


Artículos / Articles

## Exclusionary narratives at Europe's Southern Edge: a comparative digital analysis of migration discourses in the Canary Islands and Lampedusa

### *Narrativas excluyentes en el Sur de Europa: un análisis comparativo digital de los discursos sobre la migración en las Islas Canarias y Lampedusa*

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#### ABSTRACT

Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, European authorities have tightened border controls, prompting shifts in migration routes toward southern entry points, particularly the Canary Islands and Lampedusa. These dynamics have intensified debates on migration, security, and identity. In this paper, we examine how key actors use Twitter (now X) to frame these migration crises and shape exclusionary narratives. Drawing on an analysis of discourses circulated by politicians, media outlets, and civic organizations, we identify dominant actors, explore their framing strategies, and compare the resulting narratives across both regions. In doing so, this study clarifies the interplay between social media and public opinion, offering insights into how digital platforms enable the construction and amplification of xenophobic and hostile rhetoric. Our findings underscore the urgency of understanding digital media's role in shaping exclusionary narratives and highlight the methodological challenges posed by increasingly restricted data access.

**Keywords:** migration crises, social media discourse, exclusionary narratives, Canary Islands, Lampedusa, anti-immigration rhetoric.

#### RESUMEN

Desde el inicio de la pandemia de COVID-19, las autoridades europeas han reforzado los controles fronterizos, lo que ha provocado un desplazamiento de las rutas migratorias hacia los puntos de entrada del sur, en particular las Islas Canarias y Lampedusa. Estas dinámicas han intensificado los debates en torno a la migración, la seguridad y la identidad. En este artículo, analizamos cómo los actores clave utilizan Twitter (actualmente X) para

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abordar estas crisis migratorias y construir narrativas excluyentes. A partir de un análisis de los discursos difundidos por políticos, medios de comunicación y organizaciones cívicas, identificamos a los actores predominantes, examinamos sus estrategias de encuadre discursivo y comparamos las narrativas resultantes en ambas regiones. Este estudio arroja luz sobre la interacción entre las redes sociales y la opinión pública, proporcionando información sobre cómo las plataformas digitales facilitan la construcción y amplificación de discursos xenófobos y hostiles. Nuestros hallazgos subrayan la necesidad urgente de comprender el papel de los medios digitales en la configuración de narrativas excluyentes y destacan los retos metodológicos derivados del acceso cada vez más restringido a los datos..

**Palabras clave:** crisis migratorias, discurso en redes sociales, narrativas excluyentes, Islas Canarias, Lampedusa, retórica antiinmigración.

## INTRODUCTION

Concerns over the erosion of democratic values and the legitimacy of Western democracies are longstanding (Habermas, 1981), yet what distinguishes the current moment is how these systems are undermined through digital channels and populist rhetoric (Finchelstein, 2019). Across Europe, right-wing populist movements and neofascist tendencies (Griffin, 2010) capitalize on media ecosystems that facilitate the rapid dissemination of exclusionary narratives, particularly around migration. While the European Union's southern borders have long been key entry points for people fleeing conflict, poverty, and instability, the Canary Islands and Lampedusa have emerged as especially visible frontline regions (IOM, 2021). In recent years, arrivals in these areas have shifted due to stricter controls and reconfigured routes, rendering local communities' focal points of high stakes debates over national identity, sovereignty, and humanitarian responsibility (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018).

Digital platforms such as X (Twitter), with their capacity for instantaneous communication and audience segmentation, have become crucial arenas where these debates unfold (Tandoc et al., 2018; Tucker et al., 2018). Politicians, journalists, activists, and ordinary users engage in contentious exchanges that frame migrants alternately as victims, security threats, or symbols of a failing European project (Krzyżanowski, 2018). These platforms thus shape public opinion and can influence policy decisions, as exclusionary narratives and hate speech circulate widely, reinforcing stereotypes and xenophobic attitudes (Moffitt, 2016). Against this backdrop, examining the specific discourses around Lampedusa and the Canary Islands offers critical insights into how local contexts intersect with broader European anxieties about migration.

Research on social media's role in shaping migration narratives is extensive, covering topics from populist communication strategies (Laclau, 2009; Forti, 2021) to the impact of online misinformation on public sentiment (Rowe et al., 2021). While a substantial body of scholarship has examined the role of social media in shaping migration narratives (e.g. Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Krzyżanowski, 2018; Moffitt, 2016), relatively few studies have adopted a comparative, large-scale digital-data approach to examine how migration crises are framed across distinct European border regions, or closely considered how specific local contexts inform broader exclusionary discourses (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017). By focusing on the Canary Islands and Lampedusa, this study provides a detailed perspective on how digital narratives emerge, circulate and intersect; contributing to a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms behind hate speech and exclusionary politics in Europe is evolving media ecology.

## Research question and objectives

This paper addresses the following research question: *How do key actors on social media frame the migration crises in the Canary Islands and Lampedusa, and what similarities and differences in these discursive constructions contribute to exclusionary narratives in Europe?* To answer this question, the main objective is to understand how digital platforms facilitate the construction and dissemination of exclusionary migration narratives across different European border regions. In service of this goal, the analysis first identifies the prominent actors driving these conversations, then examines the linguistic and thematic patterns they employ, and finally compares the resulting narrative structures in both locations. It is important to clarify that while this study acknowledges the role of digital platforms in amplifying these narratives, its primary focus is on the discursive practices of the actors rather than on the structural configurations or underlying architectures of the platforms themselves.

By pursuing this goal, the research sheds light on the mechanisms through which online narratives shape public perception, influence political debates and resonate beyond the local context. This perspective is particularly important as the public discourse on migration evolves amid increasing restrictions on data access, especially in X (Twitter), since 2022, limiting transparency and critical scrutiny. Ultimately, this study contributes to ongoing debates on democratic governance, social cohesion, and the ethical responsibilities of digital platforms in an era where fear and hostility toward migrants are amplified online (Bhatia, 2018; Messing & Bocsák, 2020).

## Theoretical framework

Traverso and Meyran (2017) describes these emerging political movements as forms of *post-fascism*, a term he uses to characterize movements that, unlike the rigidly ideological fascism of the early 20th century, employ nostalgic and reactionary rhetoric. These movements advocate for *plebiscitary democracies*, political systems where leaders claim legitimacy through direct appeals to the populace, bypassing established parliamentary structures. Populist leaders in these movements thrive on emotional and reactionary impulses, establishing direct communication with their followers via digital platforms, which accelerates their influence. This phenomenon is central to understanding the erosion of democratic norms in contemporary Europe.

