Spain introduced the Minimum Vital Income (MVI) in 2020, running alongside
a regional Minimum Income Scheme (MIS). This resulted in two similar benefits being
administered at different levels of government. This situation poses significant challenges,
as differences in the design of the two policies may lead to disparities in their
implementation. Moreover, the common objective of these benefits, targeting the same
population, creates governance tensions, as it requires coordination between two
administrations at different levels and with different competencies (Prieto-Lobato & De la Rosa, 2023).
In addition, MIS is associated with the issue of non-take-up, a situation
in which individuals or households do not receive the benefit to which they are entitled (van Oorschot, 1991). As the objective of this research is not to
estimate the non-take-up of benefits, a general definition of non-take-up will be used.
Traditionally, this phenomenon has been explained in terms of a
cost-benefit trade-off, with responsibility placed on the individual for not applying (Kerr, 1982). However, more recent theories have developed a multi-level
framework in which the role of public administration, policy design of the benefit and the
broader social and legal context are considered crucial factors (Janssens
& Van Mechelen, 2022).
Studying non-take-up is relevant because it undermines the effectiveness
of public policies, hinders the achievement of equity and social protection goals (Almeida et al., 2025). It also poses a significant challenge for the
design and implementation of benefits (Eurofound, 2015). Furthermore, the
proportion of the population eligible for MIS in Europe who do not take it up ranges between
40% and 70% (Fuchs et al., 2020).
An analysis of the determinants of non-take-up is essential for
implementing changes that reduce this issue. In this regard, the literature has mainly
focused on individual-level factors, such as a lack of awareness of benefits,
self-perception of non-need, the time and effort required to apply, or stigma associated
with receiving a benefit, all of which play a key role in explaining non-take-up (Eurofound, 2015). However, the role of benefit design, administrative
barriers and application processes have received less attention (Moynihan et
al., 2016; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). There are instruments
that can be used to measure the costs associated with applications relating to information,
processes and stigma (Janssens et al., 2021). Although there is a
research field addressing the role of social workers in the administration of public
provision (Lipsky, 2010), there is still a clear gap in theoretical and
empirical research concerning the non-take-up of benefits from the perspective of social
workers involved in MIS administration (Dewanckel et al., 2022).
This is particularly pertinent given the governance challenges arising
from the implementation of the MVI, as the existence of two similar benefits with different
requirements may increase non-take-up of one of them (Muñoz-Higueras et al.,
2024). The study therefore focuses on the perspective of social workers involved in
managing these policies, with the aim of analyzing the administrative and policy design
factors contributing to non-take-up of benefits. A case study of the Valencian Inclusion
Income (RVI) will be conducted to identify barriers and generate useful evidence for the
design, implementation and improvement of MIS in Spain and other comparable contexts.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, a review of the minimum income
schemes in Spain is presented with a focus on the interaction between schemes. Second, we
review the relevant literature about non-take-up. In section three, we present the method
and data used in the research, followed by results. The final section presents the main
conclusions of the analysis and discusses policy recommendations.
MINIMUM INCOME SCHEMES IN SPAIN: THE CASE OF THE VALENCIAN REGION
Traditionally in Spain, MIS have been developed at the regional level.
These benefits were first introduced in the late 1980s. Shortly afterwards, all Spanish
Regions implemented their own programs, driven by varying levels of political will,
budgetary constraints, and socioeconomic conditions (Ayala et al., 2016;
Aguilar‐Hendrickson & Arriba, 2020).
This process resulted in a fragmented system of benefits characterized by
significant differences in coverage levels, eligibility criteria, administrative procedures
(Ayala et al., 2021), and levels of non-take-up (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2025). The historical and regulatory development
of these programs, together with their policy design and, in some cases, limited political
willingness to support their implementation, has contributed to widespread under-coverage
and high levels of non-take-up among those entitled to receive them (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). Consequently, these schemes have had a
limited impact on their core objectives of reducing poverty and promoting social and labor
market integration (Ayala et al., 2016; Hernández et al.,
2022).
Following the introduction of the Minimum Vital Income (MVI) in 2020,
minimum income schemes in Spain have gained institutional and social relevance (Arriba & Aguilar-Hendrickson, 2021).
The introduction of the MVI aims to establish a common minimum income
base, while enabling regional governments to complement this benefit with a regional scheme
(AIReF, 2022). Consequently, the current MIS landscape is experiencing a
change and evolution as regional governments continue to adapt their systems to the MVI (Prieto Lobato & De la Rosa Gimeno, 2023), with different outcomes in
each region (Albert et al., 2024).
