propuesta, que no es otra que la prevalencia que tiene la práctica artística sobre el consumo cultural y que no está suficientemente tematizada en la literatura científica. Pretendemos, por tanto, iniciar con este trabajo una línea de análisis futuro entre estas dos dimensiones disociadas de la práctica cultural.

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Artículos / ***Articles***

The societal quality of southern European Mediterranean countries / *La calidad societal de los países mediterráneos del sur de Europa*

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ABSTRACT

On the basis of extensive empirical data that the 72 focused composite indicators, making up the *System of Indices on the Quality of European Societies* (SIQES), provide on the 28 EU Member States, this paper analyses the *societal quality* of the Southern European Mediterranean countries, namely, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, from a holistic, multidimensional and comparative perspective. First and foremost, it indicates the position of these Mediterranean countries in the European societal quality rankings. Secondly, after confirming that, in accordance with the *Five Europes Typology*, the Mediterranean countries form a distinctive cluster, it includes an analysis of their social characteristics, comparing them with those of the other four clusters. Thirdly, on the basis of the 14 societal quality domains included in the system, it offers a diagnosis by contrasting the societal quality of the Southern European Mediterranean countries with that of the rest of the EU Member States. This structural diagnosis, endogenous as well exogenous, offers a panoramic view of great importance to both social researchers and policymakers.

Keywords: social quality; quality of life; Mediterranean countries; Europe; composite indicators.

RESUMEN

En base a la amplia información empírica que sobre los 28 países de la UE aportan los 72 indicadores compuestos focalizados que componen el Sistema de Índices de Calidad de las Sociedades Europeas*, este artículo analiza la* calidad societal *de los países mediterráneos del sur de Europa, Portugal, España, Italia y Grecia, desde un perspectiva holista, multidimensional y comparada. Primero, se ofrece el posicionamiento de los países mediterráneos en los rankings europeos de calidad societal. Segundo, tras comprobar que, de acuerdo con la* Tipología de las Cinco Europas*, los países mediterráneos forman un* cluster *propio, se analizan sus características societales. Tercero, en base a los 14 dominios de calidad societal que incluye el sistema de índices, se ofrece un diagnóstico comparando la calidad de los países mediterráneos con la del resto de países europeos. Este diagnóstico estructural, tanto endógeno como exógeno, ofrece una panorámica de gran interés tanto para los investigadores sociales como para los responsables políticos.*

Palabras clave: *igualdad social; calidad de vida; países mediterráneos; Europa; indicadores compuestos.*

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this work is to analyse the societal quality of Southern European Mediterranean countries from a holistic, multidimensional and comparative perspective. A society can hardly be understood as a mere aggregation or juxtaposition of unconnected and independent elements. Rather, it is composed of frameworks of structured and structuring relationships. Societies are units that integrate, to greater or lesser extent, a series of factors, processes and institutions in a characteristic societal configuration. Thus, it is impossible to gain an understanding of any social phenomena, any problem affecting a society and the real impact of any policy implemented in it, without a minimum knowledge of its global configuration. In this sense, the *societal quality* of a country, viz. the combination of its *social quality* and the *quality of life* of its citizens, has to be studied as a structure of connected but independent areas and domains that, together, determine to what extent citizens live a *good life* in a *good society*.

Specifically, this paper aims to provide descriptive and empirical answers, with estimates based on a very large dataset, to two basic but fundamental questions for pondering on the social characterisation of any country: what level of societal quality have the Southern European Mediterranean countries attained? And what is the quality level of the domains making up their social structure? We are fully aware that a mere descriptive knowledge of reality does not entail its full explanation or comprehension. But we are also convinced that without sufficiently valid, reliable and robust empirical data, theoretical thinking can go astray, devising hypotheses and ideas far-removed from reality. In this sense, the intention of this study is to provide social researchers, policymakers and all those with an interest in getting to know the social reality of these countries, with an information matrix that helps them to reflect carefully on how to improve both the social quality of Mediterranean societies and the quality of life of their citizens.

The analysis performed here is based on data retrieved from the System of Indices on the Quality of European Societies (SIQES) (Bericat and Jiménez-Rodrigo, 2019), comprising 72 composite indicators created by different institutions and social researchers. Each one of these indices measures the societal quality of the EU Member States in many different domains, such as child well-being, environment, gender inequality and democracy and governance. Specifically, the analysis employs the synthetic information provided by both the Societal Quality Index (SQI) and the Five Europes Typology created by Bericat (2019). Firstly, on the strength of the SQI estimates we will be able to identify the societal quality of the Southern European Mediterranean countries, in addition to the divides between them and the rest of the EU Member States. Secondly, in view of the multidimensional grouping that the Five Europes Typology offers, and after verifying that the Southern European Mediterranean countries form a distinctive group within the European Union (EU), it is possible to determine their characteristic social traits. In this sense, even though it is true that the classic typology of the three welfare regimes developed by G. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) did not initially include the “Mediterranean type”, subsequent analyses (Ferrera, 1998; Boeri, 2002) have revealed many similarities between these countries (Bericat, 2019).

Both an analysis of the societal quality of the Southern European Mediterranean countries and an analytical assessment of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of their multidimensional domain structures have been performed by applying two complementary comparative frameworks, namely, external or exogenous and internal or endogenous. The former is obtained by comparing societal quality levels in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece with EU averages, while the latter is established by comparing the quality levels of each one of their domains with respect to their own SQIs.

This analysis of the differences between exogenous and endogenous quality levels (deficits and surpluses) enables us to offer a diagnosis of overall and individual societal quality levels in the Southern European Mediterranean countries. It is evident that deep-seated structural, historical, economic, political and cultural frameworks underlie the realities revealed in the diagnosis of these countries that, as could not be otherwise, have their strengths and weaknesses. Their peripheral and marginal position in global power structures, the time-honoured delay in their processes of economic modernisation and social development, their patterns of inequality and associated elitism and cronyism, and the Mediterranean culture itself, which is no longer hegemonic in relation to the models defining it, among others, are deep-seated structural problems.

In sum, the main strengths and weaknesses of these countries can be determined with sufficient clarity and rigour using this holistic, multidimensional and comparative approach. This will doubtless contribute to the design of more efficient policies both for addressing their weaknesses and resolving key social problems and for leveraging their main strengths and endogenous resources as a means of further enhancing their societal quality.

THE SOCIETAL QUALITY INDEX OF THE EU MEMBER STATES

In order to lay the groundwork for the analysis, what follows are the results of a multidimensional index, designed by Bericat (2019), which will serve to gain a comprehensive and synthetic picture of societal quality levels in the EU Member States.

The SQI is based on a vast quantity of data gathered by the SIQES[1], a system composed of a wide range of indices developed by different researchers and/or social institutions for the purpose of measuring different aspects of societal quality and quality of life in order to compare and monitor them over time. The system is divided into 14 different societal quality domains (see Table 1). Each one of its composite indicators is formed by between two and six dimensions which, in turn, contain between two and six simple indicators. The system provides estimates for the 28 EU Member States in 72 indices and in over 280 dimensions. The 72 focused composite indicators were selected by the members of the research team responsible for creating the SIQES by applying strict methodological quality criteria (Bericat and Jiménez-Rodrigo, 2019).

The design and creation of the SIQES were inspired by the theoretical frameworks of two previous indicator systems. Firstly, it is based on the framework created by Heintz-Herbert Noll and his fellow researchers (Berger-Schmitt and Noll, 2000; Noll, 2002) to construct a pioneering system, that is, the European System of Social Indicators (ESSI), based on 14 vital domains and three major social challenges, *i. e.* quality of life, social cohesion and sustainable development. Secondly, it is grounded in the concept of *social quality* developed by Abbott and Wallace (2012) and van der Maesen and Walker (2005), based, in turn, on four strategic goals: social empowerment, social inclusion, socioeconomic security and social cohesion (Bericat, Camarero and Jiménez-Rodrigo, 2019). Due to space limitations, it is impossible to offer a detailed description of the SIQES, the selection of composite indicators, the theoretical framework on which it is based, the design of the SQI or the Five Europes Typology. Those interested can find this information, together with the design, construction, rankings and scores offered by each one of the 72 indices in the book entitled, *The Quality of European Societies. A Compilation of Composite Indicators* (Bericat and Jiménez-Rodrigo, 2019).

The calculation of the SQI was based, first and foremost, on a transformation of the original scores for the composite indicators and, secondly, on an aggregation of the transformed scores. First of all, the scores of each index were normalised by applying the min-max transformation. The EU Member State with the highest quality level (max.) was assigned a value 100 and that with the lowest (min.), a value of 0. With these two references, the percentile rank —which defines the position of the rest of the countries on a scale from 0 to 100— was obtained. The societal quality of a country is higher the closer it is to 100 and lower the closer it is to 0. After calculating the percentile rank of each one of the 58 indices finally used to calculate the SQI, initially the arithmetic mean of all the indices forming part of each one of the system's 14 domains was estimated, thus obtaining the quality index of each domain. In a second phase, for

1 The SIQES is the result of a study performed by a large research team, led by Eduardo Bericat and financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. CSO2012-35032: "Social quality in Europe. Design and development of composite indexes for the measurement and monitoring of the quality of European societies".

Figure 1. Ranking of the EU Member States according to their societal quality levels. Societal Quality Index (SQI). Percentile ranks (0-100).



Source: own elaboration.

calculating the general SQI the arithmetic mean of the quality indices of 13 domains was estimated[2] (Bericat, 2019).

The data provided by the SQI are highly relevant, for they show the position of the Southern European Mediterranean countries in the societal quality ranking with sufficient clarity and accuracy (Figure 1). Three important conclusions can be drawn from the data contained in this graph: firstly, that the societal quality of all the Mediterranean countries is lower than the EU average; secondly, that it is heterogeneous, insofar as they occupy different positions in the bottom half of the ranking of EU Member States with lower societal quality levels; and, lastly, that both their societal quality and quality of life are still far-removed from those of continental Europe and, above all, the Nordic states, thus leaving room for substantial improvement. In short, in the EU there is still a marked imbalance as regards societal quality, which seriously compromises social cohesion.

In Figure 1, which includes the score obtained by each country in the SQI, it can be observed that the arithmetic mean of quality levels in all the EU Member States, weighted according to their respective populations, is 52.9. This signifies, as already noted, that the societal quality of the Southern European Mediterranean countries is clearly lower than the EU average. Spain, with a percentile rank of 49.7, is the country with the highest level, followed by Portugal (42.9), Cyprus (42.7), Italy (41.6), Malta (39.3) and Greece (27.4). Accordingly, in the context of the EU it can be claimed that the Mediterranean countries, except for Greece, have intermediate societal quality levels, with percentile ranks ranging from 40 to 50 in the SQI. These data paint a new picture that contrasts with the cliché that the Mediterranean countries are bringing up the rear of the EU, which is plainly incorrect. However, the data confirm that their societal quality levels cannot, under no circumstances, be equated with those of the continental European countries, although the distance separating them is not insurmountable and future processes of approximation may lead to the much sought-after convergence. Finally, there are notable differences between the Mediterranean countries and the Central and Eastern Europe states (CEECs) in terms of societal quality, in favour of the former.

2 To calculate the general SQI, the "environment" domain was excluded due to the fact that it correlates negatively with the rest, for the greater the development of a country, the greater its environmental deterioration. However, environmental sustainability, a key societal quality domain, was included in the rest of the analyses.

A question frequently posed by analysts is whether the Southern European Mediterranean societies form a group of countries with common structural features. Without anticipating the analysis described in the following section, Figure 1 shows three different levels of societal quality, thus making it impossible to confirm that they form a totally consistent group. Spain would occupy the first level; Portugal, Cyprus, Italy and Malta, a fairly homogeneous second level; and Greece, the third. The difference between the SQIs of Spain and Italy is 8.1, and between those of Italy and Greece, 14.2. Thus, there is a considerable disparity between societal quality levels in Spain and Greece, equivalent to 22.3 points on the SQI scale. Nonetheless, since the Greek case is apparently an exception, it should be analysed in further detail. Perhaps its eastern location brings it closer to the Eastern European countries or maybe its unsuccessful process of modernisation (Bericat and Camarero, 2017), together with its recent economic crisis, intensified by the austerity policies and the financial adjustments implemented by the EU, have prevented it from converging at the same pace as the rest of the Mediterranean countries. The position of Italy, a country that, notwithstanding its high level of economic development, has moderate societal quality levels, is as remarkable as it is peculiar.

The room for improvement of even the Mediterranean country occupying the highest position in the ranking is considerable. The difference between Spain and Sweden, the country with the highest societal quality levels in the EU, is 34.6 points, *i. e.* a third of the scale. In the case of Italy, this increases to 42.7 and in that of Greece, to 56.9. Subsequently, it is urgent for the Southern European Mediterranean countries to design and implement adequate societal development strategies aimed at their convergence with those European countries with the highest societal quality levels. Even so, these strategies should be adapted to the nature of their societies, to their baseline societal situations and to their aspirations and social resolve. In this respect, it is important to take into account that there is a cultural trend—even reflected in the statistics currently available—to design quality indicators better adapted to the societal performance of the Nordic and continental countries. The Nordic states, as was the case with the Mediterranean countries in other historical periods, currently constitute a paradigm and utopian goal with regard to societal quality. However, just as any light casts a shadow, so too any utopia has its grey areas.

Finally, Table 1 shows the societal quality indices of the 28 EU Member States in each one of the 14 domains of the SIQES, as well as their general SQIs. The data contained in this table enables us to conduct a detailed study on the societal quality of the Southern European Mediterranean countries, discovering, by comparison, both the peculiarities of each country and those of the cluster as a whole. The analysis and interpretation of these data are complex tasks, for which reason in the following three sections we will implement a number of strategies that will allow us to gain a better understanding of both the general framework and the precise picture.

THE TYPOLOGY OF THE FIVE EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN CLUSTER

When characterising the Southern European Mediterranean countries, first and foremost it is essential to know whether, in terms of their societal quality levels and distribution, they form part of a cluster that is relatively homogeneous and distinguishable from others in the EU.

The Five Europes Typology offers an answer to this question. With the aim of determining whether the EU Member States can be grouped in terms not only of their general SQIs, but also of the quality levels of all their domains, a hierarchical clustering analysis was performed on the data matrix shown in Table 1. After identifying all the different possible solutions, it was considered that the most socially and politically relevant model, as well as the most optimal in terms of scientific parsimony and precision, was that which classified all the EU Member States in five clusters (Bericat, 2019).

The construction of this typology, unlike others such as the classic typology developed by Esping-Andersen to classify welfare regimes, was not essentially inspired by the inference of types on the basis of a preselected theoretical framework.

Table 1. The societal quality of the EU Member States. General SQI* and domain quality levels**.

Country	CLUSTER	RANKING	ICS	Quality of life	Subjective well-being	Social participation	Culture and innovation	Democracy and governance	Consumption	Quality of work	Social equality	Gender equality	Child well-being	Well-being of the elderly	Health conditions	Crime and safety	Environment
Sweden	1	1	84.3	97.4	77.7	87.5	79.1	92.0	68.1	66.6	98.0	89.2	81.5	100.0	75.4	83.2	72.2
Denmark	1	2	82.3	93.1	100.0	83.0	78.4	96.6	73.0	86.5	88.7	73.1	70.3	84.2	60.4	82.1	52.9
Holland	1	3	79.2	83.1	71.7	72.3	82.7	85.7	63.2	69.9	94.2	70.3	99.5	87.9	72.6	76.5	27.0
Finland	1	4	78.7	88.2	82.3	47.1	79.5	91.5	80.1	62.3	92.6	87.3	77.1	75.5	72.1	87.9	73.6
Austria	2	5	66.9	77.1	75.3	32.1	58.6	86.1	74.9	51.6	91.3	41.2	62.7	66.5	70.9	81.8	58.3
Germany	2	6	66.5	75.4	62.9	40.9	56.7	76.4	80.8	39.9	84.5	61.4	70.7	79.2	65.4	70.9	51.7
Luxemburg	2	7	65.8	70.6	74.8	46.2	45.4	79.7	88.6	66.2	91.3	35.0	64.5	65.1	69.2	59.3	46.5
Belgium	2	8	63.5	70.6	61.9	37.2	54.0	69.7	66.8	50.7	77.7	66.9	60.2	54.6	79.4	75.2	18.8
United Kingdom	2	9	62.3	65.5	55.5	28.8	78.8	68.6	71.3	63.2	72.7	49.6	48.0	83.5	59.2	65.7	49.6
Ireland	2	10	60.8	71.8	69.1	39.7	66.5	60.9	55.1	50.3	48.9	51.2	65.6	73.9	65.2	72.3	54.4
France	2	11	58.4	65.9	50.8	32.3	66.5	51.6	65.9	41.9	83.9	58.0	54.0	67.0	72.4	49.6	40.8
Slovenia	3	12	51.6	54.9	45.9	30.2	44.3	48.2	50.8	41.2	83.6	56.5	69.9	43.3	44.3	57.6	56.5
Spain	3	13	49.7	53.8	59.5	26.2	50.3	42.7	38.0	37.9	58.7	46.2	60.3	50.5	62.8	59.8	47.9
Czech Republic	3	14	45.4	51.5	44.1	10.6	35.0	42.1	40.9	30.1	91.2	25.9	49.8	58.3	56.2	53.9	58.1
Portugal	3	15	42.9	37.3	39.1	27.3	27.7	47.9	41.9	33.4	51.5	43.7	43.8	43.7	57.9	62.6	61.1
Estonia	3	16	42.2	41.4	27.8	13.8	56.4	47.3	35.6	41.5	70.0	38.0	44.9	57.6	36.7	38.0	57.8
Cyprus	3	17	42.7	38.0	53.2	20.3	12.5	48.4	53.5	41.4	61.8	16.9	76.8	50.5	48.8	32.3	57.5
Italy	3	18	41.6	48.8	48.0	30.1	37.9	27.4	45.3	32.5	59.2	24.0	39.8	45.3	65.3	36.7	46.2
Malta	3	19	39.3	32.0	48.7	30.2	24.2	45.9	49.7	42.7	58.4	10.8	44.7	36.2	74.9	12.2	29.6
Poland	4	20	37.9	39.1	41.2	14.2	28.6	36.3	30.1	35.6	65.2	36.4	36.7	36.6	32.0	60.7	45.1
Slovakia	4	21	34.3	39.6	32.1	19.8	21.7	36.6	40.1	31.1	72.9	19.2	41.7	17.6	32.7	41.0	72.8
Lithuania	4	22	31.1	36.4	31.7	5.7	26.3	35.4	38.7	34.8	45.5	41.1	22.6	29.6	31.6	25.0	61.0
Hungary	4	23	28.8	32.6	17.5	3.6	24.9	29.2	27.6	29.4	47.7	26.6	39.8	31.6	31.2	32.4	53.2
Latvia	4	24	28.7	23.2	18.3	4.8	32.2	34.1	35.8	44.1	26.0	50.2	22.7	41.6	15.7	24.9	76.3
Greece	4	25	27.4	31.2	19.4	24.5	20.7	13.5	38.9	21.0	38.6	18.3	38.6	12.4	61.5	17.6	50.3
Croatia	4	26	26.6	19.9	47.0	33.2	16.2	16.7	8.4	28.8	48.8	12.0	19.9	30.6	37.8	26.6	52.3
Bulgaria	5	27	17.7	8.5	12.1	12.0	8.9	3.5	6.9	28.3	3.2	50.4	15.5	32.6	33.5	15.2	52.2
Rumania	5	28	15.4	7.6	29.6	11.5	8.8	3.0	12.8	24.0	12.1	19.1	6.5	33.1	6.3	26.4	47.1
Total unweighted			49	51.9	49.9	30.9	43.7	50.6	49.4	43.8	64.9	43.5	51.0	53.2	53.3	51.0	52.5
Total weighted			52.9	57.8	52.5	31.6	51.7	52.2	55.2	42.7	69.4	47.0	52.5	60.6	58.7	56.4	48.3

Source: own elaboration.

* Arithmetic mean of the percentile ranks of the first 13 domains. ** Arithmetic mean of the percentile ranks of the composite indicators included in each domain.

Rather, the Five Europes Typology is the result of an inductive process employing a vast quantity of empirical data on the 28 EU Member States[3] pertaining to the concept of societal quality. Also, unlike Esping-Andersen's typology and those of other authors, mainly based on relevant but specific features of the social structure, the Five Europes Typology is of a multidimensional and comprehensive nature, for it classifies the countries in terms of a broad set of domains, indices, dimension and indicators. Finally, it should be stressed that the classification provided by this typology is consistent with many other scientific efforts to gain insights into the diversity of social, cultural, economic or political structures in Europe. From these endeavours a key idea has emerged that the EU is far from being a socially homogeneous political unit. This obliges us to bear in mind its basic social diversity when designing or implementing any EU policy. This basic diversity should also be taken into consideration in any study of European social reality.

According to the Five Europes Typology, whose geographical distribution is shown in Map 1, it is obvious that the Southern European Mediterranean countries do indeed form part of a specific cluster. Cluster 3 differs from Cluster 1, comprising the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and Holland; from Cluster 2, formed by the European continental countries (Austria, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg and France) and the western islands (United Kingdom and Ireland); from Cluster 4, comprising the Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary, Latvia and Croatia) and Greece; and from Cluster 5, made up of Bulgaria and Rumania. In short, apart from Greece, the rest of the Southern European Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus) do form part of the same group.

Cluster 3 is a hybrid group that, in addition to the Mediterranean countries, also includes three CEECs, namely, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Although this is not the place to offer an explanation for this mixed group, two fundamental facts should indeed be noted. First of all, that they have the wherewithal to reach similar societal quality levels departing from different social, cultural, political or economic realities, as is the case with Slovenia (SQI = 51.6) and Spain (SQI = 49.7). Secondly, that the traditions or idiosyncrasies of each country, in accordance with path dependence theories (Sewell, 1990; Mahoney, 2000), establish prior constraints, but never completely determine its future. It is evident that the clusters shown in the map correspond to groups of countries that have sustained, for decades or even centuries, very different levels of growth, cultures, geopolitical power and social structures. There is no evidence, therefore, of full, across-the-board convergence. But it is also true that each country, among those included in the same cluster, has advanced at its own pace, attaining different societal quality levels.

According to the Five Europes Typology, the Mediterranean countries do indeed form part of the same cluster within the EU. This begs the question of whether, as a group, they share some distinctive social features. In order to answer this question, let us take a look at the data contained in Table 2, which includes the average quality indices for all the clusters, as regards both their overall quality (SQI) and that of their domains. To this end, the arithmetic means of the countries forming part of each cluster, weighted by their respective populations in 2016, were calculated. The row "Total" shows the societal quality of the EU (weighted mean). Given that the "Mediterranean" countries (except for Greece) form a hybrid cluster and that Malta and Cyprus both have relatively small populations, it was decided to create a new group with the four major Mediterranean countries: Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece (4MC).

In order to study the distinctives features of the 4MC, two different comparative frameworks have been used: exogenous and endogenous. The former analyses the differences between domain quality levels registered in the 4MC and the respective EU averages (Total), while the latter analyses the differences between the quality of each one of the domains of the 4MC and their overall SQIs. The exogenous and endogenous differences included in the last two rows of Table 2 can be positive or negative, indicating quality *deficits* or *surpluses*. When characterising the 4MC, it is also important to con-

3 Since the Brexit negotiations are still dragging on, the United Kingdom is still considered part of the EU.

Figure 2. Societal quality: The Five Europes Typology.

Source: own elaboration.

sider whether the exogenous differences are higher or lower than the mean exogenous difference. From the analysis of these data the following conclusions can be drawn.

The societal structure of the 4MC reveals exogenous and endogenous deficits in both the "democracy and governance" and "gender equality" domains, specifically 18.8 and 13.9 points below the EU average, respectively. Substantial endogenous deficits can also be observed in both domains (–10.0 and –10.3, respectively). These are higher than the average endogenous deficits in the EU as a whole. In sum, in the 4MC there are notable societal deficits in democracy and governance and in gender inequality.

The 4MC have exogenous and endogenous surpluses in both health conditions and environmental sustainability, the quality level of the former being 4.8 points higher than the EU average. Even so, a correct appraisal of this figure involves taking into account that the average exogenous deficit of the 4MC with respect to the EU as a whole—that is, the difference between their SQIs and that of the EU—is –9.5. This means that the relative improvement in health conditions is equivalent to 14.3 points (the sum of 4.8 and 9.5). The endogenous

Table 2. Societal quality in the Five Europes and the 4MC. General SQI and domain quality levels*. Exogenous and endogenous difference.

Cluster	Social Quality Index	Quality of life	Subjective WellBeing	Social participation	Culture and Innovation	Democracy and governance	Consumption	Quality of work	Social Equality	Gender Equality	Child Well Being	Well-being of the elderly	Health Conditions	Crime and safety	Environment
Nordic	80.9	89.0	79.1	74.2	80.7	89.8	68.4	70.4	94.1	78.0	87.2	88.7	71.4	80.7	49.3
Continental	62.9	69.8	58.0	34.7	65.6	67.1	72.7	48.0	80.3	56.5	58.9	75.2	66.5	64.2	46.8
Mediterranean	45.0	49.8	50.8	26.8	41.3	36.2	42.2	34.6	61.5	34.0	48.9	48.1	62.5	48.4	49.2
Eastern	33.7	35.5	33.4	15.2	25.7	30.8	31.1	32.1	56.7	30.3	35.9	30.5	36.2	44.7	50.9
Balkan	16.0	7.8	24.9	11.6	8.8	3.1	11.2	25.1	9.7	27.4	8.8	33.0	13.5	23.4	48.5
Total	52.9	57.8	52.5	31.6	51.7	52.2	55.2	42.7	69.4	47.0	52.5	60.6	58.7	56.4	48.3
4MC**	43.4	48.2	49.0	28.0	40.2	33.4	41.8	33.6	56.7	33.1	47.5	44.3	63.5	45.6	48.4
Exogen. diff	–9.5	–9.6	–3.5	–3.6	–11.5	–18.8	–13.4	–9.1	–12,7	–13.9	–5.0	–16.3	+4.8	–10.8	+0.1
Endogen. diff.	0,0	+4.8	+5.6	–15.4	–3.2	–10.0	–1.6	–9.8	+13.3	–10.3	+4.1	+0.9	+20.1	+2.2	+5.0

Source: own elaboration

* Arithmetic mean, weighted by population, of the average percentile ranks of the countries in each cluster. ** 4MC: Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.

surplus in this domain (+20.1) is more than remarkable. Regarding the "environmental sustainability' domain, the absolute exogenous surplus is lower (0.1), the relative surplus thus amounting to +9.6 (the sum of 0.1 and 9.5). This domain also has a high endogenous surplus (+5.0). In short, in the 4MC there are noteworthy societal surpluses in health conditions and in environmental quality.

As to subjective well-being, there is an exogenous deficit that, nonetheless, is lower than the general one (–3.5 versus –9.5), which should be interpreted as a relative surplus. Accordingly, the endogenous balance is positive (+5.6). In other words, the 4MC enjoy a relatively high level of subjective well-being, at least judging by their average societal quality levels in this regard.

The 4MC have exogenous deficits that are higher than average in the following domains: well-being of the elderly (–16.3); culture and innovation (–11.5); and consumption (–13.4). However, when comparing their respective quality levels with their general SQIs, only slight endogenous deficits are detected (+0.9, –3.2 and –1.6, respectively). In brief, the societal quality of the 4MC as regards the well-being of the elderly, culture and innovation, and consumption is far-removed from EU averages, although in these three domains no lags in their own societal progress can be observed.

Lastly, it is important to comment on the situation in two key domains, viz. those of social participation and social equality. The levels of social participation and capital in the 4MC (28.0) are way below those in the Nordic countries (74.2), yet still comparable to the EU average (31.6). This is due to the fact that the high political and social participation in the Nordic countries is an exceptional case. Such a high maximum level, in addition to demonstrating that the levels of participation in the rest of the EU Member States leave a lot to be desired, means that these all have important endogenous deficits. This is the case with the 4MC that, although they have a slight exogenous deficit with respect to the EU average—which even approaches that of the continental cluster—have a very high endogenous deficit (–15.4).

In the "social equality" domain, the data reveal a paradox. When comparing societal quality levels with the EU average, an evident exogenous deficit (–12.7) can be observed, which is even higher than the general exogenous deficit of the SQI (–9.5). But when the quality level of this domain is compared with the general SQI, a high endogenous surplus is revealed (+13.3). In short, even though the level of social equality in the 4MC is quite a bit lower than the EU average, it is significantly higher than that of their own average societal progress.

Figure 3. Exogenous* and endogenous** differences in the 4MC cluster, according to societal quality levels by domain.



Source: own elaboration.

* Differences between domain quality levels in the 4MC and EU averages.

** Difference between domain quality levels in the 4MC and their general SQIs.

In conclusion, it can be held that societal quality levels in the 4MC have evident peculiarities, differing from both those of the rest of the clusters of the Five Europes Typology and the EU average. Figure 2 shows the exogenous and endogenous differences in each one of the 14 domains. The vertical dotted line intercepts the x-axis at the value of the average general exogenous deficit (–9.5).

EXOGENOUS SOCIETAL QUALITY BALANCE IN THE 4MC

The analysis performed in the previous section has revealed the distinguishing features of the Mediterranean cluster as a whole. The time has now come to ascertain whether these features are shared by the 4MC or, on the contrary, each one of them has its own characteristic societal quality levels. Therefore, it is necessary to continue with the analysis in order to determine these levels in each one of the four countries in order to identify the distributive patterns of the different domains. If societal quality levels in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece are similar in a specific domain, this could lead us to conclude that their social structures have certain similarities. In contrast, if there are cases of divergence or different country sub-groups, we should assume that the social, economic, political or cultural characteristics of these countries differ in some way or another.

The data contained in Table 3 are sufficient to identify these distributive patterns, as well as the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of domain quality levels in the 4MC. Using these data, we will now analyse the exogenous balance, namely, the differences between domain quality levels in each country and the EU as a whole, leaving the analysis of both the endogenous balance and the individual profile of these countries for the following section.

The data in the final row of Table 3 show the differences between the SQI of each one of the 4MC and that of the EU (52.9). These reveal, as already noted, that the SQI of Spain is very close to the EU average, that Greece is way below it and that Portugal and Italy, between both extremes, have fairly similar societal quality levels. However, the distribution of these levels in the different domains can vary greatly. Indeed, the analysis has revealed four different distributive patterns: *a)* a *homogenous* pattern in which the four countries have similar quality levels (Dp 4); *b)* a *quasi-homogeneous* pattern in three countries with similar quality levels, and a fourth that clearly diverges from the rest (Dp 3/1); *c)* a *paired* pattern formed by two pairs of countries (Dp 2/2), and *d)* a *heterogeneous* pattern, similar to the general pattern described at the beginning of this paragraph, comprising two different countries and two similar ones (Dp 1/2/1).

a) The domains displaying a homogeneous distributive pattern in the 4MC (Dp 4) are as follows: health conditions; social participation and capital; and consumption.

In the "health conditions" domain, quality levels are positive (mean difference = +3.2) and slightly higher than the EU average, except in the case of Portugal (–0.8). The fact that the quality

Table 3. Exogenous balance in the 4MC. Differences between societal quality levels in each country and EU averages by domain.

	SQI of the EU	Differences between societal quality levels in each country and the EU average				Exogenous balance		
		Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain	Surplus/ deficit	Average differ-ence*	Dis-tributive pattern
Quality of life	57.8	–26.6	–9.0	–20.5	–4.0	– – – –	–15.0	2/2
Subjective well-being	52.5	–33.1	–4.5	–13.4	7.0	– – – +	–11.0	1/2/1
Social participation	31.6	–7.1	–1.5	–4.3	–5.4	– – – –	–4.6	4
Culture and innovation	51.7	–31.0	–13.8	–24.0	–1.4	– – – –	–17.5	1/2/1
Democracy and governance	52.2	–38.7	–24.8	–4.3	–9.5	– – – –	–19.3	2/2
Consumption	55.2	–16.3	–9.9	–13.3	–17.2	– – – –	–14.2	4
Quality of work	42.7	–21.7	–10.2	–9.3	–4.8	– – – –	–11.5	1/2/1
Social equality	69.4	–30.8	–10.2	–17.9	–10.7	– – – –	–17.4	1/2/1
Gender equality	47	–28.7	–23.0	–3.3	–0.8	– – – –	–14.0	2/2
Child well-being	52.5	–13.9	–12.7	–8.7	7.8	– – – +	–6.8	3/1
Well-being of the elderly	60.6	–48.2	–15.3	–16.9	–10.1	– – – –	–22.6	3/1
Health conditions	58.7	2.8	6.6	–0.8	4.1	+ + – +	3.2	4
Crime and safety	56.4	–38.8	–19.7	6.2	3.4	– – + +	–12.2	2/2
Environment	48.3	2.0	–2.1	12.8	–0.4	+ – + –	3.1	3/1
Total (weighted)	52.9	–25.5	–11.3	–10.0	–3.2	– – – –	–12.5	1/2/1

Source: own elaboration.

* Unweighted arithmetic mean of the differences between the 4MC.

levels of this domain are fairly homogeneous in the 4MC may indicate that certain social features, such as the Mediterranean diet, among others, place health quality levels in these countries on par with the EU average. In the Health Measures developed by Klomp and de Haan (2010), it can be observed that their ranking in the "individual health" dimension is higher than in that of "quality of the healthcare sector".

Regarding social participation, be it political or social capital, quality levels in the 4MC are clearly below the EU average (mean difference = –4.6), except perhaps in the case of Italy (–1.5). This homogeneity may also be due to a social feature deeply rooted in Mediterranean culture. Nonetheless, when interpreting these data it is important to distinguish between two types of social capital: bridging and bonding. Both institutional and general interpersonal trust are rather low in the 4MC. However, community links, in addition to the networks in which they are forged, tend to be denser and stronger than in other European countries. The Index of Social Capital in the European Union (Parts, 2008) also reveals low levels of political interest in the 4MC, especially in Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, the levels of political participation in Italy and Greece are higher than in Spain and Portugal and similar to those in other countries.

The third homogeneous pattern revealed in Table 3 affects the "consumption" domain where important exogenous deficits can be observed with respect to the EU average (mean difference = –14.2). These differences do not derive exclusively from the low consumption levels inherent to the 4MC, and not even from scant consumer satisfaction, but basically from deficient consumer well-being stemming from the limited development of consumer culture and rights, as well as to the low level of knowledge and empowerment of Mediterranean consumers. Accordingly, in the Consumer Empowerment Index (Nardo *et al.*, 2011) the 4MC rank between 20 and 25 out of a total of 27 European countries.

b) The domains featuring a quasi-homogeneous pattern (Dp 3/1) are as follows: environment; child well-being; and the well-being of the elderly.

The quality levels of the "environment" domain (mean difference = +3.1) are similar to the EU average. Yet, as can be seen in Table 3, Portugal stands out from the rest with a level (+12.8) well above this. Although the level of economic development is inversely related to environmental quality, this cannot completely explain Portugal's high level of environmental quality, for even though Greece obtains a similarly positive score (+2.0), it is only slightly higher than the EU average.

Unlike environmental sustainability, the quality levels of the "child well-being" domain in the 4MC (mean difference = –6.8) are clearly below the EU average. In this domain, Spain (+7.8) is an exception to the rule. According to the estimates of the Index of Child Well-Being in the European Union (Bradshaw *et al.*, 2007), Spain is ranked 13th, while Italy, Portugal and Greece come in 19th, 21st and 23rd place, respectively. These positions remain unchanged, barring a few exceptions, in all the dimensions of child well-being included in the index, such as health, subjective well-being, social relations, material well-being, risks, education and housing.

With regard to the well-being of the elderly, the extraordinarily low average quality levels in the 4MC (mean difference = –22.6) are conditioned, in part, by Greece where levels are very low indeed (–48.2). In the ranking of the Global AgeWatch Index (Zaidi, 2013), Greece brings up the rear in the EU and in the Active Aging Index (UNECE, 2015), is penultimate. All in all, the other three countries are far from the top positions, ranking between 15 and 18, thus leaving plenty of room for improvement in the well-being of the elderly in the 4MC.

c) The domains with a paired pattern (Dp 2/2) are as follows: quality of life; gender equality; crime and safety; and democracy and governance. In three of these domains, the average difference in the 4MC ranges from –12.2 to –15.0, but drops to –19.3 in the "democracy and governance" domain. Although Greece and Portugal, on the one hand, and Spain and Italy, on the other, form pairs as regards the "quality of life" domain, in the other three domains Greece and Italy have lower societal quality levels, while Portugal and Spain obtain better results.

The fact that Italy and Spain enjoy a higher quality of life is a direct result of their level of economic development, which is higher than that of

Portugal and Greece. Nonetheless, quality of life is also conditioned by social quality. In the comprehensive Better Life Index, published annually by the OECD for its 38 member countries, Spain was ranked 19th (6.31) in 2017, between France and Slovenia; Italy 25th (5,49), between Israel and the Czech Republic; Portugal 28th (4.98), between Poland and Korea; and Greece 35th (4.3), between Brazil and Turkey.

The fact that Italy is paired with Greece with respect to "gender equality", "crime and safety" and "democracy and governance" is conclusive evidence that a country's level of economic development is by no means proportional to its level of societal quality. Italy is similar to Greece in some aspects. Gender equality in both Greece (–28.7) and Italy (–23.0) is much lower than the EU average, the situation in Spain (–0.8) and Portugal (–3.3) being far more favourable. In the "crime and safety" domain, quality levels in Greece (–38.8) and Italy (–19.7) are also substantially lower than in Spain (+3.4) and Portugal (+6.2). This same pattern appears yet again in the "democracy and governance" domain in which both Greece (–38.7) and Italia (–24.8) obtain very negative results in relation to Spain and Portugal that, albeit negative as well, are nonetheless much closer to the EU average.

d) Table 3 reveals that there are another four domains with heterogeneous patterns, formed by two single countries and another two that are fairly alike (Dp 1/2/1): subjective well-being; culture and innovation; quality of work; and social equality.

In two of these domains, quality of work and subjective well-being, the 4MC are distributed analogously to their general SQIs. Greece has the lowest quality levels of work and subjective well-being; Italy and Portugal both have similar intermediate levels; and, finally, Spain is the best placed among the four. In the case of quality of work, the analyses performed by Green and Mostafa (Eurofound, 2012) allow us to identify interesting peculiarities in each country. For instance, Italy and Greece obtain poorer results in dimensions relating to the intrinsic quality of work, although Italy, unlike Greece, occupies a good position as regards working time quality. The deficits of Portugal, however, are generally to be found in dimensions relating to the net earnings of its workforce, while Spain stands out negatively for its low labour and professional prospects. With respect to subjective well-being, Greece has satisfaction levels way below the EU average, owing to the huge emotional impact of the profound economic crisis in which it is still immersed; Italy and Portugal have intermediate levels, even though in this case subjective well-being in Portugal is clearly lower than that in Italy; while in Spain it is clearly higher than the EU average.

Moving on to the "culture and innovation" domain (mean difference = –17.5), what stands out are the poor results of Greece (–31.0) and Portugal (–24.0) versus Italy (–13.8) and, above all, Spain (+1.4) where quality levels are, relatively speaking, substantially higher. Lastly, in the "social equality" domain Greece and Portugal register the lowest quality levels, although it should be noted that those of Italy (–10.2) and Spain (–10.7) are still substantially lower than the EU average.

To sum up, the study of these distributive patterns and the differences between exogenous domain quality levels in each one of the 4MC and EU averages have shown that, together with the existence of a general common pattern, each one of these four countries has idiosyncrasies that no analysis should overlook. On the one hand, it has highlighted the societal homogeneity characterising the Mediterranean countries in seven of the 14 domains. On the other, their singularities have been revealed in both those domains in which they are distributed in pairs—Greece and Italy, on the one hand, and Portugal and Spain, on the other—and those in which they are distributed according to their higher or lower societal quality levels. From the perspective offered by the data shown in Table 3, it is evident that Greece is currently experiencing a major collapse as regards societal quality, which explains its distancing from the Mediterranean countries as a whole; that Italy, notwithstanding its high level of economic development and quality of life, has evident societal quality lacunae and deficits; that Portugal enjoys societal quality levels that are higher than would be expected in light of its economic performance, an area in which certain shortcomings can be observed; and that in Spain there is an acceptable balance between quality of life, which can be achieved with adequate economic development, and societal quality, which entails a correct distribution and investment of resources in order to build a good society.

ENDOGENOUS SOCIETAL QUALITY BALANCE IN THE 4MC

In the previous section, with an eye to performing an exogenous diagnosis and analysis of the 4MC, their quality levels have been compared with EU averages, thus revealing the distance separating them from full convergence in societal quality. Likewise, the data shown in Table 1 also make it possible to determine the distance separating any one of the Mediterranean countries from other EU Member States. That said, it should be taken into account that when comparing different countries, what is being compared are their social realities whose nature and structure can differ greatly. Hence, these types of external comparisons sometimes offer distorted pictures of reality and, in many cases, underpin social appraisals that do not do justice to the peculiarities of each country, namely, its history, culture, political structure or level of economic development. For example, when comparing the Mediterranean countries with their Nordic counterparts that, as has been seen, are at the pinnacle as regards societal quality, we implicitly assume not only that the former should attain equally high quality levels—which is doubtless a reasonable and legitimate goal—but also that they should achieve this mimetically emulating the latter's economic, social, political and cultural structures, that is, becoming carbon copies of them, all of which does not make sense.

So as to avoid this undesirable implicit assumption, *i. e.* the idea that there is only one type of societal progress and only one way of achieving it, what follows is an analysis of the data from the SIQES employing a different comparative framework, which we will call "internal" or "endogenous". The central idea of the endogenous approach is that societies are organic bodies whose components display a certain degree of integration and, therefore, must evolve as a whole, adapting their processes and characteristics to the transformation of their general social systems. This implies that the progress of one sub-system requires the parallel development of the rest of them, it being highly improbable, for example, that the economy will fully develop without the parallel development of culture, society and politics. It also suggests that the social structure from which it has originated, as held by path dependence theories (Mahoney, 2000), is decisive.

Hence the need to discover to what extent the quality levels of the different domains of a specific country differ, positively or negatively, from its respective overall SQI. This enables us to identify those domains with endogenous surpluses or deficits with respect to the average level of societal progress in each country (see Table 4).

The domains in which the 4MC have *endogenous surpluses* are as follows: health conditions (+21.5); social equality (+11.6); environment (+11.0); child well-being (+5.2); and quality of life (+2.4).

Given that in the first four domains it is possible to observe a homogeneous or quasi-homogeneous pattern, it may be concluded that they are all endogenous societal strengths. Yet, some variations can be observed in the four countries. Thus, with respect to their health conditions the surpluses of Greece (+34.1) and Italy (+23.7) are clearly greater than those of Spain and Portugal. In the "social equality" domain, the endogenous surpluses of Italy (+17.6) are plainly greater than those of Spain, Portugal and Greece. In the "environment" domain, the endogenous surpluses of Greece (+22.9) and Portugal (+18.1) are much greater than those of the two more economically developed countries, *i. e.* Italy and Spain. In relation to child well-being, a pairing pattern can be clearly observed, the endogenous surpluses of Greece (+11.2) and Spain (+10.6) being greater than those of Portugal and Italy. Lastly, with respect to the "quality of life" domain, in which it is also possible to observe endogenous surpluses, the exception of Portugal, with an evident endogenous deficit (–5.6), is remarkable.

The domains in which the 4MC have *endogenous deficits* are as follows: social and political participation (–13.8); quality of work (–9.2); democracy and governance (–7.5); gender equality (–7.4); and culture and innovation (–6.2).

Given the huge importance of these five domains and that they all show a clear average rever-

Table 4. Endogenous balance in the 4MC. Differences between the domain quality levels and SQI of each country.

	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain	ENDOGENOUS BALANCE (Surpluses / deficits)	
	Societal Quality Index (SQI)					
	27.4	41.6	42.9	49.7	Surplus/ deficit	Mean difference
	Differences between each domain and the SQI					
Quality of life	3.8	7.3	–5.6	4.1	+ + – +	+2.4
Subjective well-being	–8.0	6.4	–3.8	9.7	– + – +	+1.1
Social participation	–2.9	–11.5	–15.6	–23.5	– – – –	– 13.8
Culture and innovation	–6.7	–3.6	–15.2	0.6	– – – =	– 6.2
Democracy and governance	–13.9	–14.2	5.0	–7.0	– – + –	– 7.5
Consumption	11.5	3.7	–1.0	–11.8	+ + = –	+ 0.6
Quality of work	–6.4	–9.0	–9.5	–11.9	– – – –	– 9.2
Social equality	11.2	17.6	8.6	9.0	+ + + +	+ 11.6
Gender equality	–9.1	–17.6	0.8	–3.5	– – = –	– 7.4
Child well-being	11.2	–1.8	0.9	10.6	+ = = +	+ 5.2
Well-being of the elderly	–15.0	3.8	0.7	0.8	– + = =	– 2.4
Health conditions	34.1	23.7	15.0	13.1	+ + + +	+ 21.5
Crime and safety	–9.8	–4.8	19.7	10.0	– – + +	+3.8
Environment	22.9	4.7	18.1	–1.9	+ + + =	+ 11.0

Source: own elaboration.

sion with respect to the level of societal progress in each one of the 4MC, it is essential to stress the pressing need for these countries to design specific national plans aimed at correcting, the sooner the better, these key weaknesses in their social structures. However, although pinpointing and disclosing these weaknesses is essential, it is undeniably insufficient. With the aim of adequately designing these social action plans, the 4MC would have to promote joint research programmes that explore the direct and indirect causes of these weaknesses. Without bringing to light the web of causal mechanisms that perpetuate these key weaknesses, be they internal or external, it will be impossible to conceive the most efficient and effective ways of tackling them. Nonetheless, although the five abovementioned domains seriously hinder the progress of these countries, there is no reason why they should thwart it. Judging by their average societal quality levels, the 4MC have both the capacity and sufficient resources to tackle these endogenous deficits successfully. To this end, due to the fact that aspects deeply and secularly rooted in their social structures must be tackled, it is also essential to forge an unshakable political will capable of catalysing and concentrating the necessary energies so as to bring about their real social transformation.

The fact that the 4MC have endogenous deficits in social and political participation shows that this weakness is a social feature inherent to them all. That the deficits are substantial in Spain (–23.5), Portugal (–15.6) and Italy (–11.5) demonstrates that participation and binding social capital do not improve with general social development and, therefore, they should look for new models of social participation and new ways of increasing both social capital and general interpersonal trust.