In the context of these movements, Beatriz Acha (2021) argues that post-fascist tendencies undermine the foundations of liberal democracies by adopting exclusionary ideologies that are incompatible with democratic values. These movements promote narratives of national identity and cultural purity, often positioning migrants and minorities as threats to societal stability. Steve Forti (2021) expands on this analysis by introducing the concept of “Radical Right 2.0.” Unlike earlier far-right movements, which relied on traditional media and grassroots mobilization, Radical Right 2.0 leverages the speed, reach, and anonymity of social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter (X), and WhatsApp to disseminate exclusionary ideologies and fake news more effectively. These platforms allow these movements to amplify their messages, often circumventing mainstream media’s checks on misinformation, thereby shaping public discourse around migration and nationalism.

A significant component of Radical Right 2.0’s strategy is the manipulation of public discourse through misinformation and fake news. Fake news has become a key tool in shaping public opinion on migration, facilitating the dissemination of exclusionary narratives

that tap into societal fears and uncertainties (Tandoc et al., 2018; Baggini, 2017; d'Ancona, 2017). Social media platforms like Twitter enable these movements to rapidly spread false narratives, intensifying xenophobic attitudes and influencing policy debates. Arcila-Calderon (2020) shows how these platforms, particularly Twitter, spread false narratives about migrants, amplifying xenophobic responses. The rise of misinformation on migration is not coincidental—platform algorithms often prioritize sensationalist content that drives engagement, which in turn amplifies polarizing misinformation (Cinelli et al., 2021; Wu et al., 2019).

The manipulation of digital communication has also led to more precise disinformation campaigns, disproportionately targeting vulnerable groups such as migrants. Khatua et al. (2022) argue that these campaigns deliberately frame migrants as threats, feeding into existing echo chambers where users are repeatedly exposed to content that reinforces their pre-existing beliefs. This deepens ideological divisions within society (Sunstein, 2001; Hall & Cappella, 2008; Barberá et al., 2015), with social media platforms acting as mechanisms for both echo chambers and filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011). These mechanisms ensure that users are exposed only to content that aligns with their biases, further entrenching polarization in public discourse.

Migration remains a central issue for radical right-wing political parties, who exploit it as a powerful tool to shape public opinion and stoke nationalist sentiments. By framing migration as a threat to national security and cultural identity, these parties capitalize on societal fears and reinforce exclusionary ideologies. The migration crises in Lampedusa and the Canary Islands, given their strategic geographical positions as entry points into Europe, have become flashpoints for these narratives. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2021), migration along these routes surged by 86% in 2020, with over 77,000 migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean, leading to a significant rise in xenophobic incidents across Europe. The North African region has become a major transit point for migrants attempting to reach Europe, and the framing of this migration in right-wing discourse reflects a broader trend of fear-based narratives that dominate public perception.

These dynamics are further exacerbated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Governments worldwide adopted militaristic rhetoric to combat the pandemic, contributing to the normalization of nationalist and fear-based narratives in public discourse. This shift significantly altered how migration was perceived, with populist leaders framing migrants as public health threats, thereby justifying exclusionary policies (Wicke & Bolognesi, 2020; Chapman & Miller, 2020; Logie, 2020). The pandemic provided fertile ground for disinformation to flourish, with social media platforms becoming battlegrounds for competing narratives about migration and national security (Ferrara et al., 2020).

Social media platforms, often perceived as neutral, are shaped by ideological forces. Traditional media powerholders extend their influence into the digital sphere, reinforcing ideological biases (Russell et al., 2015). These platforms act as mechanisms of vertical power structures disguised as horizontal communication channels, enabling far-right actors to dominate migration discourse and amplify fear-based narratives that polarize public opinion (Tucker et al., 2018; Klinger et al., 2023).

In this context, it is crucial to understand the manipulation of migration discourse in social media. By focusing on the specific cases of Lampedusa and the Canary Islands during the migrant crisis of 2020. These case studies provide critical insights into how local migration crises are framed within broader populist and nationalist strategies, offering a deeper understanding of how digital media facilitates the rise of exclusionary rhetoric in contemporary Europe.

## Methodological approach

This study employs a mixed-methods approach, integrating both quantitative and qualitative analyses to investigate the public discourse surrounding migration crises in the Canary Islands and Lampedusa on the social media platform Twitter. The methodological framework is grounded in Social Network Analysis (SNA), thematic analysis, and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), providing a comprehensive lens through which to analyse the structure, dynamics, and content of migration-related debates.

## Data collection and tools

To collect the relevant data from Twitter, this research utilized a proprietary tool with access to Twitter's API (Vañó-Agulló et al., 2021), which enables both real-time and retrospective monitoring of trending topics and keywords. This tool facilitated the extraction of tweets related to the migration crises in the Canary Islands and Lampedusa, building separate databases for each case study.

- Canary Islands Case Study: tweets containing the keywords “inmigrantes” AND “Canarias” were collected from November 3, 2020, to January 31, 2021. Tweets in both Spanish and Catalan were included, as these are the primary official languages used in the region (Spain), 288.251 tweets were obtained from 50.163 nodes.
- Lampedusa Case Study: for the Italian case study, tweets containing the keywords “Immigrati” AND “Lampedusa” were collected over a longer period, from March 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020. This extended collection window was necessary to capture the sustained volume of tweets in Italy during that period. Italian was the only language considered in this case, as it is the predominant language used in public discourse on Twitter in this region, 24.978 tweets were collected from 16.288 accounts.

## Social Network Analysis (SNA)

To analyse the network structure of interactions on Twitter, the T-hoarder tool (available on GitHub) was employed, with custom modifications made to its scripts to extract relationship graphs. These graphs were then processed and analysed using Gephi, an open-source network analysis software. The SNA approach focused on identifying key actors within the Twitter discourse, emphasizing those with the highest in-degree (defined by the number of retweets they received, as they were the most shared and potentially viewed in the platform when you searched the topic). This allowed for the identification of the most influential accounts (Granovetter, 1973; Giddens, 1979; Wetherell, 1998; Segev, 2020).

The retweet (RT) dynamics were analysed to highlight how certain users or groups amplify specific migration-related content. This visibility, gained through retweets, plays a crucial role in determining the flow and reach of information on social media platforms, thus identifying influential nodes within the network.

## Thematic analysis and tools

For the thematic analysis, KH Coder 3 was used to create a co-occurrence network that visualizes connections among key terms in the migration discourse. Key terms (nodes) were selected based on term frequency, document frequency, and part-of-speech tagging following an initial thematic review. The strength of co-occurrence between words was calculated using the Jaccard coefficient, with the top 60 strongest co-occurrences rendered as network edges (Romesburg, 1984). The spatial layout of nodes was determined using the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm (Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991), ensuring an informative visualization of the underlying textual structure.