Prior to the introduction of the MVI, the scheme in place in the Valencian
Region was the RVI, introduced in 2018 as part of a broader reform of regional social
policies. The RVI was designed following the experience of the MIS implemented in the Basque
Country and Navarre, which were considered the most developed regional programs in Spain at
that time (Muñoz et al., 2017). The scheme was conceived as a broad social assistance
benefit aimed at covering a large share of the population in situations of economic need.
The amount of the benefit is linked to the statutory minimum wage and, at the time of its
introduction in 2018, the basic benefit corresponded to 70% of this indicator, increasing
with the household size up to 120% for six or more members. The RVI is granted as a
subjective right and can be maintained for an indefinite period as long as the situation of
neediness persists, although renewal must be requested every three years. Eligibility
generally applies to individuals aged between 25 and 65, although several exceptions exist,
for example in households with minors or in situations such as orphanhood, human trafficking
or gender violence. In addition, the residence requirement prior to the application was
reduced to 12 months, with further exceptions for specific vulnerable situations.
A distinctive feature of the RVI is that it combines economic support with
professional social inclusion services, reflecting an approach that integrates income
protection with personalized social intervention pathway. Beneficiaries may also have access
to complementary support measures, such as childcare services, school meal grants, textbook
assistance or university fee exemptions (Caravantes López de Lerma et al.,
2026). Finally, the scheme is structured into four different modalities grouped into
two main categories: minimum income guarantees and income supplements. The first group
includes the Minimum Income Guarantee (RGIM) and the Social Inclusion Guarantee Income
(RGIS), the latter requiring the signing of a social inclusion agreement. The second group
includes income complement schemes that either supplement non-contributory benefits or labor
earnings. In particular, the in-work income complement modality represents an innovative
element in the Spanish context, where minimum income schemes have traditionally been
incompatible with labor income. However, this modality has never been in place. The RVI
established a new right to social inclusion and access to an economic benefit, an aspect
that was previously underdeveloped in the region (Caravantes López de Lerma
et al., 2026). However, despite the positive aspects of this change, the RVI also
faces administrative challenges. The complexity of administrative procedures and a lack of
sufficient social workers may generate problems in its implementation (Muñoz-Higueras & Granell, 2020).
Regarding the administrative process, social workers are responsible for
the initial assessment of each case. After a first meeting with the potential applicant,
further intervention is usually required before the formal application for the RVI can be
submitted. During these meetings, the documentation requirements, the intervention process,
and the obligations associated with the benefit are explained. This preparatory process may
take between one and three months and typically involves more than three meetings with each
applicant.
Social workers offer support with document collection and fill out the
application form. Once the application has been submitted, it is assessed and resolved by
the Generalitat Valenciana (through its Territorial Departments), independently from the
social workers. The resolution process may take up to six months and operates under a
positive administrative silence rule. However, the benefit is recognized from the date of
application rather than from the date of the administrative decision. In exceptional cases,
such as situations involving gender-based violence or asylum, the resolution period may be
reduced to one or two months. There is an emergency procedure established by law, which
allows the applicant and their household to be considered as being in a situation of special
vulnerability
1
.
Despite the problems identified in previous research, the number of RVI
beneficiaries increased quickly after its implementation in 2018, reaching a peak of 75,493
beneficiaries in 2021.
Figure 1 shows that the implementation of the RVI has led to a rapid
increase in the number of people receiving a minimum income benefit in the Valencian Region.
Recipients refer to the individuals who are formally granted the benefit, while
beneficiaries include all members of the household covered by the benefit. According to the
latest available data, the RVI still has more recipients than the MVI. However, this gap may
close as the MVI develops further. Assessing the number of households receiving both
benefits would be highly relevant; however, the lack of available data does not allow us to
understand that.
Figure 1 Beneficiaries of a minimum income scheme in the Valencian Region
Source: own elaboration with data from Conselleria de Servicios Sociales,
Igualdad y Vivienda de la Comunitat Valenciana (2024) and Ministerio de Inclusión,
Seguridad Social y Migraciones.
NON-TAKE-UP OF MINIMUM INCOME SCHEMES
Non-take-up of public provision is recognized as a problem for social
policy protection. It impacts both effectiveness (i.e., poverty and inequality reduction)
and efficiency (in terms of the cost-benefit ratio of policy implementation) while also
creating vertical inequalities within the eligible population (Hernanz et
al., 2004). Furthermore, while short-term savings may be achieved through
non-take-up, the long-term costs may be more significant due to their impact on healthcare
and equal opportunities for children (Eurofound, 2015).
Different estimations of non-take-up are calculated. Although these
estimates vary depending on the type of benefit analyzed and the data used (Goedemé & Janssens, 2020), non-take-up is estimated to range from
20% to 80% in the USA, from 40% to 75% in Europe, and from 30% to 65% in Asia (Fuchs et al., 2020; Ko & Moffitt, 2024). This
highlights the importance of addressing non-take-up to achieve social policy objectives.
