Artículos / *Articles*

Diversity and secularization in Europe. Analyzing the correlation between indexes of religiosity and cultural diversity in Europe / *Diversidad y secularización en Europa. Análisis de la correlación entre los índices de religiosidad y diversidad cultural en Europa*

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ABSTRACT

The fast globalization of the second half of the 20th century and the advent of new demographic and migratory trends have awakened the social sciences to the growing complexity of regional cultural dynamics. Social scientists have begun to associate cultural diversity with modernity, predicting it as an inescapable and perennial condition of modern societies that affects, and is affected by, religious phenomena. However, few systematic, in-depth empirical researches have been made to assess these assertions. Thus, our paper puts forward the formulation of a diversity index (independent variable) based on four dimensions —linguistic, ethnic, religious, and place of birth— that is correlated with a (dependent) variable of individual religiosity. We conclude that, for the set of European countries and for the time period under analysis (1999-2014), theories of cultural diversity that link diversity to the displacement and recomposition of religiosity have no empirical validity.

RESUMEN

La rápida globalización de la segunda mitad del siglo xx y el advenimiento de nuevas tendencias demográficas y migratorias han despertado el interés de las ciencias sociales por la creciente complejidad de las dinámicas culturales regionales. Los científicos sociales han comenzado a asociar la diversidad cultural con la modernidad, entendiéndola como una condición ineludible y perenne de las sociedades modernas que afecta y se ve afectada por los fenómenos religiosos. Sin embargo, se han realizado pocas investigaciones empíricas sistemáticas y profundas para evaluar estas afirmaciones. Por tanto, nuestro artículo presenta la formulación de un índice de diversidad (variable independiente) basado en cuatro dimensiones: lingüística, étnica, religiosa y lugar de nacimiento, que se correlaciona con una variable (dependiente) de la religiosidad individual. Concluimos que, para el conjunto de países europeos y para el periodo de tiempo analizado (1999-2014), las teorías de la diversidad cultural que vinculan la diversidad con el desplazamiento y la recomposición de la religiosidad no tienen validez empírica.

Keywords: secularization, cultural diversity, index, religiosity, Europe.

Palabras clave: *secularización, diversidad cultural, índice, religiosidad, Europa.*

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INTRODUCTION[1]

In recent decades, academic discussions surrounding religion have been characterized by a theoretical confrontation between two overlapping yet apparently opposing narratives. On one hand, European social scientists adhering to secularization theories support the notion that the social significance of religion is waning. On the other hand, American scholars tend to defend the idea of the return (of the social meaning) of religions.

Following Casanova (2007: 3), a "dead end" in this debate has been reached, since the traditional theory of secularization maps relatively well onto Europe but not America, while the narrative of the vitality of (deregulated) religious markets maps relatively well onto America but not Europe. Scholars call for a change in the direction of current researches (Halikiopoulou, 2011), because, having reached a "dead end for the socio-scientific study of religion" (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 2017: 144) the debate over secularization has become "unfruitful" (Casanova, 2007: 1, 3).

By and large, we agree with these propositions. Nevertheless, we recall that with the recognition and development of Shmuel Eisenstadt's idea of multiple modernities in the secularization debate, a set of conceptual and epistemological innovations about the place of religion in the world emerged. In particular, the ideas of desecularization, post-secularization, multiple secularizations or secularities, and contextual secularization. The problem with this proliferation of innovations or theoretical and conceptual renewals is that they still give no answer to the most critical question in this debate, according to Pickel (2017). That is, what processes within modernity, if any, can describe the current mutations or displacements of religion in contemporary societies? In fact, most current conceptualizations are scientifically sustained by the interpretation of historical factors, by sociological and/or philosophical reflections or by the description of socio-political phenomena. There have been few studies relating the theoretical dimension to a more empirical-statistical approach that analyzes more carefully the (positive or negative) developments of religious phenomena. Even in cases where this has happened (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Pickel, 2017), studies were often based on univariate or bivariate variables, neglecting the systematization of different secularization theories and of its theoretical alternatives. Thus, they were not able to understand and interpret religion's displacement, revitalization, or decline in contemporary societies.

According to Vilaça, Sell and Moniz (2017), social scientists need new analytical grids for analyzing contemporary religious phenomena that take into account the new global economy, digital mass media, and migrations. For Peter Berger (2014), pluralism, not secularization, is the focal point in the sociology of religion. Vilaça *et al.* (2014), seek to channel research on migratory phenomena and the changes that different religious traditions and state-religion arrangements produce in the "soul" of different societies. For instance, geographic mobility and its resulting cultural, ethnic, linguistic, or religious transnationalism generate an increasingly diverse social landscape that has impacts on many aspects of cultural and social life. This is particularly visible in the North Atlantic region where the migration paradigm has abruptly changed: in the last decades, societies of emigration have become societies of immigration or of global migration.

Due to the growing importance of this debate, we consider it indispensable to compile theoretical arguments about diversity and secularization into empirical variables that can be correlated with multidimensional and comprehensive levels of religiosity. The recognition of these new analytical grids and the use of a theoretically supported methodological empiricism can bring us closer to an answer to Pickel's introductory question. In particular, such an approach can help us understand whether theories of secularization or theoretical alternatives are relevant to interpret and describe religion's mutations at the micro (individual) level.

Our article focuses on the theory of cultural diversity[2], not only because we consider it to be

2   As the literature suggests (Beckford, 2003; Vilaça, 2006; Berger, 2014), we should make a clear distinction between concepts of pluralism and diversity using

one of the core theories of secularization —along with its classic sub-theories of rationalization, societalization, and functional differentiation, combined with a more modern version of existential security— but also because it is currently singled out as one of the key factors of modernization behind the mutation of religion's micro-social meaning.

ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY

The term diversity derives from the Latin word *diversitas*, describing a situation of *variety* or *difference*. It means the multiplicity of differences and similarities between the individuals or groups that represent them in a given social system. It refers to the quality of different cultures (positive dimension), as opposed to group culture, homogenization of cultures or monoculture (negative dimension). The idea of diversity is thus associated with concepts of plurality, multiplicity, or heterogeneity concerning the set of ideas, attributes, or elements that distinguish individuals over a particular subject, context, or environment. In Crystal's words (2002: 33), it is an "incorrigibly plural" expression that is necessarily associated with a multiplicity of cultural identifications for different social groups. This article will focus on cultural diversity. It is culture that explains, gives meaning to, and assembles different social cosmologies, such as ethnic, religious, or linguistic ones, through its power to facilitate the inclusion and adaptation of individuals to different milieus. Unsurprisingly, social scientists usually associate diversity with culture (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall, 2012; Dohse and Gold, 2013).

a grounded theoretical approach. The heart of their argument is that pluralism is a normative concept, while diversity is a descriptive one. The first is a system of values, institutions, or processes that accepts diversity as a positive value, as the suffix *ism* suggests; the second relates, empirically and factually, to the degree of cultural heterogeneity existing in a given society or in the same social context. In this work, because our focus is on societies' level of heterogeneity, we explicitly chose the latter.

Diversity is not a recent phenomenon[3]. However, rapid globalization during the second half of the 20th century has arguably accelerated diversification to such an extent that it is difficult to compare the modern situation with any previous historical period (Taylor, 2007: 437). The contemporary world has become more culturally, religiously, and ethnically heterogeneous, moving towards an unprecedented diversity of worldviews that multiply unrestrictedly (Taylor, 2007).

For many, this development is an intrinsic feature of modernization. Berger (2014: 53), for example, sees modernity and diversity as ineluctably entangled. The first leads to the latter "necessarily", since it releases a number of driving processes behind diversity, namely, urbanization, mass migration, literacy, and the development of communication technologies[4]. For Vilaça (2006: 22), too, diversity is a distinguishing "trait" of modernity. The increase of migratory flows and geographic mobility, and the development of digital mass media, have led societies to become more culturally, ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse. Moreover, this growing heterogeneity is not temporary. According to Vilaça (2006: 22), it is the new "paradigm and not a mere transitory situation". Other authors corroborate these assertions. Following Martin (2005: 157), pluralism exists in "a massive way in the

3   Berger (2014) tells us that diversity has existed in different forms throughout history, for example, East Asian cultures or pre-Islamic India. However, the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the nation-state and its regime of separation towards religion is the most mentioned historical event. The Reformation destroyed the monopoly of Western Christianity allowing the creation and territorial coexistence of religious diversity. Taylor (2007) also mentions the invention of "exclusive humanism" in the 18th century as a crucial element for diversity's advent, because it multiplied worldviews in all directions (religious or non-religious). In spite of existing prior to the 21st century, diversity is more than ever an inescapable feature of modern societies, due to the globality, speed, and penetration of modernization processes. It cannot be ignored if we want to understand the contemporary religious landscape.

4   This is an update of Berger's original argument [1990 (1967)]. During the 1960s Berger argued that the secular de-monopolization of religious traditions would lead to a situation of diversity rather than the opposite.

contemporary world"; Taylor (2007: 300) argues for a "modern supernova" marked by a "galloping pluralism"; Pickel (2017: 290) claims that ongoing diversity is one of the "safest predictions for Europe"; and Vilaça *et al.* (2014: 2) predict that its growth will continue as a result of globalization. It is generally recognized that modernity does not necessarily lead to secularization, but it unavoidably leads to diversity (Berger, Davie and Fokas, 2008; Berger, 2014; Vilaça *et al.,* 2014).

By virtue of its global reach, the topic of diversity has become one of the most "promising research agendas" (Pollack, 2014: 115) and is now considered among the "most important issues" in contemporary social sciences (Doktór, 2009: 26). The fact that secularization theorists have begun to associate diversity with modernity has undoubtedly informed this development.

In the last decades, many have tried to develop methodologies to understand this phenomenon. Johnson and Grim (2013) define two types of diversity, internal and external; Gardenswartz and Rowe (2003) establish four layers; the Pew (2014) also states that the social sciences should define four categories; and Beckford (2003) goes even further, stating that diversity must be analytically distinguished through five meanings. However, there is no agreement on the issue of diversity besides the general idea that, like many other concepts, it is multidimensional and can be measured in many ways. Nevertheless, social scientists have implicitly reached consensus on how best to analyze, divide, and quantify diversity. In particular, from the 21st century onwards, studies on fractionalization (Alesina *et al.,* 2003; Fearon, 2003; Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall, 2012) have arisen and are intended to describe, compute, and understand the effects of diversity, which they describe as heterogeneity, from and in the population.

Fractionalization, that is, the degree of division (of someone or something) into different groups within a given society or region, is typically measured through the following three dimensions: ethnic, linguistic, and religious.

Ethnic fractionalization or ethnicity is, among all, the "main variable" of analysis (Alesina *et al.*, 2003: 6). Previously connected to the linguistic dimension —ethnolinguistic heterogeneity— eth-

nicity was eventually regarded as an autonomous dimension of study. Social scientists moved away from standardized definitions of ethnicity or ethnic group that usually included language and religion and which were based on the idea of a common belief in a shared heritage and/or (real or presumed) cultural habits. Notwithstanding a lack of theoretical development in this field, ethnic diversity may be said to concern distinguishing sets of biological characteristics, such as individuals' racial origin or skin color (Alesina *et al.*, 2003; Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall, 2012).

Linguistic fractionalization began to be understood, as we have seen, as an independent analysis dimension of ethnic diversity. For Alesina *et al.* (2003: 5), the separation between language and individuals' racial or physical characteristics is an "improvement" on previous research. For them, the linguistic question is as relevant as ethnic diversity. Disregarding language as an element of diversity is, according to Crystal (2002: 34), an "error", since language is an integral part of individuals' identity. In this context, Fearon (2003) builds an index of cultural fractionalization supported only on the degree of similarity or distance between languages. This type of fractionalization is measured with reference to the percentage of native language speakers in a given society (Alesina *et al.*, 2003; Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall, 2012).

Religious fractionalization is, according to Alesina *et al.* (2003: 6), probably the "less controversial and arbitrary" dimension of fractionation, since the boundaries of religion are more discernible and consistent across countries. Some authors, such as Fearon (2003), intentionally omit the religious dimension from their work. Nevertheless, others continue to include it, measuring religiosity through the available data on religious affiliation and distribution of religious groups (Alesina *et al.*, 2003; Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall, 2012).