Community detection and centrality analysis were then applied to interpret the network. Community detection methods included edge betweenness (removing edges with high betweenness as described by Newman and Girvan, 2004), random walks via the Walktrap algorithm (Pons & Latapy, 2005), and modularity-based detection using the fastgreedy algorithm (Clauset, Newman, & Moore, 2004). Additionally, centrality measures—such as betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1979; Brandes, 2001), degree centrality, and eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1987)—were calculated to assess the importance of each node within the network.

## Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

To complement the quantitative analysis, Van Dijk's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework (1997) was applied to delve deeper into the discursive strategies used by influential actors on Twitter. CDA was particularly useful in identifying racism, xenophobia, and border control narratives within the public debates on migration. By focusing on how language is used to construct migrants as "others" the CDA approach provides insight into the ways right-wing actors manipulate public perception to align with exclusionary ideologies.

## RESULTS

### Public discourse analysis: the case of Spain (Canary Islands)

This study analyses public discourses surrounding migrants at the borders of Italy (Lampedusa) and Spain (the Canary Islands), both key entry points to Europe due to their proximity to Africa. The Canary Islands are near Morocco, while Lampedusa is close to Tunisia, making them central to conflicts over migration and border control. As Lamont and Molnar (2002) suggest, borders are not only security measures but also carry deep social meanings. These maritime borders, lacking the physical fortifications of land borders, further complicate migration debates as they evoke heightened fears of uncontrollable entry and threats to national sovereignty (Demata, 2021).

### Discourses in the public debate

The analysis of the Spanish case focuses on key themes identified in the dataset filtered by "Canarias" and "Inmigrantes," where migrants are primarily framed as "illegal immigrants." Terms like "arrive" and "more" emphasize the portrayal of the sea as a border crossed by





Another recurrent theme is the association between NGOs and mafias within public discourse. The data shows terms like “inmigración” linked with “mafia” and “Cruz Roja” indicating how right-wing narratives, particularly from political parties such as Vox, promote the criminalization of organizations that rescue migrants at sea. This narrative support calls for stronger border fortifications, framing humanitarian organizations as complicit in illegal migration. The framing of migration through such a lens aligns with far-right political agendas, which often exploit fears around national security and border control to mobilize support for restrictive immigration policies (Lahav & Messina, 2024).

The theme of “invasión” is also prevalent, with terms like “denunciar” appearing alongside it in the dataset. Hashtags such as #arribavoxvenceremos and #voxextremanecesidad, promoted by Vox, dominate the conversation, illustrating a distinct bias in migration discourse. Vox's anti-immigrant rhetoric portrays migrants from Morocco and Mauritania as the “perfect enemy,” fuelling fear, hostility, and the perception of migration as an existential threat to national identity and security.

## Discourses of the key actors

Rubén Pulido (@rubnpulido) is described as a political analyst and writes for *La Gaceta de la Iberosfera*, a digital newspaper funded directly by *La Fundación Disenso*, the think tank of the far-right political party Vox. This foundation is chaired by Santiago Abascal, who is also the leader of Vox, and it espouses an ultraconservative ideology. An important detail to consider when analysing Pulido's ideological bias is that the foundation's first manifesto was signed not only by Spanish figures like Abascal but also by international figures such as Eduardo Bolsonaro, a federal deputy from São Paulo and son of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, and Giorgia Meloni, leader of the conservative nationalist party *Fratelli d'Italia*. These connections provide insight into the transnational far-right networks influencing Pulido's views on migration and geopolitics.

The second key actor is @okdiario, which represents the digital newspaper *OK Diario*. This outlet also follows a far-right and neoliberal editorial stance. Its editor, Eduardo Inda, is a well-known political commentator who frequently appears on Spanish television. Inda and *OK Diario* have been criticized and even convicted for publishing false news and failing to issue corrections. The publication positions itself as a platform for “inconformists” appealing to readers dissatisfied with mainstream media. This framing aligns with the newspaper's subjective and often ideologically biased reporting, aimed at challenging what it portrays as the dominant media narrative (Arendt, 2023).


Another important account is @casoaislado\_es, which can be categorized as anonymous, as it is not linked to any public figure. This account describes itself as an analyser of migration-related issues, particularly focusing on the insecurity allegedly caused by illegal immigration. @casoaislado\_es operates as a platform for anti-immigrant messaging, relying on its website to publish decontextualized demographic data about the immigrant population in Spain to support its anti-immigrant narrative. The data it shares is often used to reinforce negative stereotypes about migrants and justify xenophobic viewpoints (Arendt, 2023).

Finally, @veintimillapier is another anonymous account that gained prominence during the migration crisis for its opposition to the Spanish government of the time. This account became influential due to its alignment with the themes promoted by other actors in the debate, echoing anti-government and anti-immigration messages similar to those of @rubnpulido, @okdiario, and @casoaislado\_es.



The key actors in the Spanish case study demonstrate clear ideological bias toward conservative, right-wing, and anti-immigration positions. Despite some of them being linked to the media, they position themselves as independent analysts. For example, *OK Diario*, while part of the media landscape, markets itself as being “against the system,” claiming that the establishment opposes its positions. This anti-establishment narrative is further reinforced by appeals such as the one made by the newspaper’s director, who states, “They’re coming for us. Support us!” in an effort to solicit donations from its subscribers (Mudde, 2017).

**Figure 2.** Mapping of key actors and their communities. Spanish case



## Discourses of the key themes

This section analyses the key themes in the tweets shared by prominent actors during the migration crisis. One central theme revolves around the financial burden migrants allegedly place on the Spanish state. These actors frequently used economic data to argue that resources meant for Spanish citizens, such as ERTE payments during the pandemic, were unfairly diverted to migrants. This comparison framed migrants as outsiders benefiting undeservedly from state resources, reinforcing the “us versus them” narrative. The emphasis on “illegal immigrants—NOT refugees” highlights both legal and racial boundaries, consistent with Van Dijk’s concept of new racism (2000). The term “ilegal” was used to criminalize migrants, stripping them of rights and portraying them as undeserving of protection.

This depiction of migrants as criminals or threats gained significant traction during the COVID-19 pandemic. Migrants were portrayed not only as lawbreakers but also as potential carriers of disease, which heightened fears in Spain during the second wave of the virus in late 2020 and early 2021. The crisis around border control further fuelled narratives that positioned migrants as both a public health threat and a burden on the state.