In relation to Spain's broader set of MIS, research on non-take-up is
limited. Regarding the implications of non-take-up, the study by Hernández et
al. (2022) emphasizes the negative impact of non-take-up on poverty reduction in
MIS; Muñoz-Higueras et al. (2023) explore the role of policy design and
benefit features on non-take-up and coverage of MIS. The European Anti-Poverty Network,
(2024) concludes that, among others, the higher the degree of neediness, the higher the
non-take-up and defends the necessity of close social services.
Moreover, other research estimates non-take-up rates of benefits. Laín & Julià (2022) report a 47.7% non-take-up rate in the B-MINCOME
pilot project in Barcelona. Noguera et al. (2024) estimates non-take-up
at 75% of the MVI, with differences between regions and AIReF (2023, 2024) provides annual non-take-up estimates for the MVI of around 56%.
For the regional MISs, using administrative data, the estimated non-take-up ranges between
55% and 95% in 2019 (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2025).
As previously mentioned, a particular feature of the Spanish system is
that two similar benefits can be received simultaneously. This may have a negative impact on
take-up, as potential interactions between benefits can create confusion about eligibility
for compatible schemes or concern about the loss of one benefit when applying for another
(Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024; European Anti-Poverty
Network [EAPN], 2024).
Overview of determinants of non-take-up
Traditional literature distinguishes between two types of non-take-up.
van Oorschot, (1991) defines primary non-take-up as a situation in
which an eligible individual or household does not claim the benefit. Secondary
non-take-up occurs when an eligible begins the application process but ultimately does
not receive the benefit. Secondary non-take-up refers to administrative factors, such as
the application procedure, information channels, errors in the resolution process or
budget constraints.
Literature proposes several theories to explain non-take-up. In the
broadest sense, the take-up of benefits is the result of a trade-off between the costs
(e.g. information costs, administrative burden and social stigma) and the benefits (the
amount and duration of the benefit or other in-kind benefits). Consequently, eligibles
will only apply if they perceive that the benefits will outweigh the costs (Kerr, 1982; Matsaganis et al., 2010).
New theories have identified four main sets of determinants that can
be considered when explaining non-take-up: client, administration, policy design (van Oorschot, 1996) (see Figure 2) and broader
social and legal context (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022). These
sets of determinants have been extensively investigated (Fuchs et al.,
2020; Hernanz et al., 2004; Ko & Moffitt,
2024; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024; van
Oorschot, 1991, 1996). However, research into the role of
administration and policy design in explaining non-take-up has received less attention
(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022; Ko & Moffitt,
2024; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). In particular, there is a
lack of research from the point of view of social workers who manage benefits (Dewanckel et al., 2022).
Client
At the individual level, the decision to claim benefits often
involves a trade-off between perceived costs and benefits. Several determinants have
been identified. Households are less likely to apply if the expected benefit level
is low or the duration of eligibility is perceived to be short (Hernanz et al., 2004; Bruckmeiner & Wiemers,
2012).
The costs associated with claiming a benefit could be grouped into
different categories. Information cost include the time and effort required to
understand eligibility rules and benefit conditions. Process costs refer physical or
administrative hurdles involved in applying, such as filling out complex forms or
traveling to offices (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022). A lack
of knowledge about the benefit also contributes to non-take-up, particularly among
individuals experiencing higher levels of social exclusion (EAPN,
2024).
Other relevant costs include psychological and social costs, such
as the stigma associated with receiving social assistance. These costs tend to be
higher in the case of means-tested benefits (Baumberg, 2016).
Finally, social networks play a crucial role in shaping awareness
of entitlements, as information about available benefits often circulates through
informal channels. Factors such as residential segmentation may therefore affect
individuals' access to information and ultimately influence benefit take-up (Bertrand et al., 2000).
Administration
The literature has traditionally highlighted the impact of
administrative and organisational set-up on non-take-up of public provision.
Administrative features can create additional barriers to application (Peeters, 2020). In this case, the degree and quality of
information provision, the user-friendliness of the application procedure and both
the internal and external organization of agencies charged with policy delivery may
have an impact related to non-take-up.