The three dimensions mentioned above are cultural diversity's main aspects, allegedly the ones that best capture its traits. In fact, they have received great acceptance and adherence from social scientists and others willing to study the effects of cultural diversity on economic performance (Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall, 2012), political and social conflicts, state fragility (Alemu, 2016), or family values.

More recently, Dohse and Gold (2013) and Alemu (2016) have argued for the need to take further elements into account, beyond the classic triad. Social scientists have sought to extend the cultural diversity concept through the integration of a new dimension acknowledging individuals' place of birth (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Dohse and Gold, 2013; Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2016). This is crucial because the *place of birth* dimension, in contrast to ethnicity, language, or religion, grasps individuals' different life experiences, their differences in education and training, and the development of distinct worldviews. Thus, according to Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport (2016), it not only differs conceptually from the other three dimensions of diversity, but also differs empirically due to the strong absence of correlation between the first and the latter. The *place of birth* dimension rests on the assumption that the native culture, which defines the genetic/cultural distance between people born in different regions, is homogeneous. Thus, cultural diversity would be determined by the proportion of the non-native population living in that region. On one hand, it assesses the size of the foreign-born population; on the other, it evaluates its multiplicity. That is, such a measure of *intercultural diversity* (Dohse and Gold, 2013: 7-8) or *population diversity* (Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2016) infers the cultural diversity of a region through a distinction between native and foreign populations, but also takes into account the variety of the latter.

According to Erikson and Jonnson (1999), the above-mentioned four dimensions —ethnicity, mother tongue, religious denomination, and country of origin— ought to provide enough elements for the construction of an accurate index of cultural diversity. Due to its supposed accuracy, the ESS (European Social Survey) has defined them as the core dimensions of a comprehensive concept of ethnic identity.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY AS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONCEPT

The need to determine dimensions of diversity that would allow the creation of indices and, hence, the study of the effects of diversity in so-

cieties is not new. Several studies have examined this subject since the mid-1990s, particularly in the field of economics. According to Dohse and Gold (2013: 6), the current literature on the effects of cultural diversity is, by and large, "still inconclusive". On one hand, researchers recognize the positive correlation between cultural diversity and innovation and entrepreneurship. However, this correlation is usually confined to Europe, particularly its wealthier countries, and to its skilled immigration. On the other hand, it is still difficult to assess the overall positive effects of diversity (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). In fact, despite some exceptions (Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2016), studies often point to a negative correlation between cultural diversity and public institutions and policies, the provision of public goods or economic growth (Alesina *et al.*, 2003; Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall, 2012).

There are many measures for the quantification of diversity, such as indexes of fractionalization (Alesina *et al.*, 2003; Patsiurko, Campbell and Hall, 2012), and cultural (Fearon, 2003), populational (Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2016), and religious diversity (Johnson and Grim, 2013). Many formulas have also been adopted for its development. The most widely accepted (and criticized) index is the *Herfindahl-Hirschman* index on market concentration[5]. Additionally, scientists have been using the Theil index on cultural diversity[6] in order to measure the percentage and variety of cultures existing in a given society or region[7].

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5   It is an economic model that aims mainly to measure business groups' concentration. That is, it measures the size of companies with respect to their industry. It is, therefore, an indicator of the degree of competition and market concentration.

6   This index is usually employed to measure income distribution. However, in this context, scientists compute it through the weighted average of each ethnic group over the total population. That is, as diversity increases the index grows evenly.

7   There are still other indexes, for example, the Shannon-Weaver index that also allows diversity to be measured through categorical data, that is, data resulting from the test of categorical variables. It is an index widely used in ecology studies. Simpson's Diversity Index gave birth to the *Herfindahl-Hirschman* by measuring the level of concentration of individuals when organized into

Despite such theoretical and methodological clarifications regarding the effects of diversity in many spheres of social life, authors seem to neglect the religious question. As attested, and as far as we know, there are no studies that correlate cultural diversity with religiosity. The studies that use this approach like those of Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002), Norris and Inglehart (2004), Doktór (2009) or those of the religious market model[8], do it in light of the concept of (religious) pluralism. In other words, even if they want to analyze the effects of social groups' heterogeneity on religious vitality, they usually do so as from the wrong conceptual perspective. Moreover, they often appeal to one or two items, relating *pluralism*, for example, exclusively with the degree of neighbours' acceptance of different religions.

Notwithstanding our initial urge to use fractionalization indices, we could not do so because of the substantial gap between our time period of analysis (1999-2014)[9] and the one used in *fractionalization*. For example, the data from Alesina *et al.* (2003) for ethnicity cover the period 1979-2001 (only including our first three years of analysis)[10] and those of Fearon (2003) refer to the 1990s. Even

the most recent works of Patsiurko, Campbell, and Hall (2012) or Gören (2014) are not relevant to correlate with our dependent variable. The first two analyze data from 1985 to 2000 and the latter from 1960 to 1999.

We therefore had to build our diversity index from scratch, using items and sources cited by previous works[11]. The following databases were particularly useful for constructing the dimensions religious diversity and place of birth: the WCD (World Christian Database), the ESS, and the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). The first two are regularly used in religious studies, notably by European researchers, being recognized for the quality and precision of their databases. In ethnic and linguistic diversity dimensions we rely, above all, on the updated data of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and the *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, respectively. These databases are fundamental to the work of fractionalization theorists. The first is a general encyclopaedia, published since the mid-18th century, which provides data on societies' ethnic composition through the distribution (by percentage) of ethnic groups. Due to the imperfection of its data, we decided to complement the *Encyclopædia* with other sources such as the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples supported by data from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and the Eurobarometer of the European Commission. The second published by the SIL International, offers a catalogue of world languages. In its twentieth edition (2017), the SIL International contains a database with more than 7.000 languages (written or spoken), including information about speakers, regions, dialects, and

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groups. However, none of these models has currently been utilized to create diversity indices.

8 The religious market model, supported by Laurence Iannaccone, Rodney Stark, Roger Finke, Stephen Warner, and William Bainbridge essentially states that within modern societies there is a steady social demand for religion, but that religious vitality depends on the diversity of religious firms (churches or sects) and their competition within the market.

9 Its selection is not arbitrary. This option is justified by the fact that only in the last decade of the 20th century modern (individualized and indefinite) forms of religion started to be studied more systematically in the social sciences. It was only then that researchers began to display greater awareness towards the diffusion and diversity of modern religious phenomena. Until that point, the available statistical data would hardly encompass dimensions of individual religiosity, making it impossible to draw correlations with independent variables, such as cultural diversity.