As to quality of work, the 4MC register very similar endogenous deficits, which indicates that this is a general feature shared by all. According to the data provided by Green and Mostafa, these deficits affect both extrinsic (wages, contracts, working hours, etc.) and intrinsic labour dimensions (rhythm of work, significance, social relations, etc.) (Eurofound, 2012).

The endogenous deficits in democracy and governance confirm the view that this is also a defining feature of the 4MC. Yet, this is much greater in Italy (–14.2), Greece (–13.9) and Spain (–7.0), than in Portugal (+5.0), a clear exception to the rule. In the European Quality of Government Index (Charron, Lapuente and Dijkstra, 2012), Portugal ranks 14th, only one position behind Spain, while Greece and Italy rank 22nd and 25th, respectively. Both the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann *et al.*, 2012) and the World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraav and Mastruzzi, 2010) bear out this pattern.

The endogenous deficits in gender equality are yet another structural weakness of the 4MC, the huge deficit in Italy (–17.6) and, to a lesser extent, in Greece (–9.1) being particularly noteworthy. From the analysis of the three dimensions of the European Gender Equality Index (Bericat and Sánchez, 2016) it can be observed that the main weaknesses of the 4MC are to be found in the area of power inequality between men and women. In this respect, both Italy (32.4) and Greece (26.6) have a very low level of gender equality, while in Portugal (42.9) and above all Spain (50.1) this is slightly higher as regards power, but nonetheless still falling way short of full equality.

Lastly, another major endogenous deficit in the 4MC is to be found in knowledge and innovation culture. Portugal (–15.2) has the greatest deficit in this domain, while the situation in Spain (+0.6) is more favourable. Specifically, Portugal ranks low in the Global Creativity Index (GCI) (Florida, Mellander and King, 2015), especially as regards technology (investment and patents) and talent (creative classes and qualifications).

In sum, since the endogenous approach involves a multidimensional comparison of the internal structure of the 4MC, it is ideal for constructing a profile of their own deficits and surpluses, irrespective of any external comparison. The synthetic profiles of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, which can be constructed from the data contained in Table 4, are shown below.

The major endogenous deficits in Greece affect the well-being of the elderly, democracy and governance, crime and safety and gender equality. On the plus side, health conditions and environmental sustainability, as well as consumption and social equality, stand out.

In Italy, the greatest endogenous deficits are to be found in gender inequality and democracy and governance, followed by social and political participation and quality of work. In contrast, it has endogenous surpluses in health conditions and quality of the healthcare sector, social equality and quality of life.

In Portugal, there are important endogenous deficits in social and political participation, culture and innovation and quality of work. As to its endogenous surpluses, noteworthy are its good health conditions, low crime rate and high level of safety, in addition to its good environmental conditions.

The greatest endogenous deficit in Spain is in social and political participation, followed at a distance by consumption and quality of work. As to its endogenous surpluses, there is no domain that stands out above the rest, but five that are equally positive when compared to the country's average level of societal quality: health conditions, child well-being, crime and safety, subjective well-being and social equality.

Lastly, the full profile of the endogenous and exogenous surpluses and deficits in the 4MC is represented in Figure 3, while those of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece can be seen in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7, which show the distance separating each domain from both the EU average (exogenous difference) and their overall SQIs (endogenous difference).

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study has been to offer researchers, policymakers and those interested in getting to know the current situation in the Southern European Mediterranean countries, an overview of their societal quality levels from a holistic, multidimensional and comprehensive perspective. In this sense, the analysis of the data provided by the *System of Indices on the Quality of European Societies*

Figure 4. Portugal's exogenous and endogenous deficits and surpluses, by societal quality domains.



Source: own elaboration.

Figure 5. Spain's exogenous and endogenous deficits and surpluses, by societal quality domains.



Source: own elaboration.

Figure 6. Italy's exogenous and endogenous deficits and surpluses, by societal quality domains.



Source: own elaboration.

Figure 7. Greece's exogenous and endogenous deficits and surpluses, by societal quality domains.



Source: own elaboration.

(SIQES), has demonstrated that a diagnosis cannot be performed on the strength of a sole aspect, however relevant this may be. In light of the above, it has been possible to demonstrate that neither do all the domains attain the same quality levels nor do all the countries have an identical profile.

The problem arising when offering a simple and unequivocal diagnosis lies in the multidimensional and complex nature of social reality itself. For this reason, examining societal quality in many of its domains and in a large number of countries offers us an extraordinary overview. A knowledge of this global configuration contributes to frame analyses of specific social settings and phenomena in the context of a broader social structure, which in a way gives it meaning. In other words, it contributes to prevent missing the forest for the trees in its necessary study.

In no way do we suggest that social analyses of specific phenomena are less necessary than multidimensional or comprehensive ones, or vice versa. On the contrary, we believe that both are complementary and essential for offering a detailed, complete, structural and timely picture of social reality. Throughout these pages, and to the extent permitted by space limitations, we have attempted to ascertain, here and there, some of the details of current reality revealed by the data provided by the *focused composite indicators* forming part of the system. It is clear that the structural overview offered here is pointless without an exhaustive knowledge of the social features described above. But it is also equally evident that studies and research conducted on particular aspects of the social reality of the Southern European Mediterranean countries (4MC) now have an overview in which to contextualise and integrate their results. Indeed, we believe that the analysis of the research performed by the authors of the composite indicators forming part of the system is fundamental. Therefore, we will yet again refer readers to the book entitled, *The Quality of European Societies. A Compilation of Composite Indicators*, which contains comprehensive estimates and bibliographical references for all these indices.

At any rate, what is relevant is that the Southern European Mediterranean countries may continue to make progress in order to reach higher levels of societal quality in the foreseeable future. Since their SQIs are located in the percentile ranks of between 40 and 50, they currently occupy intermediate positions in the context of the EU, although that of Greece, a country currently immersed in a full-blown social crisis, is substantially lower at present. Therefore, even though it is true that societal quality levels in the 4MC fall short of those in continental Europe and especially the Nordic countries, they certainly do not bring up the rear anymore, as some are wont to say.

The analysis performed here demonstrates that the Southern European Mediterranean countries have sufficient endogenous potentialities to face new societal development challenges. To this end, they must clearly define those challenges and have the political will to tackle them. For example, we have seen that, in spite of their general endogenous deficits, they exceed the EU average in environmental quality and health conditions, which is an enormous achievement in two essential areas. In other domains, such as subjective well-being and child well-being, they are ranked comparatively high.

Before concluding we feel that we should recap on the five domains in which the Southern European Mediterranean countries have evident *endogenous deficits*, namely, those with quality levels below their general SQIs. These are as follows: social and political participation; quality of work; democracy and governance; gender equality; and culture and innovation. These are key areas not only because achieving high levels of societal quality is inconceivable without substantially improving each one of them, but basically because societal development in the Mediterranean depends on these five domains as essential drivers of progress. Their future transformation will depend on the development and enhancement of new forms of social participation and cohesion, on the adequate management of their labour markets and improvements in the workplace, on the reform of their political systems and the enhancement of their democratic quality and on a final push towards a model of society based on gender equality and the expansion of education and knowledge in a social context in which priority is given to creativity and innovation.

The development of these five domains would not be so crucial if it were not for the fact that they are all structural weaknesses inherent to the Southern European Mediterranean countries. It has been demonstrated here that these countries form a group because they share common features, essentially those that have undermined, and still undermine, their societal progress.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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Artículos / *Articles*

Movilización colectiva, transformación democrática y resistencia contra la crisis y la austeridad en el sur de Europa: la experiencia de Portugal y España* / *Collective mobilization, democratic transformation and resistance against the crisis and austerity in Southern Europe: The experience of Portugal and Spain*

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RESUMEN

Desde 2011, impulsadas por la crisis, han acaecido transformaciones sustanciales en el ámbito de los movimientos sociales y las formas de acción colectiva en el mundo. Las llamadas "Primavera Árabe" y "Primavera de los movimientos" muestran el carácter global de las mismas. La utilización masiva y exponencial por parte de estas de medios y expresiones digitales, nos permitiría avanzar en la conceptualización de un nuevo sujeto de estudio para la teoría de los movimientos sociales. Los movimientos que tuvieron lugar en España y Portugal resultan paradigmáticos para esta nueva propuesta, que desafía las concepciones dominantes sobre los movimientos sociales en las últimas décadas, a partir de la emergencia de esos nuevos actores políticos y de las nuevas formas de movilización y de activismo, que han contribuido a la redefinición de las relaciones entre el Estado y la sociedad civil, así como de las comprensiones clásicas acerca de la participación política y la democracia.

Palabras clave: recientes movimientos sociales globales; nuevas formas de activismo; democracia; tecnopolítica; Portugal y España.

ABSTRACT

Driven by the crisis since 2011, inescapable transformations have occurred in social movements and forms of collective action in the world. The so-called "Arab Spring" and the "Spring of the Movements" show the global character of these transformations, their massive use of exponential and massive use of digital media and expressions, as never had been used in history, allow us to advance in the conceptualization of a new theoretical subject within Social Movements studies. Social movements in Spain and Portugal are paradigmatic of this new proposal, which challenge the dominant conceptions about social movements of the last decades, from the emergence of these new political actors and their new forms of mobilization and activism which have contribute to the redefinition of the linkages between the State and Civil Society and, consequently, in the classical understandings about political participation and democracy.

Keywords: *recent global social movements; new forms of activism; democracy; technopolitics; Portugal and Spain.*

* Dedicamos este artículo a la memoria de nuestra colega y amiga Britta Baumgarten, fallecida el 18 de octubre de 2018. Britta Baumgarten fue una eminente socióloga, activista y una gran conocedora y estudiosa de los movimientos sociales, cuyo trabajo ha influenciado considerablemente la realización del nuestro.

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INTRODUCCIÓN

La crisis de finales de la primera década del siglo XXI ha provocado innegables transformaciones en la esfera de los movimientos sociales y en las formas de acción colectiva que los caracterizan. Se trata de una crisis sin precedentes motivada, en gran medida, por la falta de confianza de los ciudadanos en las instituciones y en la capacidad de la democracia para resolver una serie de problemas colectivos agravados por la crisis. Aunque se mantenga incuestionable desde el punto de vista normativo, el modelo hegemónico de la democracia liberal representativa manifiesta crecientes señales de desgaste, como sugieren los movimientos sociales que han aparecido desde 2011.

En este trabajo reflexionamos sobre las principales dinámicas de movilización social y activismo puestas en práctica en Portugal y España a partir de 2011, argumentando que tales dinámicas contribuyen a una nueva caracterización de los movimientos sociales.

España y Portugal se mostraron como dos realidades fértiles en lo que atañe a la emergencia de nuevos actores políticos durante el periodo de austeridad motivado por la crisis (Roca *et al.*, 2018).

En Portugal, la crisis financiera que comenzó en 2008 motivó la implementación de medidas de austeridad contenidas en los Programas de Estabilidad y Crecimiento (PEC); sucesivamente nuevas medidas fueron acordadas en el marco del memorando de entendimiento con la Troika, que estuvo en vigor entre 2011 y 2014. Es en este contexto específico que emerge la "sociedad de la austeridad", la cual se caracteriza por la contención en el gasto del Estado, la privatización del sector público, el aumento de los impuestos, la disminución de los salarios y la liberalización del derecho laboral, la cual privilegia una lógica de naturalización de las desigualdades. Dicha lógica corresponde a la cristalización de las instituciones y a las prácticas sociales en torno a una configuración del poder resultante de la combinación entre actores sociales —no electos, como la Troika, o electos, como los gobiernos—, además de una desestabilización de la estructura normativa unida al recurso a un derecho de excepción y de una transformación en la forma de gobierno, orientada por un proceso de legitimización basado en el miedo, el sacrificio y la injusticia social (Ferreira, 2011: 121). La adopción de medidas de austeridad fue extendiendo el descontento de varios segmentos de la sociedad civil que, de una forma sin precedentes desde la Revolución del 25 de abril de 1974, se organizaron, movilizándose en el combate a la austeridad, intentando impedir la dilapidación de los derechos conquistados y legalmente garantizados.

En España, las acampadas en la Puerta del Sol, Madrid, y en otras plazas del territorio, fueron una respuesta[1] a las políticas de austeridad impuestas por la Troika (Fernández *et al.*, 2012: 14-16) y al desgaste del llamado Régimen del 78 y la "cultura de la transición" (Martínez, 2016).

La crisis se afirmó como una ventana de oportunidad para que viejos y nuevos movimientos mostraran públicamente sus agendas reivindicativas (Della Porta y Mattoni, 2014), las cuales se revelaron en clara contraposición con las agendas de los actores institucionales, configurando, de ese modo, un nuevo ciclo de protestas (Accornero y Pinto, 2015: 398).

Los movimientos que emergen con la crisis suponen un nuevo frente de discusión en el ámbito de la teoría de los movimientos sociales. Los Recientes Movimientos Sociales Globales (RMSG) (Sabariego, 2017) —su configuración, acciones, estrategias comunicativas, procesos deliberativos y agenda reivindicativa, entre otros elementos— han permitido analizar y establecer relaciones entre los movimientos de España y Portugal, como así también entre países y movimientos a escala global (Roca *et al.*, 2018). El espacio ocupado por las Redes Sociales de Internet (RSI, de aquí en adelante), en la apropiación de las redes de interacción con finalidad política estratégica, acabó definiendo a los movimientos de estos países, con características distintas y una identidad múltiple, heterogénea, basada en la dimensión tecnopolítica (Candón, 2013; Sabariego, 2017).

1 Cfr. VVAA (2015), *Critical Journal for Critical Geographies* (Themed Section: Geografías del 15-M), Flesher Fominaya (2015), Calvo y Álvarez (2015), Fraile y Rodríguez (2015), Razquin (2017) y Tejerina y Perugorría (2017).

Este artículo aspira a identificar las principales acciones desarrolladas por los colectivos que surgieron con la crisis y la austeridad, y que acabaron por concentrar la red global de acción y la identidad de los RMSG. El trabajo se sustenta en una metodología cualitativa, fundamentada en la Teoría Comprometida (*Engaged Theory*) (Milan, 2010), lo que nos ha permitido elaborar una etnografía de los movimientos, que hemos desarrollado a través de entrevistas en profundidad y grupos de discusión con activistas. Un análisis de esta naturaleza facilita el mapeo de los principales actores colectivos que surgieron en el ámbito de este proceso, de las formas de acción colectiva que desencadenaron, avalando los principales impactos que este tipo de acción ha provocado.

FUNDAMENTACIÓN TEÓRICA

La crisis iniciada en 2008 profundizó la falta de confianza de los ciudadanos en la política, en el funcionamiento de la democracia y en su capacidad para resolver los problemas colectivos (Castells, 2015; Laval y Dardot, 2017), dando origen a una fuerte ola de movilización y reivindicación de cambios.

De cara a la inestabilidad económica de los últimos años, surge como reacción inmediata —definida como la reacción competente por parte de diversos gobiernos—, la adopción de paquetes de medidas que privilegian la austeridad como solución para salvaguardar los mercados, pasando por alto a las personas, los serios efectos de la crisis en sus vidas y la erosión de derechos que aquellas consideraban garantizados (Ferreira, 2011; Streek, 2013; Strickler, 2013). Es en este contexto que se ha agravado la desconfianza de la esfera ciudadana hacia las instituciones democráticas, una tendencia insoslayable en los países del sur de Europa (Mathijs, 2014), donde la participación electoral, además, ha disminuido drásticamente, como es el caso de Portugal (Pinto *et al.*, 2013). Nos referimos, así, al aumento del descontento en relación al modelo liberal de democracia (Philips, 2011; Della Porta *et al.*, 2017a), es decir, en relación al modelo hegemónico de democracia representativa, el cual es considerado de baja intensidad democrática (Santos y Avritzer, 2002), en connivencia con el sistema capitalista y sus intereses.

Aunque la democracia representativa se mantenga incuestionable como modelo normativo, esta viene evidenciando señales de crisis (Graeber, 2013), entre las cuales destacan: i) la falta de confianza de los ciudadanos en los políticos y en las instituciones políticas, con el consecuente agravamiento de la distancia entre electores y electos (Mouffe, 2000; Freire y Viegas, 2009); ii) el agravamiento de los riesgos e incertidumbres asociados a los procesos de toma de decisiones, que no permiten la participación ciudadana (Callon *et al.*, 2001; Gonçalves *et al.*, 2007), y iii) la consiguiente falta de interés en la política representativa, motivada por esa falta de respeto a la voluntad colectiva, ya que gran parte de las decisiones no tienen en consideración los problemas reales de la sociedad (Phillips, 2011; Ercan *et al.*, 2018). A la luz de estos problemas, se torna imprescindible desarrollar nuevas y mejores oportunidades de participación pública en procesos deliberativos (Santos, 2002; Matos, 2016). La participación pública en la política y en las decisiones colectivas, ampliamente debatida y evaluada a lo largo de las últimas décadas, se ha consolidado como solución para estos problemas, emergiendo como factor de esperanza, capaz de alterar el curso de la democracia, orientándola para prácticas de alta intensidad democrática.

Fue precisamente en el contexto de crisis y austeridad que se consolidaron las fuertes olas de indignación en los países analizados (Della Porta *et al.*, 2017b), las cuales avanzaron con la necesidad de repensar propuestas alternativas al escenario de déficit democrático gubernamental que nos sustenta.

En un intento por rescatar la democracia, no solo del sur de Europa, sino en varias partes del mundo, a partir de 2011, la sociedad se organizó llenando las plazas de las principales ciudades, haciendo resurgir el repertorio de la ocupación del espacio público como acción privilegiada de los movimientos sociales, en un efecto de contagio inigualable. "A los movimientos sociales les había sido atribuido un lugar: las calles. No estaba previsto que tuviesen la osadía de forzar el autocomplaciente sistema bipartidista. Por primera vez, una parte de los movimientos que emergieron de la crítica a las élites y del discurso anticapitalista renunció a la pureza de los márgenes para entrar en la lucha por el poder, y fue así que comenzaron realmente a incomodar a quienes mandan [...]. Y aun así, no quisieron percibir las ventajas de integrar estos movimientos, que canalizaron la irritación contra las políticas de austeridad" (Ramoneda, 2015: 19).

En este ciclo de protestas globales emergen no solo nuevos grupos y movimientos, sino también un complejo ciudadano dinámico y creativo (Toussaint, 2012). Para la emergencia de este nuevo ciudadano, Internet ha contribuido sobremanera, dinamizando las luchas de las entidades civiles a favor de la justicia social en un mundo que, paralelamente, globaliza desigualdades de diversos órdenes (Castells, 2015). De este modo, vino a fortalecer la sociedad civil en lo que atañe al proceso de universalización de valores y derechos democráticos, congregando intereses y necesidades, concretas o simbólicas, ayudando a promover acciones en defensa de la ciudadanía, de los derechos humanos, pero, sobre todo, en torno del bien común (Moraes, 2001; Ferreira, 2011). Se refuerza, en este contexto analítico, el papel desempeñado por las redes sociales virtuales, que se constituyeron en plataformas que permitían la emergencia de nuevas formas de activismo, contribuyendo no solo al fomento e intercambio de información, sino, y sobre todo, a la movilización colectiva en torno de la lucha contra la austeridad, reivindicando más participación y alegando que otra democracia es posible. Fue con el recurso a esta mediación tecnológica, basada en el desarrollo de redes sociales digitales temáticas o, *lato sensu*, de redes de indignación y esperanza (Castells, 2015), que muchos de estos movimientos se tornaron realidad. De estas redes emerge, así, la incitación a la movilización, originando una mayor globalización de la interacción social en torno de reivindicaciones específicas, permitiendo la circulación casi simultánea de cualquier hecho que merezca la atención de su emisor, configurando, en gran medida, los RMSG como un nuevo actor y una nueva configuración de los movimientos.

LA CRISIS Y LA AUSTERIDAD EN ESPAÑA Y PORTUGAL

Se han reforzado, en los últimos años las advertencias acerca de los peligros que enfrenta la democracia en Europa. En este contexto, un nuevo riesgo proviene de la imposición de medidas de austeridad, aplicadas a partir de discursos, muchas veces marcados por el chantaje, las amenazas, el miedo o el castigo, y del que Grecia es uno de los ejemplos más evidentes. De esta manera, en Europa, muchas decisiones han sido adoptadas por instancias que nadie eligió democráticamente, pero que, a pesar de todo, comandan los destinos y las vidas de los europeos. Este es un argumento que remite la democracia a un contexto de riesgos en aumento, principalmente si no somos capaces de invertir la ingeniería de la austeridad, que se asienta en la lucha contra los salarios bajos, la dilapidación de los derechos sociales y las estrategias de rendición al mercado, ya que se privilegia la privatización de áreas estratégicas como la salud y la educación (Nunes, 2011; Antunes, 2015). Estas son, por tanto, medidas onerosas en lo que atañe a los derechos instituidos y que, al mismo tiempo, agravan la ruptura del Estado Social (Freire, 2014: 15). Es en la compleja relación entre la crisis, la austeridad, la democracia y el autoritarismo donde reside el agravamiento de la tasa de pobreza en Europa, sobre todo en los países de Europa del sur[2].

Reaparece así, en Europa, un proceso de totalitarismo financiero (Ángel Moreno, 2017), cuya única salida apunta al sentido de la utopía de la emancipación de la democracia frente al capitalismo. El capital financiero ha sido asumido como el elemento orientador de cualquier acción política nacional o internacional, sobreponiéndose, en im-

2 De acuerdo con los datos disponibles en PORDATA, la tasa de intensidad de la pobreza en Europa (UE28) aumentó del 22,9 % en 2010 al 24,9 % en 2015. Lo mismo sucedió, con mayor intensidad, para los mismos años de referencia, en los países de Europa del sur, habiendo subido del 22,7 % para el 29 % en Portugal, del 26,8 % para el 33,8 % en España y del 23,4 para el 30,6 % en Grecia (cfr. https://www.pordata.pt/DB/Europa/Ambiente+de+Consulta/Tabela).

portancia, a los ciudadanos, a sus derechos y necesidades (Camargo, 2013).

Es en este contexto en el que los movimientos sociales han venido a desempeñar un papel fundamental, ayudando a promover un nuevo modelo de democracia, fundamentado en la participación, deliberación y transparencia, es decir, en las bases de una democracia fuerte (Barber, 1984) o de alta intensidad (Santos, 2002) como un camino posible para combatir la crisis y la austeridad.

En el caso portugués se adoptaron medidas concretas para hacer frente a la crisis, tales como los cuatro Programas de Estabilidad y Crecimiento (PEC) presentados por el XVIII Gobierno Constitucional[3], específicamente diseñados para combatir el excesivo endeudamiento del Estado. El rechazo al último PEC por parte de los partidos de la oposición abrió un nuevo episodio de crisis política, motivando una petición de dimisión del primer ministro, en marzo de 2011, seguido por la realización de elecciones anticipadas, en junio de 2011, en las que venció el Partido Social Demócrata (PSD)[4]. Si bien la petición de ayuda financiera fue originalmente formulada por el gobierno del socialista José Sócrates, en abril de 2011, la intervención de la Troika[5] fue conducida por el gobierno de su sucesor, el socialdemócrata Pedro Passos Coelho. En opinión de algunos autores, la agenda de Passos Coelho profundizó el carácter neoliberal de las políticas de la propia Troika, configurando un proceso de "autoflagelación" destinado a legitimar una terapia de choque (Freire, 2014: 23).

El año 2011 marcó así el arranque de una etapa relevante de la historia de la democracia portuguesa, signada por el descontento de la sociedad civil, sin precedentes desde la Revolución del 25 de abril de 1974.

3 Era el gobierno del Partido Socialista, liderado por el primer ministro, José Sócrates.

4 Habiendo ganado las elecciones con el 38,6 % de los votos, el Partido Social Demócrata (PSD) y el Centro Democrático Social (CDS) firmaron un acuerdo que les garantizó gobernar con mayoría absoluta.

5 Entidades con quienes el gobierno portugués firmó, el 17 de mayo de 2011, un acuerdo de ayuda por valor de 78.000 millones de euros que se llamó Memorando de Entendimiento.

En el caso español, el 15M fue asumido como una reacción crítica a la autonomía de la clase política española, a la que la esfera ciudadana contestó exactamente por no sentirse representada, desarrollando estrategias de emancipación democrática frente al encadenamiento neoliberal (Laval y Dardot, 2017) acaecido en España entre 1978 y 2011.

El movimiento interpretó la crisis en España como una excusa para la adopción de políticas de austeridad, de forma semejante al contexto portugués o griego, y aún más allá, como una oportunidad para la adopción de un modelo de gobierno liberal más radical. Este entendimiento llevó al consecuente alejamiento de la esfera ciudadana en relación a las instituciones, generando una respuesta popular sin precedentes. Hizo emerger una nueva pedagogía democrática y una nueva agenda capaz de colocar las reivindicaciones de los movimientos sociales[6] en la matriz de la política y como deber del Estado. Esta es, por tanto, una definición de democracia basada en lo común y una nueva epistemología horizontal (Aguiló y Sabariego, 2016) que rechaza el contrato vertical que jerarquizó la vida pública y privada en los últimos treinta años del país.

El espacio ocupado por la apropiación de las RSI con una finalidad política acabó por conferir, tanto al movimiento español como al portugués, una identidad múltiple y heterogénea basada exactamente en esta dimensión tecnopolítica (Candón, 2013; Toret, 2013; Sabariego, 2017). Esta dimensión se constituye como un factor diferenciado en la evaluación y definición del movimiento 15M como, además, y de modo general, de los movimientos que surgieron a partir de 2011 en Portugal y en el mundo. La tecnopolítica sobresale como una nueva categoría analítica en el ámbito de la teoría de los movimientos sociales, sustentando a los RMSG (Sabariego, 2016), precisamente por la importancia del papel desempeñado por la tecnología y, especialmente, por las RSI en sus dinámicas, representaciones y autopercepción.

6 Reivindicaciones ligadas al decrecimiento, vivienda digna, paz, desmilitarización, feminismo, ecologismo, educación laica, pública y gratuita de calidad, cultura, salud, servicios públicos, entre otras.

METODOLOGÍA

Este artículo adopta una metodología de trabajo cualitativa, basada en el análisis documental de artículos de la prensa escrita, entrevistas semiestructuradas y *focus group* con activistas y políticos. Prioriza el análisis de la prensa, a partir de la búsqueda exhaustiva de todas las noticias sobre acciones de protesta realizadas en Portugal aparecidas en dos periódicos de referencia de circulación nacional (*Público* y *Jornal de Noticias*) durante el periodo 2003-2013. Ello ha permitido mapear los principales movimientos y colectivos surgidos, sus argumentos y sus principales reivindicaciones.

La recolección de episodios de protesta en artículos publicados en la prensa escrita es un recurso común en la bibliografía sobre movimientos sociales y acción colectiva, habiendo originado el abordaje metodológico llamado *Protest Event Analysis (PEA)* (Koopmans y Rucht, 2002). En el presente trabajo, sin embargo, en lugar de realizarse el análisis cuantitativo que caracteriza a la PEA, se ha optado por realizar un análisis del contenido de las principales noticias recogidas. La recopilación inicial, asociada a un proyecto de investigación con presupuestos más amplios, ofreció un total de 7.253 noticias sobre acciones de protesta válidas para el análisis. No obstante, considerando el foco temporal de este trabajo (2008-2016), fue llevada a cabo una nueva recogida sistemática de noticias de acciones de protesta en las mismas fuentes, en un muestreo sobre 403 noticias sobre protestas relacionadas con la crisis y la austeridad. En España, fueron analizadas noticias de los principales periódicos —*El País*, *El Mundo*, *ABC*— desde el 15 de mayo hasta diciembre de 2011, siendo analizados de forma no sistemática los sitios de Internet de los principales movimientos españoles (*15M*, *n-1*, *DRY!*, *Juventud sin Futuro*), así como sus páginas y perfiles en las RSI (*Facebook* y *Twitter*), en una suerte de etnografía digital de los movimientos a través de los usos tecnopolíticos de las RSI. Estos datos ofrecieron información relevante para la problematización de los impactos de este tipo de acciones.

La Observación Participante se ha desarrollado en diversos movimientos y organizaciones desde el 15 de mayo de 2011 hasta la actualidad (15M, Asambleas de barrio, Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca, Marchas de la Dignidad, Marea Blanca por la Sanidad, Marea Verde por la Educación públicas, PODEMOS y otras organizaciones), permitiendo establecer un análisis coherente con el sujeto del análisis, tanto en objetivos como en métodos, facilitando el análisis etnográfico y de contexto entre los activistas y miembros de los movimientos sociales en sus interacciones, su autopercepción y discursos, incluso los no-verbales. Estos datos cualitativos fueron comparados con los datos cuantitativos sobre el movimiento ofrecidos por el Barómetro del Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas de España (CIS) a partir de julio de 2011.

En España, fueron realizados tres grupos de discusión entre 2011 y 2015, el último tras la irrupción electoral de PODEMOS en el Parlamento Europeo, para complementar la información etnográfica y situar las percepciones y discursos de los activistas en relación a personas que no participaban en los movimientos, entre diferentes grupos de edad, sexo y adscripción de género e ideológica. En Portugal se realizaron tres grupos de discusión con activistas, ciudadanos comprometidos en acciones de protesta y representantes políticos. Una dinámica de interacción que permitió cruzar percepciones sobre acciones de protesta realizadas como forma de participación política y sus efectos.

Se realizaron también 27 entrevistas semiestructuradas a activistas implicados en estos procesos en torno a la constitución de los movimientos, sus reivindicaciones, organización de protestas y expectativas sobre los efectos producidos, entre otros actores privilegiados en el contexto de la movilización analizado, incluyendo académicos que han trabajado en esta temática o en temáticas análogas.

El análisis de contenido de los datos recogidos en el ámbito de estos abordajes cualitativos se apoyó en el *software* NVivo y en otros de licencia abierta, para completar el análisis cualitativo (CAQDAS). Además, se realizó el análisis del contenido de los textos de prensa, recurriendo al marco analítico elaborado al efecto, destacando los argumentos avanzados por los movimientos de antiausteridad, principales acciones desencadenadas y percepción de los efectos producidos. Incidiendo aún más sobre este aspecto, en la investigación se ha privilegiado el análisis de datos, considerando las diferentes fuentes de datos que sustentan este, así como la triangulación, teniendo en cuenta que los investigadores recogieron datos separadamente, a partir de sus proyectos individuales, discutiendo y comparando los resultados. Se trató de comparar la influencia del investigador sobre la problemática de la investigación (Duarte, 2009), del sujeto de esta, la metodología y los métodos, así como de los problemas externos e internos derivados del propio proceso de investigación.

NUEVOS ACTORES, NUEVAS FORMAS DE ACTIVISMO

La crisis ofrece ventanas de oportunidad: *a)* para la derecha, una oportunidad para radicalizar la agenda neoliberal (Harvey, 2011); *b)* para las izquierdas, una oportunidad de reinvención (Santos, 2016), pero sobre todo un desafío de posible confluencia, y *c)* para la sociedad civil, un estímulo al pensamiento crítico, es decir, una oportunidad para pensar, debatir y presentar alternativas a la crisis, a su enfrentamiento y al déficit democrático que pasó a ser contestado más dura y asiduamente.

Los países del sur de Europa se revelaron particularmente activos en este proceso contestatario desencadenado por la crisis y la austeridad. De acuerdo con los datos recogidos por el *European Social Survey* relativos a 2012, tal y como se expone en el análisis de Accornero y Pinto (2015: 395), aumentó significativamente el número de personas que afirmaba que había participado en, al menos, una manifestación de protesta en el periodo 2008-2012. Este aumento es significativo en el caso de España (del 15,9 al 25,9 %) y también en el de Portugal (del 3,7 al 6,8 %).

Uno de los efectos más concretos y visibles de este marco analítico lo suponen los nuevos actores emergentes en este escenario y las formas de activismo que han definido sus acciones. Desde 2011, aunque con menor intensidad, la crisis desató una fuerte movilización de colectivos afectados, los cuales se han organizado para combatir injusticias, contrariar decisiones tomadas contra su voluntad y necesidades, manifestar insatisfacción, descontento y también para pensar y presentar alternativas democráticas.

La crisis ha sido enfatizada como factor desencadenante de estas oleadas de protestas (Ortiz *et al.*, 2013). En línea con las conclusiones de otros autores (Babo y Silva, 2016; Baumgartten, 2013; Accornero y Pinto, 2015), el análisis empírico realizado en este trabajo ha permitido identificar tres colectivos que, a pesar de algunas diferencias marcadas por la especificidad de sus contextos nacionales y culturales, poseen características y repertorios de acción comunes: la "Geração à Rasca" (Generación afligida) y "Que se lixe a Troika" (Que se pudra la Troika), en Portugal, y el Movimiento 15M en España. Tanto para los colectivos portugueses como para los españoles el uso de medios digitales y las RSI se revelaron primordiales. Fueron las RSI las que favorecieron la aparición de actores colectivos en estos contextos nacionales y sus influencias transnacionales (Accornero y Pinto, 2015). Los nuevos sujetos políticos, exhibieron una combinación peculiar de reivindicaciones materiales y políticas, basadas en la identidad, estableciendo nuevas formas de organización horizontal, en gran medida basadas en el ciberactivismo, además de la toma de decisiones y la representación (Fonseca, 2018).

Estas olas de indignación y de movilización ciudadana están encuadradas en la lucha por el derecho a las resistencias ante la opresión económica y social, reivindicando así la conservación de los derechos instituidos, que se encuentran en proceso de erosión, pero también el ejercicio del derecho a participar democráticamente en la vida pública, una de las principales banderas en la acción de los RMSG.

El caso portugués

La escalada en las respuestas a la crisis y la austeridad desencadenó, en el contexto portugués, un nuevo ciclo de protestas, de dinámicas de acción y movilización colectivas contextualizadas y singulares. Particularmente evidente fue el aumento del conflicto social de diversas formas, de las protestas menos moldeadas por estructuras organizativas (Matos, 2016) a las protestas corporativas y profesionales, a cargo de estructuras funcionales como los sindicatos, movilizando un creciente contingente de personas (Costa *et al.*, 2014; Lima y Martín Artiles, 2014). Véase, como muestra, la evolución del número de acontecimientos registrados al abrigo del derecho de reunión y de manifestación, entre 2009 y 2016, en Portugal[7], en el que es notorio el incremento de esta forma de acción colectiva en relación al periodo más caliente de la crisis, habiéndose registrado 167 acciones de este tipo en 2009, 679 en 2010 y 702 en 2011 que, con un aumento muy significativo, crecieron hasta 3.012 acciones en 2012, momento a partir del cual se invierte esta tendencia, disminuyendo hasta 2.598 acciones registradas en 2013, 1.866 en 2014, 1.300 en 2015 y 920 en 2016.

La crisis económica y la consecuente crisis política desencadenada por la austeridad se constituyeron, por tanto, como un terreno fértil para surgimiento de nuevos actores y nuevas formas de acción colectiva.

El contexto portugués destaca, como acontecimiento de ineludible importancia, la manifestación del 12 de marzo de 2011, en el ámbito de la cual, y sobre el *motto Geração à Rasca*, millares de personas salieron a las calles, ocupando las plazas de las principales ciudades portuguesas, en un acontecimiento nacional que acabó siendo considerado como la mayor manifestación en Portugal desde el periodo revolucionario de 1974-1975 (Baumgarten, 2013). Este es, además, el punto de partida que parece justificar el *boom* de acciones, organizaciones y protestas, con su punto álgido en 2012, tal y como sustentan los datos presentados anteriormente.

> Cuatro amigos —Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho, de veinticinco años, Paula Gil, de veintiseis, João Labrincha, de veintisiete y António Frazão, de veinticinco— crearon esta protesta "laica, pacífica y apartidista". La idealizaron en Lisboa. La palabra se propagó a través de Facebook. Había mucha gente preguntándose: "¿Y en Oporto?". Alexandre Afonso, de treinta y cuatro años, envió un mail invitando a implicarse voluntariamente para impulsar una réplica en Oporto. Le dijeron que sí. Perdieron el control a la mecha que incendiaron en Internet. En otras nueve ciudades, otros jóvenes adoptaron el manifiesto que convocaba a "desempleados, *quinientoseuristas* y otros *malremunerados*, esclavos disfrazados, subcontratados, contratados por obra, falsos autónomos, trabajadores estacionales, contratados en prácticas, becarios, trabajadores-estudiantes, madres, padres e hijos de Portugal" (Reportaje de Ana Cristina Pereira, *Diario* Público, 12 de marzo de 2011).

Como productos concretos de estas movilizaciones desencadenadas a partir de las RSI como Facebook, nacieron colectivos que se organizaron y que acabaron por profundizar la red global de acción e identidad calificada en este texto como RMSG. Estos colectivos asumieron forma, contenido y destaque a partir de una lista de reivindicaciones específicamente orientada contra la política de austeridad, la crisis y la forma como se venía ejerciendo la democracia, destacando el Movimiento 12 de Marzo (M12M) (contexto del que emergió posteriormente la Academia Ciudadana)[8] y el Movimiento *Que se Lixe a Troika*, responsables por las mayores manifestaciones populares jamás registradas en Portugal, realizadas el 15 de septiembre de 2012 y el 2 de marzo de 2013 (Babo y Silva, 2016).

Duarte y Baumgartten (2015) señalan esa sociedad civil fuerte, antiausteridad, que se reveló pródiga en nuevos proyectos y redes, sobre todo entre 2011 y 2013. Una de las características

7 *Fuente:* Informes anuales de Seguridad Interna, Portugal. Otros estudios muestran que, con datos ofrecidos por la policía portuguesa relativos a la frecuencia de manifestaciones, solo en Lisboa esta aumentó de 244 en 2010 para 298 en 2011 y para 579 (es decir, una ratio de una manifestación cada quince horas) en 2012 (Elias y Pinho, 2012: 43, *cit.* en Accornero y Pinto, 2015: 397).

8 La Academia Ciudadana surgió a partir de la organización de la protesta de *Geração à Rasca,* realizada el 12 de marzo de 2011, iniciativa que inauguró una nueva forma de participación ciudadana en Europa, al ser convocada en las redes sociales y sin ningún apoyo partidista ni sindical. La Academia Ciudadana tiene por objetivo impulsar la ciudadanía activa y la construcción de raíces de desarrollo con principios de sostenibilidad social, económica y ambiental y su principal objetivo es *empoderar* personas y organizaciones en el ejercicio de la profundización de la democracia (cfr. http://academiacidada.org/manifesto/).

que se ha subrayado, en lo que atañe a este ciclo de protestas, se relaciona con el hecho de que esta dinámica haya sido asegurada por redes de jóvenes, que alimentaron una red de relaciones transnacional, a partir de nuevas tecnologías de la información y la comunicación como recurso de movilización (Accornero y Pinto, 2015; Babo y Silva, 2016). No obstante, y a pesar de la propia designación generacional de estas protestas, en las que los jóvenes tienen un papel de destaque motivado sobre todo por la fuerte precariedad que les afecta, conviene señalar que a lo largo de los dos últimos años también las generaciones más mayores han mantenido una presencia asidua en el ámbito de la movilización contestataria de la crisis y la austeridad en Portugal.

> "La lucha también es fiesta porque es pacífica. Todos nosotros somos gente de paz que solo quiere una vida mejor. Que quiere un empleo. Que quiere que el gobierno nos mire como a personas. Que mire a nuestros mayores que están muriendo de hambre. Que nos mire como a gente y no como a números. Mire, no hay aquí solo precarios. Está aquí Portugal entero. La calle es nuestra y el gobierno tiene que oírnos", dice Catarina Pereira, diecinueve años, estudiante de Derecho. También Arménio Amaral quiere una vida mejor. Para él, que dice "sobrevivir con una pensión de 250 euros" y para sus nietos. "No quiero que ellos [los nietos] vivan a la intemperie", dice (Reportaje de Luciano Álvarez, *Diario Público,* 12 de marzo de 2011).

Un ejemplo de todo ello es la "APRe!", una asociación cívica, laica, apartidista, creada en octubre de 2012 con la idea de dar voz a los jubilados y pensionistas portugueses, considerados ciudadanos de pleno derecho en la construcción de una sociedad más justa y solidaria.

> Los pensionistas, mayores y sin poder reivindicativo fueron presa fácil de las políticas de austeridad. En cifras reales, desde 2010, un pensionista con 1.300 euros perdió el 27 % de sus rendimientos. ¿Estaremos en el origen de una revuelta inédita? ¿O es el aislamiento social el que lleva al inconformismo? Desde que un diputado se refirió a la "peste grisácea", son más las voces de los mayores que se oyen. La Asociación de Jubilados, Pensionistas y Reformados (APRe!) ya cuenta con cinco mil asociados y se encontró con el gobierno. Quieren tener voz en la concertación social y saben que su poder aún cuenta en las urnas (Reportaje de Nuno Ribeiro, *Diario Público*, 7 de junio de 2013).

Con la crisis, en Portugal, surgieron así varios movimientos y organizaciones que hasta 2013 intensificaron sus acciones, generando nuevas discusiones, posibilitando pensar alternativas y creando oportunidades para nuevas alianzas. A la protesta de *Geração à Rasca*, de donde surgió el M12M, se unieron otros grupos, algunos de ellos ramificaciones de redes globales como los Indignados de Lisboa, Acampada Lisboa —Democracia Verdadeira Já, Portugal UNcut o ATTAC Portugal— y que, juntos, consolidaron la plataforma 15-O (Plataforma 15 de Octubre). Estas nuevas alianzas fueron, así, siendo establecidas, destacando los llamados nuevos-nuevos movimientos sociales que ganaban aliento en la península ibérica desde 2008 (Freixa *et al.*, 2009).

Se desarrollaron colaboraciones entre varios nuevos-nuevos movimientos sociales con actores políticos convencionales, señaladamente, para el Congreso Democrático de las Alternativas[9].

9 "El día 5 de octubre de 2012, como respuesta a la convocatoria de más de trescientos cincuenta ciudadanos de todo el país y de varias sensibilidades y experiencias políticas y sociales, posteriormente suscrita por más de cuatro mil personas, se reunió en el Aula Magna en Lisboa, con la participación de más de mil setecientas personas, el Congreso Democrático de las Alternativas (CDA). El congreso ocurrió en un periodo de gran movilización en Portugal, enormes manifestaciones contra la política de austeridad conducida por el gobierno de derecha y por la Troika. Retrospectivamente, resulta más claro que estos dos procesos, las grandes manifestaciones y el CDA marcaron, cada uno a su manera, el inicio de un cambio en la trayectoria del proceso político, económico y social propiciado por el ajuste de la austeridad, los PEC y el memorando, que vino a culminar con la derrota de la derecha en las elecciones legislativas de octubre de 2015. A la movilización masiva de las manifestaciones contra la Troika y la austeridad, el CDA acrecentó una definición de denominadores políticos comunes de una alternativa y la 'defensa de un compromiso común de convergencia, que lo ayude a viabilizar un gobierno alternativo en torno a principios amplios y claros [...]

Fue además creada la iniciativa “Auditoría Ciudadana a la Deuda Pública”, con la intención de promover el debate sobre la reestructuración de la deuda soberana del Estado portugués. No obstante, y a pesar de esta singular e histórica vitalidad, ya a finales de 2011 e inicio de 2012, aparecían las primeras señales de las fracturas en los movimientos antiausteridad atrapados entre la rivalidad entre el Partido Comunista Portugués (PCP) y el Bloco de Esquerda (BE) (Accornero y Pinto, 2015).

2013 marca un giro sustentado en el debilitamiento de la frecuencia y la intensidad de las protestas, llegando a remitir a la inacción y/o disolución y el silencio de algunos de los grupos e iniciativas creadas en este tiempo, una tendencia evidenciada en el análisis de los artículos periodísticos, pero también sustentada por otras investigaciones (Accornero y Pinto, 2015; Duarte y Baumgarten, 2015)[10].

En Portugal, de cara a una renovada cohesión de los partidos tradicionales en lo que atañe a la política de la austeridad, el movimiento contestatario de la crisis y productor de alternativas acabó rendido a su incapacidad de poder transformar el sistema. Afirma esta incapacidad el que ninguno de los partidos que habían gobernado (PSD, PS y CDS) han sido fuertemente penalizados en los procesos electorales que siguieron a las movilizaciones. En realidad, de esta legitimación del poder de los partidos, emerge una solución gubernamental asentada en la coalición de izquierda integrada por el Partido Socialista, el Bloque de Izquierda, el Partido Comunista Portugués y Los Verdes, una alternativa que se tornó realidad tras las elecciones legislativas de octubre de 2015. Esta solución puede, a nuestro entender, haber contribuido aún más a diluir la acción de un movimiento ya fragmentado, en el que las organizaciones evidenciaban claras asociaciones a estos partidos que se tornaron fuerza de gobierno. Comparados con España, los impactos de las acciones de los movimientos resultaron menores, por la hostilidad, desconfianza, voluntad de diferenciación entre formas de organización, asociaciones o sindicatos, sobre todo, entre esos nuevos actores colectivos, surgidos del movimiento antiausteridad. De este modo, incluso en momentos de convergencia, por ejemplo, entre sindicatos y otras organizaciones cívicas, el resultado acabó por desembocar en manifestaciones marcadas por enfrentamientos entre manifestantes (Soeiro, 2014: 75).

A pesar de esta disminución de las acciones, la crisis y las medidas adoptadas, aunque diluyendo el *boom* de acciones reivindicativas registradas en 2011, no dejaron de incentivar la continuidad de la movilización y la organización de colectivos que luchan por nuevas causas, como los afectados por las quiebras bancarias, del que es ejemplo la asociación *Os Indignados e Enganados do Papel Comercial* (perjudicados por el *Grupo Espírito Santo*), entre otros, en Portugal.

El caso español

El 15M supuso una nueva ecología mental reivindicativa, permeando las RSI, consolidándolas como una de las principales herramientas de su sustentación y su apropiación política —Prácticas Comunicativas Emancipadoras (Milan, 2013)—, de cara al colapso del sistema en España, marcado por la institucionalización de la crisis y la excepcionalidad de la austeridad como forma de gobierno. Todo ello vino a agravar la distancia entre las instituciones, la clase política y la ciudadanía, diluida en la corrosión del Estado de Bienestar a través de la globalización capitalista neoliberal.