Improving the information provided by public administrations
regarding eligibility criteria and application procedures is key to increasing the
take-up of social benefits. Targeted outreach strategies, such as large-scale
mailing campaigns, direct contact with potential claimants, or sending social
service workers to households, can significantly reduce non-take-up, particularly
when communication avoids stigmatizing narratives (Finn and Goodship,
2014; van Gestel et al., 2022). In addition, effective
collaboration between public administrations, for example between employment and
social services or between agencies managing similar programs, can facilitate access
and reduce administrative fragmentation (Raeymaeckers & Dierckx,
2012). While online application systems can reduce transaction costs for
many applicants, they may be less effective for certain groups, such as older
individuals or households experiencing severe poverty (Kopczuk &
Pop-Eleches, 2007). Finally, the availability of high-quality and linked
administrative data plays a crucial role in identifying potential beneficiaries,
enabling targeted outreach strategies and opening the possibility of developing
automatic enrolment mechanisms (Janssens & van Mechelen,
2022; EAPN, 2024).
Policy design
At the level of policy design, the eligibility rules, entitlement
conditions and benefit structure are all defined. It is also the role of
policymakers to decide how the policy will be administered, within the constraints
of the available budget. This in turn affects the costs and incentives that
potential claimants consider.
These design choices limit the eligible population and indirectly
influence take-up through political communication, administrative priorities, and
client relationships (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). Literature indicates that targeted
programs tend to generate higher non-take-up rates (van Oorschot,
2002), as they are associated with more stigma and increased informational
and procedural costs (Bruckmeier & Wiemers, 2012). For
instance, complex criteria to assess applicants' means require additional time and
effort, while longer waiting periods further reduce take-up (Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023). In contrast, cash transfers are
more likely to be claimed than in-kind benefits (Schanzenbach,
2009). While administrative discretion allows for flexibility and more
personalized targeting, it also increases the risk of errors and claimant
uncertainty (Peeters, 2020).
Furthermore, the way in which policies are designed has a
significant impact on the conditions under which behavioral barriers, trigger events
and network effects are more or less likely to occur. Targeted benefits aimed at
specific population groups often involve complex eligibility rules, which can lead
to increased procedural and informational costs for applicants (Bruckmeier & Wiemers, 2012).
Social context
The client, administrative and policy design levels are shaped by
the broader social and institutional context (Eurofound 2015; Janssens and Van Mechelen 2022). This wider social environment
directly influences the psychological costs that potential claimants weigh when
deciding whether to apply for benefits.
Public discourse and media representations play a significant role
in this regard, as the fear of stigma is strongly influenced by dominant narratives
about individual responsibility (Baumberg, 2016). When the media
presents benefit recipients in a negative context, the perceived social cost of
claiming benefits tends to rise. Cultural norms also influence these perceptions by
defining when it is considered socially acceptable to request assistance (Reijnders et al., 2018).
The present study thus focuses on the perspectives of social
workers regarding the non-take-up drivers that have been presented. In addition, it
explores how the features of policy design and administration of the RVI could act
as determinants of non-take-up of policy.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research aims to analyze the administrative and policy design factors
that contribute to non-take-up of benefits, based on the perceptions of social workers. In
this sense, the study does not consider the perspective of potential beneficiaries who are
not taking-up the benefit. To this end, a case study of the Valencian Inclusion Income in
the Valencian Region will be conducted. Although this approach does not generate causal
inference, this study may also help to better understand other benefits affected by
non-take-up, as administrative processes are consistently identified as a key factor in
non-take-up analyses (Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022). Therefore, the
aim of this study is to provide not only empirical evidence of existing barriers, but also
useful tools for improving the design, procedures and implementation of these policies in
different contexts.
Questionnaire and data
The questionnaire used to gather the necessary data is entitled
‘Management and Governance Models of Regional Minimum Income Schemes’ (modelos de
gestión y gobernanza de las rentas mínimas autonómicas). It combines structured
Likert-scale questions with two open-ended questions, enabling the collection of both
quantitative and qualitative data.
The questionnaire was not specifically designed to study non-take-up.
Instead, it was originally developed to analyze issues related to the implementation and
co-governance of regional and national MISs, and the processes involved in their
administration. However, it includes a specific section of questions related to barriers
to access and non-take-up. The questionnaire enables an in-depth analysis of social
workers' perspectives in primary social services on the administrative processes and
policy design of the benefit. It was distributed online across several Spanish regions
in June 2024. In the case of the Valencian Region, 190 participants completed it.
No specific sampling procedure was applied. The questionnaire was
distributed to all social workers in primary social services who are responsible for
managing the RVI. No financial or employment-related incentives were offered for
completing the questionnaire.
The Regional Ministry was responsible for the distribution of the
questionnaire to social workers; consequently, data related to the response rate cannot
be provided. Nevertheless, after conversation with an administrator of the Regional
Ministry of Social Services, Family and Childhood of Generalitat Valenciana has
confirmed that our sample represents around 13.76% of social workers in primary social
services administration of the RVI. It is not possible to establish whether this sample
is balanced in terms of gender, municipality size and years of expertise in managing
MIS. The non-probabilistic design and the percentage of responses align with the study
conducted by AIReF (2019). The questionnaire contains 26 questions,
grouped into five thematic blocks, as shown in the table 1. The
questionnaire is presented in the Annex.