10 More specifically, considering the selected countries, this data does not cover a single year of the selected time period. For Italy, the available data covers 1983, for Spain 1991, for Slovakia 1996, and for Austria, Poland, and Portugal 1998.

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11 Due to the successful experience in the use of these sources in the construction of fractionalization indexes and due to their suitability for studies related to cultural diversity, we consider them relevant for choosing our different items. We have added other databases, but we have also excluded some that we already used in building other indexes, such as: the EVS (European Values Survey), the UNDP (United Nations Development Program), the Eurostat, the World Bank Open Data, and the CIA World Factbook. These either do not have relevant data on cultural diversity, or they do not examine its items as longitudinally as we wanted.

linguistic affiliation. The *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* forms a basis for the construction of linguistic diversity indexes, such as the one we intend to use and which was published in a UNESCO report on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue (2005).

That being said, we now list our cultural diversity dimensions and the items composing them:

1. Linguistic diversity:

a) Language most often spoken at home: first mentioned (*source*: ESS).
b) Number of living languages (*source*: Ethnologue).
c) Number of immigrant living languages (% of total living languages) (*source*: Ethnologue).
d) Territorial coverage of the native language (*source*: Ethnologue).
e) Index of linguistic diversity (*source*: UNESCO).

2. Ethnic diversity:

a) Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in the country? (*source*: ESS).
b) Ethnic (native) majority group (% of total) (*source*: Encyclopædia Britannica).
c) Ethnic (native) majority group (% of total) (*source*: World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples).
d) Number of significant ethnicities (above 0,5 %) (*source*: Encyclopædia Britannica).
e) In the past 12 months, have you witnessed someone being discriminated based on ethnic origin? (relevant answer: yes) (*source*: Eurobarometer).

3. Religious diversity:

a) Religious diversity index (*source*: Pew Research Center).
b) Religion or confession you currently belong to (relevant answer: non-Catholic) (*source*: ESS).
c) Religion or confession you belonged to in the past (relevant answer: applicable) (*source*: ESS).
d) Belonging to non-Catholic religious groups (% of total population) (*source*: WCD).
e) Belonging to non-Catholic groups (% of other religions and non-religion) (*source*: WCD).

4. Place of birth diversity:

a) Citizen of the country (*source*: ESS).
b) Born in the country (*source*: ESS).
c) Father born in the country (*source*: ESS).
d) Mother born in the country (*source*: ESS).
e) Foreign population (*source*: OECD).
f) Foreign-born population (*source*: OECD).

In the first dimension, we tried to follow the main linguistic items of the Ethnologue, namely the number of languages and their national coverage as well as the percentage of non-native languages. Despite its acceptance by a large number of linguists, there is some consensus that the data of the Ethnologue suffers from imperfections (Paolillo 2006)[12]. Therefore, we added an item from the ESS that we consider important to ascertaining the degree of linguistic diversity, along with an index of linguistic diversity[13] (UNESCO) which aggregates the Ethnologue's primary data.

Nevertheless, the ethnic dimension proved to be the most challenging. Because of its overlap with the linguistic or religious dimensions or even with the place of birth, ethnicity continues to be analyzed, at least in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, through aggregate dimensions such as ethnolinguistics or diversity of birthplace. With regard to the countries under examination, this approach is adopted in the case of Italy (ethnolinguistics) and Austria (diversity of birthplace). Moreover, the data has not been updated in the same time period for all countries[14]. For this reason, Patsiurko, Campbell, and Hall (2012: 196) report that the data of

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12   One of the main critiques pointed out to the Ethnologue is that its numbers are usually higher than those in other databases. This is mainly due to its broad definition of *languages* which includes dialects or other linguistic subcategories. In order to avoid its political and fluid meanings, we adopt the concept of *living languages* as defined by the Ethnologue (include definition?).

13   This index of linguistic diversity was built by computing the proportion of each language, compared to the total population. That is, it considers the number of different languages and their relative frequency as a mother tongue.

14   For Austria, the data collected corresponds to 2015, Slovakia to 2013, Poland to 2011 and Italy, Spain, and Portugal to 2000.

the *Encyclopædia* presents some "inconsistencies". This is at least partially due to the fact that in some countries data on ethnicity is considered a delicate issue. Some states do not allow the collection of information, even under respondent anonymity. In order to confront this problem, we supplemented the *Encyclopædia*'s original data concerning the proportion of the ethnic majority group and the number of proportionally relevant ethnic groups, with the updated data of the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. To make this data more reliable, since it is the most relevant item in this dimension, we repeat the same approach with the ethnic majority group. We have selected a similar item from the Eurobarometer on the observation of ethnic discrimination, which captures a micro-social dimension of ethnic fragmentation or diversity, and a final dimension of ethnic self-identification provided by the ESS[15].

In respect to the religious diversity dimension, we have selected the databases already used in the construction of the religiosity index (the ESS and the WCD)[16]. Given that the selected countries have a majority of nominal Catholics, this dimension analyzes non-Catholic religious diversity, or affiliation to religious communities other than Catholic. We have also added an item that examines, in a complementary fashion, the fluidity and plurality of religious belonging, scrutinizing religious diversity from another angle. Finally, we have added the Pew Research Center's index of religious diversity, which has become a standard for social scientists, analyzing and computing diversity among worldwide major religious groups. Due to its methodological refinement, this Pew subindex reinforces our religious diversity dimension.

Finally, concerning the place of birth dimension, we collected data in the ESS and OECD, in particular through items that show the proportion of non-native populations and their ancestors. This method enabled in-depth insight into birthplace heterogeneity. We also stress that while building this dimension, we do not use (as in the other three dimensions of diversity) any composite index. Due to its relatively late theoretical development, no index per country was built at the time of our study[17]. Instead we created one ourselves.

In brief, we built an index with four dimensions and twenty-one items. All dimensions have five items, except for the last one that has six. Given the substantial number of items and their careful selection and adequacy to our object of study, we believe that the results gathered around this index will be representative of the level of cultural diversity in each country.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY INDEX MEASUREMENT

After defining the dimensions and items that will measure the level of cultural diversity in the selected countries, we will build a diversity index (independent variable) that will correlate with religiosity (dependent variable).