El 15M fue hábil en la construcción de una nueva narrativa en torno a los factores antes enu-

por parte de las fuerzas políticas democráticas que decidan presentarse a las elecciones’. Demostró, en un proceso de debate y construcción colectiva ampliamente participado y plural, así como en las propuestas y orientaciones que constan de la Declaración política aprobada (‘Rescatar Portugal para un Futuro Decente’), que era posible aunar fuerzas sin borrar las diferencias, encontrar caminos y propuestas políticas conjuntas alternativas a la derecha” (cfr. http://www.congressoalternativas.org/).

10 Para Duarte y Baumgarten (2015), la pérdida de fuerza que asoló al movimiento de protesta desencadenado por la crisis en Portugal, dejó fuera a los Precarios Inflexibles (PI), cuyo activismo se remonta a 2007 y que, a pesar de ello, implicados en las redes globales de protesta, continúan afirmando su agenda reivindicativa con gran dinamismo.

merados (Rodrigo Mora *et al.*, 2011; Díaz Arroyo, 2011), ausente hasta su irrupción en los medios de comunicación, ni en los discursos del gobierno. Narrativa que despertó simpatías en casi todos los sectores sociales, edades y adscripciones geográficas del país (Barómetros CIS, junio-diciembre de 2011).

Las reivindicaciones de gobierno abierto y los usos y apropiaciones políticas de la tecnología han permitido situar el papel desempeñado por esta en la creación y sustentación del movimiento, que acabó integrado por muchos jóvenes universitarios, muchos de los cuales no tenían un perfil ni una trayectoria activista, encajados en la definición sociológica *mileurista*.

> No tenemos futuro, nos lo han robado para rescatar a los bancos, hay trabajo precario [*Manos arriba, esto es un contrato*, lema del movimiento], ni tenemos casa, ni curro [trabajo]. Hay que reiniciar el sistema, da igual a quien votes, al final hacen todos lo mismo (E7, mujer, activista).

A través de las RSI, el movimiento acabó conquistando la simpatía de buena parte de la sociedad española, a pesar de los intentos de demonizarlo por parte de los medios de comunicación y de la clase política, deslegitimando su manera de reivindicar, así como su carácter, propósito y objetivos.

El movimiento fue blanco de intentos de cooptación por formaciones políticas y movimientos sociales previos a la crisis (Feixa *et al.*, 2009), a través de la creación de estructuras internas como comisiones y subcomisiones al comando, la coordinación y elección de portavoces entre personas vinculadas a organizaciones externas. Aunque el movimiento reaccionase con dinámicas horizontales, rechazando líderes, estableciendo así una pedagogía basada en la búsqueda del consenso y no en las lógicas agonísticas de la representación parlamentaria.

> Yo soy apolítico, aquí somos apolíticos, bueno [...], a ver, la gente aquí tiene sus ideas, pero este movimiento no es de partidos. *PSOE-PP la misma mierda es* [otro de los lemas coreados por el movimiento en referencia a los dos partidos mayoritarios]. Por eso esto es apolítico, porque no nos representan y esta democracia es una mentira (E21, hombre, activista).

Fue en el ámbito de este proceso de confrontación de lógicas que la fuerza del 15M se fue disolviendo en asambleas de barrio a lo largo de los meses, a pesar de su legado y del impacto provocado en la llamada *nueva* política, que analizamos en el siguiente epígrafe.

¿QUÉ IMPACTOS?

Es necesario subrayar la importancia que asumen los contextos estatales en el análisis de los impactos provocados por las formas de movilización colectivas aquí tratadas y sus actores. En este sentido, a pesar de las múltiples interrelaciones que se puedan identificar y que nos permiten hablar de movimientos sociales globales orientados por la tecnopolítica (Treré, 2016; Sabariego, 2017; Sierra y Gravante, 2018), como un elemento diferenciador de estos en relación a movimientos anteriores, la cuestión es que cada contexto surge marcado por respuestas únicas. Aunque radicando en una misma crisis económica global, y a pesar de la ligazón entre movimientos conectados digitalmente, sus influencias y reciprocidades no se pueden disociar de las particularidades históricas de estos contextos democráticos, ya que ayudan a determinar las oportunidades políticas y la movilización de recursos nacionales específicos.

La irrupción del 15M significó un *clinamen* (Deleuze, 1988) en el sistema político del país, provocando diversos procesos interrelacionados (Razquin, 2015). Por un lado, impulsó el surgimiento de nuevas fuerzas políticas en la esfera institucional, que apelaron al movimiento como elemento constituyente, de las cuales PODEMOS es el caso más evidente. Por otro lado, los partidos del sistema tuvieron que modificar en buena parte sus discursos e imagen.

El movimiento continuó a través de nuevas formas de expresión y de nuevos repertorios de acción como las Mareas y las Marchas de la Dignidad. En el ámbito de los procesos electorales municipales emergieron candidaturas populares, en muchos casos, de ciudadanos sin experiencia política institucional que consiguieron representación en buena parte de las ciudades de más de 50.000 habitantes, además de las conquistas emblemáticas de las dos mayores ciudades del país: Madrid (Ahora Madrid) y Barcelona (Barcelona em Comù).

En el caso portugués, a pesar de la disminución de las acciones de protesta a lo largo del tiempo, y de la relativa inercia en que desembocaron algunas organizaciones creadas en el contexto de la crisis, el ciclo de protestas no dejó de impactar en la realidad política nacional.

Estas dinámicas se constituyeron en un paso más hacia la constatación de que la esfera pública portuguesa puede mostrarse cada vez más insumisa. El movimiento de contestación desencadenado por la crisis/austeridad debe, así, ser encarado como una manifestación de insatisfacción de la sociedad portuguesa no solo contra el funcionamiento de la economía y las consecuentes medidas implementadas sino, sobre todo, contra la crisis de legitimidad del Estado y de las instituciones políticas en la conducción de este proceso.

> No podemos dejar de luchar. Lo que sucedió en las calles y que ahora hasta parece no haber servido de nada, en realidad pienso que cambió muchas cosas. Creó un movimiento único del que no existía memoria, agitó las conciencias de gente joven y más mayor, con muchos problemas. ¡Pero que muchos problemas, sí! Esas acciones fueron noticia en muchos periódicos, locales, nacionales, internacionales. Yo tengo la certeza de que esto fue determinante para escoger a quien votar en las siguientes elecciones (E13, mujer, activista).

En este contexto, la principal novedad a destacar es el deseo de experimentación democrática (Soeiro, 2014). Ejemplo de ello son las acciones dinamizadas para capacitar para el activismo, como la reciente iniciativa de la Academia Ciudadana "CriAtividade - desperta @ ativista que há em ti" (CreAtividad - despierta @l activista que hay en ti)[11].

La participación de la sociedad portuguesa en la perspectiva de las acciones de protesta que remiten al periodo analizado, desencadenó una nueva acción política por parte de nuevos actores detentores de potencial y ambición transformadora. La acción colectiva realizada contra la crisis y la gestión política de la crisis a partir de un registro de austeridad, así como las protestas realizadas, configuran densos rituales que corresponden a momentos legítimos de democracia de alta intensidad (Matos, 2016).

En Portugal, estudios recientes revelan que este periodo de movilización antiausteridad tuvo como impacto a considerar el establecimiento de redes entre activistas, miembros de proyectos de resiliencia y grupos relacionados con formas alternativas de vivir, producir y consumir que se han articulado desde entonces para dinamizar varios proyectos, muchos de ellos aparecen en la *Rede Convergir* (Red Converger), que integra diversas iniciativas sustentables (Baumgarten, 2017).

CONCLUSIONES: UNA EVALUACIÓN DE LOS RMSG EN PORTUGAL Y ESPAÑA

La necesidad de reformas políticas, incluyendo la renovación de la propia democracia, es anterior a la crisis y la austeridad. En este sentido, los nuevos actores deberían ser observados como legítimos interlocutores en la discusión e implementación de las transformaciones a operar, lo que, además, vienen reclamando.

Los movimientos sociales que surgieron en el contexto de la crisis suponen un nuevo frente de discusión en el ámbito de la teoría de los movimientos sociales. Designados como Recientes Movimientos Sociales Globales (RMSG), su configuración, acciones, las estrategias comunicativas que adoptan, los procesos deliberativos que intentaron dinamizar y su agenda reivindicativa, entre otros elementos, a pesar de operar en contextos singulares específicos, permiten establecer relaciones entre las acciones y movimientos creados en España y Portugal con los de otros países.

Las cuestiones que diferencian a estos movimientos de los Nuevos Movimientos Sociales, nos remiten al contexto en el que surgen, íntimamente relacionado con la crisis financiera y la adopción de políticas de austeridad que afectaron a los países del sur de Europa, en un contexto global de enorme

11 Realizada el 29 de octubre de 2017. Cfr. http://academiacidada.org/criatividade-desperta-ativista-ha-ti/.

recesión y un proceso virulento de desigual globalización neoliberal y transición tecnológica, no solo en la comunicación, sino también en el ámbito del trabajo. La pérdida de soberanía del Estado-nación y el retroceso del Estado del Bienestar señalan la percepción de que, de hecho, es difícil mantener inalterable el sistema que sustenta la democracia liberal representativa, su consecuente pérdida de legitimidad e incapacidad de respuesta de cara a las reivindicaciones de la ciudadanía, las cuales acabaron aún más dilapidadas por las nuevas reglas de la austeridad.

La configuración de los RMSG está íntimamente ligada a los sectores de población más afectados por la crisis, que la contestan no solo como excusa para la adopción de las recetas neoliberales, llamadas de excepción, para acabar con el Estado de Bienestar. Por otro lado, los RMSG configuran una oposición de cara a los gobiernos que no se responsabilizan de los compromisos asumidos con los ciudadanos, a los que representan, y que se colocan al servicio de la oligarquía económica y financiera global. De estos movimientos forman parte trabajadores precarios, jóvenes desempleados, jubilados, mayores que perdieron los derechos conquistados, ciudadanos provenientes de las clases medias urbanas empobrecidas, con formación universitaria y, en muchos casos, altamente cualificados, muchos de ellos sin formación política previa ni pasado activista, pero que pasaron a asumir posiciones políticas transversales ligadas a las reivindicaciones más que a las agendas político-partidistas, que perciben incapaces de resolver sus problemas cotidianos, personales, familiares y generacionales.

La estrategia de los RMSG está fuertemente ligada a un proceso estratégico de comunicación global, posible a partir de la apropiación de la tecnología de la información y la comunicación y las RSI, que colocan al servicio de sus pretensiones, especialmente estas últimas, asumidas con la finalidad política de protestar e invertir la espiral de silencio de los medios de cara a las acciones que dinamizan y a las transformaciones que proponen. Apropiación que forma parte también del ADN de algunas de sus luchas (comunes digitales, propiedad intelectual, Internet libre y neutral...) y que ha acabado configurando una arena política extendida más allá de las plazas a través de la ocupación de plazas virtuales en la red.

Esta es una diferencia esencial en relación a los movimientos sociales anteriores, cualitativa y cuantitativamente, lo que hace de la tecnopolítica una nueva disciplina a privilegiar en el ámbito de la teoría de los movimientos sociales de la mano de los RMSG y su praxis. Nuestra propuesta, como investigador e investigadora comprometidos con nuestro sujeto de estudio, es doble. Por un lado, desafiar la teoría de los movimientos sociales y, por otro, contribuir a visibilizar sus agendas, facilitando la adopción de instrumentos políticos que posibiliten sus reivindicaciones como algo necesario para favorecer y potenciar los sistemas democráticos.

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Artículos / *Articles*

The role of sociology in the promotion of actions aimed at social innovation in the Mediterranean area / *El papel de la sociología en la promoción de acciones dirigidas a la innovación social en el área del Mediterráneo*

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ABSTRACT

The change in contexts and their complexity, especially in the Mediterranean area, has raised the need to start reflecting on modernizing innovative actions able to provide social responses to the real needs of citizens and, moreover, able to combine resources and quality. This is necessary since the expansion of rights is associated with a decreasing public funding capacity. The future challenge will surely be a retrenchment in public spending, orienting it towards the threefold structure of choice (need, preferences, goods) and overcoming of rational choice model (preferences, goods). In a context characterized by these features, the sociological knowledge becomes paramount for reading social phenomena. The role of sociology is to produce "knowledge" through which society can observe the occurring phenomena recognizing their problems, thus allowing for a continuous, ongoing improvement.

Keywords: sociology; social innovation; Mediterranean; action; policies.

RESUMEN

El cambio en los contextos y sus complejidades, especialmente en el área del Mediterráneo, ha planteado la necesidad de comenzar a reflexionar sobre la modernización de acciones innovadoras capaces de proporcionar respuestas sociales a las necesidades reales de los ciudadanos para poder combinar recursos y calidad. Esto es necesario, ya que la expansión de los derechos está asociada con una capacidad de financiamiento público en disminución. El desafío futuro seguramente será una reducción del gasto público, orientado hacia la triple estructura de elección (necesidad, preferencias, bienes) y superando el modelo de elección racional (preferencias, bienes). En un marco general con estas características, el conocimiento sociológico se convierte en algo primordial para leer los fenómenos sociales. El papel de la sociología es producir "conocimiento", así la sociedad puede observar los fenómenos que ocurren, reconocer sus problemas, permitiendo una mejora permanente y continua.

Palabras clave: *sociología; innovación social; Mediterráneo; acción; políticas.*

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WHY THE MEDITERRANEAN SHOULD BE BACK AT THE CORE OF POLITICAL AGENDAS

In the past decades, Mediterranean societies have undergone profound transformations due to both new socio-political conflicts and mobility processes linked to migrations. On the latter, data for 2017 (UNHCR, 2018) show that 171,332 migrants landed on the coasts of Italy, Spain and Greece, and in smaller amounts in Cyprus, while 3,081 died or were lost at sea. This sea (*Mare nostrum*, "our sea", as the Romans called it) is not a given fact, but an ongoing process (Ruel, 1991) and it has now become a "place of closure" rather than a "place of openness" to dialogue. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean can still provide a response to the identity crisis and the claims for autonomy affecting Europe in this historic juncture (like the United Kingdom with "Brexit" and Catalonia in Spain). These transformations pose a challenge to in order to renew the rules of common life. Migrations are a controversial issue and, although all the forecasts indicate that the Northern Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece and Spain) will have to coexist with an ever-increasing share of foreign presence, a large part of the local population struggles to consider this possibility and adopt a positive attitude.

Beyond these negative social changes, the Mediterranean is still paramount for the promotion of pluralism, diversity and freedom, because, by becoming a place of dialogue and encounter, it could be the table of peace between the West and the Islamic world (Hadhri and Mangone, 2016). If Europe and Europeans want to build —or rather re-build— their future, they will have to review their relationship with the Mediterranean and do so together with the other political and cultural actors bordering its shores, starting with the Arab peoples. After September 11th attacks on the Twin Towers in New York Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize winner for Economics, wrote: "The championing of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties can be found in the history of many societies. The long traditions of encouraging and protecting public debates on political, social, and cultural matters in, say, India, China, Japan, Korea, Iran, Turkey, the Arab world, and many parts of Africa, demand much fuller recognition in the history of democratic ideas" (Sen, 2003: 29-30).

In recent years, with the process of Europeanisation encompassing also the economy, many resentments have sprung and been expressed towards Southern Europe, often identified with the Mediterranean, overlooking the fact that it is a bridge to Africa. The weight of the Mediterranean component and its proximity to North African countries is multi-faceted and impressive throughout Southern Europe, causing many differences in comparison with the rest of Europe. European identity and European geography deal not only with the institutional divisions of the individual nations (and within the nations themselves), but also with these complex divergences that range from politics to economics, from religion to culture, as they represent true cleavages, often within the borders of the single nation state (Eder and Giesen, 2001). The Mediterranean does not represent a problem for cosmopolitanism and a cosmopolitan Europe (Beck and Grande, 2007), not least because it witnessed the birth of civilizations, religions and philosophies, legal codes and political systems, including democracy and even science. All these values and knowledges born in the Mediterranean basin (Southern Europe, North Africa and East) can be strategic elements in overcoming the European crisis that seems affect the EU since its inception, prompting the revision of policies and providing a solid basis for the emergence of a true common cultural heritage and Euro-Mediterranean knowledge.

The transformations in contexts (social, cultural, and economic) and their complexity, especially in the Mediterranean area, has raised the need to start reflecting on modernizing innovative actions that should be able to: *a)* strengthen the intercultural perspective in the comparative and general theory of the relations between the Mediterranean societies and their impact on the internal dynamics of their social life; *b)* provide social responses to the real needs of citizens and, moreover, combine resources and quality. This is necessary since the expansion of rights is associated with a decreasing public funding capacity, thus shifting the focus from the guarantee of citizens' well-being to the problem of cost containment.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

During the last two centuries, societies have become increasingly complex in both relationships and processes, with gradual unfolding according to the different geographical areas and, above all, to the socio-cultural contexts that are considered as a reference for analysis. Secularization (loss of relevance of religion in social life), rationalization (predominance of purposive rationality) and, finally, individualization (*Gemeinschaft* vs. *Gesellschaft,* with the relative replacement of Durkheim's mechanical solidarity with organic solidarity) have caused transformations in social representations and in the beliefs through which subjects interpret the society in which they live, as well as in the values by which they orientate themselves within it. All these processes have led to a redefinition of the relationship between individuals and their social environment, producing a sort of "break" (transformation)[1] in rhythms and lifestyles and affecting, in general, people's representation of life and their world.

In light of these transformations and given that national boundaries can easily be overcome —especially thanks to new computer technologies that enable us to create links and manage highly complex processes from afar— the development of mankind must be rethought by shifting the focus from the traditional elements of competitive advantage to the new ones based on knowledge (often unique and inimitable). The future challenge will surely be a retrenchment in public spending, orienting it towards the threefold structure of choice (need, preferences, goods) and overcoming of rational choice model (preferences, goods), but an even bigger challenge will be to combine the lack of resources with the concern of improving citizens' living conditions.

"For social sciences, this means focusing on the processes of structuring and de-structuring, integration and exchange, external conflict and internal reproduction of the economy, politics, culture, and the community system. These are seen and read as subsystems of a society that seems to have no physical boundaries anymore and recognizing oneself beyond boundaries involves dealing with a complex interaction process" (Mangone, 2018: 49). This logic of development, however, presents some paradoxical aspects that should not be overlooked. For example, although we are witnessing unprecedented technological progress and knowledge, there are many doubts on their development and diffusion, which could lead to an increase in inequalities and the consolidation of subordination of some peoples to others —as the management of migrants flows in the Mediterranean are a clear example of—. These doubts seem now certainty: the current political and market systems result from a series of changes and reforms imposed by the need to combine the growing expectations of the population (harbouring higher and higher quality standards that nevertheless not always corresponded to real needs) with decreasing financial resources. The economic systems, that can influence political systems, are the result of a progressive affirmation of the "economy market" (Lee and Dot, 1991), which heavily burdens political control. Although political systems result from promoting cooperation between the various levels of political responsibility, they are unable, particularly in recent years, to control monetary turbulence and to ensure a fair system of goods and services that meets the real needs of citizens. The reference to goods and services is no mere rhetoric: the presence of a fair and effective system of services is one of the determinants that can guarantee all citizens full participation in social life and the expression of their individual abilities. This is one of the three necessary —but not sufficient— conditions[2] identified by Sen (1995) so that financial, social or territorial barriers do not hinder the effective enjoyment of individual rights.

This consideration steers the reflection to another paradox of the global society: equality.

1 Here the term "break" is to be understood as a synonym of the Greek one of "krisis" which etymologically means "separo". It is the moment that separates a way of being or a series of phenomena from different others.

2 The other two are financing through general taxation and gratuitousness at the moment of consumption. The financing system must ensure that the individual contribution is exclusively determined by their ability to contribute and not by their illness-related risks and/or services received.

Equality may appear easy to define, but there are several theoretical and linguistic difficulties to the achievement of a single meaning. To understand the socio-economic and political dynamics of contemporary society, however, it is sufficient adopt the generic content of "final distribution of resources more egalitarian than that originally resulting from the game of economic and financial markets". In light of the above, equality can be variously understood, as various are its methods of application[3]. This makes it a principle difficult to ensure: no current model of welfare system (Esping-Andersen *et al.,* 2002) has succeeded in combining its different forms. It is clear that this political project is far from being implemented, as demonstrated by the fact that the general trend is to retrench welfare assistance to minimum levels (expenditure cuts), rather than to identify rational, transparent and shared criteria that are, in addition and above all, fair in the distribution of taxes and resources. Defining equality principles recognised and shared by all decision-makers is by no means easy, since it involves various spheres of human life: from the ethics of human rights to health, population and social sciences, up to economics and politics.

Equality, therefore, is not "everything for everyone", but "what is necessary so that everyone can have equal opportunity to choose for their own life project". In other words, we return to Sen's concepts of "functioning" and "capabilities" (1982; 1987), where the former are "states of being and doing" (being in good health, being adequately fed, etc.) that allow the achievement of well-being, while the latter allow for the acquisition of "functionings" (welfare) that allow them to choose between several chances of life. Now, taking up Dahrendorf's arguments (1988), it can be affirmed that *life chances*, understood as the possibility of choosing between alternatives, are never distributed equally: there are no societies in which all men have the same *entitlements* (access to and legitimate control over things) and enjoy the same *provisions* (a set of material and immaterial choices).

The basic problem is therefore one of rationing and of evolution of choices, but choices can only be taken freely if opportunities are fairly distributed on the basis of individual needs rather than social privilege.

To date, in the global society, no government can apply equality in an Aristotelian sense. The future challenge lies in retrenchments, that must sort out needs, preferences and goods (tripolar structure of choice), overcoming the logic of rational choice (preferences, goods). And yet, it is necessary to combine the scarcity of resources with the interests of improving the living conditions of all individuals.

SOCIAL INNOVATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Sen claimed that "the merits of democracy and its claim as a universal value can be related to certain distinct virtues that go with its unfettered practice. Indeed, we can distinguish three different ways in which democracy enriches the lives of the citizens. First, political freedom is a part of human freedom in general, and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings. Political and social participation has intrinsic value for human life and well-being. To be prevented from participation in the political life of the community is a major deprivation. Second, as I have just discussed (in disputing the claim that democracy is in tension with economic development), democracy has an important instrumental value in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention (including claims of economic needs). Third —and this is a point to be explored further— the practice of democracy gives citizens an opportunity to learn from one another, and helps society to form its values and priorities" (Sen 1999: 10). Societal citizenship is built precisely on these aspects, often translating into new configurations of civil society able to prompt actions not only for defining needs, but for

3 Firstly, it can be understood as an equal distribution of resources among different groups (social, ethnic, etc.); secondly, it can be understood as the equal possibility of access to resources regardless of individual income; and finally, it can be understood as an equal opportunity of access for equal needs.

taking responsibility in innovative development processes.

For the implementation of a planning methodology and participatory choices it is useful to adopt a mode of governance that points to the continuous involvement of the social forces, even if the process can appear to be exhausting and inconclusive. This to guarantee effectiveness, not only when it comes to identifying problems and taking decisions, but also, and above all, when it comes to initiating processes and implementing measures that require strong collaboration between the various social and/or local actors.

This condition implies a strong cooperation among all the actors involved, which in turn ofttimes involves a cultural "leap", that is, changes in the collective behaviour and the limitation of micro-conflictual initiatives. It follows that, first, sociology must be ready to face the challenges of future welfare, and secondly, that the stratification of legislative, regulatory, operational, and cultural innovations that has flooded society in recent years is such that the only feasible solution is to centre daily practices on the *innovation*, that precedes *experimentation* and contrasts with *conservation*. The latter, however, is not to be understood as a process of maintaining knowledge but as maintaining the *status quo*. It is understood that social innovation (Murray, Caulier-Grice, Mulgan, 2010), is not innovation *tout court*, but innovation processes whose initiation is favoured by the replacement of mechanisms or processes to achieve the same purpose —in this case, the purpose concerns the satisfaction of the needs of individuals who no longer find a response in either the market or public administrations—. In this situation, individuals are pressed to organize themselves to meet new and old needs and ensure not only the improvement of their quality of life, but also the protection of common goods. Social innovation not only provides an answer to citizens' needs, but also proposes new ways of taking decisions and implementing actions by connecting "formal" with "informal" (networking), supporting and promoting all those community solidarity and reciprocity networks (Zoll, 2000) that occur spontaneously.

The higher and more inclusive the process of involvement of all members of the community, the better the outcome of innovative practices on the social context: indeed, these are the more suitable actors and sectors for developing social innovation practices. Social innovation as such has a collective connotation, it is not the result of individual imagination or ingenuity, but of activities that are configured as cooperative learning or *communities of practic*e (Manville and Foote, 1996): groups of individuals characterized by spontaneous aggregation, which is both social and professional, inserted in learning processes and which deal with common issues and needs. Communities represent the active subject that promotes both actions and the exchange of experiences. Innovation starts from an intuition and develops to the point of turning into widespread practice. Innovation thus defined achieves social results in terms of output (for example, the provision of health and/or social services) that not only meet people's needs but also leads to an increase in collective well-being and quality of life (manifest function). At the same time, however, it also has a latent function linked to the creation of new relationships (social capital) and new governance structures. Both functions together produce what can then actually be considered as an improvement in well-being and quality of life (social improvement).

In light of the above dynamics, the ways and forms in which civil society expresses itself must aim at: i) transitioning from the "appropriation logic" to the "solidarity logic", generating new forms of cooperation and social solidarity in order to collectively compensate for social risks; ii) integrating the roles and responsibilities of civil society as a form of expression of collective needs that can affect, as a social force, the determination of both the political agenda and new alliances; iii) enhancing two key resources: knowledge and trust, which allow for a full and wide involvement with the context, where the latter prompts towards the growth of individual, organizational and collective knowledge, and the expansion of social relations, with the ensuing increase in "knowledge".

Recalling Esping-Andersen, the strategy to be implemented should be "to adapt and empower citizens so that they may be far better equipped to satisfy their welfare needs within the market. At its core it is a supply-driven policy attempting to furnish citizens with the requisites needed for individual success" (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 5). However, this process can only be achieved when the role of civil society is recognised. The *empowerment* process of political, civil and economic participation capacities enables citizens and their organisations (civil society) to identify their interests and evaluate options, as well as to plan and implement innovative lines of action aimed at responding to collective needs. These processes are particularly important in the Mediterranean area, where relations between the north and south shores seem to envisage only a reduction of the number of migrants and not an attempt to overcome a Eurocentric vision of this area. Indeed, the southern shores of the Mediterranean basin, in recent years, have seen the birth of civil society movements and actions (Solera, 2017) to reaffirm a Mediterranean identity that allows the creation of true —and not merely symbolic— networking across borders.

This means that social actors (civil society) to face future challenges will design new organisational models focusing on two key factors: innovation and experimentation. The first, in turn, is based on three strategic factors: 1) involvement, that is, the ability to involve oneself in the surrounding environment; 2) the orientation towards internal and external interests; and, finally 3) the possibility of creating relationships for a strong and lasting collaboration. Experimentation is paramount to building new development processes, such as activities, projects and actions with highly flexible management systems.

Innovation and experimentation processes are based on by the constant "creation of knowledge" aimed at "continuous innovation" in the industrial, social, and cultural fields. The new challenge to keep up with the globalization processes is to be able to learn to read and/or prefigure changes, and to do so, it is necessary to implement mechanisms of acquisition, creation, dissemination, and incorporation of the "key" resource: knowledge. And if these are the effects of globalization in the industrial world on the circulation and dissemination of knowledge, which is increasingly regarded as a factor of competitiveness and strong differentiation, we cannot but propose a further reflection on its effects on the non-industrialized world. Since ancient times, in fact the problem of knowledge has been a core issue for scholars of a number of disciplines. This is, firstly, because the primary function of knowledge is to allow the construction of meanings and thus of social reality; and, secondly, because the improvement in knowledge (especially of the objectified kind) has improved, in the absence of distortions or perverse effects (Boudon, 1977), the quality of life for individuals. Every interaction with objects or with human beings, every communicative act implies a transfer of knowledge and skills: an exchange that becomes a process of integrating differences without limitation in the individual learning paths or prejudice on "expert" *vs.* "amateurish" knowledge.

THE ROLE OF SOCIOLOGY IN PROMOTING INNOVATIVE ACTIONS

Even before the economic crisis, civil society has been called by international and supra-national organizations to actively play a more significant role, with a consequent effect on welfare systems. The World Economic Forum (WEF, 2013) has identified various practical roles for civil society. These include "capacity builder", providing the necessary training to enable the acquisition of skills and abilities; "service provider" to meet the societal needs; "incubator" of ideas and solutions that may also require a long gestation or payback period; and, finally, "citizenship champion", encouraging citizens engagement and supporting the rights of all citizens. The reorganisation of policies therefore requires civil society actors to play a reformist role by sharing responsibilities with public institutions. Civil society is not just a minor player but a powerful negotiator whose successes or failures are as influential as those of political leaders. It is no coincidence that in the preface to the Europe 2020 strategy Barroso states that "[o]ur new agenda requires a coordinated European response, including with social partners and civil society. If we act together, then we can fight back and come out of the crisis stronger" (European Commission, 2010: 3). It is no coincidence either that the World Economic Forum has launched a project to explore the rapidly changing space in which civil society actors operate. On the one hand, we see a paradigm shift in the roles between businesses, governments and civil society: they no longer represent three distinct sectors each acting within their own sphere of interest and with independent, well-defined roles with little interaction. On the other hand, in contemporary society, these three components enjoy greater activity and integration in facing social challenges through a shared and shared space.

In a context characterized by these features, and from the standpoint that sociology was born and developed as a form of thought aimed at helping society reflect on itself (Donati, 2011a), sociological knowledge becomes paramount for reading social phenomena: the role of sociology is to produce "knowledge" through which society can observe the occurring phenomena recognizing their problems, thus allowing for a continuous, ongoing improvement. Indeed, its main task is "the critical unhinging of the manoeuvring and manipulation of citizens and of consumers that rely on perverse usages of science" (Bourdieu, 2013: 12), going beyond the misleading, fake needs generated and imposed by common sense or by the media.

In other words, sociology can be considered a tool for understanding the interconnections of society, as it does not analyze the specific aspects of society as such but rather the interactions, bonds and reciprocal conditioning. According to Berger and Luckmann "[t]the central question for sociological theory can then be put as follows: How is it possible that subjective meanings become objective facticities? Or, in terms appropriate to the aforementioned theoretical positions: How is it possible that human activity should produce a world of things? In other words, an adequate understanding of the 'reality *sui generis*' of society requires an enquiry into the manner in which this reality is constructed. This inquiry, we maintain, is the task of the sociology of knowledge" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 30). Sociological knowledge, or rather sociology itself, is suspected of "compromising with politics" (Bourdieu, 2013), since its results derive from the work of a subject (the researcher) who is himself part of society and hence runs the risk of adding assumptions and prejudices. However, the main defence against this danger is precisely the search for possible ways to improve daily life by building a relationship between the actors, making society more "tailored" for all citizens.

The work of the sociologist and the resulting knowledge are therefore twofold. On the one hand, they allow "institutional accompaniment" (public service), which does not mean responding to all the needs of society, but rather formulating scientific responses to real problems —not with the "solution", but by suggesting possible pathways to improve the issue in question—. On the other hand, they allow for the development of a "critical and active citizen" very close to Schütz's ideal type "well-informed citizen" (1946). The latter, reconsidered according to the present society, seems to wish for the affirmation of a modern citizenship that it is no longer just a right, but also a duty, and for which establishing a socially accepted knowledge based on forms of responsible freedom that emerge through social reflexivity (Donati, 2011b) becomes a priority. Social reflexivity is the dimension of the individual reflexivity which is neither subjective nor structural but related to the order of reality of the social relationship.

While all work activities have individual and economic effects, some of them may also have social and cultural implications. There are problems connected with the sociologist's role that cannot be separated from those related to her commitment and intervention in general. Embracing a logic in which the sociologist's activities are considered in a relational perspective (Donati, 2011a, 2011b; Donati and Archer, 2015; Emirbayer, 1997), we believe it impossible for a clear distinction of the socio-political and biographical implications of these activities to exist according to the specific social context in which they are expressed. The boundary between science, profession and social utility is soon crossed. We can no longer speak of a contrast between theory and operativity, but rather of a continuum of interdependencies that goes from theory to operativity, through research-action. Social research therefore is indispensable for acquiring knowledge. The latter, in turn, must "dirty its hands" to read individual and/or social phenomena in order to translate the theoretical premises into concrete actions. In this logic, humanities and social sciences, and particularly sociology, assume a fundamental role in creating (first) and maintaining (then) the integration of these aspects, contributing to the construction of a responsible work environment, in which each professional, with his knowledge and experience, can be directly involved in the choices to be made in relation to the various problematic situations faced.

The crisis of welfare systems and the attempts to define and launch new policies has not prevented the fragmentation of legal labour protection, nor the deterioration of the social fabric that needs to be re-constructed through the implementation of new forms of solidarity to enable citizenship to achieve both well-being and "*savoir vivre*". Sociological knowledge lies precisely in this process of re-construction. It pays close attention to all aspects of the transformation of society, and not just to certain specific areas, since the action of the social researcher should not be exclusively technical, nor consider the understanding of reality as a given (thus exercising control over it). Rather, it should include a reflection on the researcher's own activities. Sociological knowledge breaches the wall represented by the complexity of the problems and situations experienced by subjects in everyday life, allowing for a better conjugation of the objective and subjective dimension. If order characterized traditional societies, disorder characterizes contemporary societies, and this forces scholars to redefine paradigms and methods so that sociological knowledge is configured as a networking experience resulting from comparisons and conflicts that materialize in a certain space and time.

Sociological knowledge and scientific reflection in this discipline necessarily leap towards operativity by providing not answers, but indications and tools that act as a guideline for policies (welfare, educational, economic, etc.) and innovative actions to be taken in order to achieve a society that is open to cultural differences and respects them. This applies especially to the societies bordering the Mediterranean Sea, which in recent decades have undergone the transformations described above.

The study of socio-cultural phenomena and the relative methodologies adopted aim at integrating the subjective (micro social) and the objective (macro social) dimension. The link is the interpretation and construction of reality through the relations between human beings, and between human beings, society and culture. As individuals act as agents of interaction (in the world of daily life and in institutions), all these aspects are seen as a *correlation of interpretations* and with a different methodology[4].

For the study of socio-cultural phenomena, it is necessary to consider an integrated interweaving of factors, disciplines and methods of investigation. Sociological knowledge and that of other social sciences merge into a single integrated knowledge system that pays attention to all aspects of the transformation of society (in a holistic sense: aspects of personality, society and culture) without neglecting to reflect on the researcher's activities. Knowledge associated with innovative action, makes it possible to find not the solution but the possible ways to improve the problems in question. The work of social scientists therefore has political weight because they are themselves actors in society, and as such they are bearers of values and meanings, as well as subjective and social rights. It is through their research activity that inequalities are recognised.

AN EXAMPLE OF INNOVATIVE PRACTICE: FROM SOCIAL HOUSING TO PARTICIPATORY LIVING

Sociological knowledge, as stated above, is steered towards operativity by providing indications and tools that act as a guideline for innovative policies and actions. These should be adopted with the aim of concretely creating a society that guarantees equal opportunities for various groups

4 Hence the need for studies that take into account both qualitative and quantitative aspects. The analyses based exclusively on statistical data are limited by the very data used, due to three main factors: *a)* the data does not always meet the researcher's requirements, since the statistical indicators (especially those from official sources) may not be valid as they are collected for purposes other than those of the researcher; *b)* the data refer only to the objective dimension (macro) neglecting or overlooking the subjective dimension (micro); *c)* the data are not suitable for the analysis of individual behaviours, especially when they are acquired only in a given area, since they set boundaries to the conclusions that cannot thus be generalised.

of disadvantaged people (whether migrants or other categories of people). This guideline applies especially to Mediterranean societies, since in recent decades they have experienced the deepest transformations, particularly at the demographic level (ageing population, mass migration and low birth rates).

In support of the reflections above, we will advance the example of Social Housing, an innovative practice well known in North European countries (Krokfors, 2012) but almost completely unknown in the Mediterranean countries and in Italy (Gili and Pece, 2017), at least until a few years ago. This practice seems to embody the characteristics of classical concepts such as Durkheim's "mechanical solidarity" (1893) or Tönnies's "community" (1887). The innovative element underpinning Social Housing projects is a new idea of living, characterized mainly by a social dimension in which the home is no longer a simple space where individuals or families live their private sphere, but becomes an instrument by which they have the opportunity to redefine their daily life through ties with others (reciprocity, mutual aid, collaboration). "Living" takes on methods and procedures of action that vary according to the needs of the territorial context in which one wishes to intervene and the specific characteristics of the target groups. In this way, Social Housing represents an innovative "model" to implement new interventions aimed at creating new "living formulas" able to regenerate and reconstitute relationships between people. The small communities stemming from these new living formulas develop positive attitudes and openness towards others, in turn aimed at fostering a process of social integration. The latter not only favours those "directly affected" (elderly people, migrants, abused women and other categories of disadvantaged people) but can also have positive effects on the social cohesion of the entire territory. If we think of the three types of community outlined by Tönnies (1887) —*blood*, *place* and *spirit*— the community to which Social Housing refers is a combination of these three forms: community by blood based on parental ties, community by place based on neighbourhood, and community by spirit based on friendship. The objective of Social Housing is not only to find affordable homes for disadvantaged people, but also to build quality relationships that last over time: the relationship "induced" by these new forms of living becomes a "by-product" of the intervention.

The development of relational networks (Donati and Archer, 2015) contributes to reduce the physical and cultural distances between individuals, creating a "dialogue" with the rest of the territory. The centrality of the housing dimension seems able to widen the meaning to an urbanism that becomes increasingly relational: living moves according to the interactions between physical space (for example, the home) understood as a primary relational good, and social space (for example, the neighbourhood), understood as a collective relational good. The relational dimension applied to the experience of living becomes, thus, an essential element for the construction of a path of integration. Social Housing seems, in this way, to "force" individuals to rethink society on the basis of relationships both in urban areas and the suburbs, with a housing experience that aims not only at functionality and efficiency, but also at security and social cohesion, at "taking root". The whole urban system seems to be changing under the force of these new needs that require strengthening group identities from within compared to a society that tends to liquefy these identities and relationships.

A Case Study: "Casa Scalabrini" of Rome

To support what we said so far, we will present a case study of Social Housing concerning a specific project implemented in Italy and aimed at the integration of migrants. It is the "Casa Scalabrini" project in Rome (Pece, 2017), part of the program of the Scalabrinian Agency for Development and Cooperation (*Agenzia Scalabriniana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo*) and the operational centre of the program "Welcoming and Inclusive Community" (CAI, *Comunità Accogliente e Inclusiva*), belonging to the Congregation of the Scalabrinian Missionaries of St. Charles, a social reality that for over a century has been at the service of migrants and refugees in many countries of the world.

Among the various investigative tools to carry out this case study, the choice fell on the observation and analysis of second level data. This is because when you want to know a certain social phenomenon —be it individual or collective— you have two systems to gather information: observation (the most direct and immediate way to study manifest behaviors) and interrogation (the obligatory path) to explore motivations, attitudes, beliefs, feelings, perceptions, expectations. The observation was therefore chosen because it was decided to have a "direct way" to find information about the daily life of the guests of "Casa Scalabrini", and the second level analysis, that is, we used information taken from documents existing.

The project (second level analysis) states as its main objective the need to continue the social integration of those who leave the accommodation centres for asylum seekers and refugees (SPRAR and CARA centres), with the aim of helping them acquire substantial individual autonomy, starting from the housing dimension, which in turn becomes a first step towards a process of integration. The structure of the "House" that proposes a "mixed" lifestyle (autonomous and community) has a total of thirty places available: twenty-eight reserved for asylum seekers and refugees (single, mostly men) and two accommodations reserved for small families (with no more than two to three children).

Again, from the analysis of documents and the contents of the "Casa Scalabrini" website[5], we can identify the minimum requirements necessary to be included in the waiting lists and then access the interview to obtain the room. These requirements refer to the objective dimension (basic knowledge of the Italian language and economic entry), the priorities are also established on the basis of the urgent needs of the applicant (*i. e.,* precarious health conditions, presence of children, etc.). Only a monthly contribution of 50 euros to the structure is required. The stay in "Casa Scalabrini" can vary from 6 to 12 months, a period aimed at the construction of an autonomous life project outside the "Casa" which includes both the inclusion in another house and the departure to other countries.

At the time of the visit of "Casa Scalabrini" (observation), this is developed on three levels, each of them with specific functions: on the ground floor the common areas (kitchen, dining room and a TV room) while on the other two floors find the lodgings (the so-called "casette") usually composed of three rooms with a shared bathroom and fridge, and the community meeting spaces (*i. e.,* the gym and a room used as a mosque).

All the residents of the house, predominantly young, live in "semi-autonomy" because the operators (sociologists, psychologists and social workers) and volunteers of the association "chaperone" them in their path to social and economic integration. "Chaperoning" actions consist of a series of activities aimed at personal development (first and foremost Italian language courses), professional training and the development of a civic awareness open to the host territory. The development of paths aimed at the formation of an active and civic citizenship is achieved through social commitment activities (for example, cleaning parks, protection and upgrading of public areas) in the perspective of an opening to the territory and a "return" to the local community.

The many actions implemented are useful for the "construction" of the integration process and they involve the educational, professional, civic and relational fields. The interesting aspect of this innovative action is the ability of all operators to act as "chaperones" to the acquisition of "practical" and "cultural" tools capable of bringing together, in a perspective of reciprocity, all the inhabitants of the community (migrants and natives). The relational dimension is a fundamental element for starting a process of integration and social cohesion. The peculiarities of the interaction/relationships established between the inhabitants of the house and the rest of the community, prefigure the perspective reversal of the migrant's role. The activation of path aimed at developing active citizenship allow to overcome the logic of welfare in which the migrant (the refugee or the asylum applicant) is a "passive" subject, to reach instead a support-oriented logic, where the migrant takes an

5 For an overview of the activities and objectives of "Casa Scalabrini" see the website: http://scalabrini634.it/ while for the activities carried out by the Scalabrinian Agency for Development and Cooperation in Rome, see the website: http://www.scalabrini.net/it/roma.html.

"active" role and participates —together with the operators— in the construction of relational networks (social reflectiveness) with the rest of the community within a different context and far from their cultural model of origin. The process of "restitution" that permeates the activities of "Casa Scalabrini" is also manifested through the development of virtuous attitudes that have positive effects not only for the migrants who are about to undertake a path of integration, but also because these attitudes can be examples of good practices to be extended from micro-contexts to the rest of the surrounding area.

TO CONCLUDE

The rapid social transformations, particularly those happening in the Mediterranean that involve thousands of individuals in humanitarian emergency, lead us reconsider the role of sociology in reading social transformations and, more generally, global society. Today, while we witness the development of a new way of thinking that involves even the organizational structures of the major supranational institutions, sociology seems to have difficulties in reading these transformations, perhaps because it is still "perched" on excessive self-referentiality. It is precisely in this ever-changing context that sociology can take on a primary role as a science able to understand society as a whole. This leads researchers to redefine paradigms and methods so that knowledge is configured as a network experience resulting from confrontations and conflicts in a given space and time and in an integrated knowledge system. In this way, this system of knowledge is produced by the relationship/interaction between the researcher and the object of his investigation, between self and other, without any dependencies or hierarchical levels (as it happens for the operators of "Casa Scalabrini"). All this can be translated with a single term: the suffix "co-" (shared). In other words, to actualize this integrated system of knowledge we go beyond the various discipline-related viewpoints and combine our reflections through a disciplinary co-reflection in a perspective that not only consider *macro-social* phenomena (related to social systems and their forms of organization), but include *micro-social* (relating to the individual/society relationship and social actions) and/or *meso-social* ones (relating to the relations between the social system and the world of life, the latter being understood as the set of meanings and representations of culture).

It is through systematic and methodologically well-founded observation —considered the main activity for overcoming Comte's "social physics"— that we can lay the foundations for an intervention that can involve changes/transformations both at individual and social level because it is oriented towards those innovative actions described above. It is therefore necessary to try and redefine the paradigms of sociology in a direction that takes due account of the various and different dimensions. It is unthinkable that sociological research does not integrate the contexts in which the interactions/actions of individuals take place. Furthermore, the research into why the manifestation of a phenomenon no longer refer only to the *cause(s)*, but to the *meaning(s)*.

In summary, if sociological knowledge accompanies forms of "relational reflexivity", it enables learning and activation processes (building of reference models and experimentation) that direct actions towards social innovation (Murray, Caulier-Grice, Mulgan, 2010), *i. e.* towards new ideas (products, services, and models) that meet social needs (more effectively than the alternatives) and at the same time create new social relationships: The above example of Social Housing is a concrete experience that follows these very guidelines.

It is, therefore, desirable that sociological knowledge —without denying the autonomy of sociology, and yet abandoning its excessive self-referentiality, or "sociologism", that limits all sociological knowledge within its reference frameworks and paradigms— becomes reflexive knowledge. In this way, it would promote both the construction of the mechanisms and processes to meet the needs of the subjects, and the initiatives that cannot spontaneously come into contact, to lay the (theoretical/empirical) foundations for interventions leading to positive transformations both at the individual and at the social level, that in turn can be translated into *savoir vivre.*

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Artículos / *Articles*

Apoyo y participación educativa de las familias de los países del sur de Europa: una aproximación a la realidad española y portuguesa / *Support and educational participation of families in the countries of southern Europe: an approach to the spanish and portuguese reality*

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RESUMEN

Se presentan los resultados de una investigación en la que se le ha preguntado a los estudiantes universitarios de las ciudades de Granada, Lisboa y Melilla, cuál ha sido el apoyo y la participación de sus padres y madres durante su trayectoria educativa. La investigación comparada atribuye un conjunto de características a los países del sur de Europa que influyen sobre las interacciones diarias de sus habitantes. Mediante el análisis de las relaciones paterno-filiales en materia educativa se ha querido conocer cómo responde la familia, en los momentos de crisis económica, en la educación, si continúa existiendo una división de roles y, finalmente, cuál es el balance emocional experimentado por los estudiantes durante su trayectoria educativa. Para lograr desentrañar los discursos y vivencias, se ha empleado una metodología cualitativa.

Palabras clave: apoyo de las familias; educación; países de Europa del Sur; emociones; género.

ABSTRACT

This report presents the results of an investigation into the support university students in Granada, Lisbon and Melilla have received from their parents during their educational years. Through comparative research we have identified a set of features from these southern Europe countries that influence the daily interactions on their inhabitants. This analysis of parents/children relationships in education has aimed a better understanding how the family responds within the moments of the economical crisis, if there is still a division of roles and, finally, the emotional experience of students throughout their time in education. In order to treat these discourses and experiences we have adopted a qualitative methodology.