Another dominant theme was that of invasion, a metaphor frequently used in anti-immigration rhetoric. As Van Dijk (2000) explains, this militarized metaphor equates immigrants to hostile forces threatening national security. The hashtag #EfectoInvasión reflects the “pull factor” theory, suggesting that allowing migrants to enter

encourages more to follow (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2021). This narrative framed migration as not only a threat to the Canary Islands but also to mainland Spain, intensifying anxieties around national security.

Key actors also portrayed NGOs as complicit in this so-called invasion, often linking them to human trafficking mafias. This framing criminalized NGOs, suggesting they undermined Spain's borders and were funded by entities threatening national security. By associating NGOs and maritime rescue services with organized crime, these actors sought to delegitimize humanitarian efforts and push for the dismantling of operations that reduce migrant crossings.

The theme of border militarization also emerged strongly. One actor suggested a "naval blockade" by the Spanish army to prevent migrants from arriving by sea. Although impractical, this proposal aimed to undermine the legitimacy of humanitarian actors, implying that the military was serving "illegal immigrants" instead of protecting Spanish citizens. This narrative deepened the division between "Us" and "Them," suggesting that resources and security forces were being misallocated to assist foreigners at the expense of the local population.

The issue of housing migrants was also a key point of contention. The government's decision to place migrants in camps and empty hotels was framed as preferential treatment, suggesting that migrants were receiving more privileges than Spanish citizens, further fuelling resentment. The government, labeled as "social-communist," was accused of prioritizing migrants by moving them to the mainland, deepening anti-immigrant sentiment.

A significant element of this discourse was the call for citizen mobilization. Tweets indicated that locals, driven by insecurity, organized neighbourhood patrols to protect their towns. These patrols reflected the fear and anxiety stirred by social actors emphasizing the scale of the so-called "invasión". Quantitative arguments were frequently employed to underscore the perceived threat, with actors citing the number of arriving migrants and the financial cost of their care. Van Dijk (2000) refers to this as "numerical rhetoric," used here to frame migrants as an overwhelming burden on the state.

The rhetoric of invasion and insecurity ultimately manifested in real-world consequences, as seen in the Canary Islands, where locals organized patrols referred to as "Moor hunts." This demonstrates how social media discourse around migration transcended digital platforms and led to tangible impacts on public behaviour. The narratives of insecurity and invasion spread by key actors spurred anti-immigrant mobilization, resulting in actions fuelled by fear and hostility toward migrants.

These earlier discourses significantly contributed to the social construction of the migrant as a threat, particularly emphasizing the perceived lack of security and military protection. Calls for citizens to defend themselves led to groups actively seeking out migrants with the intent to harm. In some cases, individuals shared photos and videos of weapons accompanied by threatening messages aimed at migrants. These threats reveal a disturbing level of dehumanization, with migrants being treated as prey to be hunted, akin to animals. This escalation in rhetoric is a dangerous consequence of hateful discourse, especially in a volatile social context where discussions on border security turned into violence against migrants on the Canary coasts.

In conclusion, the rhetoric promoted by key actors aligns with typical anti-immigrant narratives advocating for harsh border measures, including militarization and fortification. Tweets from accounts like @rubnpulido, @okdiario, @casoaislado\_es, and @veintimillapier exploited the arrival of migrants to discredit government actions, amplify the perceived threat posed by migrants, and emphasize the alleged lack of control over the maritime border. These messages were crafted with innuendo, leading questions, and commands that cast doubt on the government's measures, while encouraging stricter border control and

militarization of the Canary Islands' coasts. The strategic use of emotive language, capital letters, and emoticons made the content more engaging, facilitating the spread of these ideological messages.

The effectiveness of these tweets in shaping public opinion is evident in the escalation of anti-immigrant discourse into real-world violence. These messages created a clear distinction between migrants as "others" and the national population as "us," stigmatizing migrants as criminals and dehumanizing them. Additionally, the focus on the economic cost of migration fuelled further insecurity, framing the situation in the Canary Islands as an invasion, which intensified both fear and hostility among local populations.

## Public Discourse Analysis: the case of Italy (Lampedusa)

Lampedusa, one of the closest European entry points from North Africa, plays a central role in Italy's migration debate. The majority of refugees arriving on its shores come from Tunisia and Libya, making it a focal point for migration discourse. Similar to the Spanish case, a co-occurrence network analysis reveals the dominant themes shaping public discussions. The most prominent words in the network emphasize negative connotations regarding the presence of migrants, focusing on their mere existence (e.g., *"avere"*) rather than on actions or potential solutions (e.g., *"fare"* or *"dire"*). Additionally, the frequent use of *"più"* underscores the perception of an ever-increasing influx of migrants, reinforcing the narrative that arrivals are unmanageable and overwhelming.

A key theme in the Italian debate is the link between disembarkations (*"sbarco"*) and the COVID-19 pandemic. As the migration crisis intensified during 2020—at the height of the pandemic—a narrative emerged associating migrants with public health risks. Right-wing voices criticized the government's handling of the crisis, frequently disseminating misinformation. A notable example was the disinformation campaign against then-Interior Minister Luciana Lamorgese, falsely accusing her of transferring COVID-positive migrants to other parts of Italy. This tactic aimed not only to attack the government's pandemic response but also to amplify public fears about migrant arrivals.

One of the most pervasive fake news stories during this period falsely claimed that migrants were eating the local residents' dogs. This narrative exploited cultural and religious stigmas against Muslims—who traditionally do not consume pork—to deepen the divide between local populations and newly arrived refugees, portraying migrants as uncivilized and dangerous. Additionally, connections in the network reinforce the suspicion surrounding migrants' refugee status, particularly mocking Tunisian migrants by questioning their legitimacy. Since Tunisia is not in an active war like Libya or Sudan, critics framed their arrival as illegitimate, further fueling hostility toward them.

In the lower-left cluster of the network, the use of words such as *"rivolta"* (revolt) and *"invasione"* (invasion) suggests a rising call to action against what was portrayed as an overwhelming wave of migrants. The discourse frequently described Italy as being on the verge of collapse (*"scoppiare"*), reinforcing fear-based narratives that depict migration as a crisis spiraling out of control and an existential threat to Italian sovereignty.

The far-right's influence on migration discourse is evident, as the co-occurrence network prominently features Matteo Salvini, Giorgia Meloni, and the political party Lega Salvini. Discussions center on failing reception centers and migrants fleeing these facilities (*"fuggire"*), which are used to justify calls for port closures and stricter immigration policies, particularly in Lampedusa. The criminalization of migrants is another major theme, with allegations of drug trafficking (*"droga"*) and claims that reception centers serve as hubs for



## Main actors and their discourses

Before analyzing the role of key actors in shaping migration discourse, it is essential to understand their background, messaging strategies, and sources of influence. The most prominent voices in the Italian debate include Francesca Totolo, Matteo Salvini, and the official Lega party account, alongside the notable presence of Giancarlo De Risi. Each of these figures contributes to the anti-immigration narrative through different mechanisms, reflecting the complex interplay between media, politics, and independent commentary in Italy's digital public sphere.