For several years we have been studying religiosity and secularization in Austria, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain[18]. However, there

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15   The ESS in its rounds 1 (2002) and 7 (2014) provides, as we have seen, data on the basic dimensions of ethnic identity. We could not use the latter because Italy has no data concerning 2014 and Slovakia has no data for 2002 and 2014.

16   We stress that, although the databases are the same, none of the items in the *religious diversity* dimension is identical to any other in our religiosity index. Thus, there is no risk of us correlating similar variables.

17   Dohse and Gold (2013) have built a list of European regions (NUTS II, Nomenclature of Territorial Units) which analyzes regions' ranking based on the levels of foreign population living there. However, NUTS cannot be adapted to our study because it examines *national* territorial units.

18   For purposes of scientific rigor, this selection of countries is based upon comprehensive and objective criteria. First, all the countries have state-religions separation. Each state practices positive or passive secularism, in which it promotes or allows the activity and visibility of religions in public space. Second, all countries are close to the principled distance concept since the state holds different arrangements between various churches and religious communities in each country. This type of state-religion relation is based on the ideas of separation with cooperation, hierarchization of churches and religious communities, and religious freedom. Third, the selected countries are all European. They are part of the region that has seen the most changes in migratory flows. According to the authors previously mentioned, Europe is and will remain a

have always been problems with the concept of religion and particularly with methods of assessing its relevance in individuals' lives. Due to these challenges, we have recently suggested the theoretical and empirical development of a religiosity index[19], which works as our dependent variable and may be used to measure its relationship with different independent variables such as cultural diversity.

The construction of our diversity index will follow the same methodology used in the religiosity index. This will allow us, first, to compare the two indices with the same instruments and, second, to develop

a theoretical and empirical framework for the development of a cultural diversity index. It should be emphasized that this is something unprecedented and very much needed for the secularization debate.

It was necessary to build an index of cultural diversity because it allows us to validate or possibly refute, on an empirical basis, the arguments of secularization ideologists. To that end, we computed the scores from each item of our index to a range of 1 to 10 (the lowest and highest diversity level, respectively), coding them according to each items' specific scale.

The option for a 10-point scale is mainly related to our concern with maximizing the differences between selected countries. They were selected based on the most similar systems design, where countries with similar characteristics are compared. On one hand, this gives greater coherence to the choice of selected countries, improving the constancy of our variables; on the other hand, it can lead to imperceptible differences regarding their levels of religiosity or diversity. In order to avoid excessive homogenization and detect variation between countries, it will be useful to use a 10-point scale, as Grim and Finke (2006) suggest.

Each of the 21 items in our model was determined through a simple but reliable process. First, we multiply by 100 the lowest value of each item and then we divide it by the highest one. See Table 1, regarding the item *father born in the country*.

Table 1. Example of item measurement: father born in the country.

Father born in the country (% negative responses)		
	Gross average scores	Score
Austria	13,2	
Italy	3,1	
Slovakia	4,6	
Spain	8,6	
Poland	3,2	
Portugal	5,3	

Source: ESS (2002-2014).
Gross average scores rounded to units.

region of growing cultural diversity due to the phenomenon of global (im)migration. Therefore, it is an exceptional region to analyze the impact of these phenomena on our dependent variable. Finally, we have chosen the selected countries based on their socio-religious situation. We have selected only Roman Catholic majority countries, but where there have been some phenomena of religious mutation —in particular, the growth of religious and non-religious minorities and the fusion of both, the phenomenon of *believers without religion*. In our view, focusing on Catholic European countries has two essential epistemological virtues. First, they are traditionally monolithic religious markets. Consequently, they are excellent laboratories to understand the possible impacts of diversity on religiosity. Second, due to these countries' long concordatarian traditions, there is a permanent political negotiation concerning the (public or symbolic) place of churches and religious communities in society. In a context of increasing diversity, this gives us a good picture of how politics affects or wants to affect religion. For further elaboration on these criteria see Moniz (2016).

19 Our religiosity index is a multidimensional model, divided into five dimensions of religiosity —intellectual, ideological, ritual, devotional, and experimental— and formed by 22 items. We have built this index around the most recent databases of the WCD, the EVS (European Values Survey), and the ESS. We have employed this data in our selected countries. Its results can be seen in Figure 1, where we compare levels of religiosity and diversity. For further developments on this methodology see Moniz (2018). This multidimensional model is based on developments within the sociology of religion, in particular, the seminal work of Bellah (1964), where it is stated that in the modern situation religion tends to evolve into a "much more open and flexible pattern of [religious] membership" (p. 373), despite Bellah's recognition that a collective symbolization will continue to exist. Therefore, we will consider religion in its traditional and modern forms.

In Table 1, the lowest gross average value (*lv*) of the selected countries is 3.1 and the highest gross average value (*hv*) is 13.2. Following our formula, 3.1 x 100 is equal to 310, which, divided by 13.2, gives approximately 23.48. The difference between 100 and this value (23.48) is equivalent to the approximate percentage of 77 % that differs between *lv* and *hv*. The formula is quite simple:

$$X = \frac{lv \times 100}{hv}$$

In order to prove that the value of *X* (76.52 %) corresponds precisely to the difference of the gross average value between the *hv* and *lv*, we proceed to another essential calculation [(X ÷ 100) x *hv*]. Thus, the difference between the two is 10.1, which corresponds exactly to the distance of the gross average value separating the *hv* and the *lv*. After ascertaining the value of *X*, we are ready to start coding the differences between countries applying our scale from 1 to 10. The basic premise of this process is to match the differences between the gross average values and the same percentage difference of our feature scaling. Thus, the average gross values of our items were reduced, but the proportion of their differences was preserved.

We emphasize that the items available for the composition of our cultural diversity index are not always as longitudinally analyzed as we would like. Not all items in each dimension of diversity have statistical data available for all years of analysis. In Table 1, we cover nearly every selected year. However, sometimes we only have data available for shorter time intervals[20]. Nevertheless, the collected and assessed data covers most of our sixteen-year time span. Whether we have a longer or shorter time period for analysis, the figures that were subsequently operated are the result of the simple arithmetic mean of each item. For example, in Table 1, the final value of 8.6 % for Spain was attained by means of the average of the available (seven)[21] years of analysis. They were then worked

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20 This is particularly clear in the items regarding *linguistic* and *ethnic diversity* dimensions, due to the non-longitudinal data available in the different databases.