Table 1 Questionnaire design
| Block |
Objective
|
Questions
|
| 1. Benefit
design |
Analyze the
design of MIS regarding to access criteria |
9 |
| 2.
Institutional design |
Study the
internal organization of management of MIS and the relation with other
areas |
7 |
| 3. Barriers
to access |
Reasons why
people entitled to MIS do not apply it |
3 |
| 4.
Coexistence of benefits |
Changes on
policy design after MVI implementation |
6 |
| 5.
Open-ended question |
Other
relevant ideas not asked previously |
1 |
The results of this research are mainly based on blocks 1, 2 and 3 as
these address questions related to the non-take-up directly. The open-ended question is
also analyzed.
The questionnaire uses a Likert scale from 1 to 4, with 1 representing
the most positive / strongly agree perception and 4 representing the least positive /
strongly disagree perception.
Additionally, the responses have been analyzed based on the
participants' personal and contextual variables, such as gender, municipality size, and
years of experience in managing these benefits. This analysis was conducted following
evidence that these factors may influence the perception of non-take-up and its
determinants (Sabag & Levin, 2023).
Measuring and data analysis
This research adopts the conceptual framework developed by Janssens & Van Mechelen (2022) and presented in the theoretical
framework to categorize non-take-up into different levels and sub-levels. This enables a
structured analysis of the determinants of this phenomenon, with a focus on social
workers perceptions of administrative and policy design factors.
The analysis focuses on the policy design and administration of the
RVI, while also considering the broader social and legal context presented. Each
questionnaire question is linked to a specific sub-level of non-take-up, as detailed in
Table 2. In addition to these questions, open question (Q19)
complements the analysis by exploring underlying reasons and general observations.
Table 2 Non-take-up evidence
| Non-take-up level |
Sub-level
|
Question
|
Academic
reference |
| Policy design |
Degree of
targeting |
1 |
(Holford, 2015) |
| Way of
targeting |
2
8
18.4
18.9
|
(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022)
(van Oorschot, 2002)
(Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024)
(Manchester & Mumford, 2009) |
| Benefit
type and structure |
12, 13 |
(Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2024) |
| Degree of
discretion |
3 |
(Peeters, 2020) |
| Administration |
Degree
and quality of information provision |
5
18.2
18.3
|
(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022)
(Janssens et al., 2021)
(Janssens et al., 2021) |
| User-friendliness of the
application procedure |
4
9
18.5
18.8
|
(Finn & Goodship, 2014)
(Bertrand et al., 2006)
(Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2023)
(Kopczuk & Pop-Eleches, 2007) |
| Internal
organization of agencies charged with policy delivery |
6
7
18.6
18.11
|
(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022)
(Janssens & Van Mechelen, 2022)
(Bell & Smith, 2022)
- |
| External
organization of agencies charged with policy delivery |
11
18.10
|
(Raeymaeckers & Dierckx, 2012)
(Fuchs, 2007) |
Quantitative analysis assesses social workers' perceptions of the
factors contributing to non-take-up. Descriptive and multivariate techniques are used to
identify patterns and priorities. Meanwhile, a qualitative analysis of open-ended
responses reinforces the quantitative findings by offering a deeper understanding of the
identified barriers and providing additional perspectives that may not have been
captured in the survey.
However, it should be noted that the study is not without its
limitations. The present study is constrained by the perspective of social workers,
which may be subject to bias due to their involvement in the administrative process and
their personal biases (Dubois, 2016). It would be very interesting to
compare the results of the social workers' survey with the perspective of the RVI
beneficiaries to see if the identified limitations are similar in both groups.
Furthermore, it is important to consider the opinion of the policymakers, as they are
directly involved in policy design and some of the limitations that have been
identified. A future research line could be developed in this sense.
Methodological approach
The stated objectives are addressed through a methodological approach
that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques.
1. Data processing: Question categorization and correlation analysis.
First, responses that generated outlier values (e.g., "Don’t
know/No answer" or "Not applicable") were transformed into missing values
2
. Second, the survey questions were categorized according to the levels of
non-take-up identified in the literature (see Table 3) and
followed a Likert scale ranging from 1 (lower incidence) to 4 (highest incidence) on
non-take-up. A correlation analysis was then performed within each category to
identify redundancies. Questions with a high correlation (r ≥ 0.7) were considered
redundant and were either removed or combined, resulting in three questions being
eliminated and/or merged to simplify the questionnaire and ensure its accuracy2F2F
3
.