Francesca Totolo, a journalist for *Il Primato Nazionale*, positions herself as an independent researcher and reporter. However, her work is closely linked to far-right ideologies, and she has been investigated for threats against former President Sergio Mattarella. She is known for disseminating disinformation, particularly concerning migrants and NGOs involved in rescue operations. Her writings, including *Inferno SPA* and *La morale sinistra*, reinforce anti-migrant rhetoric, portraying migration as a business exploited by humanitarian organizations and criticizing the perceived moral decay of left-wing values. Totolo also played a role in spreading misleading claims during the COVID-19 pandemic, as reflected in her book *Coronavirus*. Although her online activity during the period analyzed in this study was under her former account, she now operates under a different handle (@fratotolo2), illustrating how controversial figures can maintain influence even after changes in digital identity.

Matteo Salvini and the Lega party account are analyzed together, as they represent a unified ideological force under Salvini's leadership. Since rebranding the party as *La Lega di Matteo Salvini*, he has positioned himself at the forefront of Italy's far-right and anti-immigration rhetoric. His tenure as Minister of the Interior in 2018 was marked by his refusal to allow NGO-operated ships such as *Aquarius* to dock in Italy, preventing the disembarkation of migrants rescued in the Mediterranean. Salvini's alliances with European far-right figures, including Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orbán, further illustrate his staunch nationalist, regionalist, and Eurosceptic stance. His party's messaging emphasizes themes of national sovereignty, anti-globalism, and opposition to immigration, reflecting a broader trend of nationalist populism in Italy and across Europe.

Giancarlo De Risi, a journalist, geologist, blogger, and conservative commentator, operates outside the mainstream media but remains influential within right-wing digital networks. He runs *Aquila News*, where he has historically shared conservative views on Italian politics and migration. Although his blog has not been updated since 2014, De Risi continues to disseminate right-wing narratives through independent platforms such as Facebook, leveraging social media as a primary tool for engagement.

Together, these actors illustrate the diverse pathways to influence within Italy's migration debate. Francesca Totolo uses her association with far-right media to spread disinformation and ideological narratives. Matteo Salvini represents institutionalized far-right power, using his political status to enforce anti-immigration policies and shape public discourse. Giancarlo De Risi, lacking institutional backing, builds legitimacy through alternative media, reinforcing conservative and nationalist narratives from outside traditional political and journalistic institutions. This dynamic reflects how both traditional authorities and independent voices contribute to shaping a polarized and highly contested public conversation on immigration in Italy.

Figure 4. Mapping of key actors and their communities. Italian case



Discourse of key actors on social media

In this context, the key actors’ discourse centres on how they categorize migrants. Francesca Totolo frequently compared migrants to terrorist infiltrators or described them as mere cargo, dehumanizing them with terms like “clandestine,” similar to the use of “illegal” in the Spanish case. A widely circulated piece of fake news fuelled this narrative, falsely claiming that migrants in Lampedusa were eating local residents’ dogs. This rumour, amplified by these accounts, aimed to question the migrants’ values and cultural practices, portraying them as uncivilized and incompatible with Italian society, and reinforcing xenophobic stereotypes that cast their religion and culture as threats.

These narratives also framed migrants as a source of insecurity and instability in Lampedusa, depicting their arrival as an “invasion” and portraying reception centres (hotspots) as overwhelmed and unsafe. The discourse emphasized that migrants frequently escaped from these centres, creating an image of the island being under siege. This reinforced nationalist dichotomies between “others” (the migrants) and “us” (the Italian nation), aimed at heightening public fears and fostering exclusionary attitudes.

In addition to cultural and security concerns, the discourse highlighted economic and health issues, arguing that government spending on migrants diverted resources from Italian citizens. These accounts used comparisons to suggest that immigrants were effectively “stealing” from Italians, framing the government’s support of migrants as enabling this theft and fostering resentment toward both migrants and the state’s immigration policies.

Another significant theme was the health risk posed by migrants, especially within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Tweets often linked the arrival of migrant boats to potential health dangers, suggesting that migrants could spread the virus to the residents of Lampedusa. This narrative intensified fears by portraying migrants as carriers of disease, further reinforcing the idea that their presence posed not only an economic or security



threat but also a public health risk. Additionally, migrants were blamed for increasing crime and societal instability, echoing longstanding stereotypes.

Criticism of NGOs also played a crucial role in this discourse. Although public sentiment toward NGOs in Italy was often positive, some actors framed these organizations negatively, accusing them of acting as human traffickers by rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean and bringing them to shore. During the pandemic, NGOs were further criticized for allegedly bringing infected individuals to Italian shores, despite quarantine protocols being followed aboard rescue ships before landing. This narrative framed NGOs as complicit in endangering Italy, reinforcing broader anti-immigrant sentiment.

The discourse also focused on the issue of port openings (#portiaperti), criticizing the government's decision to keep ports open to NGOs. These actors argued that port openings posed a greater threat than smaller boats landing directly on the coasts. By blaming the government for facilitating the migrant "invasion" these actors used the Lampedusa migration crisis as a political tool to pressure the Conte government. The narrative portrayed island as an out-of-control hotspot due to the government's refusal to close ports, a failure that was allegedly worsened by the strict lockdown measures imposed on Italians. This framing suggested that the government prioritized immigrants over its own citizens, adding to broader political opposition against Conte's policies.

A particularly insidious tactic in this discourse was the emphasis on the origin of migrants, especially those from Tunisia. By repeatedly highlighting Tunisians ("tunisini"), these actors sought to downplay the severity of their circumstances, implying that Tunisia was neither war-torn nor impoverished. The ironic phrase "guerra di Tunisia" ("the war in Tunisia") was used to mock the legitimacy of their migration, reinforcing the notion that their reasons for leaving were not valid and further delegitimizing their presence in Italy. This rhetoric served to undermine the humanitarian dimension of the crisis, framing migrants as opportunistic rather than genuinely in need of refuge.

Another common narrative against the Conte government was that it not only failed to protect Lampedusa but also left the police without sufficient resources to manage the migrant situation. Critics claimed that this lack of support undermined national sovereignty by depriving law enforcement of the necessary tools to protect the island. Additionally, the narrative emphasized the ineffectiveness of deportation mechanisms, with accusations that previously deported migrants were returning to Lampedusa. This argument, combined with claims that the government was neglecting the police, was used to incite organized resistance against the presence of migrants on the island.