21 These figures correspond to each of the two-year ESS rounds between 2002 and 2014.

through its specific feature scaling shown in the footer of Table 2.

Table 2. Example of item scoring: Father born in the country.

Father born in the country (% negative responses)		
	Gross average scores	Score
Austria	13,2	10
Italy	3,1	2
Slovakia	4,6	3
Spain	8,6	7
Poland	3,2	2
Portugal	5,3	4

Source: ESS (2002-2014).
Feature scaling (1-10): 1,9-2,8 = 1 point; 2,9-3,8 = 2 points; 3,9-4,8 = 3 points; 4,9-5,8 = 4 points; 5,9-6,8 = 5 points; 6,9-7,8 = 6 points; 7,9-8,8 = 7 points; 8,9-9,8 = 8 points; 9,9-10,8 = 9 points; 10,9» = 10 points.

Table 2 shows a score of 10 for *hv* and 2 for *lv*. The eight-point difference, if converted to percentage values (in this case, 80 %), approximates the real percentage difference that separates them and which in this item of diversity corresponds to our estimated value of *X* (77 %). The other percentage differences between countries, that is the averages that are neither *lv* nor *hv*, were proportionally respected, whenever possible. For example, the percentage difference between the Austrian and Spanish cases is around 35 %. In Table 2, we can see that the first has a score of 10 and the latter of 7. The difference of 3 points (corresponding to 30 %, using our feature scaling), corresponds approximately to the proportion of the difference between both. However, it should be noted that this model has limitations. Not all the gross average values correspond precisely to the percentage difference of the feature scaling. Notwithstanding, the maximum difference is one point (10 % of the proportional difference). The differences are therefore always minimal and may be only a number above or below the actual percentage differences. After finding the value of *X* for each item, using the same mathematical equation and the same methodology, we deter-

mined all items of cultural diversity, as shown in Table 3.

For all our items, the highest possible score per country is 210. The closer to this number, the higher the level of diversity. In Table 3, we can see that the totals are relatively disparate between countries. Austria stands out as the most culturally diverse country, collecting 189 out of 210 possible points. For its part, Poland is by far the country with the least diversity, with only 65 points. Spain is the second country with the highest degree of diversity, with 162 points, standing far from Slovakia (118), Italy (110), and Portugal (106), which are the countries that follow, respectively. These gross values already give some idea of the differences in diversity between countries.

Table 3. Scoring of diversity items in all dimensions.

Diversity dimensions	Austria	Italy	Slovakia	Spain	Poland	Portugal	Item
Linguistic							
	10	6	4	5	1	1	Language most often spoken at home
	8	10	7	4	3	6	Number of living languages
	10	4	6	7	4	9	Number of immigrant living languages
	10	8	9	10	8	7	Coverage of the native language
	9	10	6	8	1	1	Index of linguistic diversity
Ethnic							
	8	2	10	5	3	4	Belong to a minority ethnic group
	6	5	6	10	5	5	Ethnic (native) majority group
	7	7	8	10	7	7	Ethnic (native) majority group
	8	7	8	10	4	8	Number of significant ethnicities
	10	6	7	10	3	5	Discrimination based on ethnic origin
Religious							
	9	8	7	10	3	3	Religious diversity index
	7	2	10	4	2	3	Current religion or confession
	10	4	4	9	4	4	Past religion or confession
	10	4	7	3	6	9	Non-Catholic religious groups (% total)
	10	6	7	4	3	4	Non-Catholic religious groups (% other)
Place of birth							
	7	2	1	10	1	5	Citizen of the country
	10	4	2	10	1	7	Born in the country
	10	2	3	7	2	4	Father born in the country
	10	2	3	7	2	4	Mother born in the country
	10	6	1	10	1	4	Foreign population
	10	5	2	9	1	6	Foreign-born population
Total	**189**	**110**	**118**	**162**	**65**	**106**	

Source: author's compilation considering the aforementioned sources.

However, to ensure that no dimension has more weight than another in the final quantification, we consider the arithmetic mean of the four dimensions[22]. See Table 4.

As this Table shows, there is no change in the positioning of countries. This is the case because each dimension of diversity has almost the same number of items - only *place of birth* dimension has one more item (six) than the others (five each). However, this methodological step allows us to perfect the final scores and maximize, although not in all cases, the differences between countries[23]. This is important because it allows for more precise results in relation to the diversity index, deepening the differences and defining classification levels between countries. Hence, we determine five levels of cultural diversity: between 1.0 and 2.9 (very low); between 3.0 and 4.9 (low - Poland's case); between 5.0 and 6.9 (average level - in ascending order, Portugal, Italy, and Slovakia); between 7.0 and 8.9 (high - Spain's case); and between 9.0 and 10 (very high - Austria's case).

The diversity index allows us to see large segmentation between countries. Austria and Poland have the best and worst scores respectively. The first one is at one end (very high) of the general classification, while the second is very close to the other end (very low). Spain is also separated in the category of high diversity, being far from the other three countries that are closer to an average/low level, namely, Portugal and Italy. Thus, we can underline the existence of three groups of countries: the highly diversified ones (Austria and Spain), the moderately diversified (Slovakia, Italy, and Portugal) and the less diversified (Poland).

Individual analysis of the dimensions of diversity will allow a better understanding of these levels. In fact, Austria's dimensions of diversity all register at very high levels, except for the ethnic dimension. The place of birth dimension in particular registers a high score in five of its six items. On the other hand, Spain has the highest score in the ethnic dimension. Indeed, it is the only country with very high diversity in this dimension. However, Spain only presents average figures in linguistic or religious diversity dimensions, due to its scores on the items *number of living languages* and *belonging to non-Catholic religious groups*. Slovakia's figures are close to those of Spain but are significantly higher in the dimension of religious diversity. This is due to its very low scores on the items *citizen of the country* and *foreign population*. At the other end of the table, Poland has the lowest scores in all dimensions of diversity, standing out for its very low level of diversity in place of birth dimension where its scores remain between 1 and 2. Although Italy is the second country with the highest linguistic diversity, it has the second lowest score in dimensions of ethnic and place of birth diversity, standing out with the lowest score

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22   The choice of an arithmetic mean is due to the fact that none of the dimensions or items of this index is considered more influential or relevant than another. Thus, all have the same weight in the composition of the index.