Keywords: *family support; education; South European countries; emotions; gender.*

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LA FAMILIA EN LOS PAÍSES DEL SUR DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA

En la investigación comparada en Europa se suelen establecer diversas clasificaciones en relación con los modelos de Estados de Bienestar, atribuyéndoles un conjunto de similitudes al respecto. Desde la clasificación de los regímenes de Estados de bienestar, realizada por Esping-Andersen (1990) han proliferado numerosos trabajos en este sentido. Tres han sido las categorías de regímenes más analizadas (anglosajona, continental y nórdica), a las cuales cabe añadir una cuarta (del sur), en la que se integran España, Grecia, Italia y Portugal (Ferrera, 1996; Moreno, 2001a). En este último régimen, la familia constituye un elemento diferenciador y característico (Moreno, 2000).

Otra cuestión destacada en la literatura comparada hace mención a cómo se ofrecen por parte del Estado muy pocos servicios de cuidados y estos son asumidos por las familias, concretamente son las mujeres, quienes proporcionan la mayor parte de los cuidados a mayores, discapacitados, enfermos o niños (Orloff, 1993).

En los países de la Europa del Sur, la familia ha permanecido como sólido ámbito de microsolidaridad. En algunos de los países del centro y norte europeo las políticas públicas se han vuelto a dirigir hacia las familias y los hogares con el objetivo de "aligerar" el gasto social estatal y la intervención pública del bienestar. En el inicio del siglo xxi, las estructuras familiares en la Europa del Sur mantienen su apariencia tradicional, pero es solo una apariencia. En realidad los "viejos" modelos familiares ya no son viables a pesar de que los nuevos modelos son incipientes y restan aún por consolidarse (Moreno, 2002).

De hecho la investigación de Valiente (2011) se refiere a la erosión del familismo en el Estado del Bienestar español y Mínguez (2005) también lo ve en el modelo portugués. Entre los cambios acaecidos en las últimas décadas la mujer ocupa un lugar central puesto que se han incorporado progresivamente al empleo fuera del hogar y a la universidad. Pese a las transformaciones acaecidas, la investigación muestra cómo la mujer sigue ocupándose en gran medida de las tareas de cuidados. Otras cuestiones que merece la pena reseñar se refieren al estrés o sentimiento de sobrecarga experimentado puesto que, al compaginar varios roles simultáneamente surge la sensación de no llegar a todo y no hacerlos adecuadamente. No es de extrañar que la literatura al referirse a este modelo hable de superwoman (Nuño, 2010) o mujeres adaptativas: mujer que es capaz de combinar roles de cuidados con el empleo a tiempo completo. Bien es cierto que en esta escena la familia extensa cobra un papel protagonista pero cuando la solidaridad intergeneracional se invierte por cuestiones de edad y salud de hijos a padres nos encontramos con la llamada generación sándwich (Grundy y Henretta, 2006) teniendo que asumir simultáneamente el cuidado de hijos pequeños y padres mayores.

Así pues, los procesos como la formación de la familia, el cambio familiar y la situación laboral de la mujer en los países del sur de Europa se encuentran estrechamente vinculados con las políticas familiares y las políticas de empleo desarrolladas por los Estados de bienestar, de manera que se podrá determinar en qué medida el tradicional modelo familiar de varón sustentador característico de los países del sur de Europa se explica en función de una restrictiva política de apoyo a las familias y a las madres trabajadoras (Mínguez, 2005).

Dentro de las políticas familiares, las educativas juegan un importante papel. Desde el año 2008 el gasto público en educación en miles de euros ha descendido mientras que con el gasto de las familias ocurre lo contrario. Las características del modelo español y portugués se han visto agravadas con la crisis económica desde el año 2008. La necesidad de llevar una política de austeridad ha impactado en las ayudas sociales percibidas con la sensación de que la familia aún ha tenido que asumir más responsabilidades, que en otros países son compartidas por el Estado.

En esta investigación se ha pretendido conocer en qué medida las características del modelo de Estado de bienestar del sur se plasman en la experiencia vivida por los estudiantes en los hogares desde su ingreso en primaria hasta la llegada a la universidad.

De un modo concreto se ha querido conocer si:

— Hay una división de roles de género en el hogar en el papel que desempeñan ambos progenitores.

— Si la crisis económica ha afectado de algún modo a la educación y valores trasmitidos en el hogar.

— Si el modelo de jornada continua se refleja en las actividades realizadas por los estudiantes.

— Qué emociones reflejan los estudiantes como fruto de la relación en el hogar y si algunos factores pueden ser atribuidos al modelo de Estado de bienestar existente.

Antes de comentar los resultados se especifica brevemente cuál es el planteamiento existente sobre la participación de las familias en la educación.

PARTICIPACIÓN DE LAS FAMILIAS EN LA EDUCACIÓN

Se suelen distinguir dos tipos de participación de las familias en la educación. Por un lado, la implicación en el hogar se refiere a la ayuda o supervisión en la realización de los deberes o preparación para un examen, la transmisión de la importancia de la lectura, de la cultura, del mensaje y los valores sobre la educación y la importancia de estudiar. Hay algunas actividades fuera del hogar que se refieren al acompañamiento al colegio o a las actividades extraescolares. Por otra parte, la participación en el colegio se refiere a actividades como reuniones con el profesorado, eventos extracurriculares y otras actividades que permiten la oportunidad de interacción de los padres entre sí y con el centro (Epstein, 2001). La participación en el colegio puede ser individual, relacionada con actividades vinculadas al logro académico de sus hijos, como las tutorías, así como participación colectiva, cuando se implican en asociaciones y actividades para el beneficio del colegio, en una idea de escuela democrática.

Se pueden observar tendencias de carácter demográfico y condiciones socioeconómicas similares. Moreno (2001a) señala que los tres rasgos característicos que diferencian al régimen del bienestar mediterráneo (del Sur) son: *a)* necesidades y estilos de vida diferentes; *b)* microsolidaridad familiar, y *c)* conjunción entre universalismo y selectividad.

Harris y Robinson (2016) ofrecen un enfoque denominado *stage-setting*, y que puede ser traducido como marco o escenario para el logro educativo. En teatro, los encargados del escenario son responsables de crear un contexto que permita el éxito de la actuación. Con este símil, los autores quieren enfatizar que muchos padres construyen y logran un medioambiente social alrededor de los hijos que les permite crear condiciones en las cuales el éxito académico es posible.

El grado en el que el mensaje sobre la importancia de la educación sea transmitido con éxito depende del espacio de vida que se consiga crear para los niños en casa y en el vecindario. Frente a las teorías tradicionales sobre la necesaria implicación de las familias en actividades escolares, dentro y fuera del hogar, la perspectiva de *stage-setting* alude a situaciones en las que los padres podrían estar ocupados trabajando y, sin embargo, se garantiza este logro educativo. Podrían no tener tiempo para leer con ellos, para conocer qué están estudiando, pero sí han sabido transmitir en abstracto la importancia de la educación. ¿De qué forma? Dándoles el sentimiento de que apoyan sus esfuerzos en el colegio y en las actividades extraescolares o dando motivación al comienzo de la educación formal.

Parece que todos los padres no se implican de igual modo. El capital social, económico y cultural juega un papel fundamental (Bourdieu, 2007). En cuanto a las clases sociales, la clase media conjuga el control y apoyo en el contexto de una relación cercana y respetuosa y entendiendo que la educación es fundamental para mantener la posición social (Olmedo y Santa Cruz, 2011). Investigaciones realizadas en otros contextos también han constatado que existe un patrón común en el papel jugado por las familias de clase media (Ball, 2003; Gewirtz, Ball y Bowe, 1995; Reay, 1998; Van Zanten, 2005). Cuando las familias con dificultades económicas se interesan por la educación estas reducen el efecto de su situación y mejoran los resultados, lo cual es especialmente destacado entre los once y dieciséis años (Hango, 2007).

DIFERENCIAS DE GÉNERO EN EL APOYO Y PARTICIPACIÓN

La mayoría de los investigadores señalan que existen dos modelos de integración laboral de la mujer, que se corresponden con diferentes regímenes de bienestar. En primer lugar, los regímenes de bienestar socialdemócratas, estos se han caracterizado por el éxito de la integración laboral del colectivo femenino; en segundo lugar, la permanencia de la familia tradicional y la limitada, aunque creciente, participación de la mujer en el mercado laboral han sido tradicionalmente dos señas de identidad que han caracterizado a los Estados de bienestar del sur de Europa (Mínguez, 2005).

Como ya se ha mencionado, los países de Europa del Sur, entre ellos España y Portugal, pertenecen al modelo familista, caracterizado por la importancia de la familia en los cuidados. La mujer ha ejercido en un gran número de sociedades, especialmente en el sur de Europa, el papel de cuidadora (Bazo y Ancizu, 2004). Con la industrialización, a los varones/maridos se les impone la responsabilidad fundamental de la provisión de los ingresos, y a las mujeres/esposas, el cuidado y el servicio. En el caso de las familias de la Europa del Sur, la duplicidad de funciones dentro y fuera del hogar ha generado, lo que anteriormente hemos visto como una superwoman que ha actuado como un sólido amortiguador de sus sistemas de protección social. El papel cambiante de la mujer mediterránea (del Sur) respecto a sus expectativas vitales refleja, no obstante, actitudes de un "familismo ambivalente" (Flaquer, 1995, 1998; Saraceno, 1995). Frente a este modelo, nos encontramos el modelo socialdemócrata de los países nórdicos, donde el Estado asume importantes responsabilidades en materia de cuidados. De esta forma la mujer, en mayor medida, se ha encargado de los cuidados de los hijos así como de los mayores.

Respecto a los roles en el hogar y en la educación, la madre participa en mayor medida que el padre en la educación y su participación tiene un mayor poder predictivo en el logro educativo de los adolescentes (Hsu *et al.,* 2011). Las madres que trabajan a tiempo completo participan menos en el colegio (con bajos ingresos) que las que lo hacen a tiempo parcial pero en ambos casos más que las desempleadas. Generan estrategias para participar (Weiss *et al.,* 2003).

Otra cuestión clave es la diferente relación entre madre e hija y padre e hijo. Los padres están más implicados con los hijos que con las hijas y desciende en la adolescencia y aumenta con el conflicto marital. Son los padres con unos valores igualitarios los que más participan en la educación mientras que las madres con estos valores no precede una mayor participación de los padres (Bulanda, 2004).

No obstante, numerosos cambios sociales dificultan la pervivencia de estos roles diferenciados. El rendimiento académico de las mujeres es mayor que el de los varones, el fracaso y abandono escolar es masculino, el acceso al mercado laboral es cada vez mayor y los valores igualitarios dificultan la permanencia de esta mayor dedicación.

Otra característica reseñable y distintiva en cuanto al sistema educativo en España es la coexistencia de altas tasas de población universitaria con altas tasas de abandono escolar. Estudiar un grado universitario (o doble grado) se convierte en una necesidad en una sociedad credencialista con altas tasas de desempleo.

METODOLOGÍA

En este contexto de investigación se ha querido conocer, desde una visión micro, en qué medida las características del modelo de bienestar condicionan la relación existente en el hogar de padres e hijos en materia educativa. Para ello hemos aplicado la metodología cualitativa porque se pretende conseguir, a través de los relatos de los sujetos, su propia experiencia e interpretación de la misma. Hemos utilizado como técnica la entrevista para producir dichos datos sociológicos de la investigación y poder acceder a la realidad simbólica de los entrevistados.

El análisis de contenido se ha realizado con el programa Atlas.ti, delimitando diferentes códigos. Se ha partido de la elaboración de una entrevista estructura con un gran número de preguntas abiertas. La primera pregunta solicita al entrevistado que relate en qué momentos de su vida considera que sus padres le han ofrecido más apoyo en su educación. Esta pregunta inicial va cerrándose, con el objetivo de, junto con el relato, no perder ninguna información que se consideraba crucial en cuanto a la participación. Las preguntas incluyen cuestiones sobre el contexto socioeconómico de la familia, el aspecto sociocultural, situaciones de estrés vividas en el seno familiar, el apoyo recibido por los progenitores durante las diferentes etapas educativas, el contexto social del barrio, sobre la participación de los padres en el colegio. Como datos sociodemográficos se incluye la ocupación de los padres, el estatus socioeconómico, con quien residen y el factor cultural.

Muestra

Se han logrado obtener 135 relatos a través de una entrevista estructura *online* a los/as universitarios/as de primer curso de los Grados en Educación Primaria y Educación Social de las Facultades de Ciencias de la Educación de Granada y Melilla, y de la Facultad de Educación de Lisboa. La selección de casos de España y Portugal se debe a poder analizar similitudes y diferencias entre dos países de la periferia europea, del sur de Europa y vecinos fronterizos. Y queremos ver esos matices en dos grados muy vinculados con la educación (temática a analizar), como son los Grados de Educación Primaria y Educación Social.

En cuanto al estatus socioeconómico en el hogar de los entrevistados en Portugal, el 16,7 % es bajo y el 83,3 % están en el medio. En España, el 8,1 % es alto, 13,5 % bajo y el 77,5 % se sitúan en el medio.

Por último, hacemos mención a la situación laboral de los progenitores (Tabla 1) y al nivel de estudios alcanzados por estos mismos (Tabla 2), en este último punto hay que destacar la ausencia por parte de algunos entrevistados a la hora de contestar dicha pregunta, bien por desconocimiento, bien por sentirse avergonzados del nivel de estudios de los progenitores.

Las entrevistas están identificadas con las siguientes siglas: LB/PT = Lisboa, GR/ES = Granada y ML/ES = Melilla.

RESULTADOS

Se ha recogido una primera comparación a nivel general de estos dos países, es decir, a nivel exploratorio para comenzar a analizar diferencias y/o similitudes en la participación educativa que tienen las familias españolas y portuguesas, tanto a nivel de implicación de los progenitores en las tareas educativas, como afrontan los momentos de crisis económicas en la educación, diferencias de género en la participación educativa y en el balance emocional de los hijos a lo largo de las etapas educativas.

Una gran implicación de los dos, sobre todo de mi madre

De ellos parece desprenderse que el padre está pendiente de la trayectoria educativa, ejerciendo el rol de coordinador o supervisor pero es la madre la que juega el papel de entrenadora, la que está en el terreno observando el día a día.

Tabla 1. Situación laboral de los progenitores.

	España		Portugal	
	Padre	Madre	Padre	Madre
	Frecuencia (%)	Frecuencia (%)	Frecuencia (%)	Frecuencia (%)
Trabaja	86 (69,37)	58 (46,81)	18 (14,53)	12 (9,69)
En paro	8 (6,48)	6 (4,86)	2 (1,62)	3 (2,44)
Fallecido/a	0	1 (0,8)	1 (0,8)	0
Pensionista	8 (6,48)	1 (0,8)	1 (0,8)	1 (0,8)
Ama de casa	0	37 (29,85)	0	6 (4,86)

Tabla 2. Nivel de estudios alcanzado por los progenitores.

	España		Portugal	
	Padre	**Madre**	**Padre**	**Madre**
	Frecuencia (%)	**Frecuencia (%)**	**Frecuencia (%)**	**Frecuencia (%)**
Doctorado	7 (5,2)	1 (0,7)	0	0
Estudios Superiores	22 (16,26)	32 (23,7)	1 (0,7)	0
Bachillerato	2 (1,4)	1 (0,7)	0	0
Estudios de Secundaria	27 (19,99)	26 (19,22)	5 (3,71)	12 (8,88)
Formación Profesional	20 (14,83)	26 (19,22)	4 (2,97)	3 (2,28)
Estudios Primarios	5 (3,66)	2 (1,46)	1 (0,7)	1 (0,7)
No finaliza Secundaria	19 (14,06)	13 (9,64)	11 (8,14)	6 (4,46)
No escolarizado	5 (3,7)	5 (3,7)	0	0

Por un lado se percibe una importante labor de apoyo, participación y acompañamiento de los progenitores hasta la llegada a la universidad, propio del modelo familista. La implicación incluye desde el acompañamiento al colegio, la ayuda en los deberes o en la preparación de un examen, la transmisión de la importancia de la lectura, de la cultura, del mensaje y los valores sobre la educación y la importancia de estudiar.

Pese a esta implicación familiar, los discursos constatan aún la importancia de la mujer como cuidadora y del hombre como *breadwinner* (Bazo y Ancizu, 2004).

> Durante mi recorrido escolar, a pesar de que las reglas de estudios y comportamiento eran delineadas por mis padres, era más mi madre la que marcaba presencia en todos los momentos, o sea, llevaba e iba a buscar, participaba en las reuniones, se dirigía a la escuela para obtener información, controlaba el material, llamaba la atención cuando era necesario, etcétera (E130 LB/PT).

Se establece entonces una comparación entre ambos progenitores en la que la madre aparece como la que más se ocupa y el padre en ocasiones está ausente.

> Principalmente mi madre, porque mi padre poco estuvo presente, en mis trabajos de escuela y en nuestras bromas (E115 LB/PT).

En resumen, se obtienen un gran número de relatos en los que se afirma la implicación de los dos, acompañada de la aclaración "sobre todo de mi madre".

El padre destaca en el acompañamiento a las actividades extraescolares lo cual está vinculado con los horarios de trabajo y también con una mayor implicación en actividades de ocio con los hijos, especialmente deportivas.

> En las actividades extraescolares, siempre he practicado deporte, y aquí siempre ha estado mi padre (E34 GR/ES).

Cuando la madre trabaja

En este apartado nos encontramos relatos donde reflejan el apoyo de la madre en la educación a pesar de estar trabajando fuera del hogar.

> Mis padres siempre me acompañaron en todo mi recorrido escolar. Desde los trabajos de casa, al seguimiento en todas las actividades proporcionadas por la comunidad escolar. El seguimiento siempre fue muy lineal y consistente, o sea, siempre me acompañaron exactamente de la misma forma haciendo que nunca tuviera grandes dificultades en el ámbito escolar y en la relación con los demás. Siempre han valorado mi educación a todos los ni-

> veles haciéndome percibir su importancia. Me fui a la escuela en la zona donde siempre he vivido. Mi escuela estaba a unos 500 metros de mi casa. Como mi clase de primaria siempre fue la misma, todos los padres se conocían y, normalmente, íbamos a la escuela a pie con los padres de todos. Los padres iban alternando según su disponibilidad. Mis padres siempre trabajaron por su cuenta, por lo que acabo de pasar más tiempo con mi madre, sin embargo, ambos siempre se esforzaron al máximo para acompañarme en todo (E120 LB/PT).
>
> Mi madre siempre ha estado muy presente en mi educación, tanto en la escuela como en el hogar (E118 LB/PT).
>
> Tengo un hermano. Vivimos en un pueblo de Granada pero cerca de Granada. Vivimos los cuatro: mi padre, mi madre, mi hermano y yo. Mi madre tiene una carrera universitaria, la ESO y Bachiller, mi padre Primaria, la ESO y Bachiller porque empezó a trabajar joven, mi hermano está en 4.º de la ESO y yo haciendo una carrera universitaria. Mi madre trabaja en la administración y mi padre en el comercio. Nuestra rutina es ajetreada porque además mi hermano y yo estamos en el Conservatorio de Música y estamos de aquí para allá desde pequeños (E083 GR/ES).
>
> Normalmente mi día a día es una situación de estrés. Soy la única hija, apoyo de mi madre, así que, estoy con ella sobre todo (E08 ML/ES).

...porque mi padre estaba trabajando

¿Por qué el padre no se implica en la misma medida que la madre? A la mayor implicación de la madre le sigue una frase repetida en numerosas ocasiones y es que el padre está trabajando. Con esta frase los estudiantes quieren justificar la ausencia de su padre en esta labor de cuidados.

> Pasaba más tiempo con mi madre debido a que mi padre trabajaba. La importancia de mi educación me la han transmitido no obligándome a estudiar sino, transmitiéndome que es muy importante formarse para tener algo que quieras en un futuro (E32 GR/ES).
>
> Sí ayudaban en los deberes pero puntualmente, solo cuando yo lo necesitara. Vivo en un pueblo pequeño por lo que iba sola cuando ya era más mayor (ocho años aproximadamente). La mayor parte del tiempo la pasaba con mi madre ya que mi padre trabajaba (E105 GR/ES).

De los resultados encontrados surge una reflexión acerca del papel del padre en el trabajo. Si bien se producen cambios, persiste el modelo de *breadwinner* y ama de casa. En ocasiones, como señala la literatura, el hecho de ejercer a tiempo completo hace que la mujer deje de trabajar para dedicarse a la crianza, lo que dificulta posteriormente su incorporación en el mercado laboral.

> Somos cuatro hermanas, mi padre es ingeniero y mi madre arquitecta. Siempre he vivido con mis padres. Mi madre dejo de trabajar para hacerse cargo de nosotras (E86 ML/ES).

Además, en el modelo en el que ambos trabajan también se aprecia una mayor dedicación de la madre en la supervisión en los deberes, búsqueda de profesor particular, acompañamiento al colegio y cuestiones relacionadas con tutorías y actividades para las que se solicita por parte del colegio la participación de las familias.

> Más apoyo de mi madre que de mi padre pero siempre han estado pendientes y preocupados. Principalmente mi madre, porque mi padre poco estuvo presente, en mis trabajos de escuela y en nuestras bromas (E115 LB/PT).
>
> Mis padres, sobre todo mi madre, ha estado siempre muy presente en mi educación tanto formativa, como moral, además nunca se ha perdido ninguna actividad extraescolar en la que he participado, desde pequeña se quedaba hasta tarde conmigo y me ayudaba en mis deberes (E84 ML/ES).

Esta cuestión merece una reflexión, ¿se considera más importante el trabajo del padre que de la madre?¿Se excusa más la ausencia de la madre o llegar tarde al colegio por alguno de estos motivos?

Además, como señala la literatura, se aprecia una mayor implicación emocional en el apoyo materno.

> Han asistido en todos los actos de mis graduaciones, mi madre es la que más se preocupa y siem-

> pre me estuvo recordando que para tener un buen futuro hay que trabajar duro, ella se sigue emocionado cada vez que me dan un diploma, aunque sea de un simple taller, y eso me hace sentirme orgullosa (E74 ML/ES).
>
> Por parte de mi madre la participación en la escuela ha sido grande. En todo momento ha estado atenta y apoyando en cuestiones académicas, eso sí, sin agobio ninguno, siempre confiando en mí y sin exigir nada [...] es cierto que también mi madre ha estado nerviosa cuando yo le explicaba la importancia de algunos exámenes (E97 GR/ES).

El cuidado de la madre es entendido en muchas ocasiones como un rol de "controladora" y, cuando ansían la libertad surge alguna queja.

> Mi madre siempre me acompañó en actividades escolares. En primaria era muy exigente con los trabajos de casa pero después dejó de controlar tanto (E127 LB/PT).

En último término, se atribuyen diferentes cualidades a ambos progenitores. Se juzga a la madre como más cariñosa y comprensiva, mientras al padre como más rígido y autoritario. En definitiva persisten una estructura de valores y normas relativas a las relaciones de género y a la familia, sobre la que se construyen los roles e identidades familiares y por la cual se entiende al hombre/esposo proveedor de la familia, la máxima autoridad de la casa, y encargado de la "disciplina", el último juez (encarna la clásica *auctoritas* paterna). Por su parte la mujer debe ser la madre y esposa incondicional, la responsable del cuidado de los hijos y del marido, la encargada de proporcionarles cariño, la "dueña" de la casa (Rivero *et al.,* 1998).

> Mi madre no tanto, pero mi padre era muy rígido, rudo y autoritario. Poca comunicación teníamos, era todo con la madre (E130 LB/PT).
>
> Principalmente mi padre era más autoritario, riguroso y no era comunicativo. En estos casos el apoyo era por parte de la madre. Era poco el apoyo en estos momentos. Mi día a día era pasando la mayor parte del tiempo con la madre, porque el padre era el único que trabajaba y, por tanto, trabajaba inmenso. Rara vez estaba en casa. Y poco contribuyó a mi educación (E131 LB/PT).

Cuando la crisis económica irrumpe en el proceso educativo de las familias

La crisis económica ha supuesto un escenario complejo para los países del sur de Europa. La necesidad de invertir en otras cuestiones ha agravado la situación respecto a las ayudas en materia de bienestar. Sin embargo, las familias han confiado en la educación como un mecanismo de movilidad social y de búsqueda de empleo.

Los relatos de los estudiantes muestran que la formación y vivencias educativas no pueden ser desligadas del contexto social en el que surgen:

> La situación económica ha ido empeorando debido a la crisis y problemas que han ocurrido y actualmente es bastante baja. Quizá el problema de más dificultad que hay en mi casa es el de desempleo ya que ha habido un cambio un poco brusco siempre hemos sido una familia muy normal con su trabajo, con lo necesario para vivir y para algunas cositas más y actualmente ha empeorado la cosa (E50 GR/ES).

El panorama de estudio se ha visto marcado por una situación económica difícil muy vinculada con las relaciones de pareja, conflictos y rupturas. Las soluciones a los problemas han sido variadas pero permanece la idea de que la educación era un buen aliado para salir de esa situación. Esta situación se refleja en familias de clase trabajadora, de clase media y familias desestructuradas de barrios con conflictos.

La clase media lo señala como una excepcionalidad, considerándose siempre una familia "normal". Pese a las dificultades económicas, el capital cultural está interiorizado.

> En mi casa somos tres hermanos en total, una hermana mayor de veinticinco años, y otra hermana y yo que somos mellizos, por suerte mi madre ha conseguido inculcarnos los mismos valores a los tres, todos estamos estudiando aquello que siempre nos ha gustado y es cierto que los tres en el ámbito de la educación. A pesar de la dificilísima situación económica que hemos atravesado en estos últimos ocho-nueve años, siempre se le ha dado mayor importancia a lo emocional y a los estudios que a lo material. A pesar de que hasta hace poco no se ha

llevado a cabo la separación, es cierto que en los últimos años y teniendo en cuenta la difícil situación económica la relación de los padres no ha sido nada buena, cosa que siempre se ha intentado dejar a un lado cuando uno de nosotros tres necesitábamos cualquier cosa (E97 GR/ES).

En las zonas rurales y con bajo capital cultural, la universidad es una oportunidad siempre vinculada necesariamente a buenos resultados.

Algunos padres, sin embargo, recuerdan este esfuerzo económico. Es el caso de una familia de clase trabajadora y bajo nivel de estudios de una zona rural, quien dice:

Pues que más vale que estudie o sé que tocará trabajar (E51 GR/ES).

Además, entre la clase trabajadora las dificultades vividas unido a la ausencia de tradición educativa hace que se valoren los resultados con mucho orgullo.

Cuando decidí venir a la Universidad tuve todo el apoyo posible, aunque lamentablemente mi madre no puede ayudar monetariamente, lo que hace todo el proceso más difícil. Pero siempre ha ayudado en otros aspectos, como la comida, el apoyo psicológico, etc. Siempre se mostró orgullosa de haber elegido seguir un curso superior (E127 LB/PT).

Otra cuestión interesante se refiere al contexto del barrio. Aunque, en ocasiones lejos de constituir una mala influencia por haber visto prácticas muy alejadas de la norma escolar, han servido de incentivo para salir de esa situación.

Vivo con mis padres y hermanos. La situación de mi barrio no es favorable y tomo como ejemplo a mi barrio para seguir adelante. Ha habido desempleos (E94 ML/ES).

Mi ciudad me gusta bien poco, más que ciudad es su gente, tiene pocos valores de nobleza y tiende mucho a tomar confianza y a malinterpretar, mi casa bueno vivo con mis dos hermanos pequeños y uno está en camino, a veces se hace imposible estudiar en casa por el ruido de los niños y tengo que irme a la biblioteca, los niños están en primaria. Mis padres se divorciaron cuando yo era un bebé y ahora vivo con mi padrastro, que para mí es mi padre. El único que trabaja en casa es mi padre, estamos pasando por una situación complicada esperemos que mejore pronto (E74 ML/ES).

Los relatos ayudan a comprender los diferentes bagajes que hay en el aula tras haber llegado todos a la universidad.

Mis padres se separaron cuando tenía tres años, mi padre se fue a vivir a Valencia, mi madre cuando yo tenía doce años se quedó en paro y estuvo cuatro años en paro hasta que se fue a Suiza, y yo me emancipé con dieciséis, mi madre no tiene estudios y es limpiadora, mi padre tiene un módulo medio de administración pero trabaja como jefe de obra, situación económica desde hace poco baja, ahora mismo baja-media (E108 GR/ES).

Somos tres hermanos, vivía y vivo con mis hermanos y padres, mi madre formación profesional, mi padre nada, mi hermana carrera universitaria, mi hermano y yo igual, carrera universitaria también, mi hermana, mi hermano y yo estudiantes, mi madre peluquera, mi padre en paro, momentos difíciles creo que ninguno, podría considerarse uno de ellos el desempleo de mi padre (E071 ML/ES).

Ante la dificultad económica... más apoyo. Clases particulares y actividades extraescolares

Merece la pena reseñar a Park *et al.,* 2016, quienes aluden a la pérdida de centralidad de la escuela y adquieren mayor protagonismo las actividades extraescolares como ventaja competitiva y mecanismo de desigualdad.

Las razones que suelen atribuirse a este comportamiento se encuentran en la percepción de que el sistema educativo no es de calidad, de forma que hay que realizar una inversión extra, así como en la ansiedad y deseo de los padres de garantizar una distinción en los estudios con el objetivo de lograr el éxito y la movilidad social. Lo que ocurre con las clases de inglés en una sociedad global.

Son las clases medias las que hacen mayor inversión en clases particulares, movidas por lo que Lareau (2003) *"concerted cultivation"* explicando cómo los padres de clase media inscriben a sus hijos en actividades extraescolares como deporte, artes o música.

Las madres se implican más en el proceso de decisión de la escuela secundaria. En ocasiones hay un rechazo por parte de los jóvenes de que las madres se impliquen (inmiscuyan). Se observa, además, una mayor relación entre madre e hija y padre e hijo.

La educación secundaria es una etapa crucial. En el cuestionario educación secundaria incluye obligatoria y posobligatoria. Las altas tasas de abandono escolar hacen interesante el análisis de cuál es el tipo de apoyo experimentado en el hogar (Fernández Enguita *et al.,* 2010; Martín-Lagos, 2012). Si bien es cierto que algunos padres siguen ayudando a estudiar “cuando lo necesitaba” (E03 ML/ES), “en la explicación de lo que no entendía” (E17 ML/ES), durante la etapa de secundaria se percibe de forma generalizada la sustitución del apoyo en los estudios por parte de los padres al apoyo mediante clases particulares y academias. Se constata que, en secundaria, aumentan las dificultades de los padres para explicar cuestiones que desconocen “me ayudaban en lo que podían y si no, iba a clases particulares” (E42 GR/ES).

Las clases particulares constituyen un apoyo económico cada vez más frecuente. Se mencionan mayoritariamente las dificultades en matemáticas, que eran las que más les costaban, no entendían o tenían más dificultades por el cambio a otro centro con más nivel. Valoran que les apoyasen económicamente en esta decisión sin ponerle ningún inconveniente.

Es preciso hacer una distinción entre las clases particulares y las actividades extraescolares vinculadas a idiomas, deporte, música, entre otras.

Respecto a las clases particulares España destaca por la gran inversión que realizan las familias en ellas. Además los estudiantes lo valoran como un esfuerzo económico que realizan sus padres para que puedan progresar y rendir más.

> Me llevaba todos los días al colegio mi padre ya que mi madre trabajaba, me han pagado academias o comprado libros tanto del colegio como de lectura (E075 ML/ES).
>
> En todas mis etapas escolares me han ayudado con los deberes en los que necesitase ayuda. En ciertas asignaturas de la ESO, que tienen un nivel superior, me han pagado una academia para que me ayudarán en algunas asignaturas (E27 ML/ES).
>
> Ayudándome con las tareas o deberes, apuntándome a academias para mejorar mi rendimiento escolar y llevándome a actividades extraescolares (E75 ML/ES).

Existen discursos sobre el apoyo de los padres en clase particulares de diversas clases sociales. En general parece que responde a un perfil de hogares con dos ingresos pero no necesariamente de nivel educativo alto.

> La situación ha sido buena pues mis dos padres tienen estudios superiores y empleo por lo que me han podido facilitar clases particulares y el ambiente también bueno porque querían que siguiera sus pasos y fuera a la universidad (E59 GR/ES).

Esto quiere decir que en aquellas familias con nivel educativo bajo se prima también este tipo de ayuda para poder continuar y obtener buenos resultados.

> Mis padres me llevaron a estudiar hasta los dieciséis a partir de ahí empecé a desplazarme sola, en los deberes me han ayudado poco ya que su nivel de estudios es escaso, pero siempre han intentado pagarme una academia (E74 ML/ES).

Hay apoyo especialmente en Matemáticas y Química. No obstante, en ocasiones recurren a redes familiares como abuelos profesores, primos mayores o hermanas.

En cuanto a las actividades extraescolares los estudiantes no mencionan la cuestión económica. Sí el tiempo que han dedicado sus progenitores en recogerles y traerles así como en asistir a los espectáculos, partidos, etc. Lo que ocurre es que la realización de un gran número de actividades muestra en ocasiones síntomas de agotamiento.

> Siempre he querido tener más libertad. Era estresante ir a la escuela, luego ir a la academia y repasar. Quizá al principio obtienes buenos resultados, pero tu cuerpo se cansa de tanto trabajo (E79 ML/ES).

La idea es poder en ocasiones conciliar horarios y también mejorar la formación puesto que hoy no solo se entiende la relativa a la escuela.

Mis padres nunca me han ayudado en los deberes, siempre lo he hecho todo por mí misma, o, en el caso de Matemáticas y Naturales, con ayuda de profesionales; han dedicado mucho tiempo para mis actividades (extra) escolares, cuando han estado reventados de todo el día, han sido capaces de venir a verme en mis actuaciones de baile, en las de inglés... (E110 GR/ES).

A pesar de que mis padres no tuvieran educación superior, ellos en las tareas escolares que traía intentaban siempre ayudar, o pedir ayuda a familiares. Nunca sentía falta de apoyo en casa en las tareas escolares (E135 LB/PT).

Mi madre siempre me acompañó en actividades escolares. En la primaria era muy exigente con los trabajos de casa pero después dejó de controlar tanto. En esa fase pasaba más tiempo con mi abuela y tías. Siempre fui sola a la escuela por que siempre he estudiado muy cerca de casa. De cualquier forma, siempre me ha transmitido la importancia de tomar la educación en serio y que esta tiene impacto en toda nuestra vida. Se mostró más preocupada cuando chumbe el 11.º año y me quedé un poco "perdida" sin saber qué hacer. Entonces me apoyó en la decisión de hacer mi curso profesional que me dio equivalencia al 12.º año. En el 9.º año tuve muchas negativas, y ahí mi madre y mis profesores me encaminaron al gabinete de orientación psicológica de la escuela, ya que en esa fase había perdido un familiar que me era muy querido (E127 LB/PT).

Balance emocional de los estudiantes ante su proceso educativo

Me he sentido muy mal, estresada y agobiada, también porque saben que puedo

En el cuestionario se les solicitaba que relatasen si, la relación con sus progenitores ha estado marcada por el estrés o el confort. Los estudiantes se estresan en la relación con sus padres por tres motivos principalmente. El primero es por las altas expectativas depositadas por sus padres hacia sus resultados académicos. En los relatos se justifican estas altas expectativas porque los padres saben que puedo. Quiere decir que si la calificación es más baja siempre les dicen que pueden conseguir mejorarla. Esta circunstancia y la búsqueda del perfeccionismo hacen que los hijos sientan frustración y agobio, considerando que no valoran su esfuerzo.

Mi padre es de un pueblo agrícola y se sacó dos carreras con mucho esfuerzo así que no entiende que saquemos alguna nota mala (E08 ML/ES).

La verdad, es que creo que mi padre siempre ha sido muy estricto con las notas, también porque él sabe que puedo. Aunque si es cierto, que a veces me he sentido muy mal, estresada y agobiada cuando he sacado una nota más baja (E33 GR/ES).

Además, se sienten mal por los resultados académicos porque van a defraudar a sus padres, quienes esperaban más de ellos y no tanto porque estos resultados sean negativos para ellos. Esto implica que la responsabilidad se ha trasladado a los padres y no a los hijos. Sería el llamado modelo de padres helicóptero. No obstante, si la presión va acompañada de comunicación, los hijos lo agradecen.

Con respecto a mi educación, mis padres siempre han estado muy encima y eso me hace tener presión por querer aprobar y no defraudarles. Esta presión muchas veces me ha hecho fallar en exámenes y esas cosas, es algo que no me gustaría pero ellos quieren lo mejor para mí y por eso son así (E69 ML/ES).

Una segunda causa de estrés está motivada por tener un gran número de actividades y una agenda que no les permite descansar ni pasar tiempo con sus padres. Las actividades extraescolares no se viven como ocio sino que tienen un alto nivel de exigencia.

El día a día en general ha sido un poco estresante, pues entre el conservatorio, y demás actividades, no tenía apenas tiempo para hacer toda la tarea que mandaban ni de llevar los estudios al día, siempre estudiaba el día de antes y ese día faltaba a las actividades extraescolares, pero tampoco podía faltar a las actividades porque también me hacían exámenes (E25 ML/ES).

En último término, el estrés aparece vinculado a conflictos en el hogar motivados por las dificultades económicas, el alcoholismo o el divorcio, entre otros.

En general mi día a día ha sido bastante estresante, las dificultades económicas en casa crispaban mucho el ambiente y en todo momento vives con el remordimiento de no saber qué es lo que puede ocurrir cuando llega una carta y cuando suena el teléfono. Mi zona de confort se ha desarrollado principalmente en el estadio de fútbol y en la escuela, donde conseguía olvidar lo que pasaba de puertas adentro (E97 GR/ES).

El día a día se limitaba a ir al colegio y esperar el día que pudiera salir de ahí y que no hubiera más peleas, quería una vida como la de otra niña cualquiera en su casa (E58 GR/ES).

He sentido estrés de pequeña cuando no me salían bien los deberes y cuando mi padre bebía demasiado, tuvo problemas con el alcohol (E102 GR/ES).

En la transición a la facultad la ayuda de mis padres fue bastante importante principalmente a nivel emocional, pues esta fase fue bastante estresante (E122 LB/PT).

Fueron bastante estrictos, exigentes casi en todo, pauta, conducta, estudios. Sentía que tenían razón y que todo era para nuestro bien. Estoy bastante estresada y nerviosa cuando paso por momentos de angustia (E112 LB/PT).

Espacio de confort

Como contrapartida el espacio de confort está vinculado a situaciones en las que los padres no han exigido o presionado mucho, les han dado libertad, han mantenido una buena relación, las calificaciones iban bien, basado en la confianza y con unas reglas del juego. La responsabilidad ha recaído sobre los hijos, basada en la confianza y con una situación en el hogar basada en la tranquilidad y en la comunicación. En los relatos de Portugal, apenas hacen mención al espacio de bueno o malo del confort. Ellos tienen muy inculcado que es una obligación el aprobar y sacar buenas notas independientemente de como sea su ambiente.

Mis padres nunca han sido muy estrictos, siempre me han dicho yo te dejo tu libertad para hacer cosas y confiaré en ti hasta el día que esta se rompa y me demuestres lo contrario. Por tanto, nunca han estado encima de mí en el tema de estudiar en la ESO o bachillerato ni en salir en los horarios ya que siempre he sido muy responsable y nunca he demostrado a mis padres lo contrario. A veces sentía que era demasiado dejada la relación en ese sentido pero siempre me han dicho que es porque confían en mí y por una parte es algo que me gusta porque yo misma me doy cuenta de cómo tengo que llevar las cosas y comportarme. Mi día a día ha sido tranquilo, pero como en todas las familias hay momentos para todo: estrés, alegrías, momentos duros, etcétera (E50 GR/ES).

En otras ocasiones han sido estrictos pero se ha transmitido el mensaje de que era por su bien incluso que es lo “normal”.

En cuanto a modales mis padres sí han sido exigentes en el sentido de saber comportarse con los demás, hablar bien y en los estudios sí que intentaban motivarnos para estudiar y que sacásemos buenas notas pero la verdad es que sí vivo en un estado de confort donde puedo hablar con mis padres de cualquier tema (E57 GR/ES).

Es más estricto mi padre que mi madre pero siempre en un espacio de confort y con comunicación (E68 ML/ES).

DISCUSIÓN Y CONCLUSIONES

Los resultados muestran cómo las condiciones estructurales y las políticas sociales condicionan las relaciones en el hogar. Hay que matizar que esta investigación es experimental y el propósito es seguir aumentando la muestra y otras líneas de investigación que han surgido en el estudio. No obstante, con este comienzo hemos podido observar varios puntos a reflexionar. Cuando hablamos del nivel educativo de los padres, concretamente cuando ambos progenitores no finalizan secundaria, en los relatos de los españoles, mayoritariamente las madres son ama de casa o limpiadoras y dependientas. Los padres siempre se preocupan y les apoyan en los estudios incluso con clases particulares. Les animan a que lleguen a la universidad. En algunas ocasiones se menciona que *si no estudia le tocaría trabajar, estudiar para ser alguien en la vida.* Se destacan barrios en ocasiones conflictivos, donde no se estudia mucho. Se premiaban las notas con regalos materiales. Son buenos estudiantes y se destaca el apoyo de sus hermanos. En Portugal, los padres también apoyan a los hijos en los estudios. A diferencia con los relatos españoles, tienen poca participación en el colegio. No se premian las notas porque lo consideran una obligación. Poca afición a la lectura y si a viajar más por su país. Si necesitan ayuda para los deberes recurren a algún familiar. No acuden mucho a la ayuda de las clases particulares, a diferencia de los españoles.

Cuando hay más nivel de estudio en la madre con respecto al padre, nos encontramos en los relatos españoles, más implicación de la madre en la educación, participación en el colegio y grandes lectoras frente al padre. Más apoyo con clases particulares, alegan que “el que no estudia a trabajar al campo” y potencian la participación en actividades extraescolares (clases de música, danza, fútbol). Pero ambos apoyan al hijo. En Portugal, son más estrictos los padres, las madres ayudan más en los deberes. Cuando el nivel de estudio es a la inversa, es decir, el padre tiene más nivel de estudios que la madre, los padres tienen más contacto con el colegio y en Portugal, son más exigentes. No premian a los hijos cuando sacan buenas notas o aprueban, ya que lo consideran como una obligación y si castigaban por sacar malas notas. Tímidamente refuerzan al alumno con clases particulares ni actividades extraescolares, a diferencia de los entrevistados españoles.

Hay que resaltar que cuando en ambos progenitores su nivel de estudio es de Formación Profesional, tanto en los casos españoles como portugueses se transmiten competitividad en los estudios y en el caso de Portugal, las madres son más exigentes que los padres con castigos severos.

En este sentido el modelo de Estado de bienestar del sur, concretamente en España y Portugal, continúa perpetuando a la madre con un importante rol en el hogar en la gestión de las cuestiones relativas a la educación. Se hace en un contexto en el que la mujer ya no tiene el papel predominante en el hogar y los numerosos cambios dificultan seguir desempeñando de modo predominante este rol. Se reclama una mayor responsabilidad compartida.

Por su parte esta situación se ha visto agravada cuando se producen situaciones de crisis económica. Los estudiantes han asistido a dificultades en el hogar relativas a la economía, al empleo y a los conflictos existentes como consecuencia de ello. Se ha percibido el esfuerzo realizado por las familias y cómo han transmitido que en estos momentos era aún más importante la educación como salida a la situación de desempleo. Esta necesidad de invertir en educación se ve plasmada en las actividades extraescolares y en la generalización de las clases particulares como modo de mejorar los resultados. Reconocen también el esfuerzo en tiempo destinado a acompañarles a las actividades y en animarles con los resultados. Surge entonces la necesidad de buscar alternativas a este esfuerzo económico que agrava las desigualdades cuando las familias no tienen capital educativo.

En último término, se aprecian situaciones emocionales de estrés entre los/as estudiantes marcadas por esta situación. Sus padres, con un gran esfuerzo económico han depositado unas altas expectativas sobre ellos resumidas en la frase “sabemos que tú puedes”. Esta cuestión ha generado agobio, estrés y frustración cuando las expectativas se han visto mermadas y la vista entonces se ha dirigido a sus padres con un sentimiento de culpa.

Respecto a las redes de apoyo además de los progenitores en España cobran protagonismo los profesores particulares y los entrenadores. Son mencionados en gran número los abuelos, tíos, hermanos, primos... En Lisboa (Portugal) sobresale la mención a los abuelos y en el caso de Melilla (España), al obtener una muestra importante de estudiantes de cultura musulmana, son mencionados bastantes veces los hermanos mayores. Cuestiones que denotan cómo la estructura de relaciones sociales y de apoyo en cada lugar condiciona el papel en la educación. Una primera comparación entre España y Portugal refleja que la madre parece tener un rol más destacado en Portugal con la ausencia del padre. No obstante, a diferencia de España, los estudiantes no justifican la ausencia paterna y parece estar más interiorizada la división de roles. Se aprecia un estilo educativo más estricto y presión por parte de la madre. En los discursos de Portugal aparece en mayor medida el sentido de la responsabilidad, la obligación y la independencia. No aparece la culpa porque los padres tengas más expectativas sobre los estudios. Hay castigos que llevan a dejar sin comer, sin salir de la casa. En otros casos se premia más que castigar aunque no destacan las grandes recompensas materiales y se alude al sentido de la responsabilidad. Cuestiones, sin duda, que precisan un análisis más pormenorizado en futuras investigaciones.

En otros casos se constata en los hogares situaciones marcadas por el confort, depositando la confianza en los hijos y relacionándose con ellos en un buen espacio de comunicación. El resultado ha sido calma y tranquilidad en el hogar.

Esto ha sido una primera aproximación, de forma general, sobre la participación educativa de la familia. Sería importante ampliar la muestra de los discursos según diversos perfiles, como puede ser profundizar en los tipos complejos de familia, el papel que tienen otras figuras familiares en la educación, así como comparando los resultados con los de otros modelos de Estado de bienestar.