2. Descriptive and open-ended responses analysis.
Once the questions had been selected, a basic descriptive analysis
was conducted, including a mean, median and deviation comparison across
subcategories, to identify elements that respondents considered to potentially
contributed to non-take-up. Open-ended responses of Q19 were analyzed using content
analysis to complement the quantitative data. This qualitative approach helps to
identify key ideas and suggestions that enhance the interpretation of the results.
3. Group comparison analysis by gender, municipality size, and years of expertise
in benefit management.
Perceptions of non-take-up were assessed based on variables such
as gender, municipality size, and years of expertise. These differences were
analyzed using statistical tests such as ANOVA or t-tests. These categories were
defined based on the information collected in the survey.
This methodological approach combines the identification of
factors related to non-take-up with a more interpretative analysis, ensuring robust
and relevant results for improving the RVI and similar schemes. The data collected
and techniques employed address the research objective of analyzing administration
and policy design factors that contribute to non-take-up from the perspective of
social workers.
RESULTS
This section presents the main survey findings on the administrative and
policy design factors that, from the perspective of social workers managing the RVI
influence the non-take-up.
Before presenting the results highlighting the factors influencing
non-take-up from the perspective of social workers, it is important to provide context on
their overall perception of the phenomenon. Question (Q17) of the survey addresses this
issue directly, revealing that 55% of respondents believe that there are 'few' eligible
individuals not claiming the benefit and 7% consider that non-take-up does not even exist,
with an average response of 2.57. In addition, related to the open-ended question (Q19), one
specific comment is that: "Here in the Valencian Region, everyone applies and when I say
everyone, I mean EVERYONE".
This perception contrasts with previous estimations of non-take-up
presented in the theoretical framework, none of which were below 55% (AIReF,
2023, 2024: Noguera et al., 2024; Muñoz-Higueras et al., 2025). This discrepancy may be due to different
factors:
One potential explanation for this phenomenon relates to the limited scope
of interactions with potential beneficiaries. Social workers primarily interact with
individuals who have already been identified as being in need of social services,
particularly those who are connected to their own social center. Consequently, their
experience is based on a subset of the population that has already established contact with
the system. Individuals who are eligible but never approach social services remain largely
invisible to them, which makes it difficult to perceive the full magnitude of non-take-up.
This finding aligns with the broader literature on non-take-up, which shows that
administrative systems primarily capture individuals who actively claim benefits, leaving
the eligible population outside the system largely unobserved (van Oorschot,
1991).
Secondly, the working conditions of street-level bureaucrats may also
influence their perceptions. As Vincent Dubois (2016) highlighted,
frontline workers operate within significant organizational constraints, limited resources
and cognitive biases that shape how they interpret the functioning of public provision.
Research on street-level organizations shows that these institutional constraints strongly
influence frontline behavior and perceptions of policy outcomes (Brodkin,
2011). In the context of Spain, other research has demonstrated how elevated
workloads and shortages of resources within social services can have a significant impact on
this phenomenon (Serrano & Arriba, 1998). These pressures may reduce
the time and capacity for reflection about the existence of individuals who remain outside
the system.
A third element is the lack of clear institutional benchmarks regarding
the size of the eligible population. In many cases, there are no official estimates of how
many people should potentially receive a given benefit. Without a reference point, social
workers tend to evaluate program performance based on the cases they manage rather than on
the gap between beneficiaries and the eligible population. This complicates the
identification of potential beneficiaries who are not claiming the benefit.
Descriptive and open-ended responses analysis
After responses were aggregated across levels, a descriptive analysis
was conducted to identify the factors that social workers perceived as being the most
influential in non-take-up determinants.
Figure 3 Descriptive of non-take-up sub-levels
Figure 3 shows the mean, median and deviation of the responses,
according to the non-take-up levels and sub-levels analyzed. Policy design factors are
highlighted in dark gray while administration factors are highlighted in light gray.
This information can be complemented with the open-ended question. It
allows respondents to share any information that was not previously addressed. Given the
multidimensional nature of non-take-up, this is particularly important in this context.
To maintain the structure of the analysis, the open-ended responses
were grouped using the same categorization as before, i.e. according to administration
and policy design levels. While the information provided is more challenging to
categorize, similar responses can still be linked to different categories.
A total of 70 comments were collected, representing 36.8% of the
sample. Some comments refer to more than one determinant of non-take-up. Finally, 81
items are considered.
Other responses could be linked with the previously analyzed
categories, but it is necessary to expand on them from the client's perspective, as new
items have been found.