23   For example, in Table 3 the difference between Italy and Slovakia was 7 % and in Table 4 it increased to 8.6 %. Nevertheless, most of the differences between countries remained unchanged and even decreased (1.1 %) between Austria and Poland.

Table 4.   Arithmetic mean of each diversity dimension.

Diversity	Austria	Italy	Slovakia	Spain	Poland	Portugal
Linguistic	9.4	7.6	6.4	6.8	3.4	4.8
Ethnic	7.8	5.4	7.8	9.0	4.4	5.8
Religious	9.2	4.8	7.0	6.0	3.6	4.6
Place of birth	9.5	3.5	2.0	8.8	1.3	5.0
Means	**9.0**	**5.3**	**5.8**	**7.7**	**3.2**	**5.1**

Source: author's compilation considering the aforementioned sources.

in the item *belonging to a minority ethnic group in the country*. Portugal has the second lowest score in dimensions of linguistic and religious diversity, yet it presents the highest consistency of scores in all dimensions of diversity. All dimensions are within low-high or average-low intervals and the largest difference between all scores of all dimensions is only 1.2.

In sum, Austria and Spain are the countries with the highest diversity indexes, accumulating 25 items within the interval of very high diversity. They collect almost 80% of all these items, distributed more or less evenly across all dimensions of diversity. For its part, Poland, which is the country with the lowest level of diversity, collects 9 items of the very low diversity range. This represents 45% of all countries. These items are concentrated mainly on the dimension of place of birth diversity. All other countries, with the exception of Italy or Slovakia in the dimensions of linguistic and religious diversity respectively, have predominantly low or very low diversity items.

CORRELATION BETWEEN CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND RELIGIOSITY

It is time to compare the diversity index with our dependent variable - the religiosity index. We will try to understand which of the arguments usually mentioned regarding the effects of diversity on religiosity (more diversity means less religion, more diversity means more religion, diversity has no effect on religion or diversity has tendentially negative effects on religion, but does not weaken it) is corroborated empirically by our data. We begin to test these propositions by means of Figure 1.

Figure 1 allows us to quickly verify that the countries with the lowest diversity indexes (in descending order, Italy, Portugal, and Poland) are the most religious. Conversely, the countries with the highest rates of diversity (in ascending order, Slovakia, Spain, and Austria) are the least religious. Our classification levels allow us to clarify that, for example, Spain and Austria, the only countries with an *average* religious score (the lowest of all countries) are those with *high* or *very high* diver-

Figure 1. Columns illustrating the relationship between religiosity and diversity.

	Austria	Italy	Slovakia	Spain	Poland	Portugal
■ Religiosity	5,95	8,13	7,17	5,82	9,68	8,12
■ Diversity	8,98	5,33	5,8	7,66	3,18	5,05

*Source:* author's compilation considering the aforementioned.

sity indexes respectively. For its part, Poland, the only country with a *very high* religiosity score, is also the only country with a *low* diversity index. The proposition that more diversity means less religion is therefore echoed in our research. In fact, there is an almost perfect negative correlation between the two variables. With the exception of Austria and Spain, the rank order is totally and negatively respected: the country with the highest score in religiosity is the sixth and last ranked in terms of diversity (Poland); the second country with the highest score in terms of religiosity is the fifth and penultimate in terms of diversity (Italy), and so forth. In order to better understand this negative correlation, see Figure 2.

In Figure 2 we examine the correlation between religiosity and diversity indexes. The analysis of the relative position of countries shows more clearly what Figure 1 already revealed: that there is a very strong and statistically significant negative correlation between the two variables ($r(6) = -0.960$; $p < 0.01$)[24]. Thus, considering the chosen countries and our methodology, diversity helps to explain almost perfectly the (negative) change of religiosity (96 %). In fact, Figure 2 shows a very strong negative correlation between diversity and religiosity. By analyzing the graph quadrants, we find that the three most religious countries are in quadrant 1 (more religiosity and less diversity), while the less religious ones are in quadrant 4 (more diversity and less religiosity). Slovakia is the only country in a different quadrant (number 3: less religiosity and less diversity), but because of its closeness to quadrant 4 and its (negative) linearity with other countries, it should not be considered a deviating case. Figure 2 echoes the propositions of secular-

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24   The p-value is exactly 0.002.

Figure 2.   Religiosity *vs.* Diversity (relative position of countries).

Source: author's compilation considering the aforementioned sources.

ization theorists regarding diversity: the greater the level of diversity of a country, the lower its level of religiosity. That is, more diversity is correlated with less religiosity. Diversity seems to be negatively associated with religious flourishing, leading to the weakening of the latter. Conversely, theories that claim that diversity is conducive to religious development are not echoed in this research. For instance, quadrant 2 (more diversity and more religiosity) is the only empty one. Similarly, the theories that support the inexistence of some relationship between these variables are untenable, considering our results. Finally, we want to individually examine the correlation between religiosity and each of the dimensions of diversity, in order to perceive which of them correlates more strongly with the dependent variable. Let us examine Table 5.

The first point we stress is that all dimensions of diversity have a strong negative correlation with religiosity —all results are statistically significant—[25]. Regardless of the different dimensions of diversity, its correlation with religiosity is always strongly negative. The second point we stress is the especially strong negative correlation between ethnic diversity and religiosity, which is also statistically significant ($r(6) = -0.950$; $p < 0,01$). As

Alesina *et al.* (2003) stated, ethnicity is diversity's main dimension of analysis. We also emphasize its closeness to the strong negative correlation of our diversity index (as we have seen, [$r(6) = -0.960$; $p < 0,01$]). This could lead us to consider that diversity's ethnic dimension, in itself, covers the essential elements of the relationship between diversity and religiosity. On the other hand, diversity's linguistic dimension shows the least negative correlation with religiosity ($r(6) = -0.780$; $p < 0,10$)[26]. This is mainly due to the fact that Italy —the country with the second highest index of religiosity— is also the second most diverse in this dimension. In fact, if we withdrew Italy from this dimension, we would have a much stronger negative correlation[27]. Therefore, the separation of the ethnic and linguistic dimensions proposed by Alesina *et al.* (2003) was useful, because it proves that they are distinct spheres of diversity that, consequently, have non-coincident impacts on the dependent variable.