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Artículos / *Articles*

Ageing in southern Europe. Emerging perspectives and challenges for sociology / *Envejecimiento en el sur de Europa. Perspectivas emergentes y desafíos para la sociología*

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ABSTRACT

The process of transitioning to an ageing population has occurred later, but nevertheless more intensely, in Southern Europe than in other regions. Consequently, these countries have been forced to politically, socially and economically adapt to this significant challenge. Sociologists play an important role in identifying and understanding social trends and issues, as well as in contributing to the design of public policies across Europe. However, research has tended to explore issues of ageing populations in Northern Europe, in spite of the notable demographic shifts and contextual specificities of Southern Europe. In response, this study has a dual objective: first, to collect the theoretical and methodological contributions of authors from or focusing on Southern Europe, and second to explore the originality of studies that belong to Southern European sociological traditions. In order to systematise the study, the theoretical paradigm of Marshall's classification of social science theories in the field of ageing is used. Specifically, the present study incorporates the topics of active ageing, adult education and ageing at work as the main foci of analysis. The results of this theoretical study

RESUMEN

El proceso de transición hacia una población que envejece ha ocurrido de manera más tardía, pero de forma más intensa, en el sur de Europa que en otras regiones. En consecuencia, estos países se han visto obligados a adaptarse política, social y económicamente a este importante desafío. Los sociólogos juegan un papel importante en la identificación y comprensión de las tendencias y problemas sociales, así como en la contribución al diseño de políticas públicas en toda Europa. Sin embargo, la investigación ha tendido a explorar los problemas del envejecimiento de la población en el norte de Europa, a pesar de los notables cambios demográficos y las especificidades contextuales del sur de Europa. En respuesta, este estudio tiene un doble objetivo: primero, recoger las contribuciones teóricas y metodológicas de los autores del sur de Europa, o que se han centrado en esta región, y segundo, explorar la originalidad de los estudios que pertenecen a las tradiciones sociológicas del sur de Europa. Para sistematizar el estudio, se utiliza el paradigma teórico de la clasificación de Marshall de las teorías de las ciencias sociales en el campo del envejecimiento. Específicamente, el presente estudio incorpora los temas del envejecimiento

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show that the sociology of Southern Europe can contribute significantly both to the issue of ageing and to public policies for its management, in the process providing a more holistic and human-centred approach.

activo, la educación de adultos y el envejecimiento en el trabajo como los principales focos de análisis. Los resultados de este estudio teórico muestran que la sociología del sur de Europa puede contribuir significativamente tanto a la cuestión del envejecimiento como a las políticas públicas para su gestión, en el proceso de proporcionar un enfoque más holístico y humanista.

Keywords: southern Europe; sociological theory; active ageing; adult education; older workers.

Palabras clave: *sur de Europa; teoría sociológica; envejecimiento activo; educación de adultos; trabajadores mayores.*

INTRODUCTION

Europe can be described as an "ageing society". Demographic change, a process that has been highly impactful in recent years, is applying significant pressure to all developed countries. At the European Union (EU) level, the population share of residents aged 45-65 has increased by 7 % in the last ten years (Eurostat data on Population structure and ageing, 2016a). According to the same source, this trend will increase during the coming decades, with people aged 65 and over expected to comprise approximately 30 % of the EU population by 2050.

In Southern Europe, the proportion of older people within the total population is growing much faster than the equivalent in Northern Europe. According to Tommasini and Lamura (2009), owing to their traditional high fertility rates and higher life expectancy, the ageing process started much earlier in Northern European countries and has been more persistent than in Southern Europe. Nevertheless, the more recent demographic tendency towards ageing has been so fast and profound in Southern Europe that this region can today be considered, together with Japan, as one of the "oldest" areas of the world. Southern European countries have been forced to quickly adjust to a new context in which the ageing process is having real and significant impacts on social, cultural and economic spheres alike. Policymakers have thus been prompted to intervene in order to address the related challenges.

According to Eurostat (2016a), Southern European countries are among the "oldest" in Europe. In terms of mean population age, Italy (45.5 years), Portugal (44.0), Greece (43.9) and Spain's figures (42.8) are higher than the EU28 figure (42.6), with only Malta (41.1) and Cyprus (37.2) below that threshold.

In this new and challenging scenario for Southern Europe, sociology is increasingly regarded as playing an important role in contributing to the observation and understanding of such an unprecedented transition, as well as assisting in the design of effective policies. This paper addresses issues related to population ageing in contemporary Southern European societies, in light of the major theoretical contributions brought by the sociology of ageing in recent decades. Indeed, increased longevity as well as the growing share of the elderly population due to the fall of fertility rates has instigated unprecedented challenges to individual lives and society, exposing sociological thinking to new and still unresolved questions.

The study of ageing, which dates from the end of the 19th century (Ferraro, 2006), has traditionally been characterised by a multidisciplinary approach (Marshall and Bengtson, 2011). Nevertheless, a prominent role has historically been played by classic gerontology (Estes, Biggs and Phillipson, 2003), the science that studies the biological implications of the ageing process. Moreover, in spite of growing attention to the ageing topic by classic sociologists in the middle of the 20th century (*e. g.* Parsons, 1942), the paramount role of classic gerontology rendered it difficult for social theory to make original contributions, both theoretically and methodologically. It is also important to acknowledge that classic gerontology, alongside social gerontology and its "critical" variation (Phillipson, 1982), grew especially within Anglo-Saxon scientific and academic environments. Thus, theoretical assumptions and empirical practices are still strongly influenced by traditions that are in many ways distant from a Southern European sensibility.

The development of sociological studies on ageing has also been subjected to stereotyping and isomorphic pressures, since the management of growing shares of the elderly population has increasingly been viewed as a target topic by national policies and supranational strategies (*e. g.* the World Health Organization and the EU), and relatedly the object of recommendations (*e. g.* United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, International Labour Office, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Furthermore, the study of ageing within the social sciences has also varied according to the different traditions and paradigms that have arisen in diverse European areas, as well as in different historical contexts. Scholars from Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries initiated study of the topic before their Southern European counterparts owing to cultural reasons (*e. g.* the influence of mainstream structuralism in the USA since the 1950s) and because they were earlier in addressing the ageing topic with *ad hoc* policies (as has been the case of most Northern European countries since the early-1980s). This fact has undoubtedly influenced these regions' research agendas. The way in which population ageing is interpreted and managed by public strategies also varies considerably across different European areas and countries, with Southern countries again responding only subsequently to their Northern counterparts.

Stemming from these general observations, the objective of this paper is to review the theoretical approaches and paradigms adopted within sociological research on ageing in Southern Europe, and to discuss their specific contributions to this scientific field.

Sociological theories on ageing have been classified along the axis of the normative/individualistic continuum on the side of theoretical development, and along the axis of the micro/macro approaches on the methodological side (Marshall, 1996). As will be explained in the following sections, Marshall's classification —and its developments— will be assumed as a reference milestone within this paper, since this represents the most systematic contribution to the theoretical development of sociology of ageing.

Together with a review of the literature and the original contributions presented by Southern European scholars, the main questions that this paper address are as follows:

— Are there elements emerging from research carried out in Southern Europe that represent a step forward, under theoretical and empirical perspectives, according to the scientific literature that has been consolidated in recent years?

— How can these research and theoretical acquisitions be framed within the current "state of the theory" (Marshall, 1996: 12) of the sociological reflection on ageing?

— How can the exploration of issues related to population ageing and specific to Southern European countries help improve broader sociological understandings of the topic?

As such, this paper has two main objectives: to contribute to the theoretical and methodological conceptualisation of sociology as regards different aspects of the ageing process, and to explore (as feasible) the originality of studies conducted by scholars belonging to Southern Europe sociological traditions. Indeed, given the contrasting social, political, economic and cultural contexts present here, the ageing process in Southern Europe has its own specificities (and internal diversity) that deserve to be foregrounded, and which can also represent a framework within which new sociological theoretical and methodological perspectives of ageing may arise.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The systematisation of sociological theories concerning ageing has been central to Victor W. Marshall's scientific study. During the mid-1990s, the author published a contribution within the *Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences*

(Binstock and George, 1996) entitled "The State of Theory in Aging and the Social Sciences" (Marshall, 1996). Marshall attempted to classify the most important theories on ageing in sociology and related disciplines, and proposed this classification as an ideal-type. The classification is organised along two axes, which represent the long-standing tensions that have characterised the sociological tradition: on the one hand the micro-macro dimension, and on the other the distinction between normative and interpretative theorising (1990).

The micro-macro dimension reflects the methodological debate between predominant positivist deductive approaches based on large-scale studies, and (increasingly popular) alternative inductive approaches that do not rely on positivist postulates and that are based on small-scale studies. The meso-dimension represents an intermediate linking position.

The normative-interpretative axis reproduces the theoretical debate crossing the entire sociological tradition concerning the interpretative assumptions that explain the relationship between individuals and society. The normative pole affirms that social norms are imposed upon individuals, whilst the interpretative pole affirms that individuals produce their own norms and understandings of society. Bridging approaches attempt to reconcile the two perspectives.

In this way, Marshall classifies the most relevant theories on ageing in the field of sociology and its neighbouring social science disciplines, starting from the normative-macro and ending with the interpretative-micro.

Instead of discussing the contents of the classification, we proceed by considering Marshall's return, 15 years later, to the theories he had reviewed in his classification. In a contribution written together with Vern L. Bengtson for the *Handbook of Sociology of Aging* (Settersen and Anegl, 2011), he updated his perspective according to the discipline's advancement, and suggested some future directions for theories of ageing (Marshall and Bengtson, 2011). In this contribution, the authors also distinguish sociological theories according to the historical phase of their development, enabling them to identify three fundamental phases:

— Early developments in the sociology of ageing.
— Developments from the 1980s.
— Current theoretical development.

In "Early developments in the sociology of ageing", Marshall and Bengtson consider the contributions of authors like Burgess (1960) and his theory concerning the shift of the aged toward a "role-less role", and Cumming and Henry's (1961)

Table 1. Marshall's classification of social science theories in the field of ageing.

Level of analysis	Normative	Bridging	Interpretative
MACRO	Structuralism Modernisation and ageing theory	Interest group theory Institutional theory	Political economy
LINKING	Disengagement and activity theory "Birth and fortune" thesis Age stratification perspective	Life course perspective Feminist theories	Critical theory Symbolic interactionism and phenomenology Cultural anthropology
MICRO	Role theory Developmental theory Conventional economics and rational choice theory	Exchange theory	Self and identity theories (community theory; career/ status passage; dramaturgical)

Source: Marshall, 1995: 13.

"disengagement" theory. These theories, influenced by structuralism and postulating the progressive (and "planned") loss of functional and social roles by the elderly, can be contrasted with the "activity" theory (Havighurst and Albrecht, 1953) and its derivative "successful aging" theory (Havighurst, 1961; Rowe and Kahn, 1998), which postulate (still within the normative perspective) the adjustment process that the elderly can undertake in order to keep active. This section also considers theories concerning age norms and their influence on shaping normative roles for the elderly (Neugarten, 1974), as well as theories related to "ageing and modernisation". The latter is interpreted as a deterministic structure operating at the level of social institutions. Other theories have also been set at the micro or social psychological level.

Under "Developments from the 1980s", Marshall and Bengtson (2011: 19) consider three perspectives that brought "significant changes to the definition of the field" in the decades to come. The first is the establishment of the political economy perspective, which outlines the socio-political production of the aged as a problem, and hence stands in contrast with the age and modernisation theory of authors like Cowgill and Holmes (1972). This macro and interpretative perspective had been advanced by several scholars during the 1980s and 1990a, including Estes (1979), Townsend (1981), Walker (1981), Guillemard (1983) and Kholi *et al.* (1991). The second significant perspective is the development and formalisation of the life course theory, initially proposed by Cain (1964) and later refined by authors like Elder (1974, 1995) and Abeles and Riley (1977). Originating in the Chicago School's approaches, especially its attention to the longitudinal analysis of individual lives, the life course perspective has been classified by Marshall as an example of meso (linking) level theorising, attempting to bridge normative and interpretative paradigms. The third perspective arising as a development since the 1980s is the interpretative sociology and the social construction of ageing and the life course. This perspective bridges traditions such as symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and other interpretative approaches in order to emphasise individual agency during the life course. In this case, the contributions can be classified under the meso and interpretative cell of Marshall's classification. In the phenomenological tradition, authors including Handel (2000), Newman (2003) and Holstein and Gubrium (2007) have indicated that the life course is a social institution produced as a social constructed reality.

Under "Current theoretical developments in the sociology of ageing" Marshall and Bengtson recap the emerging perspectives that arise either as a development of pre-existing sociological theories on ageing or as an interpretation of the ageing process in light of other sociological theories. The emerging perspectives are listed as follows (2011: 21-27):

— Stress theory, ageing, and the life course.
— Cumulative inequality.
— The standardised life course.
— Risk society.
— Chance events and the life course.
— Structure and agency in the life course.
— The family and the life course.
— Critical gerontology and the critical feminist perspective.
— Globalisation, ageing, and the life course.

Finally, in their joint contribution the authors introduce issues that should be addressed in order to facilitate the continued advancement of the sociology of ageing. First, and as had been emphasised in Marshall's production in the 1990s, they propose the importance of further explanatory sociological theory about ageing, which go beyond confirmative and theory-supportive approaches. Indeed, according to the authors, in the field of ageing studies "the collection of information —data— about these important issues will not add much to our deeper knowledge unless we pay attention to the development of theory about social processes and the course of life to help us understand the data we accumulate" (2011: 29). Second, Marshall and Bengtson call for greater awareness of previous theorising in order to understand what has been already theorised and to reject approaches that are no longer relevant. Third, the authors argue for more interdisciplinary theories, since "disciplinary boundaries have increasingly become barriers to aging and life course theorizing" (2011: 28). They also recommend greater attention to the fact that the current predominance of the life course paradigm should not overshadow other useful perspectives arising from sociology, such as theorising on social institutions. Fifth, the authors underline the importance of being aware of diversity in the study of social aspects of ageing. Finally, they place attention on the fact that the sociological study of ageing, in spite of the general absence of explanatory theories, has demonstrated significant improvements in a relatively short space of time.

In conclusion, with respect to the "state of the theory" on ageing depicted by Marshall (1996: 12) and Marshall and Bengtson (2011), and the absence of a specific, previous approach to Southern European sociological theories on ageing, it is possible to argue that both the ideal-typical classification according to the sociological perspectives, and the classification of theories according to historical phases, represent helpful tools for orienting and exploring the original contributions of sociology of ageing in Southern Europe. Nevertheless, the classification will not be used as a rigid method, but rather as a reference milestone for discussing the contributions presented in this paper.

ACTIVE AGEING IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

The following sections examine three active ageing-related topics, significant within Southern European sociology. The literature review does not aim to be exhaustive, but nonetheless address topics stemming from a comprehensive interpretation of active ageing that emphasises not only the importance of health and well-being for social inclusion in old age, but also the active inclusion of older people in various social spheres such as education and the labour market.

In order to explore the development of literature concerning these topics, we primarily consider the contributions of authors who published in the English language in international scientific journals. Contributions published in Spanish and Italian scientific journals have been included as well, due to the authors' knowledge of these languages. The prevalence of confirmative studies or simple data collections that Marshall and Bengtson (2011) treat as a concern in their work also affects the sociology of ageing in Southern Europe.

AGEING ACTIVELY

Active ageing (AA) finds its first formulation at the end of the 1990s as a more comprehensive strategy for achieving healthy ageing (Kalachea and Kickbusch, 1997). In 2002, in a contribution for the Second United Nations World Assembly on Ageing held in Madrid, the WHO proposed the well-known definition of active ageing that has persisted until the present day. In a document addressed to the Assembly, the WHO (2002a: 12) specified that "Active ageing is the process of optimizing opportunities for health, participation and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age". In spite of its brevity, the definition is thorough, addressing multiple issues raised by the ageing process. In particular, the WHO (2002a: 12) clarifies the use of some terminology within the definition. For example, the document specifies that "the word 'active' refers to continuing participation in social, economic, cultural, spiritual and civic affairs, not just the ability to be physically active or to participate in the labour force"; moreover, that "'Health' refers to physical, mental and social well-being as expressed in the WHO definition of health".

Thus, the definition addresses three macro topics, encompasses one general strategy, and sets a general goal. The three macro topics are those already specified, starting from the health issue. According to WHO, an AA strategy should implicate the broadening of access to care services at a reasonable cost, thus guaranteeing its inclusivity of the whole population. Furthermore, as already specified, the field of participation covers different fundamental life spheres, hence extending the AA strategy towards scopes such as work, education and community life. In turn, these life spheres extend the application of AA to other spheres that can be adopted as tools to achieve AA goals, such as ICT literacy, nutrition, financial education, and so forth. Finally, the third topic covered is security, which primarily refers to the fundamental vital dimensions of autonomy and independent living. In these fields, not only are disabilities and frailties of functional capacities as defined by WHO's (2002b) ICF[1] considered, but also other dimensions that may be evaluated as strategic for healthy and active ageing, including housing and economic conditions.

Concerning AA as a strategy, WHO's definition clearly specifies that the process refers to the optimisation of opportunities, "as people age". The nature of this strategy raises multiple issues related to equality, in the process opening the discussion to the topic of diversity (Villar Posada *et al.,* 2018). As will be shown, people do not age at the same pace, nor does the population ageing process work in the same way in every country (and not even in geographic areas that might be considered homogeneous owing to culture, lifestyle, and welfare assets, like Southern Europe).

What remains unchanged from country to country is AA strategies' general aim to enhance older people's quality of life. Moreover, this general aim applies at every age and is additionally expressed with the goal of extending the so called "disability-free life expectancy". Thus, increasing the number of years of healthy life, and reducing the number of years spent suffering chronical disabilities both represent major concerns for every political decision-maker, owing to several associated implications. For instance, how long should be the working life-span? Is it possible to include and extend the working life of individuals who suffer from disabilities? When should workers retire? How should the increasing costs of pensions and the loss of autonomy of an increasing number of elderly people for an increased number of years be managed?

A quick look to healthy life expectancy data clearly illustrate, more than other examples, the importance of the strategic goal of extending disability-free years. If we consider six countries in Southern Europe —Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Italy, Spain and Portugal— it is possible to observe that all demonstrate life expectancies at birth above the European mean, both for women and men. In 2015, the highest female life expectancy at birth was found in Spain (85.8 years), and for men in Italy (80.3 years)[2]. Nonetheless, healthy life years at birth for women in Spain only stood at 64.1 years, or just 74.7 % of Spanish women's life-span, with the remaining 21.7 years spent with disabilities. This figure reaches almost 30 years in the case of Portugal. A similar dynamic can be observed in the case of Italian men, who only reach 62.6 years disability-free, or 77.9 % of their life span, with the remaining 17.7 years of their lives spent with disabilities. Once again, the worst figure is found in Portugal, at almost 20 years.

Thus, in spite of quite similar life expectancies at birth, the ways in which people in Southern European countries age are highly heterogeneous. Moreover, women and men age differently. A country like Portugal holds the lowest percentages of disability-free life, despite its high life expectancy at birth. On the opposite side, the figures of Malta impress owing to the highest percentages of disability-free life both amongst women (88.9 %) and men (91.2 %). Moreover, in spite of the differences in life expectancies at birth, the gender divide in terms of healthy life years almost completely disappears in every country considered. Women still maintain a slight advantage over men, except in the case of Portugal, where men have a lower life expectancy at birth than women but a longer healthy life-span.

These data demonstrate convergent (*e. g.* life expectancy at birth) as well as divergent (healthy life years) trends between Southern European countries. This topic has been recently discussed in literature. Following previous studies (Troisi and Kondratovitz, 2013), Kondratowitz (2015) analyses two concepts: the modernisation process taking place in the Mediterranean basin, and the idea that the whole region is unified (and crystallised) with regard to the ageing process. The author aims to define a strategy for international comparative research in gerontology in Mediterranean countries, *i. e.* in Southern Europe, North Africa and Turkey. Under the theoretical view, Kondratowitz suggests an interdisciplinary approach based on:

— The *histoire totale* (total history) theory, based on the studies of the French Annales School (Revel and Hunt, 1995).

1 International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health.

2 Own processing of Eurostat hlth_hlye data.

— Theories of social and cultural anthropology.
— The fundamentals of discourse analysis.
— Post-colonial theories.
— Reflexive modernity theories (Beck *et al.,* 1996).

Other recent contributions attempt to set an agenda for research on ageing focused on the countries of Southern Europe, actualising a theoretical and methodological tradition that nonetheless dates from almost thirty years ago. In this respect, it is possible to regard some contributions within the Italian collective book *L'anziano attivo* (*The Active Elder*) (Urbani *et al.,* 1991) and an article for the *Revista Española de Investigacion Sociologica* (*Spanish Journal of Sociological Investigation*) entitled *La nueva sociologia de la vejez* (Bazo, 1992) as the first systematic contributions of the Southern Europe sociological tradition. For example, Rodríguez Rodríguez *et al.* (2012) present a road map for future research on ageing, as a Spanish contribution to the European Futurage network's activities. According to the authors, as also reported by Aguilar Parra *et al.* (2013), the three main areas of investigation are: 1) healthy and active ageing to be analysed as an issue through adopting a multidisciplinary approach; 2) the socio-economic and environmental resources of the elderly, and 3) bio-gerontology. The topics related to bio-gerontology are more distant from the social sciences.

Once again, following a similar path stimulated by the 2012 European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations, interdisciplinary attention in Italy was also placed on developing an agenda for research on active ageing and healthy living (Riva, Ajmone Marsan and Grassi, 2014). The originality of the proposal arising from the empirical experiences collected in the book is the notion of leaning on a human-centred approach that is rooted in humanistic epistemologies.

An example of the human-centred approach proposed by the book, which is based in the field of sociology and applies to ageing, is the relational theory underpinning the survey "I don't want to retire". This was conducted in Italy in 2013-14 with a representative sample of 900 elderly people aged between 65 and 74 years old, with the aim of exploring active ageing dimensions (Bramanti, Meda and Rossi 2016).

According to the authors, relational sociology

> observes the individuals as included in networks of significant relationships. From this point of view, the family is seen as the basic social relation, the spring of society, capable of establishing alliances between genders and generations. Furthermore, the family —insofar as it fully expresses its social subjectivity— creates forms of sociality and promotes forms of prosocial belonging for its members (Rossi *et al.,* 2014: 58).

The same sociological paradigm underpins two recent studies concerning intergenerational solidarity —that is, another pillar of EU's AA strategy— carried out in Spain (López López, González Hincapié and Sánchez Fuentes, 2015; Cavallotti and Marcaletti, 2017).

Finally, it is worth to mention the growing amount of systematic contributions devoted to specific theoretical aspects of active ageing, authored by Southern Europe scholars (Marcaletti, 2007; Marcaletti, Garavaglia and Milone, 2014; Ezquerra, Pérez Salanova, Pla and Subirats, 2016; Scabini and Rossi, 2016).

AGEING AND ADULT EDUCATION

Adult Education (AE) has been positioned as an important strategy of the European Commission in the promotion of active aging and older adults' social inclusion. While inequalities exist in participation in adult education across age and socioeconomic groups in a wide range of countries, they tend to be smaller in Northern and Central European states in comparison to their Southern European counterparts (Eurostat, 2016b). If we take into account the latest available data from this source, differences in older adults' participation in formal and non-formal educational activities are evident. In Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, participation rates in AE amongst adults aged 55-64 are above 50 %; however, in Southern Europe this rate is far lower, such as 33.0 % in Italy, 29.9 % in Cyprus, 29.0 % in Spain, 28.6 % in Portugal and below 20.0 % in Malta, Croatia and

Greece (Eurostat, 2016b). This inequality is also evident in the international literature on AE, which is rather *Northist-dominated* (Borg and Mayo, 2008). However, in spite of the general absence of Southern European countries in official statistics and international scientific contributions, we can identify interesting and innovative, emerging proposals to approaching AE in both academic and social environments, facilitating a more socially transformative vision for this topic.

According to Borg and Mayo (2008), three main reasons exist to attend to the specificity of Southern European AE scientific study. First, owing to the hegemony of the English language, the AE literature has excluded interesting contributions from countries including (but not limited to) Malta, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Second, Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy is highly relevant and influential in the study and definition of transformative practices of AE coming from Southern Europe. Finally, the demographic specificity of the southern regions of Europe, on the one hand being the principal recipients of immigrants from North Africa, and on the other hand being countries undergoing a recent but rapid and constant process of population ageing, renders AE highly relevant here according to Southern European authors.

Regarding the first element, the predominance of English in AE theories and practices has led to the exclusion of many contributors from Southern European countries (Macedo, Dendrinos and Gounari, 2003; Guimaraes, Lucio-Villegas and Mayo, 2018). Aligned with this idea, Borg and Mayo (2008) also denounce the international literature on AE for being dominated by ideas and experiences from Northern and Central Europe, and for consequently being those that tend to be incorporated in European AE policies, as a result silencing movements and local initiatives on AE that could have brought visibility to groups traditionally excluded by neoliberal and globalising dynamics, including the elderly, women and migrants. Facing this hegemonic globalisation, numerous examples exist in Southern Europe of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos describes as practices related to counter-hegemonic globalisation or globalisation from below (Dale and Robertson, 2004). Taking into account only the scope of AE, these approaches are characterised by their opposition to trends of commodification and the excessive vocationalisation of this type of education. Thus, they criticise and oppose globalisation from above, which, as mentioned, excludes older adults, among other groups (Formosa, 2000, 2007).

This idea can be connected with the second element that, according to Borg and Mayo (2008), characterises the theory of AE in Southern Europe. Indeed, taking into account the approaches of Torres (1987, 2013), Mayo (1999), Puigvert (2004), Flecha and Elboj (2005), English and Mayo (2012) and Borg and Mayo (2006, 2008), Iñiguez Berrozpe and Marcaletti (2016a, 2016b, 2017), one of the main contributions of the sociology of AE in these countries is the considerable influence of Paulo Freire and his critical pedagogy (1970). The association between education and politics, the critical struggle against inequality and hegemonic thinking through participatory citizenship, and how this can only be achieved through education, are ideas included in the aforementioned authors' works, but, also in the specific experiences that they collect in their different countries.

In this sense, influenced by these theories, Formosa (2000, 2007), Borg and Mayo (2008) and Guimaraes, Lucio-Villegas and Mayo (2018) criticise the aforementioned "top-down" vision and current hegemonic economy-oriented discourses that remain prevalent in European AE theories. The ideas of flexibility, mobility, job-related counselling and basic employment-related skills are essential in European documents on AE policies. This economic and instrumental vision of AE is related to a macro-normative orientation, influenced by the structural functionalism regarding older adults, following Marshall's classification (1996) in which older adults are defended as having a lot to offer the economy provided that their work skills are updated, and so their pensions no longer represent a burden for national governments.

Advocating for a form of AE with a more comprehensive and humanistic orientation, and following Freire's precepts, when taking into account concepts beyond instrumentality (such as community, citizenship and solidarity), some Southern theorists have supported what has been termed "the critical turn of AE" (English and Mayo, 2012: 215; Torres, 2013). This model is based on social interactions and the effect of agency (as a collective) on the structure in order to produce social transformation, and advocating for interaction between macro and micro sociological levels. In Alexander's words, "Neither micro nor macro theory is satisfactory. Action and structure must now be intertwined" (1988: 77 quoted in Marshall, 1996: 11). Furthermore, this is more an interpretative than a normative approach, with strong relations with Jürgen Habermas' critical theory emphasising the importance of communication and negotiation (intersubjective dialogue) through which agents themselves, and agents and structure, can reach agreements (Ritzer, 1988: 490, cited in Marshall, 1996: 16). The objective here is to transform inequalities through education (Flecha and Elboj, 2005).

The influence of Freire's critical pedagogy (1970) and the importance within of Habermas' intersubjective dialogue (1987-1989) in this bottom-up social transformation through education, has also had a relevant echo in the third element that we mentioned at the beginning of this section: the demographic particularities of the Southern European countries. On the one hand, their character as recipients of immigrants stimulates critical pedagogical claims for the provision of educational materials and practices that support the resettlement of migrants (Borg and Mayo, 2006). On the other hand, the progressive process of population ageing in Southern Europe (in the absence of social protection) causes AE to be demanded by academics not only as a tool for older people's inclusion in the labour force, but also to improve their quality of life, to make their lives meaningful, and to promote their participation in a community (Borg and Mayo, 2008; Milani, 2002).

An example of bottom-up research inheriting such a Freirean approach and the particularities of Southern European countries is provided by the Community of Researchers on Excellence for All (CREA) in Barcelona, Spain, based on adult education in learning communities. Specifically, among other works, we can quote "La Verneda-Sant Martí Adult School: A Reference for Neighborhood Popular Education" by Aubert *et al.* (2016). In this paper the authors analyse the relevant contributions of La Verneda School to the transformative movement in democratic education. In a deprived area of Barcelona, with a high percentage of (for instance) migrants, people from cultural minorities and older illiterate adults, this school has become an international paragon. The democratic organisation of the school, its basis in egalitarian and intersubjective dialogue, its openness to the community, and its probable role in improving La Verneda's neighbours' quality of life through education represent the keys to its success. Its non-academic adults' empowering and transformative aim has attracted the attention of the most important European research projects on education (*i. e.* INCLUD-ED, 2006-2011 Framework Programme, European Commission). Another relevant outcome from it and other CREA research on this topic is the use of communicative methodology, based on Habermas' theory of communicative action (1987-1989). Through communicative interviews, focus groups, observations and other qualitative techniques, it has achieved a

> continuous and egalitarian dialogue among researchers and the people involved in the communities and realities being studied. To this dialogue, researchers bring existing scientific knowledge, and the researched subjects contribute knowledge from their lifeworlds. In this process, new understandings emerge informing solutions to many social problems. Later, social actors lobby for the development of effective social policy based on those solutions (Gómez, Puigvert and Flecha, 2011: 235).

Thus, the communicative approach has not only been considered an important contributor in many international publications with a significant impact, but also facilitates subsequent transformative policy decisions on social issues.

Therefore, the sociology of education in Southern Europe calls for a transformative and emancipatory AE approach that follows the Freirean trend. According to academics such as Flecha (1997) or Flecha and Elboj (2008), the objectives of AE in an ageing Europe are to overcome ethnocentrism through developing educational processes based on the contribution of different cultures to recognising the equality of differences. Moreover, it must take into account the voices and experiences of these adults in the construction of their own learning though intersubjective dialogue, and give new prominence to the community, to cultural areas, to education for active citizenship and to the creative use of free time. Ultimately, as specified by Milani (2002), overcoming the neoliberal discourse that prevails in the hegemonic globalising discourse and that promotes market-driven values, and requires life-centred values that contribute to the community and social transformation. Certainly, and following Milana and Holford (2012), in spite of the fact that AE policies are yet to fully incorporate these ideas, educational practices in the different European regions increasingly reflect the AE critical turn.

AGEING AND WORK IN SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The participation of older workers in the labour market is critical to coping with the effects of demographic ageing (Lynch, 2006). Across Europe, labour shortages and the unsustainable costs of social security systems (deriving from the progressive augmentation of the workforce's mean age and of the proportion of older workers within the workforce and retirees within the total population) present the main causes of concern.

Most European countries have introduced institutional reforms to tackle the challenges posed by population ageing. These have primarily consisted of reforms to the pension system with the objective of raising the state pension age, and the introduction of activation policies aimed at reducing incentives to early retirement and thus promoting older workers' continued employment.

Although this wave of reforms has been of interest in most European countries, we can still find high cross-national variation in their effects, and especially in the labour market participation of older workers (Bennett and Moehring, 2015). Specifically, we find the lowest activity rates of people aged over 50 in Southern European countries, especially Italy, Greece and Malta, whose activity rates are respectively 32.2, 28.9 and 30.0 % (Eurostat, 2016a). Moreover, significant gender gaps exist in these countries in older workers' labour market participation. Women's activity rates are much lower than men's: in Italy, the activity rate of women aged over 50 is 24.1 %, compared with 41.8 % of men. In Greece this is 21.1 % compared with 36.8 % of men, and in Malta 17.6 % compared with 43.3 % of men (Eurostat, 2016a). A further relevant issue exists when discussing employment in old age: in Southern Europe, as in other European countries (for instance Germany), long-term unemployment is widespread amongst the elderly and often late-career unemployment represents a pathway to retirement. Finding a new job after an unemployed spell is much more difficult for older than for prime age workers (Blossfeld *et al.,* 2011; Chan and Stevens, 2001; Frosch, 2006).

Given this scenario, promoting older workers' labour market participation in Southern Europe represents a highly relevant policy objective that has driven aforementioned processes of the reform of the pension systems (Natali and Stamati, 2014, 2015). These reforms have not been accompanied by broader strategies aimed at promoting a cultural shift from the young-in old-out culture of the past. Indeed, this is a culture that retains the idea that early-retirement is a socially acceptable option in order to increase opportunities for younger workers (Guillemard, 2003). Moreover, in these countries, a lack of job opportunities continues to represent a considerable problem cutting across generations, and it increases the risk that policies designed to extend people's working lives reduce the opportunities of younger generations, thus sustaining the broadly diffused idea of an intergenerational conflict in the labour market (Marcaletti, 2013).

The study of older workers' labour market participation in Southern Europe appears to be a relevant and controversial topic. However, literature is this field and with specific attention to this area of Europe is rather scarce, aside from studies of the pension evolution that these countries have in common (Natali and Stamati, 2014, 2015). We predominantly find cross-national comparisons among European countries that highlight, among others, the specificities of Southern European countries in a comparative perspective. On the other hand, as far as country-specific studies are concerned, we will focus on the Italian case that two of the authors of the current paper have studied extensively.

As far as the comparative studies are concerned, two theoretical approaches have prevailed: the life course approach (Mortimer and Shanahan, 2003) and the approach of the political economy of old age (Estes, 1979; Estes *et al.,* 1984). These two theoretical perspectives facilitate exploration of older workers' employment conditions by taking into account how past experiences affect the final part of the career and how specific institutional conditions support or obstruct this group of workers (Bennett and Moehring, 2015; Ebbinghaus, 2006; Engelhardt, 2012). Thus, we can recognise prevailing attention to the interrelations between the micro and macro levels, that is, the individual characteristics and behaviours and the contextual (social, cultural, policy) conditions that affect the degree of inclusion of older workers in the labour market and their career paths. These different approaches have specifically informed studies about (among other topics) career trajectories and transition to retirement (Guillemard and Rein, 1993; Herbertsson, 2003; Maltby *et al.,* 2004; Blossfeld *et al.,* 2006; Hofäcker, 2010; Guillemard, 2013), job quality (Dragano *et al.,* 2011; Siegrist *et al.,* 2007), and life course and employment regimes (Leisering, 2003; Hofäcker, 2010).

The results of these comparative studies have shown that Southern European countries share commonalities both from the micro and macro perspective, which derive from social and cultural norms prevalent in the Mediterranean region of Europe (Algan *et al.,* 2005), as well as from the specificities of the Mediterranean welfare system (Ferrera, 1996). Specifically, analyses defined by Hofacker as "institutional filters" (2010: 133) —that is, the institutional conditions that affect the employment situation of the older workers: pension systems, education systems, employment relations and active labour market policies— have shown that Southern European countries can be classified as an "employment exit regime" (Hofacker, 2010: 133). This definition refers to institutional conditions —specifically high incentives for early-retirement and competitive labour market disadvantages for older workers— that tend to incentivise early withdrawal from the labour market, instead of prolonging work careers, and obstruct labour market mobility in the late-career phase. Among the institutional filters, we can also include the low levels of support for work following retirement that derives from the characteristics of the pension systems (Dingemans *et al.,* 2017).

Moreover, comparative analyses have demonstrated that older workers in Southern European countries, compared to Central and Northern countries, tend to report lower levels of self-perceived job quality and higher levels of work stress (Dragano *et al.,* 2011), which in turn influence the relatively early shift to retirement (especially amongst women) (Dal Bianco *et al.,* 2015) and a greater propensity to exhibit depressive symptoms (Dragano *et al.,* 2011).

A further topic that has been discussed in comparative studies about work and ageing in Europe and that highlights the specificities of Southern European countries is the management of older workers within work organisations and the role of employers in promoting older workers' employment (Conen *et al.,* 2011). Employers' contributions to active ageing policy objectives have been shown to be highly relevant (Loretto and White, 2006). The approach of the new-institutionalism and (again) of the political economy of old age, adopted in studies with a focus on work organisations (Garavaglia, 2014), have facilitated attention to the interactions between the macro level of the institutional context in which companies operate and the meso level of the companies themselves. Studies focusing on work organisations have shown that especially in Greece, Spain and Italy is exhibited a lack of corporate attention to extending people's working lives with it a general absence of specific measures regarding older workers. Employers tend not to see the ageing of the workforce as a topic of concern and do not develop management policies that can be formally defined as age management; moreover, they do not take substantial measures to retain and recruit older workers (Van Dalen *et al.,* 2009). Thus, they tend not to act proactively in response to policy initiatives aimed at prolonging the working career. The issue of older workers' recruitment is highly relevant because it is linked to late-career labour market mobility —which is lower in the countries of Southern Europe— and to age discrimination in the labour market. Through an interpretative approach, studies have demonstrated that prevailing age norms affect managers' attitudes and behaviours towards older workers. Negative stereotypes about older workers are widespread —*i. e.* older workers are less flexible, more resistant to change and less productive (Chiu *et al.,* 2001; Finkelstein *et al.,* 1995; Loretto and White, 2000)— and they affect recruitment processes and the actual job opportunities available to workers in their late careers.

Finally, as far as country-specific studies are concerned, we have mentioned that we are focusing here on studies regarding population ageing and labour market dynamics in Italy and age management in Italian companies. In this regard, the Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational Training of Workers (ISFOL) has recently analysed older workers' labour market participation in different areas of the country and the policy challenges that have derived from workforce ageing in Italy (Fefe, 2016). The study highlights high cross-regional variations in labour market participation amongst older workers, in the job and training opportunities available to older workers, as well as in the age management practices developed within companies. It maintains that active labour market policies must be created that address workers in their late careers that, in order to be effective, take into account the highly differentiated contexts of constraints and opportunities available to workers.

ISFOL has also mapped and analysed age management practices in both SME and big Italian companies (Aversa *et al.,* 2015; Checcucci *et al.,* 2017). The studies highlight the presence of few formalised best practices in the field of age management and, in contrast, a few innovative experiences in the field of career management and human resource development that, even if not formally recognised as age management practices, implicate aspects that are highly relevant to guaranteeing the sustainability of prolonged working careers. Among the age management tools used by Italian employers, we find the Quality of Ageing at Work Questionnaire (Marcaletti and Garavaglia, 2014, 2016). The questionnaire has been developed to analyse how age and seniority differences affect self-perceived quality of work, so as to highlight the specific issues that need to be addressed by employers in order to guarantee prolonged careers that are also sustainable and productive. The tool is inspired by the Workability Questionnaire (Ilmarinen, 2006), but it has been developed taking into account the specificities of Southern European companies, as well as of the Southern European entrepreneurial structure and management culture (Marcaletti and Garavaglia, 2014, 2016). The theory underpinning the tool (and the research outcomes it produces) is that age is not the only factor affecting employees' perception of the quality of their working conditions, but also that the strongest influence is explained by the combination of age and the passing of time.

Overall, comparative and country-specific studies on older workers' employment have highlighted that the concerns related to older workers' employment in Southern European countries are connected to social and cultural norms prevalent in the European Mediterranean region (Algan *et al.,* 2005), as well as to the specificities of the Mediterranean welfare system (Ferrera, 1996). These themes, including low activity rates especially of women over 50, widespread long-term unemployment of older workers, low labour market mobility in late-career, negative stereotypes about older workers and a lack of company measures in the age management field, require a comprehensive policy approach that not only aims to postpone the state pension age, but also promotes sustainable and productive prolonged careers. In order to be effective, these policy strategies should take into account the institutional conditions that are typical of these countries, as well as to foster the contribution of employers to active ageing policy objectives.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

As specified in the Introduction, the objectives of this paper comprised the search for specificity and originality of sociological thinking on ageing by scholars belonging to Southern European traditions or studying the Southern European case. We have also tried to identify future steps from the established theoretical and methodological achievements stemming from other European or extra-European traditions. A further objective was to explain why the Southern European tradition remains relevant.

Regarding the means of advancing the sociological theory of ageing, Marshall and Bengtson (2011) have emphasised some conditions. We recap here the four fundamental needs: first, for more explanatory theories; second, to be aware of previous theorising; third, for more interdisciplinary theories; fourth, to be aware of diversity. We will take these conditions into account in the subsequent discussion.

According to the review of relevant theoretical contributions within the fields of active ageing, adult education and work that we have selected, it is possible to first confirm the originality of the contributions originating in Southern Europe. The humanistic/human-centred approach does not represent an absolute novelty in sociological theorising, but it is undeniable that it constitutes the epistemological foundation of both Freire's critical pedagogy —assumed to be paradigmatic by the Spanish transformative approach in the field of AE (Flecha and Elboj, 2005, 2008; Aubert *et al.,* 2016, Gómez, Puigvert and Flecha, 2011)— and of relational sociology, assumed for studying active ageing amongst the elderly. The human-centred approach represents in itself a criticism of functionalist and utilitarian approaches affirming supranational levels and/or that predominate in other European and extra-European regions, as well as their respective academic traditions (Borg and Mayo, 2008). Moreover, it has been possible to identify the originality of the theoretical and methodological contributions in the age management field in Southern Europe (Marcaletti and Garavaglia, 2014, 2016) with the aim of overcoming the limitations of theories from Northern European countries, that is to say, perspectives that exerted disproportionate influence across the entirety of Europe.

According to the reviews presented in the previous sections, it is possible to argue that not only is the theorising from Southern Europe original, but also that the sociological theories upon which it leans represent a step forward. Given that Freire's work dates from the 1970s, whereas relational sociology was formulated in the 1980s, both contributions represent the origin of approaches explaining society and human action in a new way, and that were later developed and used for further innovation by subsequent generations of scholars.

The new theorising on the relationship between age and work in Italy (Marcaletti and Garavaglia, 2014, 2016), although still somewhat inchoate, can be said to be undergoing the same process, since it gathers the established theoretical approaches and innovates them according to the sociological perspective. In this sense, it represents another example of theory originating within an interdisciplinary context, as is also the case for critical theories concerning adult education (in dialogue with pedagogy) and relational sociology (in dialogue with social psychology).

Concerning the objective of bringing the selected theories from Southern Europe back to Marshall's classification, it is possible to argue that the most relevant contributions rely on interpretative/bridging assumptions concerning the relationship between individuals and society, which adopt micro/meso (linking) approaches. Although the Spanish transformative approach in the field of adult education can undoubtedly be classified as micro and interpretative, its intrinsic formulation in relation to democratic and active citizenship epistemologies also enables it to extend towards the bridging assumptions (see Aubert *et al.,* 2016). The same can be argued concerning the study of the relationship between ageing and work, which take place at the micro and meso (organisational) levels, and in its nature it is interpretative, although taking into account the constraints of the socio-institutional context, it additionally works at the level of bridging assumptions (Garavaglia, 2014; Hofacker, 2011; Van Dalen *et al.,* 2009). At a theoretical level, relational sociology finds in the definition of the relation itself the means of overcoming the dilemma between action and structure, and with it proposes a bridging approach. In spite of its methodological development also extending towards micro level studies, this theoretical approach is best suited to macro/meso investigations, as in the case presented in the previous sections.

Lastly, because most are rooted in human-centred epistemologies, the examples of sociological theorising of ageing from Southern Europe also satisfy the final objective of this paper. In other words, they demonstrate not only originality and innovation, but also their relevance as theories and approaches that can account for the enormous diversity amongst individuals. This is the case, for example, for tackling stereotypes concerning age in AE, encouraging the adoption of more holistic approaches to education. Another example can be the criticism both of successful ageing and disengagement theories, through proposing deeper insights regarding individual active ageing strategies. Moreover, these approaches encourage rejection of the culture of quantifying ability to work that has become consolidated in Europe due to the influence of Northern European countries, as well as the stereotyping of generations rooted in Anglo-Saxon influence, through proposing alternative and more human-centred visions.

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Artículos / ***Articles***

Sex and Gender Equality Policies in Education in Three Southern European Societies: the cases of Andalusia and Valencian Community (Spain) and Portugal / *Las políticas de igualdad sexual y de género en educación en tres sociedades europeas del sur: los casos de Andalucía y la Comunidad Valenciana (España) y Portugal*

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ABSTRACT

Gender mainstreaming is an international strategy in Europe relating to gender equality using an intersectional approach. It deals, specifically, with new challenges for sexuality and diversity in education. From within this context, this paper focuses on two goals. The first is to analyse sex and gender equality policies in education, since the 2000s, in three Southern European societies: Andalusia and Valencian Community, in Spain, and Portugal. The second goal is to arrive at some comparative conclusions about the recent developments in sex and gender equality policies in education in these three societies. We end with some comparative conclusions. First, there is the political orientation of governments, which seems to be of relevance. Second, there are the policies and plans reviewed, which show a move from (binary) gender equality to a more inclusive gender equality that intersects with sexuality and diversity. Sexuality education, already available in Portugal, is still absent from Spanish schools. These three experiences can inform European public policies.

Keywords: gender policy; sexual policy; equality; sexuality education; diversity.

RESUMEN

La incorporación de la perspectiva de género es una estrategia internacional en Europa hacia la igualdad de género, que aborda nuevos retos relativos a la sexualidad y la diversidad en educación, desde un enfoque interseccional. En este contexto, este artículo se propone dos objetivos. Primero, analizar las políticas de igualdad sexual y de género en educación desde la década de 2000 en tres sociedades del sur de Europa: Andalucía y la Comunidad Valenciana, en España y Portugal; en segundo lugar, llegar a algunas conclusiones comparativas sobre los desarrollos recientes en las políticas de igualdad sexual y de género en educación en estas tres sociedades. El artículo se cierra con algunas conclusiones comparativas. Primero, la orientación política del gobierno parece ser relevante. En segundo lugar, las políticas y los planes revisados muestran un cambio de la igualdad de género (binaria) a una igualdad de género más inclusiva que intersecciona con sexualidad y diversidad. La educación para la sexualidad, incorporada ya en Portugal, está todavía ausente en la escuela española. Estas tres experiencias pueden ser de utilidad para las políticas públicas europeas.