Table 3
Information of open-ended question
| Level
|
Sublevel
|
Item
|
Frequency
|
| Client
(20.98%) |
|
Informal
economy |
4.94%
|
| |
|
Lack of
knowledge |
16.05%
|
| Policy
design (51.85%) |
Degree of
targeting |
Selection
criteria |
14.81%
|
| |
Way of
targeting |
Policy
design |
6.17%
|
| |
Benefit
type and structure |
Stigma
Intervention |
9.88%
20.99% |
| |
Degree of
discretion |
|
- |
| Administration (27.16%)
|
Degree
and quality of information provision |
Information provision
Digital gap |
9.88%
1.23% |
| |
User-friendliness of the
application procedure |
Application process
|
8.64%
|
| |
Internal
organization of agencies charged with policy delivery |
|
- |
| |
External
organization of agencies charged with policy delivery |
Interaction between
schemes |
7.41%
|
The results of both analyses indicate that, from the perspective of
social workers, even the client perspective is considered. It is evident that
administrative-level and policy design factors have an influence on non-take-up
determinants of RVI.
In terms of policy design (dark gray), social workers consider that
the benefit type and structure and the way of targeting represent the most influential
factors.
Benefit type and structure (2.44): The survey refers to the social
inclusion pathway. Thus, the RVI has an in-kind part (intervention and inclusion
pathway) and a monetary part (amount received) of the benefit. Social workers consider
that this process is not being carried out correctly, as the level of support could be
higher, particularly in programs that refer to support for employment. Furthermore, from
a social workers’ perspective, being a beneficiary of the scheme and following the
integration pathways could potentially lead to a stigmatization of beneficiary
households (9.88%).
One respondent notes: “Because they are ashamed to go to the
municipal social services".
Finally, there is a clear result relating to the coexistence of the
two benefits. The MVI only provides economic support, whereas the RVI also offers a
social inclusion pathway. Social workers are considering (20.99%) the fact that only the
RVI intervention and social inclusion pathway is presented, and that this is increasing
non-take-up of the scheme because eligible households may prefer to apply only for the
MVI, which has no obligations.
Way of targeting (2.42): Respondents consider that the specific access
conditions are inadequate. This scheme seems to be extremely strict in some areas, such
as household composition and previous cohabitation, which are not linked with reality.
They also note that the calculation of incomes and assets does not reflect the real
situation. Highly selective programs can also increase the associated stigma, resulting
in non-take-up of the benefit. All these factors make it more difficult for social
workers to manage applications. For 6.17% of respondents, the design of the policy is
increasing non-take-up.
Degree of targeting (2.27): This is linked to the previous point.
Overall, social workers believe that the requirements for accessing the scheme are too
restrictive and do not align with the needs of households in poverty and/or social
exclusion situation. They also consider that the selection criteria are excessively
focused on long-term poverty (14.81%).
Degree of discretion (1.55): In this case, the lower the score, the
more the respondent agrees. Even if they are not mentioned in open-ended questions,
exceptionalities are considered a way to facilitate access to benefits. In the RVI,
social workers can consider a household to be in a situation of special vulnerability,
in which case access to the programme is easier and waiting periods for a resolution are
reduced. Social workers can create a situation of positive discrimination, which they
also consider to be beneficial for managing the scheme.
In terms of administration factors (light gray) there are fewer
differences between sub-levels.
User-friendliness of the application procedure (2.68): It has the
highest score of all categories and is also presented in 8.64% of open-ended responses.
This category refers to the complexity of formal procedures and the impossibility for
applicants of completing them independently and directly online. This increases the
application cost of the scheme. Without the support of a social worker, potential
applicants would find it very difficult to fulfil the official requirements.
One respondent considers that non-take-up exists because: “Due to
the high DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED BY PRIMARY SOCIAL SERVICES”.
Degree and quality of information provision (2.45): Social workers
consider that the eligibility criteria are not clear enough for potential applicants,
which is probably why applicants consider that the RVI is not designed for them. This is
also linked to the idea that the system does not provide clear and accurate information
about entitlements and requirements (9.88%).
Internal organization of agencies charged with policy delivery (2.53):
Social workers consider staff shortages and insufficient training to be important
internal problems. This sometimes results in a lack of support for potential clients
when they apply. In this sense, a lot of changes to the normative characteristics of the
RVI and the implementation of other benefits, such as the MVI, are being considered.
External organization of agencies charged with policy delivery (2.37):
While social services that manage the RVI are linked with employment and housing
services, the coordination with others, such as education or the third sector, could be
improved. Social workers consider that the multi-level organization of MIS, with the
regional RVI and national IMV, is resulting in difficulties when applying the RVI. The
two benefits are not coordinated (7.41%), which has a negative impact.