In summary, the Italian case was characterized by efforts to portray migrants as uncivilized threats to national sovereignty and Italian safety. NGOs were accused of acting as human traffickers and profiting from migration, with the alleged complicity of the Conte government. This political and ideological bias permeated social media during the Lampedusa crisis, as actors framed the situation as a defence of Italian identity. Economic arguments claimed that the government prioritized spending on migrants over Italian citizens, while health concerns fuelled fears that migrants would spread COVID-19, worsening the pandemic ([Human Rights Watch, 2024](#)).

Moreover, comparisons were made regarding freedom of movement, with actors arguing that migrants were granted more liberties than Italians, who were subject to strict lockdown measures. These narratives deepened the divide between "us" and "them," reinforcing and legitimizing anti-immigrant rhetoric. Ultimately, this framing justified xenophobic sentiments, presenting them as necessary for the common good of the nation.



## DISCUSSION

This comparative analysis reveals both similarities and differences in the public debates on migration in Spain and Italy, as well as in the discourses and themes promoted by key actors. Within the framework of media framing theories—which suggest that media representation significantly influences public perceptions of critical issues such as migration (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989)—our study highlights the prominent role of media-linked actors, particularly those associated with far-right digital newspapers funded by foundations linked to political parties: Vox in Spain and CasaPound and Fratelli d'Italia in Italy (Forti, 2022). The Spanish newspaper OK Diario, for example, aligns with far-right ideology, supporting Berry et al.'s (2016) findings that certain media outlets often frame migrants negatively.

A notable difference between the two cases is that, in Spain, two influential actors—@casoaislado\_es and @veintimillapier—operate anonymously, despite lacking direct media affiliation. This reflects how social media platforms such as Twitter amplify voices outside traditional media structures, enabling non-affiliated yet ideologically aligned figures to shape migration narratives (Krzyżanowski, 2018). In contrast, Italy's discourse prominently features Matteo Salvini and his party Lega Salvini, demonstrating how platforms like X (formerly Twitter) allow political leaders to bypass traditional media and directly engage the public on migration issues (Engesser et al., 2017). Despite these differences, both cases illustrate the growing legitimization of non-institutional actors in shaping public debates. Figures with no formal expertise—such as @GiancarloDeRisi—gain influence by spreading ideologically charged narratives and presenting subjective information as facts. This trend underscores how social media empowers non-traditional actors to influence migration discourse (Wall et al., 2017).

Despite variations in the actors involved—political figures in Italy versus anonymous voices in Spain—the dominant narratives in both cases share key characteristics. These actors propagate far-right ideologies emphasizing neoliberalism, nationalism, and anti-immigration rhetoric. Their messages systematically degrade migrants based on their origin, culture, and ethnicity while harshly criticizing institutions that support them, a strategy that aligns with the concept of “othering” in media discourse (Van Gorp, 2005). The COVID-19 pandemic further reinforced this dynamic, as seen in previous crises where marginalized groups became scapegoats (Vaño-Agulló et al., 2021). Social media plays a crucial role in this process by rapidly disseminating emotionally charged messages and amplifying xenophobic sentiments (Papacharissi, 2015).

A recurring feature across both cases is the portrayal of migrants as a threat and the delegitimization of institutions handling the migration crisis. Far-right actors depict state institutions as complicit in exacerbating the problem, fuelling public distrust and reinforcing xenophobic attitudes. This aligns with Chouliaraki and Stolic's (2017) argument that media coverage often incites fear and hostility toward migrants rather than fostering empathy. The framing strategies used by these actors emphasize alleged economic burdens, security risks, and health concerns. Migrants are portrayed as criminals, reinforcing stereotypes and echoing the “threat frame,” which presents migrants as a direct danger to host societies (Ibrahim, 2005). In Italy, for instance, fabricated claims that migrants were eating locals' dogs exploited xenophobic fears, exemplifying how misinformation spreads through social media and shapes negative perceptions (Bakir & McStay, 2018).

The use of dehumanizing language further entrenches exclusionary narratives. Terms such as “illegal immigrants” in Spain and “immigrati clandestini” in Italy strip migrants of their human rights by focusing solely on their legal status and portraying them as inherently criminal. This aligns with Khosravini's (2010) analysis of how media discursive strategies

contribute to the stigmatization of migrants. The COVID-19 pandemic heightened these exclusionary discourses, as fears of disease transmission positioned migrants as a public health threat. This framing justified stricter border controls and reinforced the perception of migrants as social, economic, and health risks (Logie, 2020; Budhwani, & Sun, 2020).

Across both contexts, migration was framed as an “invasion” of illegal immigrants—a well-established rhetorical device used to stoke fear and justify exclusionary measures (Charteris-Black, 2006). In Spain, this rhetoric materialized in proposals for a naval blockade, reinforcing the notion of border fortification as a means to protect national identity, culture, and traditions. Calls for civil self-defense emerged alongside accusations that institutions prioritize migrants over citizens, reflecting the securitization of migration discourse, where migration is treated as a security crisis necessitating urgent action (Huysmans, 2000). In both countries, NGOs supporting migrants faced intense scrutiny and criminalization. However, the focus differed: in Spain, NGOs were directly labelled as “mafias,” while in Italy, criticism was primarily directed at the government’s alleged complicity with these organizations. This distinction aligns with Lucchesi and Cerase’s (2023) findings on how NGOs are delegitimized in anti-immigrant discourses.

Another key controversy involved claims that governments granted migrants more privileges than citizens during pandemic lockdowns, reinforcing nationalist sentiments and fuelling the perception that the state was neglecting its own population. This discourse extended to security forces, with narratives accusing the police in Italy and sea rescue services in Spain of failing to protect citizens. Such framing strategies deepen public mistrust and align with what Wodak (2015) terms the “politics of fear,” where emotions are manipulated to serve political agendas.

As Demata (2021) argues, platforms like Twitter simplify and polarize debates, enabling extremist ideologies to spread unchecked. Rather than offering solutions, these actors promote what Van Dijk (2000) describes as “new racism,” which dehumanizes migrants through exclusionary and anti-immigration discourse. Addressing these harmful narratives requires a critical reassessment of media portrayals and the implementation of communication strategies that respect migrants’ human rights while addressing public concerns. A more balanced and humane portrayal of migration—grounded in empirical evidence and ethical reporting—could help counteract the damaging effects of these discourses (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017).