Palabras clave: *política de género; política sexual; igualdad; educación para la sexualidad; diversidad.*

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INTRODUCTION

Gender mainstreaming is an international strategy in Europe aimed at accomplishing gender equality (see the EIGE)[1] and dealing with new challenges regarding diversity (Duru-Bellat, 2011) and sexuality in education (Cruells and Coll-Planas, 2013; Venegas, 2018a), from an intersectional approach (Verloo, 2006; Lombardo and Verloo, 2009; Carbin and Edenheim, 2013). Southern European societies, such as Spain and Portugal, are making an impressive effort in helping the European Union to act against neo-conservative emerging anti-gender campaigns (Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017) by emphasising the importance of bottom-up experiences (Bustelo, 2016). Within this context, education emerges as one of the most effective means of implementing sex and gender equality policies (Santos, 2015; Venegas *et al.,* 2018), although each country has followed different paths towards their implementation.

In the case of Spain, gender equality policies in education have had a long trajectory, since the 1980s, around the so-called notion of coeducation, or education for equality between men and women (Subirats *et al.,* 2013), within which sexuality education has emerged as a more recent issue (WHO[2], 2010; Venegas, 2011; Beaumont and Maguire, 2013; Venegas, 2013a; Venegas, 2018a). On the other hand, in the case of Portugal, concerns with gender equality policies have increased in the last years. Currently, the political agenda is mainly focused on tackling the wage gap and abuses against women, such as, the huge cases of domestic violence, human trafficking and discrimination. Within national equality programmes and strategies, school education emerges as a crucial factor in generating changes and providing gender and sexual equality. Since 2017, the Government challenged the educational system, from pre-school to upper secondary education to implement modules of sex education and gender equality under the compulsory subject of Citizenship and Development. In this paper, we briefly pinpoint the integration of sex education in school curricula at a national level, since it is designed and monitored by the central government (Santos, 2015; Fonseca and Santos, 2015).

Therefore, the administrative and territorial structure of each country deserves some preliminary consideration. Spain is divided into 17 autonomous communities, including Andalusia and Valencian Community, which have competences in education within the more general directives from the State Ministry of Education, but also under the more global directives from the European Union. This is why it is of interest to analyse these three territorial and administrative levels in Spain[3]. Nevertheless, in Portugal, the central government sets the national directives taking account of those of the European Union. Thereby, it is worthwhile comparing the current regional developments in Spain, such as those in Andalusia and the Valencian Community, with the more global and national situation in Portugal, in so far as, in education, Spanish regional governments are more important, and have more competences, than the national government (Ortbals, 2008; Bustelo, 2016). The reason to study Andalusia and the Valencian Community is rooted in the political orientation of their respective governments in the last decade, socialist in Andalusia and conservative in the Valencian Community[4].

Taking account of these considerations, this paper aims: 1) to analyse sex and gender equality policies in education since the 2000s in three Southern European societies. They are the Spanish regions of Andalusia and the Valencian Community, and Portugal. In so doing 2) to arrive at some comparative conclusions about the recent developments in sex and gender equality policies in education in these three Southern European societies.

The paper starts by presenting a brief review of the European Union's directives, which regulate (to improve) sex and gender equality policies in education, which comprise sexuality education policies in school settings. Then, we analyse the milestones

1 The EIGE is available at: https://eige.europa.eu.

2 WHO: World Health Organization.

3 To learn more about the regional division of subnational governments, multi-government Spain, see Ortbals (2008) and Bustelo (2016).

4 To learn more about the importance of the political party in office in each Spanish region for the development of gender equality policies, see Ortbals (2008) and Bustelo (2016).

regarding this field in both countries. Following this, we conduct a regional analysis relating to Spanish regions of Andalusia and Valencian Community. We conclude this paper with a reflection on the comparative analysis of these three cases of interest for the current policies on sex and gender equality in Southern European societies.

A SOCIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK IN ORDER TO ANALYSE SEX AND GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES IN EUROPE

In this section, we delimit the sociological structure on which we base our approach to the key topics and ideas that define sex and gender equality policies in education.

In times when, as the last European Union citizenship report (2017) emphasises, we are still confronted with sexual abuses and gender violence, and inequality and discrimination at several levels, it makes sense to recover the principles of citizenship and sexual citizenship in order to analyse sex and gender equality policies in education (Santos, 2018). Feminist movements have been crucial in identifying the gendered, ethicised, racialised, classed process (Venegas, 2018b) from which someone was able to be a citizen. They have also highlighted how women have been relegated as *Others* or the "second sex" by male privilege (Beauvoir, 1949). They were fundamental in the questioning of these gender-blind policies and the universality in which dominant discourses of equality and rights were based (Young, 1997; Arnot, 2003). Therefore, claims for cultural rights emerged in order to highlight the right to participate and be represented in the popular culture, in which education has played important role. These discussions have challenged the neoliberal model of equality as determined by formal heterosexist patriarchal principles and rejected its "false universalism" and the "gender neutral" (Lister, 2004).

Along with this fight for public space, the abuses within the private space, mainly regarding sexuality, could not remain invisible. The need to extent the rights, duties and protection of citizenship to sexual issues and to recognise sexual differences and sexuality free from coercion, abuses and violence became imperative. However, bringing notions of sexuality to the citizenship field is, to begin with, an apparent contradiction in terms (Weeks, 1998; Richardson, 2001; Plummer, 2003). While sexuality was seen as private, the concept of citizenship was traditionally located in the political and public spheres. Thus, sexual citizenship becomes a public strategy more than an academic concept which provides a set of accesses and resources of sexual rights as recommended by international equality plans. Concerning education, these claims are at the foundations of a more open, equal and fair system of sexuality education (Santos *et al.,* 2012).

Moreover, concerns about diversity, which are defined by the European Institute for Gender Equality as "the differences in the values, attitudes, cultural perspective, beliefs, ethnic background, sexual orientation, gender identity, skills, knowledge and life experiences of each individual in any group of people" (EIGE, 2018c: n/p), must be recognised in school education as well (Perry, 2009). Intersecting inequalities such as gender, class, race (Venegas, 2018b), sexual orientation, disability is key for a plural educational environment concerned with inclusion and democracy (Richardson and Monro, 2012).

This brief sociological approach forms the theoretical basis that frames our analysis of sex and gender equality policies in education in the three Southern European societies which we analyse below. Before so doing, a brief review of the European Union's main directives is presented in the following section.

GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN EDUCATION POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Gender Equality Policies were introduced in 1957 for the first time in Europe (Jacquot, 2016). The first equality actions of the European Economic Community (EEC), such as equal pay for male and female workers, were economic in nature. Art. 119 (art. 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) was the unique policy in European gender equality until 1997. This article, which was quite productive, made the European Union one of the most progressive political systems worldwide. It also became the most solid pillar of the Social Europe.

Since 2011, gender equality has been included in the justice portfolio, as part of a broad policy of fundamental rights. Nonetheless, Jacqout (2016) states that, nowadays, "the European policy of gender equality is threatened with dismantling, and even with gradual extinction" (n/p). We might guess that, to some extent, it has to do with emerging anti-gender campaigns in Europe (Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017), which coincide with the effect of the economic crisis and the conservative turn of European politics (Bustelo, 2016).

Among all the policy areas for gender mainstreaming in the European Union, education is one of the most important insofar as it is a key factor for social change relating to equality, the defence of human rights and a holistic notion of development (see the EIGE)[5]. Education is also crucial in improving citizenship. The lack of training leaves women at greater risk of social exclusion. Among the main issues in this policy area, we highlight the most important for the purposes of this paper. These include gender prejudices and stereotypes, which must be tackled from within formal education in order to help diminish gender imbalances in society, and gender-related violence and sexism, which are also at the core of sexuality policies in the European Union. The EIGE underlines some key topics within gender-related violence in schools, such as verbal or sexual harassment, sexual abuse, corporal punishment, stalking, cyber-harassment and bullying. According to the EIGE, these practices might make the girls who suffer from them experience school problems such absenteeism, poor performance, school dropout, low self-esteem, depression, pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections (STI) like HIV. The EIGE adds that, although these sexual and gender problems exist in society in general, they are particularly serious in schools and in adolescent years. Some studies[6] show that, even when the incidence of these problems is higher in girls, boys are also at risk. This is because they can experience discrimination, bullying and violence, due mainly to their sexual orientation, disability or ethnicity. In relation to bullying, it is often gendered and it reflects and imbalance of power relations. Not fitting the gender norms is another frequent reason of suffering from bullying.

This is how equality policies gradually move from gender to gendered sexuality issues in education (Venegas, 2018a). Subsequently, sexuality policies in education arise as the most appropriate mechanism to tackle all these issues within school settings (Venegas, 2013c; Santos, 2018), as shown below.

Sexuality education policies in the European Union

Policies for sexuality education in the European Union are contained within Gender Equality Policies, addressing the following main goal:

> Disseminating general and technical information, facts and issues which create awareness and provide young people with the essential knowledge and training in communication and decision making skills they need to determine and enjoy sexuality both physically and emotionally, individually as well as in relationships [The Safe Project (IPPF European Network) in 2007, cited in Beaumont and Maguire, 2013: 7].

It should include physiological and relational aspects of sexuality from an open-minded perspective. The key actors are Ministries of Health and Education, family planning associations, NGO, teachers, parents and professionals (in health care, social work, etc.). The European Union, as a whole, does not have policy-making competencies in this field. These belong to each individual member states. Nevertheless, concrete recommendations have been made by several international agencies. According to the briefing

5 "The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) is an autonomous body of the European Union, established to contribute to and strengthen the promotion of gender equality, including gender mainstreaming in all EU policies and the resulting national policies, and the fight against discrimination based on sex, as well as to raise EU citizens' awareness of gender equality" (https://eige.europa.eu/about-eige).

6 See EIGE in: https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/policy-areas/education.

by Beaumont and Maguire (2013), "Southern European States [such as the ones in this paper, Spain and Portugal] have deficient or inexistent sexuality education programmes [...]. In Spain, the subject is hardly ever taught in schools in rural areas. Overall, the best practises are observed in Benelux, Nordic countries, France and Germany" (p. 8). According to this briefing, Portugal, Spain (and France) are the countries with the highest level of HIV/AIDS. STI infections are higher in the UK, Slovakia, and Spain. Differences between countries can be explained in terms of cultural, religious and economic factors. Beaumont and Maguire (2013) add that it is noticeable that the sexuality educations in Latvia, Cyprus, Estonia and Slovakia are improving progressively more than in Ireland, Spain or the United Kingdom. A similar conclusion was reached by Parker, Wellings and Lazarus (2009) some years earlier, when they concluded that, in Spain, there is no formal curriculum aimed at sexuality education within the education system (Venegas, 2013c). The situation is still the same. On the other hand, in Portugal (as will be described in the following section), they are currently implementing systematic sexuality education resources aimed at all school levels (from pre-school to upper secondary education) within citizenship education lessons.

Beaumont and Maguire (2013) find it problematic that the dominant approach in sexuality education policies emphasises prevention (teenage pregnancy, STI) over educating children on how to live sexuality with pleasure and responsibility. So the focus is more on health than on education itself (Venegas, 2011). It becomes clear in sentences like this: "Sexuality education provides children, teenagers and young adults information about sexuality also with the aim to be protected from a risky behaviour and bad consequences" (Beaumont and Maguire, 2013: 10). In a different sense, a relevant contribution of sexuality is that, according to experts, "where sexuality education is of a higher quality and with efficient content, the level of HIV infection is lower, teenage pregnancy is rarer and gender equality is more respected" (*ibid.*). This is the role education plays in promoting sex and gender equality, thereby the reason to call for sexuality education in school settings. Additionally, the CEDAW[7] stresses that the delivery of sexuality education must be free from discrimination and stereotypes and must convey values relating to gender equality.

On the other hand, the Council of Europe considers sexuality education as one of the factors that influence social, mental and physical health and well-being. It is part of human rights education, education for democratic citizenship and intercultural education (see also Venegas, 2013b). The "Pestalozzi Programme" of the Council of Europe aims to avoid prejudice and stereotyping of sex and sexuality. This programme recommends healthy discourse, understanding and respect for sexual diversity, avoiding taboos, violence and discrimination (CE, 2013: n/p).

Some key data to illustrate these issues

Sex and gender equality in the European Union deals with some of the key challenges and dilemmas which we face nowadays. Sociological data points to those challenges that should be addressed from sexuality education within the context of sex and gender equality policies in education. The European Commission's Report on Equality (2017) gathers some of these key challenges, which are presented here in relation to Spain and Portugal:

— The gender pay gap in 2015 was 16.3 in the European Union 28, 14.9 in Spain and 17.8 in Portugal.

— The number of women on the boards of the largest publicly listed companies (%) in 2016 was 23.9 in the UE28, 20.3 in Spain and 14.3 in Portugal.

— Sexual violence (including Rape and Sexual Assault) in 2014 was 2,475 women in Portugal and 9,468 women in Spain.

In a different sense, regarding sexual diversity, the FRA[8] (2013) survey concludes that many LGBT Europeans hide their identity or avoid cer-

7 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.

8 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

tain locations out of fear. Other people experience discrimination and violence on account of being LGBT, although they do not usually report this to the authorities. The report data will inform the European Union institutions and member states so that they can identify the fundamental rights challenges facing LGBT individuals living in the European Union and Croatia. The report offers a basis for developing European and national legal and policy responses to address the needs of LGBT people, and to protect their fundamental rights. On the other hand, the FRA (2014) survey shows that trans people experience the highest levels of discrimination, harassment and violence among LGBT subgroups.

In the next two sections, we analyse the three cases proposed in this paper. However, first, it is important to remember that, due to their different political, territorial and administrative organisations, the analysis is focused on these three cases according to their competences in education policy making. Therefore, Portugal is analysed as a centralised political unit. However, in Spain, state gender equality policy making is only briefly reviewed, in order to approach a further level of education policy development, which applies to the regions of Andalusia and the Valencian Community.

SEX AND GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES IN PORTUGAL

Gender equality plans in Portugal

In Portugal, gender concerns in education are not new. Since 1986, the Lei de Bases do Sistema Educativo[9] emphasized the need, as a major component of its educational system, "to ensure equal opportunities for both sexes, in particular co-education practices". Twenty years later, concerns about equal opportunities in relation to the access to pedagogical didactic resources also required school textbooks to comply with the values of non-discrimination and gender equality[10].

9 Law nº 46/86, amended in 2005, and later in 2009.

10 Law nº 47/2006.

Since 2007, the focus on gender education has been supported by three National Equality Plans (PNI)[11], as a political measure of gender mainstreaming to meet CEDAW commitments. Each plan lasts for three years and is the responsibility of the CIG - Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality, which seeks to find an answer to the social and political changes embracing the new paradigm that evolves from women's rights to that of gender equality.

Looking at the National Plans, we see that there has been a shift of focus to non-discrimination and sexual diversity issues. The focus on professional, family and personal life balance (uses of time) and inequalities in parenthood and the labour market (such as, the wage gap)[12] have switched to current concerns with new masculinities and femininities, gender identity and gender violence[13]. Indeed, in the III Plan (2007-2010) the parity between men and women in the labour market, and in the sexual and reproductive health agenda, was strongly influenced by the abortion law. This was despite the fact that the diversity among women —those more vulnerable such as single mothers, women with disabilities, immigrants— and the elderly were not explicitly considered. The consolidation of new gender roles, the valuing of affection and care appeared as central to active citizenship in Plan IV (2011-2013) and V (2014-2017), as result of public debates and the sanctioning of same sex marriage. It was within this political and social context that the latest law on Sexuality Education[14] was designed and implemented, in addition to the national guidelines on education, gender and citizenship for all school levels (from primary to secondary education)[15]. Current national plans are detailed in following section.

11 National Plans for Equality are available online at https://www.cig.gov.pt/documentacao-de-referencia/legislacao/cidadania-e-igualdade-de-genero/.

12 III National Plan for Equality - Citizenship and Gender (2007-2010).

13 IV National Plan for Equality, Gender and Non-discrimination (2011-2013).

14 Law nº 60/2009, Sex Education at school.

15 V National Plan for Equality, Gender and Non-discrimination (2014-2017).

Gender and sexuality education in school

In Portugal, the advances and setbacks in the history of sexuality education have been deeply rooted in gender equality and sexual claims by different political parties and sectors of society.

The presence of gender and sexual equality in the educational field has become more consistent in recent years, mainly under the current left-wing government. Since 2017, two national strategies have been launched, aligned substantively with Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, in order to fight structural discrimination in this field: the National Strategy for Citizenship Education (ENEC) and the National Strategy for Equality and Non-Discrimination 2018-2030 "Portugal + Equal" (ENIND). According to Agenda 2030, global and structural action must include the equal participation of women and men in both public and private sectors, including the scientific and technological, and the elimination of all forms of discrimination against sexual orientation and violence. This is mainly supported by other international mechanisms in the field such as the European Pact on Equality between Men and Women 2011-2020, the Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-2019; Development Strategy for Gender Equality and women empowerment (CPLP 2017-2020).

ENIND includes three National Action Plans on gender equality for the next four years. The first plan - "Action Plan for Equality between Women and Men", focuses mainly on the Roma community and the promotion of digital skills for women. The second plan aims at fighting "violence against women and domestic violence". The third, fights "discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity". According to these axes, this strategy aims to break gender and ethnic inequalities and injustices, and prevent men and women from violence and discrimination, due to the high rates of *femicide*[16]. Although it is decreasing, in 2017, 20 femicides and 28 femicide attempts were identified (OMA, 2017) and domestic violence (an average of 5036 women and 775 men were victims of domestic violence in 2017) (APAV, 2017). In 50% of the cases, the crime was committed by husbands, partners and boyfriends and in 22% of cases by ex-husbands, ex-partners, ex-boyfriends. This highlights the need for sexual, but mainly relational and affective education (OMA, 2017). Violence goes beyond the domestic sphere and discrimination now includes gender identity, in addition to sexual orientation. Gender identity and transsexuality has gained ground in the context of public discussion, as a result of the new law on gender identity, approved in April 2018, that allows young adults aged 16 and over to change their name and identity in legal documents.

Therefore, public policies on equality and citizenship share a common view with the motto "No one can be left behind", which implies a collective commitment of all sectors in defining measures.

Within this context, educational institutions and schools emerge as one of the main sites of action. Last academic year (2017-2018), the government implemented the project of *autonomy and curricular flexibility* from primary to secondary education in line with discourses of educational decentralization. This project covers state and private schools, whose governing bodies and administrations are responsible for the management of the curriculum in a contextualized way (having 25% of the time of the curricula to decide what to do). Schools are taking a central role.

As part of the new educational reform, concerns relating to violence, discrimination, inequality and injustice in schools came to the fore. The compulsory implementation of the subject: Citizenship and Development Education emerges as a key step to reinvest and reinforce gender equality and sexuality education. Within this strategy, gender equality becomes compulsory at all school levels, while sexuality education is compulsory in some school years, mainly in low secondary education. This political proposal moved sexuality education from health to within a citizenship framework, thus expressing wider concerns with gender identity, discrimination, sexual and women's rights and in line with the latest law of sexuality education.

The implementation of school-based sexuality education in Portugal has been surrounded by a set of political changes and controversies since 1984

16 Femicide or feminicide is a sex-based hate crime, broadly defined as the intentional killing of females, either women or girls, just because they are female.

(the first legislation). The first decade of the 21st century was clearly a time of tension and debates that opposed conservative lobbies against new claims for citizenship around: the (contested) law to decriminalise abortion[17]; the approval of same-sex marriage[18] and the moral struggle against the compulsory implementation of sexuality education. These tensions strongly affected sex education and highlights the interdependence between social, political and educational debates

In 2009, the first law solely focused on sexuality education, as an autonomous and compulsory knowledge for curricula, was launched for all grades in both state and private schools. Its greatest innovation was marked by the priority given to new a set of new contents relating to sexuality, affections, sex and relationships education, sexual abuses and other forms of coercion, gender equality and the respect for pluralism. It was addressed in non-disciplinary areas of the curriculum, such as citizenship education, for 12 hours in secondary schools (for pupils from 15 to 18 years old) and a minimum of 6 hours in low-secondary schools (for pupils from 10 to 15 years old). This proposal was weakened, in 2011, by the elimination of these areas from the curriculum, but has now been strengthened by its integration in some National Equality Plans (PNI) and recently in the ENEC.

SEX AND GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES IN SPAIN

The state level

The two first decades of the 21st century have been of special significance in terms of gender legislation, approving the most important state and regional laws in terms of gender equality, including gender-related violence. For the aims of this paper the first, and most important, milestone at the state level in Spain is the Organic Law 1/2004 28 December, on Comprehensive Protection Measures against Gender Violence[19]. Another state norm is the Organic Law 3/2007, 22 March, for the effective equality of women and men. A third relevant one is the Organic Law 2/2010, 3 March, on sexual and reproductive health and the voluntary interruption of pregnancy, which is a unique law that explicitly emphasises the need to include sexuality education in the Spanish setting and also the 17 regional official curricula in school settings. This law, approved by the socialist party, was abolished when the conservative party won the elections in 2011. Since then, nothing has been done about it.

Explicitly in the educational arena, the LOGSE[20] (1990) is the landmark, since it is the law that establishes the principles aimed at a coeducational system, specifying that "from the coeducational system of education the real equality of women and men shall be enhanced, in all its dimensions: curricular, school and others" (art. 5.2).

The autonomous community of Andalusia

Since the 1980s, under socialist governments, Andalusia has been developing a remarkable strand of research and pedagogic materials on gender and equality in the so-called model of "coeducation" (Subirats, 2013), which:

> Proposes an education that breaks with the limits imposed by the categories of gender, that breaks with the hierarchies in the relationships between the sexes, that rescues the value of the basic knowledge for the life of feminine cultures and women's knowledge, and that empowers and generates new and richer identities in female and male students (Regional Ministry of Education, 2005: 43).

This significant work has been the result of the close cooperation between the Andalusian Women's

17 Law nº 16/2007 IVG - Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy. Abortions can be carried out by public health services up to the first 10 weeks of pregnancy, based on a women's own decision.

18 Law nº 9/2010 - Same-sex Marriage. Portugal was the sixth European country to legally enable marriage between homosexual couples.

19 Plan I (2005) analysed in the Andalusian case is, in fact, a consequence of this Organic Law regarding its educational directives.

20 Ley Orgánica General del Sistema Educativo (LOGSE), 3rd October, 1990, introduced by a socialist government, replaced the previous general law on education (1970), during Franco's dictatorship. It was the first democratic, egalitarian educational law in Spain.

Institute and the Regional Ministry in charge of Education (see also Ortbals, 2008). Consequently, Andalusia approved its first plan in 2005, called I Plan of Equality between Men and Women in Education. In 2016, the *II Strategic Plan of Gender Equality in Education* was approved. The change in titles produced a global shift from the binary definition of gender to the recognition of the diversity "of gender identities, sexual orientations and family models", as shown in Plan II (see also, Venegas, 2018a).

Plan I (2005) is based on the significant gender changes in Andalusia and Spain since the 1980s, though it also embraces also the structural challenges for equality yet to be achieved. Plan I focuses on the promotion of a gender equality model synonymous with equality between men and women. Plan II (2016) goes back to the principle of equality in order to review the promotion of democratic citizenship (Venegas, 2013b).

Some key laws, both at state (as indicated above) and regional levels, framed in Plan II (2016-2021), continue to defend equality in education and add other current dimensions of interest like diversity of gender identities, sexual orientations, family models and forms of coexistence, understanding both men's and women's needs (to adopt the relational, structural approach of gender relations), and rethinking masculinities rather than femininities.

Plan I draws on three principals. They are visibility, transversality and inclusion (this is being different from diverse, but not unequal). Plan II adds a forth principal: parity. Plan I aimed four main objectives; each one was specified in a series of special actions, the most relevant ones (in relation to the objectives of this paper) are presented below.

Objective 1 tries to facilitate the understanding of the differences existing between women and men. Some key measures are: the introduction of a coeducational module in initial teacher training, the secondary elective subject called "Social Changes and Gender"[21], and the preparation of good practice guides aimed at changes in gender relations in schools. Sexuality education is not included as such anywhere in Plan I, but this elective subject includes Chapter 4, dedicated to "Relations and Feelings". This is the official curriculum which is closest to this topic, and it is absent from the Spanish curriculum throughout the rest of the country (Parker *et al.,* 2009; Beaumont and Maguire, 2013).

Objective 2 aims to promote equal educational practices. Here the key measures are to promote a non-sexist, non-androcentric model in all aspects of the education system, and to appoint a teacher responsible for coeducation in each school financed with public funds. The latter shows another key novel aspect for equality in education in Andalusia.

Objective 3 is to promote changes in gender relations, following some relevant measures such as training in care work, to make the contributions of women in history visible in the curriculum and, again, the elective subject mentioned above. In this sense, the remarkable Equality Plan Collection[22], created by the Regional Ministry of Education, together with the Andalusia Women's Institute, to give support for the implementation of Plan I, offers materials to help the educational community to work on these issues. Objective 3 includes the issue of funding coeducation projects together with parents' school-based associations.

Finally, objective 4 aims to correct the imbalance of responsibilities among teaching staff. In so doing, it proposes to promote the participation of teachers in the management bodies of the Regional Ministry of Education, and to include data disaggregated by sex in the evaluation of teacher activities.

Between the two plans, a regionally relevant norm was approved: the Law 2/2014, 8 July, integral for non-discrimination on grounds of gender identity and the recognition of the rights of transsexual people in Andalusia. For the first time in Andalusia, trans people's rights were recognised and defended.

Plan II, due to its strategic nature, offers a different, more complex model based on 4 strategic lines, detailed in 4 objectives, from which 11 mea-

21 See Didactic Guide in http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/educacion/portalaverroes/documents/10306/1513789/guia_didactica.pdf.

22 See all documents and the whole Collection in http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/educacion/webportal/web/portal-de-igualdad/coleccion-plan-de-igualdad.

sures are stated in addition to a total of 69 actions. Each action is detailed with particular indicators to make the implementation evaluable. Only the most relevant actions are analysed here. They illustrate the shift of paradigm previously mentioned.

Line 1 refers to a School Plan with a gender perspective, so the purpose of objective 1 is to establish the best conditions needed for schools in order to implement coeducation plans through no-gender bias organization and their curriculum. Some actions to be highlighted are the inclusion of a Gender Equality Plan within the School Plan including equality, coeducation and prevention of gender violence, discrimination, harassment or sexist behaviour based on the idea of inferiority or superiority of any sexual orientation, or in the expression of a gender identity different from that assigned at birth. This action is a good example of the paradigm shift defended in this paper. Another key action here is gender mainstreaming in didactic programming, making women's contribution, and their struggle for citizenship rights, visible. The elective subject "Social Changes and Gender" is kept on.

Line 2 focuses on sensitization, training and involvement of the educational community, so objective 2 is to implement actions in this sense in relation to gender equality, coeducation, and prevention of gender violence. A remarkable action here is long-life teacher training in matters of gender equality and the prevention and eradication of gender violence, including the elimination of discrimination based on either inferiority or superiority of any sexual orientation or expression of gender identity. Another is to include materials to show diversity of gender identities, sexual orientations, models of families and living together, to avoid discrimination on those grounds.

Line 3 is to contribute to the eradication of gender violence, so objective 3 is to promote actions to raise awareness and prevent gender-based violence, to eradicate it, and to intervene possible cases properly. A remarkable action appeals to the absent factor in sexuality education: the care of egalitarian socialization and emotional education at all educational levels, with special attention paid to the value of affection and love in young people's relationships. Another action refers to education in non-sexist values, deconstruction of gender roles, and sexuality education taking account of the different recognized sexual orientations, personal autonomy, construction of self-concept and development of a life project without gender biases, emotional education, adequate conflict management and prevention of gender violence. It is also to make both students and families aware of the safe use of information and communication technologies, to avoid identity theft, cyber bullying, grooming, sexting or different ways of exercising gender violence through them. In addition, it aims, in schools with socially vulnerable students, to educate families in ways of avoiding practices such as arranged marriages or female genital mutilation which violate the freedom, health and integrity of girls and young people. Furthermore, it promotes the need to detect gender violence in education, including harassment or sexual abuse through social networks and all types of sexist, homophobic or transphobic attacks. Finally, it aims to implement an action protocol on gender identity in the Andalusia education system. Line 3 explicitly gives account of the emphasis Plan II sets on sexuality, diversity and equality.

Line 4 refers to the structural measures in the education system itself, so objective 4 is to promote the integration of the gender perspective in the functioning of the educational administration in general. An exceptional initiative is to promote cooperation with universities aimed at training teachers in all these sex and gender equality issues.

We end this section with some more evidence. Plan II was designed over the evaluation of Plan I. It concludes, "The autonomous community of Andalusia has been a pioneer in the development of an equality plan in education" (AGAEVE, 2014: 55). The main contribution of Plan I has been to establish awareness of gender equality in the education community. Teachers and staff in charge of Plan I highlight key aspects such as a more adequate treatment of gender equality, a more inclusive use of language; data disaggregated by sex, better coexistence and more equal treatment, more interest in coeducation; the search for gender equality; students' awareness and parental participation. Plan I stated the basis for Plan II, which searches for carrying equality further until 2021.

The Valencian Community

In the case of Valencian Community, we refer to two clearly differentiated political periods. The first, which started in 2003, is when the Valencian Government approved the General Act on Equality between Women and Men. This lasted until 2015, when a new political period, marked by the political change of the Valencian government began after 20 years of the Partido Popular government (right wing). A new government was formed (left wing) by the pact of Partido Socialista del País Valencià (PSPV), Compromís and Podem. It brought about a significant political change.

The approval, in 2003, of the Valencian Act on Equality marks the beginning of political actions in this area, and one of the first Spanish laws on this matter, which came even before the state Act in 2007. However, there was a lot of criticism from various social and political sectors because it was not fully developed. In this first period, there had not been a specific plan relating to equality in education, so it was not a priority for the Valencian conservative Government, though the 2003 Act devotes some articles to education for equality, drawing on the LOGSE (1990). However, the annual coeducation plans proposed by this law were never carried out. According to the Legal Advisory Council, this law proclaimed goodwill principles, but did not always establish the means to achieve them.

In 2010, the Valencian Community approved an order to regulate a work-family balance seal in the business field, which was a priority in the equality policy implemented in the first political period, during which liberal policies were prioritised. It has dominated the vision of equality, prioritising actions in the field, such as the creation of the seal "Fent Empresa. Iguals en Oportunitats" ("Doing business. Equal in opportunities").

In the first period, two initiatives on equality in the Valencian Community were approved: the plan of the Valencian Government to combat violence against women (2010-2013) and the plan for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (2011-2014). The first is a specific plan focused on violence against women, so it cannot be considered a global equality plan. The second, approved in the last term of Partido Popular in Valencian office, can be considered an equality plan, highlighting the idea of equal opportunities.

Despite this, in the last two years the Valencian Community has witnessed an accelerated change in policy making on equality and education, linked to social welfare actions.

The second political period started with the May 2015 political change. The new three-party Valencian government placed "rescuing people" at the centre of its policies with a gender violence action plan as one of its most outstanding political issues. The agreement refers to the action on gender violence as a mainstreaming objective.

The three-party political agreement incorporates equality perceived as equality in gender identity, specifically through the commitment to approve a comprehensive Law for the effective equality of LGTBI[23] people. This commitment was fulfilled with the approval of Law 8/2017, of April 7, of the Valencian Government, by recognising the right to identity and gender expression in the Valencian Community. This law defines gender identity as the:

> Internal and individual experience of gender as each person feels it deeply, including the personal experience of the body and others such as dress, way of speaking and expressing oneself. Gender identity is generally accompanied by the desire to live and receive acceptance as a member of this gender and even the unwavering desire to modify, by hormonal methods, surgical or otherwise, the body itself to make it as consistent as possible with the gender felt as own when it is not correlated with the one assigned at birth (Preamble to the Law).

The Valencian case joins other communities that offer public health care to trans people. Andalusia pioneered these actions. In this way, this law promotes comprehensive medical and social care, in addition to contributing to the "normalisation" of transgender people. Chapter II of the law is specifically dedicated to measures in the field of education. First, it reflects the will to implement actions on gender identity, gender expression, and

23 Lesbians, Gays, Transsexuals, Transgender, Bisexuals, Intersexuals.

sexual and family diversity in that area. The Valencian Government expressly assumes the obligation to ensure that the "educational system is a respectful space, free of all pressure, aggression or discrimination on grounds of gender identity, gender expression, sexual and family diversity in any of its aspects or manifestations and will develop measures for the effectiveness of these principles" (article 21). The law states that both the School Project and the curricula must overcome all types of discrimination and the management team must attend and support trans people who belong to the educational community.

This political commitment has been created together with social entities and activists. The result is socially unquestionable. It involves a relevant sociological change making visible to traditionally invisible sexual and gender groups. The transgender category functions as a concept that refers to the move beyond the pathologising, binarist and reifier definitions of the masculine and feminine categories.

Another key milestone in the Valencian Community is the recent approval of the so-called *Coeducation Plan* in March 2018, in which a large number of social and educational agents participated. It is based on six principles: mainstreaming, visibility, inclusion, intersectionality, equilibrium in parity and democratic values. The plan was recently submitted and, unlike the gender identity law, it does include the mention of equality, as perceived as equality between women and men, understanding coeducation as a tool key to achieve equity and equal opportunities between women and men. We see that here the notion of equity is limited to that of equality as if they were synonymous when in fact they have different scopes. A critique in terms of meritocracy has been allocated to the idea of equity. The plan also includes the objective to address gender identity, gender expression and sexual and family diversity.

It should be noted that the Gender Identity Law (known as the Trans Law), and the Coeeducation Plan, have coincided temporarily in their development. In fact, in the first version of the plan, the dimension of gender identity was not incorporated as a defining characteristic. However, it has been included in its final version, probably due to the influence of the Trans Law, and because the social and political debate was being undertaken at that time.

The Coeducation Plan includes an extensive concept of coeducation, which overcomes the sex in which students have been socialised. Students' deficiencies should be balanced in accordance with the sexism that permeates society. Coeducation includes all sorts of social inequalities and forms of discrimination (sex, gender identity, gender expression, ethnicity, sexual diversity, family diversity, sexual characteristics, origin or social class). This global definition incorporates the intersectional approach and creates a framework that is not just reduced to an idea of coeducation which is understood mainly as an educational model based on gender equality. This is because a coeducational school is inclusive in a broad sense, that is inclusive in diversity, and this presents the challenge of promoting a new cultural model (Villar-Aguilés, 2018).

This intersectional definition also means recognising multi-dimensional inequality in school and the need to address it. In this sense, we draw on the words of Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (2003[1964]) when they assert that: "Blindness to social inequalities condemns and authorises to explain all inequalities, particularly regarding educational success, such as natural inequalities, inequalities of talents" (p. 103).

Thereby, this current political term in the Valencian Community represents the move from gender equality —equality between men and women— to sex and gender equality —gender diversity of identities and expressions— (Venegas and Villar-Aguilés, 2018).

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have aimed to achieve two main goals. The first one is to analyse sex and gender equality policies in education since the 2000s in three Southern European societies, which are Andalusia and the Valencian Community, in Spain, and Portugal. Our second goal is, to arrive at some comparative conclusions about the recent developments in sex and gender equality policies in education in these three Southern European societies. The global framework for these developments is a European context in which gender first, and sexuality more recently, have become mainstream and linked to the notions of diversity and intersectionality.

After having analysed the three case studies presented in this paper, we conclude with a reflection on the comparative analysis of these cases that might be of interest for current policies on sex and gender equality in Southern European societies. On the one hand, the political orientation of the party in office appears to be important. In the three cases, there is a shared feature: that the further development in sex and gender equality has occurred under left wing governments (see also Ortbals, 2008; Bustelo, 2016).

Though the 1980s saw the beginning of the implementation of gender equality policies in both Spain and Portugal, it is at the turn of century when they increased their visibility and incidence in the educational arena. In our three cases, there is an intertwining of gender and sexuality issues, moving from gender equality to sex and gender equality, even though their rhythms are different. This also involves the implementation of sexuality education within gender equality plans. Nevertheless, Portugal has implemented a proper school-based national sex education policy, while in Spain this matter is not yet present in the school curriculum. However, coeducation has been largely developed in the two Spanish cases described in this paper and some sexuality education issues are covered within it.

Whereas gender equality has not yet been reached, and the high level of gender-related violence is an unfortunate example of this, equality policies are moving towards a more inclusive definition of gender, intersecting sexuality and diversity. The three cases analysed here are good examples of this. Yet, the challenge for Southern European societies, and for the European Union as a whole, is to continue developing these sex and gender equality policies, while, at the same time, bearing in mind the structural dimension that still defines inequality. These concrete Spanish (Andalusian and Valencian) and Portuguese experiences, together with advances in the commitment to equality, can inform European public policies to go further in this social aim.

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Artículos / ***Articles***

El sistema de vivienda del sur de Europa: ¿continuidad o ruptura? / *The housing system of southern Europe: continuity or rupture?*

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RESUMEN

El fuerte impacto de la crisis en la vivienda ha puesto en cuestión la continuidad del sistema residencial característico de los países del sur de Europa y su singularidad frente a los discursos que proclaman la implantación universal de un sistema de vivienda liberal. Por este motivo, el siguiente artículo analiza las dinámicas residenciales acontecidas en España desde principios del siglo XXI, dentro de un marco que engloba a los países de referencia del sur de Europa, a fin de comprobar hasta qué punto su Sistema sigue vigente con respecto a la Unión Europea. El análisis constata que, pese a haber sufrido algunas alteraciones, su singularidad permanece, reforzando así la importancia de examinar cada sistema residencial para comprender el funcionamiento de la vivienda, los comportamientos residenciales y sus problemáticas.

Palabras clave: comportamiento residencial; sistema de vivienda; régimen de tenencia; acceso a la vivienda; sur de Europa.

ABSTRACT

The strong impact of the crisis on housing has called into question the continuity of the residential system characteristic of the countries of southern Europe and its significance against the discourses that proclaim the universal implementation of a liberal housing system. For this reason, the following article analyses the residential dynamics that have taken place in Spain since the beginning of the 21st century, within a framework that encompasses the reference countries of southern Europe, in order to verify to what extent its System remains in force with respect to the European Union. The analysis shows that, despite having suffered some alterations, its uniqueness continues, which reinforce the importance of examining residential system in order to understand the functioning of housing, residential practices and their problems.

Keywords: *residential practices; housing system; tenure regime; access to housing; southern Europe.*

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INTRODUCCIÓN

En la última década y a raíz del fuerte impacto causado por la crisis se ha asistido a una verdadera turbulencia en el sistema de vivienda de los países del sur de Europa. Esto obliga a revisar buena parte de las declaraciones que se hicieron a principios del siglo XXI sobre la existencia de un sistema residencial propio del sur de Europa (Allen *et al.,* 2004) e impulsa a asumir el reto de averiguar si existe una continuidad de dicho sistema residencial que permita entender si persisten sus divergencias con el resto de Europa y en qué sentido. Sobre la base de estos objetivos principales, las preguntas que se plantean hoy se refieren, por tanto, al modo en que los sistemas de vivienda se han visto alterados como consecuencia de la crisis, su impacto sobre los comportamientos y necesidades residenciales y la reacción a los mismos.

Al respecto de estas cuestiones, este artículo sostiene como primera hipótesis que, a pesar de que la crisis haya podido romper en algunos casos la trayectoria del antiguo sistema residencial del sur, tal y como podría reflejar el aparente crecimiento del régimen de alquiler; su singularidad permanece debido al carácter y a la intensidad de los cambios residenciales experimentados, en comparación con Unión Europea, así como a la persistencia de otras peculiaridades residenciales. Al mismo tiempo, como segunda hipótesis, se parte de la consideración de que las formas de articulación similares de los sistemas de vivienda del sur de Europa, en los que el bienestar residencial se sustenta en la familia ante una escasa intervención estatal (Leal, 2002), han provocado, en el contexto de crisis, consecuencias y reacciones parecidas en lo que respecta a las condiciones y problemáticas de acceso a la vivienda y el afronte de los gastos de adquisición o alquiler de la misma, siendo esperable, en este sentido, un empeoramiento similar en estos indicadores, lo que también les distinguiría de las dinámicas acontecidas en Europa.

Para fundamentar estas hipótesis, se lleva a cabo un análisis comparado de las dinámicas sociales y residenciales, desde principios de siglo y hasta la actualidad, en el sur de Europa con respecto de las acontecidas en el conjunto de la Unión Europea. En este sentido, atendiendo a los distintos estudios previos efectuados, los países del sur de Europa objeto de análisis son Grecia, Portugal, Italia y, en especial, España, que recibe especial atención por ser el referente del sur más cercano y en dónde probablemente el sistema de vivienda se ha visto más alterado como consecuencia de la crisis. Dicha comparación transcurre a través un análisis estadístico bivariado, con el que se pretende articular la explicación de las dinámicas acontecidas, y un análisis multivariado de conglomerados con el que se busca dotar de un carácter demostrativo al marco explicativo aportado.

Con el fin de asegurar la comparabilidad internacional se han empleado datos secundarios publicados por la “European Mortgage Federation (EMF)” y, especialmente por Eurostat, Oficina Europea de Estadística que elabora e integra datos poblacionales y residenciales comparables a escala europea. En base a la información facilitada por este organismo, se ha realizado un análisis especial de las estadísticas europeas que se publican sobre ingresos y condiciones de vida, conocidas internacionalmente como “European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)” y caracterizadas por ser el instrumento de referencia, de periodicidad anual, para estadísticas comparativas sobre la distribución del ingreso, la inclusión social y el comportamiento residencial a nivel europeo. De forma complementaria, se han seleccionado diversas estadísticas y datos oficiales provenientes del Banco de España, el Ministerio de Fomento o el Consejo General del Poder Judicial con el fin de profundizar más en el contexto español.

Para desarrollar esta tesis el artículo examina, tras la presente introducción, el debate teórico que reivindica la existencia, en general, de un marco heterogéneo del bienestar y la vivienda en Europa, y en particular, de un sistema residencial propio de los países del sur, detallándose sus características. El tercer y cuarto apartado, analizan respectivamente el preludio de la crisis y sus efectos sobre el sistema de vivienda del sur de Europa. En el quinto apartado se estudia el impacto de las transformaciones del sistema de vivienda a través de las condiciones residenciales de la población, destacando las dimensiones residenciales que se han visto más afectadas. En el sexto apartado, se procede a la elaboración de un análisis multivariable de conglomerados, cuya función será la de constatar si persiste un sistema de vivienda propio del sur de Europa. Por último, en la conclusión, se sintetizan los principales hallazgos de la investigación.

LA HETEROGENEIDAD DE LOS SISTEMAS RESIDENCIALES: EL CASO DEL SUR DE EUROPA

La compleja realidad que envuelve la comprensión de los procesos residenciales se ha visto rebajada en los últimos tiempos dada la fuerte incidencia de unos marcos interpretativos enfocados en el estudio del impacto social de las transformaciones económicas globales. Concretamente, a finales del siglo XX, las teorías sobre la ciudad global (Sassen, 1991), la ciudad dual (Castells y Mollenkopf, 1992) o la ciudad dividida (Fainstein *et al.,* 1992) marcaron una potente y atractiva línea de pensamiento, que proclamaba una inevitable convergencia internacional hacia un aumento de la polarización social y residencial. El discurso económico y unilineal que plantea esa tesis, inspirada en el caso estadounidense, fue pronto adoptado dentro de los estudios de vivienda de manera que, una serie de autores (Harloe, 1985, 1995; Ball, Harloe y Marteens, 1988; Yunus, 2015), ha manifestado la convicción de que se asiste a la implantación progresiva y generalizada de un sistema de provisión residencial[1] liberal con consecuencias análogas sobre las formas de habitar.

Sin embargo, como contrapartida teórica a este enfoque monocausal y universalista, las interpretaciones de rango medio, englobadas bajo la teoría de la divergencia (Kemeny y Lowe, 1998; Kemeny, 2001), aportan una visión alternativa que reivindica la necesidad de una mayor profundización en los contextos que se analizan como condición indispensable y previa a la proclamación de patrones residenciales universales. Frente a la prevalencia del libre mercado, como único mecanismo explicativo a los procesos residenciales, se enfatiza en el papel que ejerce el resto de instituciones implicadas en la conformación de los distintos sistemas de bienestar y vivienda europeos (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Barlow y Duncan, 1994; Kemeny, 1995; Balchin, 1996; Allen, 2006; Hoekstra, 2010).

La fundamentación teórica de esta perspectiva encuentra su raíz en la obra de Esping-Andersen (1990) que sostiene como, en base a la forma en la que se articulan las dimensiones del Estado de bienestar referidas al grado de desmercantilización y estratificación social, en Europa coexisten tres tipos de regímenes de bienestar: el liberal, el conservador y el socialdemócrata.

Uno de los problemas fundamentales, además del carácter estático que adopta su esquema interpretativo (Navarro, 2006; Hoekstra, 2003, 2010), es que su análisis se construye en base a la experiencia vivida por unos determinados países, provocando que la ubicación de otros en sus tipologías resulte imprecisa, como sucede con los países del sur de Europa, en los que la familia ejerce un rol fundamental en la provisión de bienestar (Allen, 2006; Castles y Ferrera, 1996). No menos importante es que su definición de Estado de bienestar se reduce, sobre todo, a lo que acontece en el mercado laboral, cuestión también criticable pero que ha servido a su vez como fuente de inspiración al conocimiento de la relación existente entre el bienestar y la vivienda.

Al respecto, Jim Kemeny es el autor que mejor representa la reacción crítica a la indiferencia científica hacia la vivienda como dimensión del bienestar. A través de "Housing and Social Theory" (1992), Kemeny sienta las bases teóricas que le conducen a la formulación de una sociología de la residencia en base a la cuál sostiene que la trascendencia social de la vivienda pasa necesariamente por su integración dentro del sistema de bienestar, tal y como demuestran también estudios más recientes (Stamsø, 2010). Al analizar los mecanismos de provisión residencial, Kemeny incorpora tanto la importancia que juega el Estado como el mercado y otras instituciones, ofreciendo así un marco interpretativo del bienestar más completo que el de Esping Andersen.

1 Tomando la noción de Bourne (1981), el sistema de provisión residencial se entiende cómo el término que sirve para englobar a todo el rango de interrelaciones que se producen entre las distintas instituciones, actores y unidades de vivienda que intervienen en las formas de producción, consumo y regulación de la vivienda.