Let us now consider the other two dimensions of diversity. The religious one, contrary to what the theory of religious economy points out, has a strong correlation with the dependent variable —its result has statistical significance ($r(6) = -.819$; $p < 0.05$). The addition of *place of birth* dimension, suggested

[25] We do not underestimate the influence that other dimensions not considered in these correlations may have on our dependent variable. However, as already explained elsewhere (Moniz, 2019: 243), the inclusion of other items and variables linked to cultural diversity has been inconclusive, including those related to economics (for instance, economic growth or redistribution of income and wealth), despite their tendency towards a negative correlation. For this reason, we have decided not to include them in our analysis.

[26] Given the small size of our sample (only six countries) we will consider statistically significant correlations with a confidence interval of up to 90 %: $p < 0.10$. We will focus more on correlations with higher confidence intervals, namely those within the standard value of 95 %, $p < 0.05$. However, considering the exploratory nature of this research, a statistical significance $p < 0.10$ may suggest that a specific dimension of diversity should be further explored.

[27] This correlation would be: $r(6) = -0,896$; $p < 0.05$.

Table 5. Correlation between religiosity and diversity dimensions.

Religiosity	Diversity			
	Linguistic	**Ethnic**	**Religious**	**Place of birth**
Pearson's *r*	−.780*	−.950***	−.819**	−.840**
Significance	.067	.004	.046	.036
N	6	6	6	6

* Correlation coefficients significant at the 0.10 level.
** Correlation coefficients significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Correlation coefficients significant at the 0.01 level.

by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) or Dohse and Gold (2013), has also proved to be fruitful, since it is the second dimension of diversity with the highest negative correlation with religiosity, which is also statistically significant ($r(6) = -0.840$; $p < 0.05$). However, *contra* Alesina, Harnoss, and Rapoport's (2016) assertion, this dimension also has a strong correlation with the dependent variable.

Thus, given these strong negative correlations, we can affirm three essential aspects regarding diversity theories, even if the latter do not propose a multidimensional concept of diversity as we do. First, in the theoretical field, our data do not corroborate the propositions of the religious economy theory which assert that the greater the diversity of religious choices, the more religion will tend to flourish. On the contrary, our data demonstrates that this relationship is the opposite in every dimension of diversity: diversity is always negatively correlated with religion. On the other hand, it is in line with classical theories of secularization (for instance, Berger, 1990 [1967]) or with some of its most recent iterations (for example, Taylor, 2007; Berger, 2014), which maintain that diversity leads to the contamination, differentiation, or weakening of social values and, consequently, of religious worldviews. Second, in the empirical field, our study does not support theses that affirm a null relationship between diversity and religion (Voas, Olson and Crockett, 2002; Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Our data points instead to the work of Doktór (2009) or Pollack and Pickel (2009), especially their conclusions about the negative impacts of diversity on religion. Third, our results chime with the argument that the correlation between diversity and religiosity is tendentiously negative and that its dynamics are essential to understanding the place of religion in contemporary societies (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Berger, 2014). Finally, our study does not corroborate the hypothesis that religion is an anthropological constant that no process of modernity is capable of weakening. On the contrary, our data suggest a general weakening of religiosity as societies become more diverse.

Although we do not categorically conclude, as Pickel (2017) does, that diversity has *destructive* consequences for religiosity, our research allows us to affirm that all dimensions of diversity are nega-

tively correlated with religion. We believe that this empirical contribution is meaningful because it can help secularization theorists to conclude more assertively what they have been saying implicitly in their work (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Berger, 2014). That is, diversity has impacts on religion that go beyond the simple adaptation of religiosity in the contemporary world (Berger, Davie and Fokas, 2008; Berger, 2014; Vilaça *et al.*, 2014).

FINAL REMARKS

Our study concludes that the theory of secularization, according to which societies with greater cultural diversity are less religious, has empirical validity within the remit of our selected countries and methodology. In fact, our data shows that cultural diversity explains about 96% of the negative variation in religiosity. Cultural diversity has, in all its dimensions, a negative impact on religiosity. Theoretical propositions regarding diversity's tendency to weaken cultural homogeneity and deconstruct the plausibility structures of religion have empirical resonance.

However, this does not mean that society's secularization necessarily corresponds to the decline or end of religion. This reflects the complexity of our times. Religion can pass simultaneously through decline, mutation, and resurgence. The inevitability of secularization theories is thus open to debate and revision.

Currently, these are uncharted waters. Nevertheless, we know that the processes of modernity described by diversity theorists do not seem to have a positive impact on the religiosity indices of the selected European countries, contrary to what market theory of religion theorists had found in North America. Modernity, and diversity in particular, have a very negative correlation with religion, directly or indirectly weakening its social significance. The fragmentation that diversity produces in taken for granted beliefs (including religious ones) increases the plausibility of individuals choosing secular options in their daily lives. This deepens levels of religious illiteracy and affects religion's individual and social relevance. However, there is no reason to believe that we will witness a linear process of

decline —a *destructive* loss of religion's relevance, in Pickel's (2017) prophetic words— even with the dissemination and deepening of diversity. In particular, if we take into consideration the constant significance of religious beliefs in highly diverse modern societies, including some examined in this study. However, in this context, the idea of a religious return seems even more unlikely. If, on the one hand, we believe that secularization is happening and that this affects religion; on the other hand, we think that the predicted outcome of their metanarratives is wrong.

This work is only the first step towards understanding the impacts of new social dynamics on religion. It will be necessary to increase the available databases and, consequently, to improve the index construction models. It will be necessary to study other relevant independent variables, such as the classical theories of secularization (rationalization, societalization, and functional differentiation) and their theoretical updates (existential security). It will be necessary to explore new analytical grids, such as global economy, digital mass media, or terrorism. It will also be necessary to examine different regional contexts, including more countries. In sum, as Berger (2014) prophetically said, it will be necessary to study the *many altars of modernity*, religious or non-religious, and to understand the (changeable) condition of religion in modern societies (revitalization, decline, or transformation). We leave these challenges to new researches and researchers willing to probe the effects of modernization on religiosity.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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