## CONCLUSIONS

This study demonstrates that key actors on social media—particularly those aligned with far-right and anti-immigration ideologies—frame migration crises through narratives of fear, hostility, and exclusion. Across both Spain and Italy, these actors reinforce xenophobic sentiments by repeatedly emphasizing themes of illegality, invasion, and threat. However, important local nuances exist: in Italy, cultural stigmatization—such as unfounded claims about migrant practices—dominates, whereas in Spain, concerns focus on health and economic burdens, particularly exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic. These tailored discourses illustrate how exclusionary rhetoric is adapted to different national audiences while contributing to a broader European trend of marginalizing migrants.

By examining prominent social media actors, linguistic patterns, and thematic structures, this study highlights the role of far-right media figures, such as Rubén Pulido (@rubnpulido) in Spain and Francesca Totolo (@francescatotolo) in Italy, in shaping migration discourse. Their affiliation with conservative and anti-immigration digital media underscores how media and political actors work together to reinforce exclusionary narratives in both countries in a similar

way. While these discourses do not fully determine political governance, they significantly influence public opinion and policy debates, often normalizing adversarial attitudes toward migrants. The dominant frames in both countries reduce complex humanitarian issues to simplistic notions of criminality and illegality, delegitimizing migrants' rights and reinforcing exclusionary ideologies (Van Dijk, 1991; Logie, 2020; Abramitzky et al., 2024; Nasuto & Rowe, 2024).

Additionally, these narratives contribute to the criminalization of NGOs involved in migrant rescue operations. In Spain, NGOs are accused of collaborating with mafia networks, whereas in Italy, the focus is on the government's complicity with these organizations (Lucchesi & Cerase, 2023). A significant rhetorical shift also links migration to public health threats, a theme that gained traction during the COVID-19 pandemic. Portraying migrants as disease carriers reinforced xenophobic fears and justified stricter border policies, aligning with broader securitization strategies (Chouliaraki & Stolic, 2017). The absence of actors leading counter-narratives further exacerbates these harmful representations, leaving migrants vulnerable to racialized stereotyping and public hostility.

Given that the data collection for this research occurred during 2020 and 2021, the relevance and timeliness of the findings are reinforced by observable changes in the prominence of key figures analyzed. For instance, Rubén Pulido's follower count on Twitter increased significantly from approximately 60,000 to over 125,300 followers since the data extraction period. Similarly, Francesca Totolo had to create a new account (@fratotolo2) due to previous content moderation policies, yet still experienced substantial growth from around 20,000 followers to 58,500. These increases underline the persistence and even intensification of exclusionary discourses on social media, highlighting the necessity of approaching such phenomena dynamically. Discourses can evolve rapidly, but their underlying exclusionary nature remains persistent, continually damaging public dialogue and policy discussions.

Nonetheless, this study faces methodological limitations arising from recent policy shifts on social media platforms, making data access increasingly restrictive and complicating comparative analyses over time. To comprehensively track and analyze these evolving phenomena, future research would benefit from renewed data collection during subsequent migration crises, employing longitudinal designs to capture discourse dynamics effectively. Furthermore, the unpredictable amplification by media and social media complicates stable analysis, necessitating diverse methods to understand how discourses are disseminated and reshaped. Systematic periodic data collection can significantly enhance insight into how exclusionary narratives persistently shape public opinion and policy.

These findings confirm that digital platforms facilitate the construction and dissemination of exclusionary migration narratives, fulfilling the study's research objective. Further exploration is required to fully understand their impact, calling for expanded geographic and methodological scopes, including qualitative methods such as interviews and ethnographic studies to assess narrative evolution and the potential effectiveness of counter-narratives (Logie, 2020). Developing balanced, rights-based communication strategies is crucial for countering the rhetoric of fear and hostility shaping migration debates in Europe.

## DECLARATION OF AI USE

AI-based language modelling tools have been used to improve the clarity, coherence and nuance of text.

## ETHICAL AND PRIVACY STATEMENT

This study analyses publicly accessible Twitter data from public figures and pseudonymous accounts, thus explicit consent was unnecessary. Names and content remain non-anonymized, consistent with AoIR (2019) guidelines and Twitter policies. Analyses are aggregated to minimize privacy risks and maintain research integrity.

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## ANNEXES

### Remarkable Tweets:

**@rbnpulido:** "50.000 euros diarios que nos están suponiendo los 7.000 inmigrantes ilegales alojados a pensión completa en varios complejos turísticos de Canarias.

**@rbnpulido:** "Ya quisieran muchos de los españoles que están esperando a cobrar el ERTE

los 50 € diarios que están costando los más de 7.000 inmigrantes ilegales —NO refugiados— que están alojados a pensión completa en hoteles y barracones militares de Canarias. - 350.000 €/día y subiendo”.

**@rbnpulido:** “Una pareja de nórdicos **denuncia un intento de robo en su apartamento de Canarias**. El autor fue **un adolescente que huyó tras ser sorprendido hacia la zona de #Arguinegún donde están alojados los inmigrantes ilegales** llegados a Gran Canaria. ¿Casualidad?”

**@ casoaislado\_es** “**Mientras la inseguridad sigue disparada en Canarias, con peleas, robos y delitos sexuales**, las pateras repletas de inmigrantes ilegales siguen llegando a nuestras costas. Aquí tenemos a otro grupo de ilegales que se graban poniendo rumbo a España. Con porro incluido.

**@veintimillapier:** O el Gobierno frena el efecto llamada, o nos invaden por Canarias, por las costas de Levante, o nos saltan las vallas de Ceuta y Melilla. Han convertido España un coladero de inmigrantes ilegales.

**@rbnpulido** “**Señal de peligro Detenidos en Valencia 16 inmigrantes ilegales procedentes de Canarias tras detectarse 2 positivos**. Los positivos han sido derivados a un hospital de Alicante y los restantes al hospital de campaña para guardar cuarentena. ¿La cumplirán?”

**@rbnpulido:** “ 🚨 Más de 100 inmigrantes «asistidos» por Salvamento en 24 h. **+ de 600 km para recoger a invasores en zonas cercanas** a los puertos controlados por las mafias de la inmigración ilegal. !! Ya son 735 las llegadas ilegales registradas en Canarias. + 130% (2020) + 1.700% (2019)”

**@rbnpulido:**El #EfectoInvasión continúa. Más de 200 inmigrantes ilegales llegan hoy a Canarias. Las llegadas a costas andaluzas no cesan y el CATE de Almería ya se encuentra por encima de su capacidad. 🚨 Casi 1.000 inmigrantes ilegales en lo que llevamos de semana.

**@okdiario:** “**Invasión de pateras en Canarias:** la llegada de inmigrantes ilegales pasa en un año de 1.497 a 16.760.”