El modo en el que interfieren los distintos agentes implicados en la provisión de vivienda, así como las funciones adoptadas por cada uno de ellos le permite identificar distintos sistemas de vivienda los cuales desarrollará más en profundidad en su obra más célebre "From Public Housing to the Social Market" (1995), en la que analiza la relevancia que juegan las formas de tenencia en el bienestar de los hogares, definiendo a partir ellas la existencia de dos sistemas de vivienda distintos:

Por un lado, diferencia los sistemas de alquiler dual, en donde la provisión de vivienda social viene exclusivamente de la mano del Estado y se restringe a los sectores de población más desfavorecidos, protegiéndose así de la competencia al mercado privado en donde el sector del alquiler resulta costoso, minoritario y poco atractivo frente a la propiedad que obtiene un gran apoyo desde las políticas de vivienda y es en consecuencia el régimen de tenencia predominante. Los países angloparlantes (Gran Bretaña, Irlanda, Estados Unidos y Australia) y algunos escandinavos (Noruega, Finlandia e Islandia) se integrarían dentro de este modelo.

Por otro lado, distingue los sistemas de alquiler unitario en donde la política de vivienda garantiza la competitividad entre el sector social y privado del alquiler provocando que la propiedad adquiera un rol secundario puesto que la efectividad y predominancia del mercado del alquiler ofrece alternativas más sugerentes dentro de un sistema universalista en el que la intervención del Estado se dirige a todos los ciudadanos sin distinción de renta o de condición social. Identifica varios países dentro de este modelo y los divide en función del nivel de desarrollo que presente su sector social de alquiler. Así, los Países Bajos presentarían el mayor nivel de vivienda social, mientras que en países como Suecia o Dinamarca habría un equilibrio y en Alemania y Suiza predominaría el alquiler privado.

De esta forma, en los sistemas de alquiler unitarios el alquiler social tiende a reducir las rentas del alquiler privado favoreciendo un acceso a la vivienda más asequible, no solo en el mercado del alquiler sino también en el de la propiedad, ya que la presión de la demanda sobre el mismo será menor y también la especulación. Por el contrario, los sistemas duales implican una dependencia casi exclusiva hacia un mercado libre en propiedad que encarece los precios y alimenta la especulación lo que dificulta la asequibilidad de la vivienda conllevando mayores niveles de esfuerzo en el acceso a la misma y con ello mayores niveles de impago (Arbaci, 2007; CECODHAS, 2012).

En base a la articulación de los sistemas de tenencia y su efecto sobre las condiciones de acceso a la vivienda cabe a su vez argumentar, de forma lógica, cómo los grupos vulnerables económicamente encuentran una mayor accesibilidad, asequibilidad y protección residencial bajo los sistemas unitarios de alquiler que en los sistemas duales, en los que el acceso a la vivienda es costoso e implica un mayor esfuerzo y una mayor precariedad residencial (Borj, 2014).

El problema al planteamiento teórico de Kemeny es que los sistemas de tenencia resultantes acaban limitándose a las formas de organización residencial de los países que analiza, en su mayoría angloparlantes y escandinavos. Esta simplificación provoca que cuando se intenta aplicar su teoría a otros contextos residenciales su encaje resulte problemático. Así lo constata Leal (2005: 75) cuando afirma que, pese a que el sistema español pueda ser integrado dentro de los sistemas de tenencia dual, la preponderancia de la propiedad dentro del propio mercado de vivienda social (Viviendas de Protección Oficial) implica un desajuste con respecto a las tipologías diseñadas por Kemeny en tanto que contemplan al alquiler como la única forma contractual posible dentro del sector de vivienda desmercantilizado.

Aunque de forma más reduccionista que Kemeny, Balchin (1996) ofrece también un completo panorama sobre el posicionamiento que adoptan los países de Europa en función de sus políticas de vivienda. Por un lado, distingue a los países que incentivan la propiedad mediante políticas de discriminación positiva (desgravación fiscal o ayudas a la construcción para comprar) y, por otro, a los países que abogan por una neutralidad de las políticas de vivienda hacia la tenencia, logrando un sistema más equilibrado que amplía los márgenes de elección residencial.

Al respecto y pese a que todavía perduran las huellas de un sistema de tenencia propio de un pasado intervencionista, Inglaterra es situada como el paradigma del primer modelo, dada la creciente propensión hacia la propiedad que experimenta su sociedad en el siglo xx (Saunders, 1990). Bajo el primer modelo también se situarían Irlanda, España e Italia; mientras que Holanda, Suecia, Francia, Alemania y Suiza se ubicarían dentro del segundo patrón residencial. Por último, analizó también la ubicación de los países del Este de Europa considerando que, como producto de sus procesos de democratización e industrialización, se encontraban bajo un modelo de transición en donde la intervención del Estado deja paso a una privatización residencial e implantación progresiva de un modelo liberal, tesis también compartida por Clapham (1995); Turner *et al.* (1992), o Cirman (2006).

Sin prescindir del papel decisivo de los sistemas de tenencia a la hora de establecer familias de bienestar, Barlow y Duncan (1994) añaden otra perspectiva indispensable al evaluar las formas de promoción residencial y provisión del suelo. De acuerdo a las mismas, en un sistema liberal, con Inglaterra como paradigma, la promoción residencial es de tipo especulativo y la provisión de suelo gestionada por los promotores privados. Así, el acceso a la vivienda queda sometido a las fluctuaciones del mercado siendo residual la intervención del Estado. En el sistema corporativista, con Francia como arquetipo, se aplica una regulación en los costes del suelo y la vivienda de manera que el acceso a la misma queda más protegido. El sistema socialdemócrata, representado por Suecia, se caracteriza por una promoción de vivienda y una gestión del suelo desmercantilizada con una fuerte restricción hacia la obtención de beneficios por lo que las problemáticas de acceso a la vivienda son escasas. El sistema rudimentario, sin ningún país identificado como prototípico, se rige por una promoción de vivienda especulativa y una gestión privada del suelo lo que les convierte en proclives a presentar problemas de acceso a la vivienda que afectan sobre todo a los grupos más vulnerables económicamente.

Los poderosos esquemas interpretativos de Esping-Andersen, Kemeny y Barlow y Duncan, sirvieron como fundamento a una serie de autores (Allen *et al.,* 2004) para identificar, de forma concluyente, un sistema residencial propio de los países del sur de Europa, enriqueciendo así el espectro teórico necesario para comprender los múltiples procesos residenciales que acontecen en Europa y abordar de forma más eficaz las políticas de bienestar.

Dicho sistema ha recibido distintas denominaciones como la de familista o “Latin Rim Regime” (Abrahamson, 1995; Arbaci, 2007; Ferrera, 1995; Castles y Ferrera, 1996; Flaquer, 2004) y ha sido concebido por estar basado en un régimen de bienestar distinto, lo que supone la identificación de otra alternativa de bienestar a las originalmente esbozadas por Esping-Andersen (1990).

Ha sido caracterizado (Allen *et al.,* 2004) por tener una gran proporción de hogares viviendo en propiedad, así como una alta proporción de segundas residencias que respondía, por un lado, a una economía en la que el turismo juega un papel significativo y, por otro, a una cierta tradición de los hogares que les empuja a tener más de una vivienda. Al mismo tiempo, se constataba cómo la convivencia dentro del núcleo familiar se prolongaba más en el tiempo con respecto al resto de los países europeos, debido en buena medida al retraso de la emancipación de los jóvenes. También se identificó una forma diferente de producción de viviendas, en la que gran parte del beneficio de los promotores provenía del proceso de revalorización del suelo a diferencia con otros modelos en los que el beneficio provenía de la construcción. Por último, se daban también una serie de características diferenciales en términos de política de vivienda, con un bajo porcentaje de viviendas de alquiler social, una inversión pública más escasa en vivienda en relación al PIB (Sánchez Morales, 2010) y una canalización clientelar de los subsidios para el acceso a la vivienda que se extiende a las clases medias.

Estas características distintivas se fundamentaban en una configuración de un sistema de bienestar en la que el Estado tenía poca participación en la provisión de subsidios y servicios y también en la regulación de las actividades de mercado, delegando así a la solidaridad familiar y a la sociedad civil un número de funciones que las entidades públicas tendían a asumir en otros países europeos. Por tanto, uno de los pilares de este sistema fue que la familia actuaba para proporcionar el acceso a la vivienda a sus miembros, con el apoyo disponible en cada caso, ya que la alta dependencia hacia un mercado libre en propiedad conducía a una escasez de vivienda asequible y a una marginación

Tabla 1. Sistemas vivienda europeos identificados hasta principios del sg. XXI.

	Sistema socialdemócrata	**Sistema corporativista**	**Sistema liberal**	**Sistema familista**	**Sistema transicional**
TENENCIA	Sistema unitario: predominio de alquiler social.	Sistema unitario: predominio de alquiler privado.	Sistema dual: predominio de la propiedad.	Sistema dual: predominio de la propiedad.	Sistema dual: predominio de la propiedad.
FORMAS DE PROMOCIÓN	Promoción de vivienda y gestión del suelo desmercantilizada.	Regulación en los costes del suelo y la vivienda.	Promoción especulativa, gestión privada del suelo.	Promoción especulativa, autopromoción y la autoconstrucción. Gestión privada del suelo.	Promoción crecientemente especulativa y gestión privada del suelo.
POLÍTICA VIVIENDA	Fuerte intervención pública y promoción del alquiler social.	Alta intervención pública para controlar el mercado privado de alquiler.	Promoción de la propiedad y provisión residual para una minoría estigmatizada.	Promoción de la propiedad e intervención muy residual para los grupos más vulnerables.	Hacia provisión de vivienda social residual: privatizaciones y recortes en subvenciones.
ASEQUIBILIDAD DE LA VIVIENDA	Mayor asequibilidad dada la desmercantilización de la misma mediante la promoción del alquiler social.	Mayor asequibilidad dada la desmercantilización de la misma mediante la promoción del alquiler privado y social.	Menor asequibilidad dada la privatización, mercantilización de la vivienda y el fomento de la propiedad.	Menor asequibilidad dada la mercantilización de la misma y el fomento de la propiedad.	Menor asequibilidad dada la privatización de la vivienda social y el fomento de la propiedad.
SITUACIÓN RESIDENCIAL DE GRUPOS VULNERABLES	Accesibilidad, asequibilidad y estabilidad residencial.	Accesibilidad, asequibilidad y estabilidad residencial.	Problemas de accesibilidad, asequibilidad y precariedad residencial.	Problemas de accesibilidad, asequibilidad y precariedad residencial. Familia como soporte.	Problemas de accesibilidad, asequibilidad y precariedad residencial.
PAÍSES PROTOTÍPICOS	Suecia, Países Bajos.	Alemania, Francia, Suiza.	Inglaterra.	España Italia, Portugal, Grecia.	Hungría, Eslovenia.

Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de Kemeny (1995), Balchin (1996), Barlow y Duncan (1994), Allen *et al.* (2004), Clapham (1995), Arbaci (2007).

persistente de los grupos de bajos niveles de renta o vulnerables (Arbaci, 2008). Así, en el caso de los jóvenes, las familias eran empujadas a asumir la permanencia de sus hijos en sus hogares hasta las edades posteriores, debido a los problemas que afectaron tanto al mercado laboral como al residencial (Garrido y Requena, 1996; Gaviria, 2007; Fernández Cordón y Leal, 2014). La intervención pública sobre la vivienda se basó, en gran parte, en acciones indirectas en las que se dio prioridad a las medidas socialmente regresivas que favorecían a las clases medias, como son la promoción de la deducción fiscal y el mantenimiento de la escasez de vivienda social de alquiler.

Hoy la vigencia de dicho sistema residencial se pone en cuestión dadas las transformaciones acontecidas en la última década, en la que se pasó de una fuerte expansión, económica, demográfica y residencial a otra de profunda depresión en la que la vivienda y las condiciones residenciales de la población se han visto profundamente afectadas.

ANTECEDENTES A LA CRISIS: CAMBIOS SOCIODEMOGRÁFICOS Y RESIDENCIALES

La comprensión de los procesos residenciales de los últimos años pasa, en primer lugar, por analizar el contexto previo al estallido de la crisis. En base al mismo, a principios del siglo XXI, los países de Europa del Sur iniciaban un cambio demográfico profundo causado, por un lado, por el elevado flujo migratorio y, por otro, por la reducción del tamaño de los hogares, como consecuencia del envejecimiento de la población y la disminución de las tasas de natalidad (Fernández Cordón y Leal, 2014; Leal, 2008).

Como fruto de la inmigración, la población de los países del sur de Europa, creció considerablemente durante el periodo 2003-2008, sobre todo en el caso de España (9,18 %), para limitar su crecimiento o disminuirlo posteriormente, excepto en el caso de Italia, que fue fuertemente afectada por el movimiento de solicitantes de asilo tras el estallido de la crisis. Este fuerte crecimiento de la población, fue uno de los principales impulsores del gran aumento de la construcción de viviendas y de precios en ese periodo, lo cual afectó a los comportamientos residenciales y llevó a un alto endeudamiento de los hogares y de todo el sistema financiero que agravó seriamente el impacto de la crisis crediticia a nivel global (Módenes y López-Colás, 2012). Este es el trasfondo que contribuiría a acelerar e intensificar la crisis que sufriría el sistema de vivienda en el sur de Europa, llamando a la necesidad de hacer un cambio radical en el mismo.

Desde la segunda mitad de los noventa y, especialmente, a lo largo de la primera década del siglo XXI, se producía así un nuevo fenómeno demográfico en el sur de Europa transformándose

Figura 1. Incremento relativo de la población (%) en los países del sur de Europa en comparación con la media europea en los periodos 2003-2008 y 2009-2014.



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de los datos demográficos publicados por Eurostat.

de países emisores a receptores de inmigrantes. De acuerdo a los resultados de los censos del año 2011, publicados por Eurostat, la población nacida en el extranjero superaba el 7 % de la población total en todos los países del sur de Europa analizados con excepción de Portugal, en donde el porcentaje era del 4,2 %. Al respecto, España fue el país más afectado y uno de los países europeos con mayor proporción de población nacida en el extranjero con un 12,06 % (Musterd y Fullaondo, 2008), lo que contrasta con la media de la Unión Europea de los 27, situada en el 6,6 %. A pesar de que la composición de esta población extranjera era diversa y presentaba características y estrategias residenciales diferentes, se trataba en conjunto de un aumento de población joven y de bajos ingresos lo que supuso un efecto añadido a la tendencia positiva que experimentaba la formación de hogares jóvenes, cuyo significado fue la del aumento progresivo de inquilinos (Módenes y López-Colás, 2014).

Por otro lado, además de la necesidad de dar alojamiento a los crecientes hogares de inmigrantes, hubo otra necesidad derivada de una disminución general del tamaño de los hogares basada en el envejecimiento de la población, el mantenimiento de unas bajas tasas de natalidad y el aumento de los hogares unipersonales y monoparentales. Esto suponía que para un mismo tamaño de población aumentaba el número de hogares y por tanto las necesidades de vivienda, lo que sirvió para alimentar aún más la producción de vivienda y el crecimiento de los precios (Rodríguez, 2010).

Además, la tendencia alcista del mercado en respuesta al aumento de las necesidades de vivienda se enmarca en un contexto en el que la política de vivienda se instrumentaliza para fomentar el desarrollo económico mediante ayudas directas e indirectas a la promoción de la propiedad y el impulso del sector de la construcción (Allen *et al.,* 2004; Arbaci, 2008; Leal, 2005). Este hecho habría promovido un sobrecalentamiento del mercado de en base al cuál el volumen de viviendas en los países del sur de Europa acabaría creciendo a una tasa mucho mayor que la de la demanda real generándose así un crecimiento especulativo de la producción que era estimulado a su vez por un crédito fácil de obtener (Loureiro *et al.,* 2015; Gentili y Hoekstra 2018).

Al mismo tiempo, el aumento de unas necesidades de vivienda apoyadas fundamentalmente en unas políticas que fomentan la compra frente al alquiler conllevó un aumento notorio en el número de transacciones en los cuatro países, pero a través de dos mecanismos distintos y con implicaciones diferentes para el mercado hipotecario. En Italia y Grecia, las viviendas se compraban con una elevada proporción del patrimonio de los hogares, ya que son países donde la cultura hipotecaria está menos desarrollada (Emmanuel, 2014). Sin embargo, en Portugal y España, se produjeron altos niveles de endeudamiento de los hogares con el fin de adquirir viviendas. De esta forma, el crecimiento imparable de los precios de la vivienda en estos dos países, como consecuencia de un aumento de las necesidades, fue también mantenido gracias al crecimiento de un sistema de financiación blando.

Tabla 2. Tamaño del hogar en los países del sur de Europa en comparación con la media europea (2001-2015).

Países	2001	2007	2015
UE (27)	*n.d.*	2,4	2,3
Grecia	2,6	2,7	2,6
España	3,0	2,7	2,5
Italia	2,6	2,5	2,4
Portugal	2,9	2,8	2,5

Fuente: European Union Labour Force Survey y EU-SILC, datos publicados por Eurostat.

Figura 2. Evolución de la deuda hipotecaria sobre el PIB.



Fuente: datos publicados por la Federación Hipotecaria Europea (European Mortgage Federation, Hypostat).

Por tanto, el resultado es una notable diferencia en el nivel de endeudamiento de los hogares entre estos países del sur, habiendo alcanzado los 2/3 del PIB en España y Portugal. En estos dos países, la deuda saturó la capacidad de los bancos, que tuvieron que recurrir a préstamos externos para satisfacer esta creciente demanda en un momento en el que había un considerable excedente de ahorro en algunos países europeos cuyos sistemas de crédito miraban favorablemente a estos préstamos, dado el crecimiento económico que prometían. En este sentido, la gran deuda de las familias y promotores inmobiliarios influyó en la mayor gravedad de la crisis financiera de España y Portugal.

IMPLICACIONES DE LA CRISIS SOBRE EL SISTEMA DE VIVIENDA

Las transformaciones sociodemográficas y residenciales analizadas repercutirían considerablemente sobre los acontecimientos que viviría el sistema de vivienda una vez terminada la época expansiva mediante las dinámicas del mercado y la actuación del Estado a través de la política de vivienda, cuestiones que se examinan a continuación.

Los efectos de la crisis en el mercado de vivienda

Tras la fuerte etapa alcista, vivida especialmente en el sur de Europa, la demanda de vivienda comenzó a disminuir gradualmente, como en Grecia, o directamente se desplomó, como en España, lo que, junto con el colapso del mercado financiero y la “crisis crediticia”, tuvo un efecto perjudicial añadido sobre la demanda que impulsaba los precios, la producción y finalmente la estabilidad de las empresas promotoras. En España, la imposibilidad de vender las viviendas recién construidas supuso la bancarrota de muchas compañías inmobiliarias provocando una omisión en masa de los pagos de préstamos y dejando así a los bancos con un *stock* de viviendas difíciles de vender. Esta fase, que afecta a todos los países del sur de Europa, presenta el caso más agudo en España debido al gran *stock* de viviendas nuevas que finalmente no eran vendidas y que llegó a alcanzar según el Ministerio de Fomento la cifra de 649.780 en 2009 (Sánchez, 2010; Rodríguez, 2017).

Cuando los altos precios y la pérdida de expectativa de revalorización revirtieron el proceso alcista, a mediados de 2007, un año antes de la caída de Lehman Brothers en Estados Unidos, la demanda se retuvo a la espera de una caída de

Figura 3. Evolución del índice de visados de viviendas (2010=100), 2005-2015.



Fuente: datos de construcción publicados por Eurostat.

precios y, por tanto, de una reversión de la espiral creciente de los mismos. Una vez que la espiral descendente comenzó, la crisis financiera estalló y los bancos dejaron de prestar dinero, lo que rápidamente aceleró la caída de la producción debido a una caída en la demanda. Pero el tiempo promedio que se tarda en producir una casa, dos años o más, significó que esta caída se retrasó en relación con la caída de la demanda, lo que contribuyó a aumentar el número de nuevas casas no vendidas, como es el caso español, pero también el de Grecia y Portugal, aunque con menor intensidad.

En general, la crisis también ha tenido un impacto directo sobre el mercado residencial en toda Europa pues durante años se ha asistido a un notable ajuste de los precios, basado en gran medida en la dificultad de financiar a los compradores de vivienda ("crisis crediticia"). Sin embargo, lo que ha distinguido a los diferentes países ha sido principalmente la capacidad de reaccionar ante la depreciación de la vivienda. En el sur de Europa, especialmente en España, dicha depreciación de la vivienda ha sido más aguda debido a que, además de hacer frente a las dificultades financieras, había un gran *stock* de viviendas sin vender, así como viviendas que fueron revertidas a los bancos a través de los procesos de ejecución hipotecaria de individuos y empresas que no podían hacer frente a los pagos. De esta forma, el sistema residencial condujo y agravó a su vez a la actual crisis económica en España y la promovió también en otros países del sur, a través de su impacto en el sector financiero, el mercado de trabajo y las condiciones de vida de los ciudadanos.

Según los datos de los censos de 1991 y 2011, publicados por Eurostat, se produjo un cierto crecimiento de las viviendas desocupadas en todos los países del sur de Europa (Grecia pasó de un 33,7 % a un 35,3 %; Italia de un 21,1 % a un 22,7 % y Portugal de un 26,3 % a un 31,9 %) excepto en España, en dónde el porcentaje disminuye de un 31,5 % a un 28,3 %. Esta disminución podría explicarse por el crecimiento de la población durante ese periodo de tiempo, el uso como residencia permanente de algunas viviendas vacías o secundarias antes, y por los cambios en el acceso a las viviendas principales. Con todo, la proporción del *stock* de vivienda desocupada en los países del sur, sigue manteniendo una gran distancia en relación con la media europea (Vinuesa, 2008), situada en un 15,8 % según los resultados censales de 2011 publicados por Eurostat y cuyas cifras se desglosan por país a continuación:

Esta característica continúa siendo un factor distintivo de estos países del sur, dado el privile-

Figura 4. Porcentaje de viviendas desocupadas por países de la Unión Europea, 2011.



Fuente: datos de Censos de 2011 publicados por Eurostat.

gio que tradicionalmente se ha otorgado al acceso a la propiedad como forma principal de tenencia. Sin embargo, como sucede en España, no se espera que haya un aumento proporcional significativo (Del Pino, 2015) porque las prácticas residenciales de los hogares han cambiado y ahora el tiempo de vacaciones es más fraccionado y la población utiliza más hoteles o alquiler de casas para estancias cortas. Este estancamiento también estaría relacionado con la forma de acceder a una vivienda principal, ya que, según la Asociación Hipotecaria Española (2010), se ha asistido a una extensión de los periodos de hipoteca que, en el caso español, ha ido desde los trece años en 1991 a los veinticuatro años de promedio en 2010. Si consideramos un cambio de casa antes de la jubilación, la consecuencia es que los hogares estarían pagando toda la vida activa por su casa lo que dificulta la compra de una segunda vivienda como sucedía en los años setenta y ochenta.

La pasividad de la política de vivienda estatal

La fuerte sacudida sufrida en el mercado de la vivienda y sus implicaciones sociales y residenciales hacen fundamental preguntarse por la reacción del Estado a través de la política de vivienda en estos países del sur de Europa. Al respecto, la alternativa de intervención pública frente a una fuerte crisis económica y residencial habría sido la de aumentar la inversión pública en vivienda, principalmente en vivienda social. Sin embargo, esta iniciativa no ha sido implementada debido a la política de recortes en los servicios sociales, como respuesta a la exigencia de la Comunidad Europea de reducir el gasto público. Se dibuja así una tendencia descendente en la ya exigua inversión pública en vivienda (CECODHAS, 2012), en relación con la de otros servicios básicos como la salud o la educación, lo que denota además el escaso interés y compromiso político que suscita la cuestión residencial. Tal como demuestra el siguiente gráfico, si bien el gasto público en vivienda sobre el PIB ha dibujado una tendencia descendente en el conjunto de la Unión Europea de los 27 esta ha sido, en general, más acusada en los países del sur de Europa.

Como consecuencia, se asiste a una cierta disminución de la producción de viviendas sociales pasando, en Italia, de aproximadamente 9.000 unidades en 2005 a 4.600 unidades en 2014 y en España, de 15.000 unidades en 2005 a 2.500 en 2014 (Housing Europe, 2017) produciéndose además, en su caso, incluso una disminución del escaso *stock* existente de viviendas públicas, debido a la venta de una parte del mismo a inversores privados especulativos, como sucedió en Madrid (García-Calderón y Abellán, 2016).

Por otro lado, debido a que algunos de los aspectos de los planes de inversión pública son pensados a largo plazo, como son los subsidios a

Figura 5. Evolución del gasto público en vivienda sobre el PIB en los países del sur de Europa en comparación con la media europea, 2002-2015.



Fuente: datos económicos y financieros publicados por Eurostat.

préstamos o la desgravación fiscal a los compradores de primera vivienda, sucede que la mayoría de los escasos nuevos presupuestos de vivienda tuvieron que ser gastados en programas pasados sin ninguna oportunidad de desarrollar nuevas alternativas capaces de responder a la crisis. Esta condición demuestra que la política de vivienda sigue siendo la hermana pobre del Estado de bienestar del sur.

El caso español muestra cómo la supresión de la desgravación fiscal, que fue uno de los pilares del coste real de la política de vivienda y que llegó a alcanzar un 75 % de la inversión estatal en vivienda (Rodríguez, 2009), no podía ser implementada de un año a otro debido a los compromisos adquiridos con los hogares que ya habían comprado una casa antes de esta supresión.

La consecuencia es un fracaso del sistema de vivienda en tanto que la administración pública demuestra una gran dificultad y desinterés para implementar nuevas políticas que respondan a las necesidades emergentes como son la de mejorar las condiciones de alquiler de las viviendas y aumentar la vivienda social pública.

Por tanto, tras años de crisis en los países del sur de Europa, se ha asistido a una gran congelación de las políticas de vivienda orientadas al bienestar social entendiendo por estas el establecimiento de medidas que garanticen el acceso asequible a la vivienda y la estabilidad residencial para el conjunto de la población.

LAS CONSECUENCIAS DE LA CRISIS DEL SISTEMA DE VIVIENDA EN LAS CONDICIONES RESIDENCIALES DE LA POBLACIÓN

En general, la fuerte dependencia de la vivienda con respecto de un mercado libre, así como su relevancia para el conjunto de la economía, provoca que los sistemas de vivienda del sur de Europa estén sometidos a ciclos de depresión más profundos que la media europea. Como consecuencia, se han generado situaciones sociales de gran precariedad que afectan a las condiciones residenciales de los hogares analizándose a continuación las dimensiones que se han visto más afectadas.

El giro de los hogares hacia un alquiler con limitaciones

La alta exposición de los sistemas de vivienda del sur de Europa a las fluctuaciones económicas ha supuesto que, en un contexto de profunda crisis, se haya producido una alteración notable e inesperada de los comportamientos residenciales asociados al régimen de tenencia. Mientras en la época de expansión, el auge del empleo, la financiación y las ayudas públicas siguieron engordando el régimen de propiedad; las tremendas convulsiones vividas durante la crisis han conllevado un retroceso en el porcentaje de propietarios en favor del que representan los arrendatarios.

De forma paralela, y también como efecto de la crisis, la media de los países europeos, ha atravesado la misma tendencia con un descenso de la propiedad en beneficio, sobre todo, de un alquiler a precios de mercado que apuntaría hacia un proceso de convergencia con respecto de los países del sur, aunque no exento de matices importantes.

En primer lugar, los países del sur de Europa experimentan un crecimiento global del alquiler mucho más leve que el que se vive de media en la Unión Europea, con un aumento de 3,5 puntos porcentuales entre 2007 y 2015, que contrasta con el de Grecia (0,5 pp.), España (2,5 pp.), Italia (0,4 pp.) y Portugal (–0,6 pp.), en dónde incluso desciende levemente el porcentaje de alquiler.

En segundo lugar, las diferentes intensidades con las que crece el alquiler mantienen, cuando no aumentan, las distancias que separan los niveles de propiedad del conjunto de Europa con respecto del sur, demostrándose así que la propiedad sigue estando muy arraigada en las sociedades de sur. De hecho, la casi exclusiva dependencia de un mercado libre a la hora de acceder a una vivienda en alquiler supone un claro obstáculo de cara a su crecimiento ya que implica un fuerte sometimiento a las fluctuaciones de precios dentro de un sector que, además de seguir penalizando al inquilino, presenta una escasa oferta que le hace especialmente sensible a los aumentos de demanda. Esta es la situación que atraviesa actualmente España, en especial los centros de las grandes ciudades, y que invita también a reconsiderar a este régimen de tenencia como el equivalente a la vivienda social de otros países europeos (Pareja y Sánchez, 2016). La fuerte subida de precios que está experimentando el alquiler (mayor que la propiedad), estaría además favoreciendo el aumento de situaciones residenciales abusivas y precarias, como son el pago de rentas excesivas, el hacinamiento o los desahucios derivados del retraso en los pagos de las mensualidades.

El endurecimiento en la asequibilidad a la vivienda

La fuerte dependencia del mercado libre que plantean la articulación del sistema de tenencia en

Tabla 3. Evolución del porcentaje de población que vive en alquiler, a precios de mercado y a precios reducidos o gratuito (2007, 2015) y cálculo de la diferencia en puntos porcentuales (Dif. pp.).

Países	Alquiler a precios de mercado			Alquiler a precio reducido			Total alquiler		
	2007	2015	Dif. pp.	2007	2015	Dif. pp.	2007	2015	Dif. pp.
UE (27)	12,6	19,8	7,2	14,6	10,9	–3,7	27,2	30,7	3,5
Grecia	17,9	19,8	1,9	6,5	5,1	–1,4	24,4	24,9	0,5
España	10,7	12,7	2	8,6	9,1	0,5	19,3	21,8	2,5
Italia	12,2	15,4	3,2	14,5	11,7	–2,8	26,7	27,1	0,4
Portugal	9,8	12,7	2,9	16	12,5	–3,5	25,8	25,2	–0,6

Fuente: EU- SILC, datos publicados por Eurostat.

Figura 6. Variación interanual del precio de compra y de alquiler en España.



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos publicados por el Ministerio de Fomento y Fotocasa.

los países del sur de Europa provoca que el acceso a la vivienda sea una gran problemática inherente a la que los hogares tienen que enfrentarse en su trayectoria residencial.

En el caso de España, el costoso acceso a la vivienda en propiedad en la época del boom inmobiliario implicaba la asunción de un fuerte esfuerzo y compromiso hipotecario que mermaba las condiciones económicas y vitales de los hogares. Aun así, pese a los riesgos inherentes que entrañaba, se prefería mayoritariamente la compra por las ventajas que suponía frente a un mercado del alquiler exiguo, costoso, informal y deteriorado. La compra era el equivalente a la seguridad, la autonomía y el ahorro mientras que el alquiler simbolizaba más el derroche, la precariedad y la inseguridad por lo que este se percibía como una opción transitoria hacia la propiedad y de alojamiento para los grupos sociales más desfavorecidos.

Con la crisis, el acceso a la vivienda se hizo todavía más complicado ya que, pese a que los intereses hipotecarios y los precios de la vivienda bajaron progresivamente, la falta de financiación, el colapso del mercado laboral y el impacto económico sobre las familias dificultaban más si cabe el acceso a la vivienda. Por tanto, si bien el esfuerzo de compra se redujo, tan solo fue de manera artificial ya que la realidad apuntaba a la falta de una salida residencial para amplios sectores de la población que, en el mejor de los casos, solo podían plantearse el alquiler. Fue entonces cuando esta forma de tenencia comenzó a cobrar mayor protagonismo como única alternativa habitacional para una parte de la población, un espejismo que ahora se torna en preocupación por el impacto al alza en los precios que la reactivación de la demanda y la especulación está provocando sobre esta forma contractual y también sobre la propiedad, promoviéndose así una progresiva y nueva escalada en el esfuerzo de acceso.

En consecuencia, el acceso a la vivienda se presenta como un grave problema estructural que se acentúa aún más en los periodos de crisis.

En el conjunto de Europa, el acceso a la vivienda también ha sufrido un empeoramiento en el contexto de la crisis. Sin embargo, la incidencia de la situación económica y laboral ha sido menor ya que, pese a los procesos de liberalización residencial (Scanlon *et al.,* 2015), el sistema de tenencia es más heterogéneo y equilibrado y las formas contractuales mercantilizadas compiten en mayor medida con las desmercantilizadas. De esta forma, si se compara el crecimiento del esfuerzo de acceso al alquiler entre 2007 y 2015, los países del sur de Europa vuelven a destacar por el mayor crecimiento que presenta este con respecto de la Unión Europea.

Figura 7. Evolución del esfuerzo de acceso de los hogares a la propiedad y el alquiler en España.



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos publicados por el Banco de España y Eurostat.

El aumento de la morosidad y el drama social de los desahucios

Otro de los grandes problemas que muestra la ineficiencia del sistema de provisión de vivienda en el sur de Europa a la hora de garantizar el bienestar residencial ha sido el notable aumento de la morosidad que se deriva de las graves dificultades de los hogares para pagar la hipoteca adquirida y las mensualidades de los alquileres. Ello además ha conllevado un incremento sin precedentes en el número de desahucios, lo que resulta especialmente grave debido a la escasez de viviendas sociales, que ni siquiera permite un alojamiento alternativo temporal para los hogares afectados (Rodríguez, 2010).

En contraste, en el conjunto de Europa, el aumento en el porcentaje de personas que presenta retrasos en los pagos de la hipoteca o el alquiler ha sido mucho menor lo que vuelve a subrayar la propia idiosincrasia del sistema residencial del sur de Europa. En estos países, la mercantilización casi absoluta de la vivienda implica de por sí la asunción de mayores costes y riesgos de impago y más aún cuando el empleo está sujeto en buena medida a la propia dependencia de la economía con respecto de un sistema de residencial fluctuante y desequilibrado y en dónde la promoción libre de la propiedad ha funcionado como motor fundamental de crecimiento y generación de empleo.

En el caso de España, el número de lanzamientos anuales recibidos por el Tribunal Superior

Tabla 4. Porcentaje de la renta disponible de los hogares destinada al pago del alquiler, 2007-2015 y cálculo de la diferencia en puntos porcentuales (Dif. pp.).

Países	2007	2015	Dif. pp.
UE (27)	23,5	25,2	1,7
Grecia	26,2	31,6	5,4
España	27,6	32,1	4,5
Italia	20,8	25,0	4,2
Portugal	16,0	23,1	7,1

Fuente: EU- SILC, datos publicados por Eurostat.

Tabla 5. Porcentaje de personas con retrasos en los pagos de la hipoteca o el alquiler, 2007-2015.

Países	2007	2015	Dif.
UE (27)	3,4	4,0	0,6
Grecia	7,4	14,3	6,9
España	3,5	6,2	2,7
Italia	3,7	5,4	1,7
Portugal	3,1	4,4	1,3

Fuente: EU- SILC, datos publicados por Eurostat.

de Justicia ha sido especialmente alto, alcanzando en el periodo 2008-2016 la cifra de 515.354. Estos han afectado a los hogares en régimen de propiedad, debido no solo a los incumplimientos hipotecarios, derivados de una combinación entre los altos niveles de endeudamiento y de desempleo (Cano *et al.,* 2013; Etxezarreta *et al.,* 2013), sino también a consecuencia de unos procedimientos de ejecuciones hipotecarias especialmente abusivos y denunciados por distintos organismos europeos, dada su incompatibilidad con la normativa europea y su vulneración de los derechos humanos. Al mismo tiempo, los desahucios han incidido de manera muy preocupante en los hogares en alquiler, superando incluso a los referidos por deudas hipotecarias y siendo fuertemente influidos por unas leyes que facilitan los juicios rápidos de los inquilinos que no pagan a tiempo (leyes 19/2009, 37/2011 y 4/2013). Así, según el Tribunal Superior de Justicia, en el año 2015, un 53 % de los lanzamientos practicados se produjeron como consecuencia de procedimientos derivados de la Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos mientras que un 43 % sucedieron a raíz de procedimientos de ejecución hipotecaria.

Ante la desprotección residencial a la que abocan las medidas y actuaciones institucionales a nivel estatal, el papel de la familia ha sido de nuevo fundamental a la hora de ofrecer una alternativa habitacional a los hogares afectados por la crisis. Pero también lo ha sido la propia sociedad civil que, a través de su organización mediante asociaciones, movimientos sociales o plataformas, algunas tan relevantes como la Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH), no solo han servido para brindar apoyo jurídico a los afectados, sino también para frenar y renegociar numerosos desahucios, así como negociar alquileres sociales con las entidades financieras, a través de sus denuncias, demandas y movilizaciones. De esta forma, el impacto de la crisis sobre el sistema de la vivienda ha originado también unos efectos sociales y políticos sin precedentes.

El crecimiento de la precarización residencial en los grupos sociales más vulnerables: el caso de los jóvenes

La desprotección residencial que implica la débil intervención del Estado de bienestar en la vivienda en el sur de Europa, ha conducido durante la crisis hacia unos procesos más intensos de precarización residencial en dónde los grupos vulnerables, que ya sufrían serias problemáticas de exclusión o marginación residencial, como son los inmigrantes, los hogares de bajos recursos o los jóvenes, han sido los más afectados.

Centrándonos en el caso de los jóvenes, dada la preocupación internacional que suscita el grave empeoramiento de su situación social y residencial (Georgallis y Moyart, 2016), las estadísticas reflejan como, en los países del sur de Europa, la crisis ha hecho que los jóvenes permanezcan en casa de sus padres incluso durante más tiempo. De hecho, dentro del aumento de la proporción de jóvenes que viven en el hogar paterno, no solo se incluyen ya a aquellos que tienen dificultades para acceder a su primera vivienda sino también a aquellos que habiendo logrado formar su propio hogar han tenido que regresar a casa de sus padres ante los impedimentos que su situación económica ha supuesto de cara a poder hacer frente a los gastos de la vivienda (Echaves, 2018). Este retraso de la emancipación representa así una extensión de la situación de dependencia y un retraso en el paso a la edad adulta. Al mismo tiempo, también afecta a la fecundidad, ya de por sí muy baja en estos países del sur (Echaves, 2017).

En este sentido, la media europea señala también cómo, entre 2007 y 2015, se ha asistido a una tendencia alcista en la proporción de jóvenes que vive con sus padres. Sin embargo, la intensidad con la que se produce esta tendencia es más fuerte en los países del sur, demostrándose así no solo cómo estos siguen manteniendo un comportamiento específico con respecto al resto de Europa sino también cómo la intervención familiar sigue jugando un rol fundamental en la satisfacción de las necesidades residenciales de los jóvenes (Jurado, 2003; Miret, 2007).

Esta agudización del retraso de la emancipación está relacionada con el fuerte desempleo juvenil y el aumento de la proporción de empleos precarios de corta duración que no permiten garantizar el pago mensual de la hipoteca o el alquiler. De acuerdo a los datos publicados por Eurostat de la encuesta denominada "Labour Force Survey", la tasa de paro entre los jóvenes ha aumentado de forma alarmante durante la crisis en el sur de Europa. Así, en el año 2015 el paro juvenil era del 41 % en Grecia, 35 % en España, 28 % en Italia y 21 % en Portugal, lo que contrasta con el 15 % que presentaba de media la Unión Europea de los 27.

¿SIGUE EXISTIENDO UN SISTEMA RESIDENCIAL PROPIO DEL SUR DE EUROPA?

A fin de aportar una visión sintética y demostrativa al análisis explicativo desarrollado, que sostiene la persistencia de un sistema residencial propio del sur de Europa, se efectúa a continuación un análisis multivariable de conglomerados, basado en el procedimiento de K medias, para los años 2007 y 2015. En consonancia con los planteamientos del artículo y, en función de la disponibilidad de los datos, se han considerado los siguientes indicadores:

— Porcentaje de población que vive en alquiler.
— Porcentaje de vivienda social.
— Porcentaje de vivienda desocupada[2].
— Porcentaje de la renta disponible de los hogares destinada al pago del alquiler (esfuerzo de acceso al alquiler).
— Porcentaje de personas con retrasos en los pagos de la hipoteca o el alquiler.
— Proporción de jóvenes que viven con sus padres entre dieciocho y treinta y cuatro años.

La decisión final del número idóneo de conglomerados fue de cinco y se tomó obedeciendo, en primer lugar, a los criterios teóricos y científicos según los cuales se identifican cinco sistemas de vivienda diferenciados en Europa (socialdemócra-

2 Los datos sobre vivienda desocupada para 2007 y 2015 provienen respectivamente de los censos de vivienda de 2001 y 2011 ya que no se dispone de datos específicos para el periodo analizado.

Tabla 6. Proporción de jóvenes de entre dieciocho y treinta y cuatro años que viven con sus padres en los países del Sur de Europa en comparación con la media europea (2007, 2015).

Países	2007	2015	Dif. (%)
UE (27)	46,9	47,7	0,8
Grecia	59,2	63,8	4,6
España	55,2	58,0	2,8
Italia	61,2	67,3	6,1
Portugal	58,3	62,9	4,6

Fuente: EU- SILC, datos publicados por Eurostat.

ta, liberal, corporativista, familista y transitorio, propio de los países del este). En segundo lugar, la elección de estos cinco conglomerados, obedece a su vez a criterios lógicos desde un punto de vista estadístico (Cea D'Ancona, 2002) de manera que, tras un análisis exploratorio, se ha asegurado que la selección de los cinco conglomerados cumpla con los criterios de similitud entre los casos que componen un mismo conglomerado y, a la vez, de máxima diferenciación posible entre los casos de los distintos conglomerados y significatividad estadística (resultados en anexos).

La Tabla 7, muestra los resultados obtenidos para ambos años constatando la existencia y la continuidad de un sistema de provisión residencial propio de los países del sur de Europa, que se diferencia claramente de las dinámicas que afectan a la configuración del resto de sistemas de vivienda

Tabla 7. Resultados del análisis de conglomerados para los años 2007 y 2015.

	Cluster 1	**Cluster 2**	**Cluster 3**	**Cluster 4**	**Cluster 5**
2007	**Bulgaria, Letonia, Lituania, Hungría, Malta, Rumanía Eslovenia y Eslovaquia**	**Grecia, España, Italia, Chipre, Portugal**	**República Checa, Bélgica, Estonia, Irlanda, Luxemburgo, Austria, Polonia**	**Dinamarca, Francia, Holanda, Finlandia, Suecia, Reino Unido**	**Alemania**
% Alquiler	12,85	24,46	27,36	31,57	48,10
% Vivienda social	3,39	2,12	9,81	20,00	4,60
% Esfuerzo acceso al alquiler	12,33	22,18	20,59	28,25	21,70
% Vivienda desocupada	17	28	9	9	8
% Retrasos en los pagos	2,20	4,76	2,43	3,55	2,20
% jóvenes con padres	60,38	58,20	48,76	26,33	44

	Cluster 1	**Cluster 2**	**Cluster 3**	**Cluster 4**	**Cluster 5**
2015	**República Checa, Estonia, Hungría, Lituania, Luxemburgo, Polonia, Rumanía, Eslovaquia**	**Bulgaria, Letonia, Malta, Eslovenia**	**España, Italia, Portugal, Grecia y Chipre**	**Dinamarca, Francia, Holanda, Finlandia, Suecia, Reino Unido**	**Bélgica, Alemania, Irlanda, Austria**
% Alquiler	15,28	20,13	25,20	33,83	37,75
% Vivienda social	3,89	3,73	1,64	19,55	10,78
% Vivienda desocupada	11,20	26,15	29,86	11,12	14,55
% Esfuerzo acceso al alquiler	20,38	11,95	27,12	28,82	22,78
% Retrasos en los pagos	2,64	3,10	7,66	3,77	2,55
% jóvenes con padres	55,66	58,65	60,74	28,27	45,22

Fuente: datos publicados por Eurostat (EU- SILC) y European Federation of Public, Cooperative & Social Housing.

y a los países que los componen[3]. Los países de referencia estudiados (España, Italia, Portugal y Grecia) conforman el núcleo de los países del sur de Europa al que se une también el caso de Chipre.

Sin embargo, pese a la persistencia de la singularidad dicho sistema, se aprecian alteraciones significativas en los valores que adoptan los indicadores seleccionados, lo que influye a su vez en el posicionamiento global del sistema de vivienda del sur del Europa. Desde 2007 a 2015, el conglomerado que conforman los países del sur de Europa refleja un leve aumento de las viviendas desocupadas y del peso del alquiler, pero sobre todo manifiesta un ascenso del esfuerzo de acceso a esta forma contractual, así como del porcentaje de personas con retrasos en los pagos de la vivienda y de jóvenes que vive con sus padres; mientras que el porcentaje de vivienda social (el más bajo) desciende incluso más. Estas transformaciones constatan así un agravamiento de los problemas residenciales que afectaban ya a los países del sur provocando un empeoramiento de su situación global en términos de bienestar ya que, en relación con el resto de conglomerados, se posiciona como el más ineficiente en lo que respecta al acceso a la vivienda puesto que es donde el esfuerzo de acceso y el afronte de los pagos de la vivienda se vuelve más complicado y repercute de forma más aguda en los grupos más vulnerables como los jóvenes.

CONCLUSIONES: LA SINGULARIDAD CAMBIANTE DEL SISTEMA RESIDENCIAL DEL SUR DE EUROPA

En respuesta a las preguntas planteadas al comienzo de este artículo, se puede concluir que el distinto sistema de vivienda del sur ha experimentado cambios sustanciales en la última década. Sin embargo, estas transformaciones no implican una pérdida de la singularidad que le sigue diferenciando considerablemente de las dinámicas seguidas por el resto de la Unión Europea, reafirmando así la relevancia de los planteamientos realizados por la tesis de la divergencia.

Como proceso de cambio destacable se encuentra el creciente aumento del alquiler en los países del sur de Europa lo que, en principio, iría al encuentro de la tendencia vivida en el conjunto de la Unión Europea pero con matices importantes ya que la intensidad con la que ha aumenta esta forma contractual y su relevancia global es menor en los países del sur y los impedimentos de cara a que este régimen de tenencia siga consolidándose como una alternativa a la propiedad siguen siendo considerables, dada la indiferencia de una política de vivienda estatal que apueste por el alquiler.

Por otro lado, debido a la acción del mercado, los graves problemas de acceso a la vivienda se han acentuado impactando especialmente sobre el alquiler lo cual incide en los grupos más desfavorecidos, como son los jóvenes cuyo porcentaje viviendo en casa de sus padres ha aumentado convirtiéndose en el más alto. Esto implica la permanencia de una concepción diferente de la solidaridad familiar en los países del sur, en donde la vivienda sigue siendo un asunto familiar (Bonvalet *et al.,* 1993), de modo que, si sus miembros no pueden ayudar económicamente a los jóvenes en su acceso a la vivienda, al menos estos permanecerán en casa. Al mismo tiempo, hay que considerar el notable aumento del porcentaje de personas que no puede hacer frente a los pagos de la vivienda, siendo el más alto de Europa, y su efecto en el gran número de desahucios.