An open-ended question summarizes the opinion of this percentage with
the statement “Because they already have the MVI, which has no monitoring or
intervention pathway.”
Finally, even at the client level, there were no questions in the
survey. The open-ended question provides some interesting and commonly referred results.
The lack of knowledge about the RVI is presented on 16.05% of
responses. There is the traditional determinant of non-take-up. It is also interesting
that 4.94% consider the presence of the informal economy to be a disincentive for
potential users to apply for the scheme. In this regard, social workers consider that
the RVI must be compatible with labor market earnings.
Differences between groups
Due to the characteristics of the sample, differences may be observed
depending on the respondent's gender, the size of their municipality or their years of
experience in benefit management. For this reason, the sample's characteristics are also
presented.
Table 4 Disaggregated results by social worker’s characteristics
| Sub-level
|
Gender
|
Municipality Size
|
Years of expertise
|
| |
Male |
Female
|
>0
<9,999 |
>10k
<19,999 |
>20k
<99,999 |
>100k
|
1 to 5 |
6 to 10
|
11 to 20
|
21 to 40
|
No |
| |
27 |
162 |
44 |
24 |
68 |
54 |
79 |
39 |
28 |
29 |
15 |
| (%) |
14.21 |
85.26 |
23.15 |
12.63 |
35.78 |
28.42 |
45.26 |
22.10 |
10.52 |
14.23 |
7.89 |
| Degree of
targeting |
2.18 |
2.29 |
2.22 |
2.37 |
2.35 |
2.18 |
2.3 |
2.28 |
2.42 |
2.10 |
2.2 |
| Way of
targeting |
2.49 |
2.40 |
2.36 |
2.54 |
2.41 |
2.43 |
2.36 |
2.44 |
2.51 |
2.42 |
2.50 |
| Benefit
type and structure |
2.68* |
2.39* |
2.39 |
2.5 |
2.49 |
2.40 |
2.38 |
2.38 |
2.57 |
2.62 |
2.33 |
| Degree of
discretion |
1.33 |
1.59 |
1.38 |
1.25* |
1.63* |
1.72* |
1.49* |
1.64 |
1.6 |
1.44 |
1.73 |
| Degree
and quality of information provision |
2.66 |
2.42 |
2.38 |
2.60 |
2.49 |
2.40 |
2.54 |
2.38 |
2.48 |
2.13 |
2.78 |
| User-friendliness of the
application procedure |
2.67 |
2.68 |
2.70 |
2.69 |
2.58 |
2.78 |
2.66* |
2.80* |
2.72* |
2.42* |
2.9* |
| Internal
organization of agencies charged with policy delivery |
2.50 |
2.54 |
2.43 |
2.72* |
2.42* |
2.67* |
2.56* |
2.52 |
2.58 |
2.29 |
2.81 |
| External
organization of agencies charged with policy delivery |
2.67* |
2.31* |
2.54 |
2.5 |
2.34 |
2.24 |
2.36 |
2.41 |
2.46 |
2.28 |
2.58 |
| Mean |
2.39 |
2.32 |
2.3 |
2.39 |
2.33 |
2.35 |
2.33 |
2.35 |
2.41 |
2.21 |
2.47 |
Table 4 shows information about the sample and its characteristics.
The predominant characteristics are female gender (85.26%), cities with more than 20,000
inhabitants (64.20%), and recent workers with less than five years' experience of
managing benefits (45.26%).
Overall, there are no significant differences in the responses, even
when differentiated by personal and geographical characteristics. However, the ANOVAs
show that there are statistical differences between respondents' personal
characteristics in relation to some specific questions.
Firstly, in terms of benefit type and structure, men have a higher and
more significant mean. This suggests that male respondents believe potential
beneficiaries do not receive sufficient support in understanding the benefit. This is
similar to how men perceive the organisation of external agencies, which they consider
to be the worst. This may influence non-take-up.
Secondly, an interesting relationship exists between municipality size
and degree of discretion. The significant result of this is that the larger the
municipality, the greater its influence on non-take-up. This suggests that there is more
contact between social workers and applicants in smaller cities. This close relationship
can reduce non-take-up.
Finally, in relation to the years of expertise of social workers, new
recruits may consider use this degree of discretion to a greater extent than others. As
they gain more experience, they become more critical of discretion, perhaps because they
identify more structural or bureaucratic problems in the granting of benefits. Regarding
the application procedure, a notable finding was observed: new and more experienced
workers find it easier than medium-expertise workers. There may be different reasons for
this. Firstly, new workers have only worked with RVI, so fewer or no legal changes have
occurred. On the other hand, workers with more expertise may have sufficient knowledge
to cope with procedural changes.