Mientras tanto, otras características propias del sistema de vivienda del sur siguen reforzando su peculiaridad ya que el peso de la vivienda desocupada no solo sigue siendo el más alto, sino que todavía aumenta levemente, mientras que, el peso del alquiler social permanece como el más bajo, habiendo descendido incluso más.

Por tanto, en general, se puede afirmar que el sistema de vivienda en el sur de Europa presenta una singularidad cambiante que le ha convertido en el más ineficiente a la hora de garantizar el bienestar residencial del conjunto de la población.

3 En este sentido, resulta lógico que los sistemas de vivienda resultantes del análisis efectuado en 2007 y en 2015 muestren discordancias con aquellos identificados a nivel teórico, de acuerdo a las distintas contribuciones científicas precedentes, pues los valores que adoptan las variables que los caracterizan no tienen por qué permanecer impasibles en el tiempo al igual que tampoco los países que los componen.

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ANEXOS

RESULTADOS DEL ANÁLISIS DE CONGLOMERADOS 2007

Centros iniciales de los conglomerados

	Conglomerado				
	1	2	3	4	5
% Alquiler	10,90	24,40	25,50	32,90	48,10
% vivienda social	2,60	0,00	17,00	19,00	4,60
% esfuerzo acceso al alquiler	7,70	26,20	18,10	27,20	21,70
% vivienda desocupada	12	35	5	4	8
% Retrasos en los pagos	3,50	7,40	3,60	1,80	2,20
% Jóvenes con padres	72,00	59,20	50,90	15,90	44,00

Historial de iteraciones[a]

Iteración	Cambio en los centros de los conglomerados				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	12,330	9,944	9,090	10,621	0,000
2	2,398	2,254	2,283	2,491	0,000
3	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000

[a] Se ha logrado la convergencia debido a que los centros de los conglomerados no presentan ningún cambio o éste es pequeño. El cambio máximo de coordenadas absolutas para cualquier centro es de ,000. La iteración actual es 3. La distancia mínima entre los centros iniciales es de 27,203.

Centros de los conglomerados finales

	Conglomerado				
	1	2	3	4	5
% Alquiler	12,85	24,46	27,36	31,57	48,10
% vivienda social	3,39	2,12	9,81	20,00	4,60
% esfuerzo acceso al alquiler	12,33	22,18	20,59	28,25	21,70
% vivienda desocupada	17	28	9	9	8
% Retrasos en los pagos	2,20	4,76	2,43	3,55	2,20
% Jóvenes con padres	60,38	58,20	48,76	26,33	44,00

Distancias entre los centros de los conglomerados finales

Conglomerado	1	2	3	4	5
1		19,326	22,729	45,936	40,974
2	19,326		23,088	42,562	34,384
3	22,729	23,088		26,164	21,964
4	45,936	42,562	26,164		29,456
5	40,974	34,384	21,964	29,456	

ANOVA

	Conglomerado		Error		F	Sig.
	Media cuadrática	gl	Media cuadrática	gl		
% Alquiler	499,372	4	38,431	22	12,994	0,000
% vivienda social	308,335	4	27,121	22	11,369	0,000
% esfuerzo acceso al alquiler	226,955	4	16,234	22	13,980	0,000
% vivienda desocupada	362,479	4	48,104	22	7,535	0,001
% Retrasos en los pagos	6,330	4	2,086	22	3,034	0,039
% Jóvenes con padres	1141,300	4	40,708	22	28,036	0,000

Las pruebas F sólo se deben utilizar con una finalidad descriptiva puesto que los conglomerados han sido elegidos para maximizar las diferencias entre los casos en diferentes conglomerados. Los niveles críticos no son corregidos, por lo que no pueden interpretarse como pruebas de la hipótesis de que los centros de los conglomerados son iguales.

Pertenencia a los conglomerados

Número de caso	Países	Conglomerado	Distancia
1	Bélgica	3	10,234
2	Bulgaria	1	9,855
3	República Checa	3	9,415
4	Dinamarca	4	11,923
5	Alemania	5	0,000
6	Estonia	3	17,106
7	Irlanda	3	7,385
8	Grecia	2	8,795
9	España	2	8,980
10	Francia	4	13,304
11	Italia	2	9,339
12	Chipre	2	5,410
13	Letonia	1	5,990
14	Lituania	1	12,187
15	Luxemburgo	3	11,745
16	Hungría	1	12,837
17	Malta	1	18,608
18	Holanda	4	15,574
19	Austria	3	20,812
20	Polonia	3	15,276
21	Portugal	2	6,702
22	Rumania	1	12,240
23	Eslovenia	1	10,517
24	Eslovaquia	1	13,879
25	Finlandia	4	8,192
26	Suecia	4	10,253
27	Reino Unido	4	12,453

RESULTADOS DEL ANÁLISIS DE CONGLOMERADOS 2015

Centros iniciales de los conglomerados

	Conglomerado				
	1	2	3	4	5
% Alquiler	16,30	19,20	24,90	27,30	48,10
% vivienda social	7,50	6,00	,00	13,00	3,90
% esfuerzo acceso al alquiler	19,30	5,00	31,60	30,90	22,40
% vivienda desocupada	2,50	31,80	35,30	9,60	9,00
% Retrasos en los pagos	1,10	2,40	14,30	4,60	2,20
% Jóvenes con padres	60,90	66,10	63,80	20,10	43,10

Historial de iteraciones[a]

Iteración	Cambio en los centros de los conglomerados				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	10,988	11,865	10,291	12,634	13,783
2	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000

[a] Se ha logrado la convergencia debido a que los centros de los conglomerados no presentan ningún cambio o éste es pequeño. El cambio máximo de coordenadas absolutas para cualquier centro es de 0,000. La iteración actual es 2. La distancia mínima entre los centros iniciales es de 30,581.

Centros de los conglomerados finales

	Conglomerado				
	1	2	3	4	5
% Alquiler	15,28	20,13	25,20	33,83	37,75
% vivienda social	3,89	3,73	1,64	19,55	10,78
% esfuerzo acceso al alquiler	20,38	11,95	27,12	28,82	22,78
% vivienda desocupada	11,20	26,15	29,86	11,12	14,55
% Retrasos en los pagos	2,64	3,10	7,66	3,77	2,55
% Jóvenes con padres	55,66	58,75	60,74	28,27	45,22

Distancias entre los centros de los conglomerados finales

Conglomerado	1	2	3	4	5
1		18,105	23,415	37,587	26,048
2	18,105		17,284	43,342	28,201
3	23,415	17,284		42,652	27,587
4	37,587	43,342	42,652		20,729
5	26,048	28,201	27,587	20,729	

ANOVA

	Conglomerado		Error		F	Sig.
	Media cuadrática	gl	Media cuadrática	gl		
% Alquiler	492,022	4	35,113	22	14,013	0,000
% vivienda social	310,449	4	22,890	22	13,562	0,000
% esfuerzo acceso al alquiler	206,862	4	23,810	22	8,688	0,000
% vivienda desocupada	414,832	4	24,986	22	16,602	0,000
% Retrasos en los pagos	23,344	4	4,411	22	5,293	0,004
% Jóvenes con padres	1013,958	4	49,743	22	20,384	0,000

Las pruebas F sólo se deben utilizar con una finalidad descriptiva puesto que los conglomerados han sido elegidos para maximizar las diferencias entre los casos en diferentes conglomerados. Los niveles críticos no son corregidos, por lo que no pueden interpretarse como pruebas de la hipótesis de que los centros de los conglomerados son iguales.

Pertenencia a los conglomerados

Número de caso	Países	Conglomerado	Distancia
1	Bélgica	5	10,939
2	Bulgaria	2	7,449
3	República Checa	1	13,818
4	Dinamarca	4	9,557
5	Alemania	5	13,783
6	Estonia	1	16,851
7	Irlanda	5	9,730
8	Grecia	3	10,291
9	España	3	7,012
10	Francia	4	11,180
11	Italia	3	10,571
12	Chipre	3	10,016
13	Letonia	2	9,452
14	Lituania	1	10,041
15	Luxemburgo	1	15,280
16	Hungría	1	5,414
17	Malta	2	11,865
18	Holanda	4	13,804
19	Austria	5	15,182
20	Polonia	1	10,988
21	Portugal	3	5,979
22	Rumanía	1	13,643
23	Eslovenia	2	8,403
24	Eslovaquia	1	16,664
25	Finlandia	4	12,634
26	Suecia	4	7,323
27	Reino Unido	4	10,193

Artículos / *Articles*

The importance of attitudes towards risk to explain indebtedness in southern European countries / *La importancia de las actitudes hacia el riesgo para explicar el endeudamiento en los países del sur de Europa*

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to analyse the socio-demographic determinants and individuals' attitudes towards risk to explain indebtedness in southern European countries. This analysis is done within the context of an increasing process of financialization of individual behaviour. Our work analyses this process using the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), drawn up by the European Central Bank between 2009 and 2011. The methodological plan consists of a combination of a multiple correspondence analysis in order to identify the various household debt models and a logistic regression analysis in order to detect the explanatory variables that best explain the differences between indebtedness models. The main contribution of this paper is the identification of those variables that explain the economic differences in household debt levels. Results are showing a relevant influence of individual attitudes on indebtedness in Southern Countries in detriment of sociodemographic variables, which are not relevant explanatory factors.

Keywords: indebtedness; financialization; attitudes towards risk and investment; mortgage market; Southern Europe.

RESUMEN

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar los determinantes sociodemográficos y las actitudes de los individuos hacia el riesgo para explicar el endeudamiento en los países del sur de Europa. Este análisis se lleva a cabo en el contexto de un creciente proceso de financiarización del comportamiento individual. Con este fin se utiliza la Encuesta sobre la Situación Financiera y el Consumo de los Hogares (HFCS), elaborada por el Banco Central Europeo entre 2009 y 2011. El plan metodológico consiste en la combinación de un análisis de correspondencias múltiple, para identificar los diversos modelos de deuda de los hogares, y un análisis de regresión logística, para detectar las variables que mejor explican las diferencias entre los modelos de endeudamiento. Los resultados muestran la influencia de las actitudes individuales sobre el endeudamiento en los países del sur de Europa, en detrimento de las variables sociodemográficas.

Palabras clave: *endeudamiento; financiarización; actitudes hacia el riesgo y la inversión; mercado hipotecario; sur de Europa.*

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of household indebtedness. Reduced entry barriers to loans and low interest rates in the years leading up to the crisis have been shown to have caused a sharp hike in private debt. The economic recession linked to the banking sector had a clear impact on household domestic economies, particularly in the case of peripheral EU member states, namely Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, for whom the crisis brought high levels of unemployment. Although the distribution of private debt in each of these countries varies considerably, radical changes to income and the structure of the labour market have immersed large sectors of the population into situations of financial anguish.

The aim of this paper is to analyse indebtedness patterns in southern European households. Firstly, it analyses the socio-economic characteristics associated with the varying degrees and types of indebtedness of households in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. Secondly, it examines the determinants underlying indebtedness in these countries; in other words, the existence or non-existence of a structurally analogue pattern of indebtedness determined by a number of factors that shape the relationship between the debtor and the creditor bank. Finally it addresses the extent to which households' growing participation in the credit market is attributable to the influence of the financialization process on the economic behaviour of both individuals and households[1], reflected in the emergence of new financial consumer models based on the figure of the investor and new values related to money and the perception of risk and confidence.

In order to address these objectives, this paper is divided into three sections. The first provides a theoretical background to our research, based on three premises: the social structure of indebtedness; the institutional determinants underlying the indebtedness of southern European households; and the process of households' financialization. The article then describes the methodological approach adopted, including a description of the source of the data employed, namely the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey, the key variables and the results obtained from the multivariate analysis techniques selected and the binary logistic regression analysis. Finally, based on the findings obtained from the statistical analysis, the third section includes a theoretical interpretation and possible future lines of study based on the phenomenon of the financialization of daily life.

SOCIALLY STRUCTURED INDEBTEDNESS OR A PERIPHERAL MODEL?

Private household indebtedness within a specific culture and social structure has been widely addressed both in the fields of economics and economic anthropology. Yet surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the underlying institutional determinants of the economic behaviour of households and individuals from a sociological perspective. The sole exceptions to this are the contributions made by authors such as Zelizer (2011), Carruthers (2005) and more recently Lazzarato (2012).

Economic literature has amply considered the socio-demographic variables that determine the degree of household indebtedness. These variables are considered to be universal factors that act outside the institutional or cultural context. The starting point for analysing the factors that condition credit demand is Keynes' 'fundamental psychological law', according to which the population's consumer spending rises in line with the increase in their income, albeit not as much as said increase in income (Keynes, 1981: 93). Taking Keynes' consumption function as a basis, James Duesenberry developed his relative income theory, rooted in the notions that the capacity to save is the result of a conflicting desire to improve the current standard of living and to secure future wellbeing through saving (Duesenberry, 1972: 54). Two key aspects

1 This analysis considers both units of analysis (individuals and households). The HFCS questionnaire consists of two main parts: 1) questions relating to the household as a whole, including questions on real assets and their financing, other liabilities and credit constraints, private businesses, financial assets, intergenerational transfers and gifts, and consumption and saving; 2) questions relating to individual household members, covering sociodemographic variables.

influence the choice between these two options: habit formation and the interdependence of consumer preferences.

In contrast, Friedman's permanent income hypothesis refutes Keynes' theory by claiming that when making consumption and saving decisions, consumers consider their income over a period of many years and not merely at a specific moment in time. Friedman's ideas are based on long-term considerations, as individuals make spending decisions in accordance with expected future income, adapting consumption to expectations (Friedman: 1973: 37-56). Modigliani takes these ideas a stage further, positing a life cycle hypothesis whereby people's decisions at any given time reflect a fairly conscientious effect to spread expenditure evenly over all stages of their lives, although this is subject to the limitations imposed by the resources they obtain. Their wish is to achieve a stable degree of consumption, and in this sense saving and credit represent a means of sustaining a balanced and homogenous spending trajectory at each stage of the life cycle (Modigliani, 1966).

Recent economic literature has revealed a series of other factors in order to explain consumption and indebtedness. Iacovello (2008) created a model intended to shed light on indebtedness dynamics in US households based on income inequality. This model revealed that consumption inequality increases less than income inequality, and that the sharp hike in indebtedness in the USA is attributable to the widening gap in income equality. Foster and Magdoff (2009) claim that the factor that currently drives consumption is the unequal distribution of wealth. According to these authors, the working class spends the majority or even all its income on consumption, whilst the capitalist class channels a large percentage of its income into investments. In the USA consumer spending has risen at a faster rate than income, and it is within this context of wage stagnation that the working class resorts to loans in order to maintain or improve their standard of living (Foster and Magdoff, 2009: 41-51).

In this sense, socio-demographic variables such as rent or age contribute to explaining household indebtedness regardless of the institutional and cultural context. However, debt is a highly complex social phenomenon conditioned by cultural and institutional factors that hinder the simpler study of its socio-demographic determinants. The following section addresses these issues, with particular reference to the specific case of peripheral Southern Europe.

CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS OF INDEBTEDNESS

Debt and indebtedness are relative, non-absolute concepts. Indebtedness refers to debtors' capacity to comply with a monetary undertaking acquired over a particular period of time. It compromises debtors' present and future income, as the loan conditions are determined by estimates regarding their future solvency; in other words, their projected capacity to repay the monetary loan and its corresponding interest. Yet it also refers to the regulatory and cultural system governing the moral obligation to repay the loan or the various reasons that drive individuals into debt (Graeber, 2012).

Debt, seen as a contract or social agreement between two parties, therefore implies a complex power relationship between creditor and debtor, mediated by institutions that determine their rights and obligations (Carruthers, 2005). These institutions encompass a series of social and cultural practices, sustained either by legal regulations or moral sanctions.

Although the emphasis on culture and regulatory considerations in order to explain economic and institutional practices is not new, in recent years it has acquired greater relevance. Nevertheless, despite the growing sociological interest in considering the institutional determinants of private indebtedness, the study of indebtedness patterns from a comparative perspective has been systematically overlooked. Applying this analysis to southern European countries is of particular importance given the challenges facing economic integration in peripheral Southern Europe.

In this sense, an initial issue for consideration is the feasibility of considering southern European countries as a homogenous model in cultural and institutional terms[2]. Although academic literature

2 We are not referring here to the regulatory models governing indebtedness relating to mortgage legislation

dismisses the notion of a homogenous welfare model for Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, it has identified a fourth European welfare model comprising the Mediterranean states (Ferrara, 1996). This poses the question of the degree to which families' economic behaviour could reflect similar patterns in peripheral Europe, whilst at the same time reflecting similar challenges in terms of Europe's integration and convergence processes.

This so-called fourth world of welfare is characterised by a series of common cultural and institutional features that combine elements from other European welfare models within a social context marked by a strong sense of family (Moreno, 2002; Ferrara, 2004) and a clear leaning towards a pension-based social protection system to the detriment of other aspects. This hybrid welfare model (Esping Andernsen, 2010) involves similarities between the integration strategies posited by the European Union and adopted by socio-economic agents of southern European countries, together with the impact they have had and continue to have on the economy and public finances of these countries (Bruszt and Vukov, 2017).

However, and as discussed earlier, this does not imply the existence of a homogenous welfare model among southern European countries, particularly in the light of the considerable rise in internal diversity of welfare models in peripheral Europe from the 1990s onwards (González and Luque, 2015). The 2007-2008 financial crisis and consequent adjustment processes have revealed major differences in the structural imbalances of public finance, as well as varying effects on the so-called 'adjustment policies' of social protection systems (Aristegui *et al.,* 2017).

This combined diversity and consistency that characterise Southern Europe has led to the systematic review of the term 'Mediterranean model', particularly in the wake of its increasing fragmentation. As a result, references to the diversity that characterises Mediterranean states include not only the nature of social protection systems, but also the impact of the 2007-2008 crisis on the various countries analysed, the resulting adjustment policies and the measures adopted by the European Commission, the CEB and the IMF (the so-called 'European Troika') in order to guarantee compliance with Maastricht convergence criteria regarding public indebtedness and deficit.

On the other hand, southern European countries also share similar EU economic integration strategies aimed at deregulating the movement of capital, guaranteeing the free market and creating the necessary regulatory bodies (Bruszt and Vukov, 2017). The extent to which the impact of integration in peripheral Southern Europe has further weakened the economies of these countries, heightening the diversity of the so-called Mediterranean model, has to date received scant attention from literature on European integration, apart from a few notable exceptions such as the work by Offe (2015) Streeck and Schafer (2013) or Esping Andersen (2010).

The reasons provided above for the co-existence of common features and a high degree of heterogeneity within the Mediterranean model has led us to apply a new meaning to the concept of 'international regimes' in order to describe the set of explicit and implicit regulations, principles and rules that encompass actors' expectations in a specific aspect of social life; in this case the institutional framework for indebtedness. In this sense, this article attempts to determine the existence or non-existence of a common pattern of indebtedness for Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain that reflects a regulatory-institutional basis favouring such practices, as well as a set of similar values regarding housing and consumption.

FINANCIALIZATION PROCESSES: A MOVE TOWARDS A COMMON PERIPHERAL MODEL OF INDEBTEDNESS IN SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES?

Financialization is the most commonly-used concept in the social sciences to define the increasingly significant role financial systems play in contemporary societies. It refers to a shift in the capital accumulation model from industry-based

or civil and business regulations regarding loan contracts, but instead to the cultural models and welfare regimes that supposedly condition individual economic practices.

capitalism to an alternative, finance-based model (Ertuk *et al.,* 2008). Although this process can be considered an economic phenomenon, its origin and effects are political and social. Economic sociology studies in this field cover a wide range of aspects, yet also share a common interest in analysing changing behavioural patterns in household economies, the State, financial and non-financial institutions, their participation in financial markets and their impact on the capital accumulation model (Crouch, 2009).

In terms of individual and household economic practices, financialization refers to the rapid encroachment of the financial sector into various aspects of everyday goods and service consumption, housing, insurance and pensions. Today, financial institutions are increasingly focused on the business opportunities presented by individuals. This is the result of the considerable expansion of financial markets and the growing participation of non-bank financial intermediaries (Lapavitsas, 2009: 7-8). Financialization has revealed the emergence of new economic and financial values that are spreading to everyday economic practices, whilst at the same time disseminating new patterns of economic behaviour (Lapavitsas, 2009: 8-10).

Financialization brings with it a core concept: risk. In developed consumer societies, risk also represents market opportunities. 'As a result, the deployment of the risk society has highlighted the contrasts between those affected by risk and those that benefit from it' (Beck, 2013: 65). Martin *et al.* (2008) took this notion a stage further, arguing that the actions resulting from financialization represent a new ontology for 21st century life, whereby risk is not merely a form of calculation or of knowledge, but is also a form of being (2008: 122).

Public institutions have played a key role in promoting this type of behaviour within a process that Martin (2002) termed as 'the financialization of daily life', seen as the promotion of public policies that shift responsibility for welfare provision from the State to individuals. Consequently, the US Government's decision to free access to the mortgage market began as a means of transferring social guarantees and rights from the State to financial markets, manipulating assets and promising major earnings (Martin, 2002: 20-33).

In this sense, it is worth considering the degree to which the financialization of daily life represents a process of convergence amongst European societies in general and southern European countries in particular. Such a process would appear to indicate the emergence of a pattern of economic behaviour in keeping with an incomplete accumulation model (Ertuk *et al.,* 2007) known as finance capitalism (Jessop, 2013) in line with societies such as the USA and United Kingdom. This model is characterised by an intense relationship between households and the financial system and the predominance of values in daily life that are characteristic of this sector, as well as the emergence of a new accumulation pattern of capital earnings obtained from financial investments rather than through trade and commodity production (Arrighi, 1994; Krippner, 2005). The analysis of the possible existence of a common cultural pattern of behaviour in southern European countries is not something new in the sociological literature. Main contributions on this field have been focused on the political behaviour of the euro-Mediterranean area (see Torcal, 2010) and, as mentioned before, a common number of cultural, social and economic structures (Esping-Andersen, 2010). However coherently with the main contributions of this paper, it is not possible talking about a common pattern of values and attitudes in southern European countries, but on a heterogeneous practices common to different welfare regimes (Calzada *et al.,* 2013).

Literature on financialisation of daily life has focused primarily on the analysis of individual behaviour in the USA and the UK (Martin, 2002). There are few exceptions based on empirical grounds for cases outside the Anglo-American context (Di Feliciantonio and Aalbers, 2017). This paper aims to take the first step to fill this gap and open a new research agenda on the cultural determinants of economic action for Southern countries. For this purpose we have included in our methodological design the importance of individual attitudes towards risk and investment.

METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN

The working hypotheses

In the light of the contributions above mentioned, the first hypothesis presented in this article refers to the socio-demographic conditioning of credit behaviour. In line with the work of Foster and Magdoff (2009), Friedman (1973) and Modigliani (1966), amongst others, individual credit behaviour is conditioned by their position within a specific social structure determined by variables that include sex, age, occupation, level of education, income or marital status. We therefore hypothesize that:

Hypotheses 1. Credit behaviour in southern European households is conditioned by socio-demographic determinants that are common to countries analysed, which constitute a homogenous model of indebtedness.

Secondly, and closely linked to the previous hypothesis, our intention is to analyse the extent to which it is possible to identify a financialized indebtedness model, associated with loan contracts as a tool for investment rather than use, or with the acquisition of financial products used as guarantees for prior loan contracts; in other words, economic behaviour based on the commercialisation of risk as an indicator of financialized behaviour (Hardie, 2011).

Financialization is a process which has led to certain political, economic and social transformations (Massó and Yruela, 2017). However, in this paper we focus on the process of financialization of households and individuals, understood as a set of attitudes towards financial risk that take place in the field of everyday life. By analysing households and individuals' behaviour in terms of values and attitudes towards indebtedness and financial risk, we could explore the possibility of convergence or divergence towards a common economic culture in Southern Europe. We therefore expect that:

Hypotheses 2. Individuals' attitudes towards indebtedness in Southern Europe indicate a process of convergence towards a financialized model.

Case study presentation: indebtedness in southern European households

Our analysis focuses on the cases of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. Peripheral economies have experienced a sharp hike in indebtedness for more than a decade and particularly following the creation of the euro (Lapavitsas, 2014). The largest percentage of this debt in terms of the GDP corresponds to the private sector, and specifically the case of financial and non-financial corporations.

Indebtedness patterns in southern European countries must be interpreted within the institutional context shaped by their welfare and labour market system and the industrial development and economic policy, among others. A number of variants in European capitalism can be identified in Southern Europe: the late industrialisation, the importance of agriculture and tourism, high levels of land speculation linked to urban development and the important presence of small family businesses (Calzada *et al.,* 2013; Esping-Andersen, 2010). This region is also characterised by its dual market nature, in the sense that we find both robust and technologically advanced business sectors as well as SMEs that constitute the predominant model of the business tissue.

The 2008 economic crisis has had a similar effect on countries within the area, where the impact of the recession was particularly severe resulting in loss of activity, rising unemployment and inequality, welfare cuts and social movements. Whilst Spain and Portugal registered high household debt levels —lower than the European average, the level of household indebtedness in Greece, and particularly Italy, were amongst the lowest in Europe. However, it must also be noted that in the case of Greece, these levels have experienced a steady rise and are now practically on a level with those of Spain (Figure 1).

As for mortgage contract indebtedness, the model in Portugal and Spain is clearly associated with the real estate and building sectors, resulting in a financial-property bubble stemming from private over-indebtedness (Lapavitsas, 2014). The analysis of mortgage debt and GDP reveals that Spain, Portugal and Italy have significantly high

Figure 1. Total household debt. GDP percentage.



Source: Eurostat.

levels, whilst Greece ranks amongst the lowest in Europe. However, in comparison with Greece, mortgage growth rates were significantly high during the years leading up to the crisis in Spain, Italy and Portugal (Figure 2).

The database

For the purpose of this research we have used data provided by the European Central Bank and obtained from the 2010 Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). The main objective is to estimate the impact of socio-economic variables on demand and the accumulation of insured and uninsured debt in European households. In 2008, the European Central Bank decided to conduct a survey into the financial situation and consumption of households in 15 countries in the Euro-area. Most of the data was collected in 2010; the sole exceptions were Greece and Spain, where the fieldwork was carried out between 2008 and 2009.

The HFCS questionnaire comprises various topic-based sections designed to collect socio-demographic information, details of real assets and their financing, liability, credit limitations, financial assets, pensions, income and consumer spending. The universe was made up of all private households and their residents in the country at the time of data collection. The sample includes around 54,000 interviews, although the number varies from one country to another, not necessarily in proportion to their size.

Two statistical analyses were carried out using HFCS micro data: one of an exploratory nature using a multiple correspondence analysis; and a second dependence analysis, using the binary logistic regression technique. As shown in Table 1, 14 variables were selected, grouped into three topic-based blocks. The first includes socio-demographic characteristics that positioned individuals within a specific social structure. The second block is formed by variables that shed light on households' loan behaviour. The third and final block contains the variables related to attitudes towards investment and risk.

Figure 2. House purchase loans in %.



Source: Euro area statistics.

RESULTS

We have carried out a multiple correspondences followed by a binary logistic regression analysis to answer the proposed hypothesis and evaluate, on the one hand, the relationship between loan behaviour in southern European households and the socio-demographic determinants; and on the other, whether this loan behaviour indicates a process of convergence towards a financialised model of economic behaviour

The socio-demographic determinants of southern European indebtedness

Analysing the social structure of indebtedness requires the contextualisation of households' loan practices and attitudes towards credit in accordance with their socio-demographic characteristics in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.

The results of the discrimination analysis (Table 2) show that in the first dimension, the variables relating to loan activity condense the greatest explanatory variance. In the case of the second dimension, socio-demographic variables and those related to the informal loan system and attitudes to risk display the highest degree of relevance.

These conclusions are supported by the graph depicting the discrimination mean values for the two required dimensions (Figure 3). In the MCA (Figure 3), variables concerning both units of analysis (individuals and households) are considered. It is very interesting as it seems that, in fact, there are two dimensions: one in which households variables conform dimension 1, and, a second one, in which individuals' sociodemographic variables are significantly grouped (dimension 2). The variables positioned furthest from origin (0.0) are characterised by their major contribution in defining the dimension. The graph confirms that the variables that display the best degree of discrimination in order to interrelate the various categories are Country; Mortgages or loans using HMR as collateral; HMR mortgage: loan refinancing; and HMR mortgage: purpose for the loan, as they contribute a high degree of dispersion and distance from the centroid.

In order to facilitate the factor interpretation process, all the categories of variables were

Table 1. Variables selected from the HFCS (2010).

Code		Variable
SOCIODEMOGRAFIC VARIABLES	SA0100	**Country:** Spain / Italy / Greece / Portugal
	PA0100	**Marital status:** single or never married / married / consensual union on a legal basis / widowed / divorced
	PA0200	**Highest level of education completed:** primary or below / lower secondary / upper secondary / tertiary
	PE0100	**Labour status:** doing regular work for pay, self-employed, working in family businesses / on sick, maternity, other leave (except holidays), planning to return to work / unemployed / student, pupil, unpaid intern / retiree or early retiree / permanently disabled / compulsory military service or equivalent social service / fulfilling domestic tasks / other not working for pay
	RA0200	**Gender:** male / female
	RA0300	**Age:** 16-25 / 26-35 / 36-50 / 51-64 / 65+
FINANCIAL VARIABLES	HB1000	**Mortgages or loans using Household Main Residence (HMR) as collateral:** yes / no
	HB1100	**HMR mortgage:** loan refinancing: yes / no
	HB1200	**HMR mortgage: purpose of the loan:** to purchase the HMR / to purchase another real estate asset / to refurbish or renovate the residence / to buy a vehicle or other means of transport / to finance a business or professional activity / to consolidate other consumption debts / for education purposes / to cover living expenses or other purchases
	HC0300	**Household has a credit card:** yes / no
	HC1310	**Was refused credit:** yes, turned down / yes, not given as much credit / no
	HD1800	**Investment attitudes:** take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns / take above average financial risk expecting to earn above average returns / take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns / not willing to take any financial risk
	HI0600	**Last 12 month expenses were below/above income:** expenses exceeded income / expenses about the same as income, /expenses less than income
	HI0800	**Ability to get financial assistance from friends or relatives:** yes / no

Source: authors' own based on HFCS micro data (2010).

grouped in the dimension in which they displayed high coordinates (Tables 3 and 4).

Observing the coordinates in relation to centroid for each category of variables allows us to define the characteristics that typify the dimensions:

Dimension 1: This dimension includes the Spanish and Italian cases. In terms of the sociodemographic profile, it is made up of individuals aged between 36 and 65 and over, although the majority falls within the latter age group. This explains the prevalence of married individuals, who are either self-employed or employed but also inactive, disabled or carry out domestic tasks[3]. Fur-

3 According to the Workforce Survey the unemployment rate for the third quarter of 2017 stood at 16.38 %. By sex, the difference between unemployment rates for men and women is almost 4 pints (14.80 % and 18.21 % respectively). The endemic problem of youth unemployment remains, registering a rate of 35.97 % (Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 2017).

Table 2. Discrimination mean values.

	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Mean
Country	0.508	0.692	0.600
Mortgages or loans using HMR as collateral	0.814	0.186	0.500
HMR mortgage: loan refinancing	0.708	0.069	0.388
HMR mortgage: purpose of the loan	0.712	0.071	0.392
Household has a credit card	0.422	0.223	0.322
Was refused credit	0,172	0,020	0,096
Investment attitudes	0,056	0,221	0,139
Ability to get financial assistance from friends or relatives	0,005	0,355	0,180
Last 12 month expenses were below/above income	0,051	0,226	0,138
Marital status	0,062	0,195	0,129
Highest level of education completed	0,073	0,023	0,048
Labour status	0,060	0,376	0,218
Gender	0,061	0,007	0,034
Age	0,055	0,405	0,230
Total household gross income	0,260	0,271	0,265
Total assets	4,018	3,339	3,678

Source: authors' own based on HFCS micro data (2010).

thermore, all categories included in the loan variables score in this dimension with the exception of those items relating to the variable "Ability to get financial assistance from friends or relatives". The analysis of the highest scores reveals that all the loan variables differ in this factor, and therefore the universe included in this dimension tends to have loans pending repayment, has experienced cash flow limitations at some time and resorts to the use of credit cards as a means of deferring payment. As for their attitude towards investment, this group assumes a substantial level of risk in the expectation of obtaining high returns; in other words, they are willing to accept a high level of risk. In this group, age is confirmed as a decisive factor when incurring debt. This indicates that life cycle dictates a greater or lesser acceptance of indebtedness, as these loan practices tend to appear later in life.

Dimension 2. This dimension includes households in Greece and Portugal. The respondents' profile is that of a very young group (16-35) with a high level of education (tertiary). Regarding the Marital Status variable, items related to single status, cohabitation, widowhood and divorce all scored. This is an economically inactive sector, as they claim to be unemployed, on sick leave or studying. Consequently, the variables relating to loan behaviour have little weight in this factor. This is a highly trained segment of the population, whom, given their youth, are immersed in a phase of inactivity. Nevertheless, the case of the 26-35 age group is worthy of mention, as despite falling into the category of young adults, they remain affected by the instability of the labour market. As a result, they experience cash flow difficulties and are forced to resort to an informal system of loans (financial support from friends and relatives). As for their at-

Figure 3. Discrimination mean values, Dimension 1 and 2. Symmetrical normalisation.



Source: authors' own based on HFCS micro data (2010).

titude towards investment, they are not willing to assume risks.

The multiple correspondence analysis reveals a link between the socio-demographic and loan variables analysed. They have all been grouped in two dimensions that differentiate between Spain and Italy on the one hand, and Greece and Portugal on the other. The first dimension, which includes Spanish and Italian households, reflects a socio-demographic profile of an indebted group aged between 36 and 65 and over. Their consumption strategies are linked to credit, and therefore they tend to have loans pending repayment. In this dimension, the profile that emerges is that of a group ready to assume a high level of risk in the hope of obtaining a high degree of return. The second dimension comprises households in Greece and Portugal. Unlike their first dimension, the socio-demographic profile is that of a young group aged under 35. An unstable job market excludes them from the formal loan system and therefore they are not prepared to assume risk.

The multiple correspondence analysis provides a descriptive insight into the indebtedness of southern European households. In order to obtain explanatory models, we will now address the principal conclusions that can be drawn from the binary logistic regression analysis.

Table 3. Centroid coordinates for Dimension 1.

Variable	Categories	Centroid coordinates
Country	Spain	–1.293
	Italy	1.143
Mortgages or loans using HMR as collateral	Yes	–3.026
HMR mortgage: loan refinancing	Yes	–3.321
	No	–2.999
HMR mortgage: purpose of the loan	To purchase the HMR	–3.113
	To purchase another real estate asset	–2.113
	To refurbish or renovate the residence	–2.366
	To buy a vehicle or other means of transport	–1.953
	To finance a business or professional activity	–2.515
	To consolidate other consumption debts	–3.604
	To cover living expenses or other purchases	–2.236
	Other	–4.095
Household has a credit card	Yes	–0.961*
	No	0.857
Was refused credit	Yes, not given as much credit	–2.410
	No	–2.022
Investment attitudes	Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns	–0.240
	Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns	1.107*
Marital status	Married	0.425*
	Consensual union on a legal basis	–1.347*
Highest level of education completed	Primary or below	–1.172
	Lower secondary	0.585
	Upper secondary	0.351
	Tertiary	0.361*
Labour status	Doing regular work for pay/self-employed/working in a family business	0.162
	Permanently disabled	0.894
	Fulfilling domestic tasks	–0.429
	Other not working for pay	0.891
Gender	Male	0.337
	Female	0.403
Age	36-50	0.96
	51-64	0.489
	65 +	–1.145
Total household gross income	20.001-50.000	–0.873
	+50.000	–1.491*

NB*: The category is included in both dimensions as it obtained a very similar score, i.e. "correspondence".
Source: authors' own based on HFCS micro data (2010).

Table 4. Centroid coordinates for dimension 2.

Variable	Categories	Centroid coordinates
Country	Greece	–1,233
	Portugal	–1,650
Mortgages or loans using HMR as collateral	No	0,647
HMR mortgage: purpose of the loan	For education purposes	–5,531
Household has a credit card	Yes	0,931*
Was refused credit	Yes, turned down	–1,637
Investment attitudes	Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns	1,200
	Not willing to take any financial risk	–0,262
Ability to get financial assistance from friends or relatives	Yes	–1,403
	No	–1,624
Marital status	Single/never married	1,088
	Married	–0,496*
	Consensual union on a legal basis	1,484
	Widowed	–1,235
	Divorced	–0,618
Highest level of education completed	Tertiary	–0,413*
Labour status	On sick/maternity/other leave, planning to return to work	1,462
	Student/pupil/unpaid intern	2,357
	Retiree or early retiree	–1,111
	Compulsory military service or equivalent social service	3,264
Age	16-25	2,152
	26-35	0,441
Total household gross income	Until 10.000	–1,231
	10.001-20.000	–0,746
	+50.000	1,557*

NB*: The category is included in both dimensions as it obtained a very similar score, i.e. “correspondence”.
Source: authors’ own based on HFCS micro data (2010).

Convergence towards financialized behaviour?

A binary logistic regression model with a twofold objective has been carried out: firstly, to examine the factors underlying the indebtedness of households in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, and secondly, to study the possible existence of a growing convergence towards an analogue financialized model among southern European states. Whilst the multiple correspondence analysis sheds light on indebtedness in peripheral Europe, the logistic regression analysis seeks to provide an insight into the variables underlying the pattern for households' private debt. This dependence technique for qualitative variables was selected due to the high number of independent variables and its simple interpretation.

Debt is the dependent variable, the result of a process of variable calculation and transformation. Two metric variables from the HCFS database —Outstanding balance of mortgage debt and Outstanding balance of other, non-mortgage debt— were added together to create a new variable that included the households' total insured and uninsured debt. This new variable was then divided into 'yes' (debt) and 'no' (debt) in order to conduct the regression analysis.

Initially, various models containing the set of independent variables included in the methodological design were considered. At a later stage, all the socio-demographic variables were ruled out as they shed no light on dependent variable behaviour. The final independent variables included in the logistic regression model were 'Investment attitudes, 'Last 12 months' expenses were below/above income' and 'Ability to get financial assistance from friends or relatives'.

It is important to highlight the lack of statistical significance of the socio-demographic variables in the logistic regression model, therefore ruling out the possibility of a homogenous model of indebtedness forged by the socio-demographic profile of the population. In this sense, there is no empirical evidence to back the first hypothesis posed in our research. Notwithstanding the fact that cultural and attitudinal variables have a relevant influence to explain patterns of credit behaviour in detriment of socio-demographic variables, opens up new lines of research.

Below is a table summarising the binary logistic regression model. It includes the variables that were statistically significant in terms of their contribution to the model's log-likelihood. Table 5 shows those variables that exert a greater influence on the probability that a southern European household will incur a debt (either insured or uninsured).

Table 5 reveals that all the variables included in the model are significant (with a significance level of less than 0.05), with the exception of one of the response categories for the variable Last 12 month expenses were below/above income. The coefficients (B) associated with the model's significant co-variables were positive, indicating that the variable for each coefficient (B) increases the probability of Y. Also worthy of note is the variable Investment attitudes, with a significance level of $p<0.001$ and high coefficients and is therefore the variable that most impacts on the likelihood of Y; in other words, the probability of households incurring debt. Finally, the table shows the statistics in terms of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, in order to contrast the null hypothesis that there are no differences between observed and predicted values based on the regression model (Cea, 2004). The statistics indicate a high level of significance (greater than 0.05), and therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating that the model adjusts well to the data.

This section has described the construction of a logistic regression model intended to identify the factors underlying the variability of indebtedness in southern European households. Interaction between income and expenditure, financial support from friends and relatives or attitudes towards investment have a positive relationship with indebtedness. This regression model suggests that the likelihood that households and individuals of Southern Europe will incur debt, is related to the following: the management of personal finances; having a strong personal network, namely 'informal system of credit'; and the level of risk tolerance.

The three variables included in the model impact directly on the likelihood that households in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain will incur debt. These variables include an element of a vision

Table 5. Household indebtedness: logistic regression analysis coefficients (2010).

	B	E.T.	Wald	GL	Sig.	Exp(B)
Last 12 month expenses were below/ above income (Expenses exceeded income reference category)			29.216	2	0.000***	
Expenses about the same as income	0.334	0.087	14.837	1	0.000***	1.397
Expenses less than income	-0.068	0.062	1.193	1	0.275	0.935
Ability to get financial assistance from friends or relatives (yes reference category)	0.119	0.052	5.217	1	0.022*	1.127
Investment attitudes (Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns reference category)			125.134	3	0.000***	
Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns	0.753	0.190	15.680	1	0.000***	2.123
Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns	0.822	0.161	26.140	1	0.000***	2.275
Not willing to take any financial risk	0.725	0.075	93.274	1	0.000***	2.066
Constant	-0.984	0.072	189.338	1	0.000***	0.374
N	7280					
Hosmer -Lemeshow test	Chi squared 7.045					
	Sig. 0.217					

*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
Source: authors' own based on HFCS micro data (2010).

forged by a specific system of values and beliefs, although this will vary in each of the four countries analysed. Despite their significance, the findings are not sufficiently sound in order to prove the existence of a process of financialization convergence in Southern Europe. It is therefore not possible to contrast the second hypothesis due to the lack of evidence of a common cultural framework in peripheral Europe.

CONCLUSIONS

Regarding the first hypothesis, the analyses conducted have failed to reveal the existence of a stable loan behaviour pattern based on the socio-demographic values studied. The fact that these variables could not be included in the logistic regression model due to their lack of statistical significance prevents us from identifying a social structure based on these positional variables. The lack of empirical evidence as to how these variables relate to one another within a specific social structure is attributable to the complex nature of debt, determined by multiple cultural and institutional factors that prevents the mere statistical analysis of their socio-demographic determinants. It is therefore not possible to consider sex, age, marital status, employment situation or income as determinants of indebtedness in the case of peripheral households, thereby confirming the inexistence of a homogenous social structure for loans in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.

In contrast, the binary logistic regression analysis did reveal the existence of various behavioural patterns related to risk and savings management; in other words, various models of indebtedness determined by cultural factors. Indeed, one particular variable has been identified as having a direct impact on household indebtedness, namely the attitude towards investment and risk. Since the early studies into the relationship between wealth and the aversion to risk conducted by Arrow and Pratt in the 1960s and 1970s, people's attitudes to risk have played a key role in many economic fields (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1974). Total household income is normally the mean used for repaying accumulated debt. However, this income is vulnerable to cyclical upsets such as redundancy or economic instability, thereby generating uncertainty regarding the ability to meet loan repayments. In this sense, it is understandable that household attitudes to risk play a key role in the decision to apply for a loan.

Based on the results of the multiple correspondence analysis, Spanish and Italian households adopt a far more wary attitude to investment than their Greek and Portuguese counterparts. The formers are prepared to assume a high degree of risk in order to obtain an equally high return, whilst the latter prefer to opt for a greater sense of security. The results of our analysis indicate that Spanish and Italian households are far more inclined to incur debt than those in Greece and Portugal. However, the exploratory, non-casual nature of the multivariant technique employed does not allow for the categorical confirmation of these two peripheral models of indebtedness, thereby not contrasting the second hypothesis of our research. Moreover, the precarious common trajectory of European integration observed amongst southern European countries and the economic instability of all four countries in 2008, should be taken into account when analysing households' attitudes towards financial risk as an explanatory variable to the decision to incur debt. Therefore, we cannot confirm the convergence towards a common financialization process in southern European countries due to their socio-economic, political and cultural diversity. In the light of the above, it becomes necessary to open up new lines of research focused on the study of the impact of cultural values on attitudes towards indebtedness and their relation with the institutional context of each country.

In short, the differences between the system of values between countries leads us to consider the extent to which such culturally divergent aspects can explain international differences in financial systems and practices, and specifically the various financialized models of indebtedness. These relevant differences between the financial and indebtedness practices of households raise questions that should be addressed within a new field of research that considers cultural and institutional aspects in its analysis of financial problems.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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Agradecimientos: En una sección a parte enumerar todas las personas que han proporcionado algún tipo de ayuda o soporte durante la investigación (pruebas de lectura, revisión bibliográfica, etc.)

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Un breve resumen de entre 100 y 150 palabras en español e inglés. El resumen en español llevará como título RESUMEN y en inglés ABSTRACT

Cinco palabras clave separadas por comas en español e inglés que llevarán como título Palabras clave: Palabra 1, palabras 2, palabras 3

Keywords: Palabra1, palabra 2, palabra 3

Con el fin de aumentar la visibilidad de su artículo sugerimos las siguientes recomendaciones:

El título debe ser claro y descriptivo. Debe reflejar el contenido del trabajo e incluir los términos más relevantes (que se utilizarán también como palabras clave). Se debe utilizar el menor número de palabras posibles y no utilizar acrónimos, códigos, abreviaturas o palabras entrecomilladas.

El resumen debe incluir las palabras clave o sinónimos de las mismas (los robots de búsqueda de información utilizan las palabras claves y sinónimos). Por ejemplo, para saber si un documento es adecuado para una búsqueda que utilice la expresión "derechos humanos", el buscador considerará más relevantes los documentos que también contengan términos como "democracia", libertad", "justicia" Debe evitarse la inclusión de referencias bibliográficas en el resumen siempre que sea posible.

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b) No justificar el texto.
c) No sangrar el comienzo de los párrafos.
d) Todas las abreviaturas estarán descritas la primera vez que se mencionen.

5. Los distintos apartados del texto **no deben ir numerados** y se escribirán como sigue:
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6. Todas las **tablas y figuras** estarán numeradas correctamente (números arábigos para tablas y figuras).

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Leyenda:
Figura 1 Título de la tabla (Times New Roman, tamaño 11. Primera letra en mayúscula)
Fuente: Esta es la fuente (Times New Roman, tamaño 11)

Los títulos de las Figuras no deben de formar o estar incluidos en la misma. Deben situarse como texto normal en el lugar donde se desea colocar la imagen.

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Leyenda de las tablas:
Tabla 1 Título de la tabla.
Fuente: Esta es la fuente

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Dos autores:

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c) Capítulo de un libro:

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d) Referencias de internet:

Spencer, H. (2001). The Sociology of Herbert Spencer (en línea). http://www.spencer/info/sociology/opus5.pdf, acceso 1 de Abril de 2011.

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