**@casoaislado\_es:** “Cruz Roja está siendo clave en el traslado de los inmigrantes ilegales de Canarias a la Península. **Esta ONG, subvencionada con decenas de millones de euros, está ayudando al Gobierno de Sánchez a dispersar a los inmigrantes ilegales por la Península. Debe ser investigada.**”

**@casoaislado\_es:** La Justicia debe investigar inmediatamente estos movimientos de Salvamento Marítimo. ¡Están recogiendo inmigrantes ilegales en aguas internacionales a más de 170 km de Canarias! ¿Colaboración con las mafias?

**@rbnpulido:**“*La situación en Canarias es caótica. En plena pandemia, más de 8.000 inmigrantes ilegales han llegado en las últimas 4 semanas. FCSE, Salvamento, sanitarios, protección civil, y ahora, también el Ejército. Para un bloqueo naval, NO. Para alojarles a pensión completa, Sí.*

**@veintimillapier:** Vecinos de Canarias convocan patrullas vecinales para protegerse de los inmigrantes ilegales: ¡Nos han vendido!

**rbnpulido:** “**El 2020 finalizó con más de 23.000 inmigrantes ilegales llegados a Canarias**. La gran mayoría, llegaron durante los últimos cuatro meses del año. El Gobierno data en 6.000/7.000 los alojados. Más de 16.000 están en ¿paradero desconocido?”

**@ casoaislado\_es:** “**En las últimas horas han llegado 8 pateras con más de 300 inmigrantes ilegales a Canarias. Solo en octubre y noviembre llegaron más de 13.500 ilegales. ¿La solución del Gobierno? Gastar otros 12,4M€ para cubrir sus necesidades. Mientras tanto, muchos**

*españoles pasando hambre.”*

**@okdiario:** “Invasión de pateras en Canarias: **la llegada de inmigrantes ilegales pasa en un año de 1.497 a 16.760**

*“Este es un gobierno de mierda, hermano, pero esto se va a acabar. A partir de mañana vamos a salir de caza. Grupo de cuatro o cinco moros juntos: palizote”, “This is a shitty government, brother, but this is going to end. From tomorrow we will go hunting. Group of four or five Moors together: palizote”, (Miquel Ramos y Eduardo Robaina 2021, la marea.es)*

*“Estamos armados hasta arriba. Los moros van a morir, te lo digo así de claro”.We are armed to the top. The moors are going to die, I tell you that clearly.” (Miquel Ramos y Eduardo Robaina 2021, la marea.es)*

**@francescatotolo:** Uno dei barconi di #migranti sbarcato ieri a #Lampedusa. In soli tre giorni, 1.559 immigrati sbarcati, nonostante il #Viminale sia a conoscenza delle infiltrazioni terroristiche.

**@matteosalvinimi:** Dopo la Ong tedesca, con un carico di oltre 200 immigrati clandestini, ecco in azione la nave dei centri sociali, che torna in mare e ne va subito a raccogliere 70 non lontano da Lampedusa. Avanti, c'è posto, tanto il governo non muove un dito

**@francescatotolo:** ‘Dopo i suoi reportage a #Pozzallo e #PortoEmpedocle, @ChiaraNews sta ricevendo insulti e minacce da immigrati, soprattutto tunisini, come è già successo alla sottoscritta. Noi non ci fermiamo, ma rilanciamo partendo per #Lampedusa

**@francescatotolo:** A Soufli, in #Grecia, i residenti hanno beccato, facendoli arrestare, 29 immigrati clandestini che avevano rubato i loro animali per mangiarseli. Quindi non sono leggende di #Lampedusa?

**@francescatotolo:** Un #migrante esce tranquillamente dall’hotspot di #Lampedusa. Come ci spiega un residente, gli immigrati vanno e vengono, peraltro buttando immondizia e facendo bisogni ovunque

**@matteosalvinimi:** Arrivati da Lampedusa e trasferiti a Cori (Latina), i “turisti per sempre” come ringraziamento adesso azzannano anche le Forze dell’Ordine. Cosa ancora più preoccupante perché in quella struttura sono stati trovati 12 immigrati positivi al Virus.

**@francescatotolo** ‘Un gruppo di immigrati tunisini, fuggito dall’hotspot di #Lampedusa, è stato rintracciato dalle Forze dell’Ordine. #clandestini #immigrazione

**@francescatotolo** È arrivata questa mattina all'alba la nave quarantena #GnvAzzurra, che ospiterà buona parte degli immigrati clandestini che nelle ultime settimane hanno letteralmente invaso #Lampedusa.

**@LegaSalvini:** ‘#MORELLI: ⚠️ ⚠️ ⚠️ LAMPEDUSA INVASA! Più di 600 immigrati sbarcati sull’isola in 24 ore. QUESTO GOVERNO È LA ROVINA DELL’ITALIA!!!

**@GiancarloDeRisi:** ‘Salvini, ancora sbarchi a Lampedusa: “Governo da mandare a processo”. Stanotte sono sbarcati circa 700 immigrati: “Senza controlli è una vera invasione. Non è solo un problema economico, ma anche sanitario”

**@francescatotolo:** ‘Da #PortoEmpedocle è partita la nave #GnvAzzurra che farà da hotspot galleggiante per gli immigrati sbarcati a #Lampedusa. Il costo giornaliero sarà di più di 50 mila euro, per un totale di quasi 4,8 milioni di euro per 92 giorni. Tutto ciò per “accogliere” #clandestini tunisini

**@matteosalvinimi** ‘!! PAZZESCO, IMMAGINI DI POCO FA! Il governo sposta gli immigrati clandestini da Lampedusa su navi da crociera che costano agli italiani milioni di euro? E a

Lampedusa ricominciano gli arrivi, in un ciclo continuo

**@LegaSalvini** #Salvini: !! PAZZESCO, IMMAGINI DI POCO FA! Il governo sposta gli immigrati clandestini da Lampedusa su navi da crociera che costano agli italiani milioni di euro? E a Lampedusa ricominciano gli arrivi, in un ciclo...

**@francescatotolo** 'Dei 350 #migranti saliti a bordo della nave quarantena #GnvAzzurra lunedì scorso a #Lampedusa, ben 12 sono positivi al #COVID19 e 6 casi sono incerti. Che attendibilità hanno i tamponi effettuati quando gli immigrati sono sbarcati a Lampedusa? #Lamorgese #Conte #Speranza

**@matteosalvinimi** 'Salvini: Da stanotte a Lampedusa sono sbarcati 700 immigrati. Non è solo problema economico, ora anche sanitario. Non possiamo permetterci centinaia di sbarchi ogni giorno: producono criminalità e problemi. #lariachetira'

**@GiancarloDeRisi** 'Ora anche il sindaco Martello accusa apertamente il governo che ha tradito tutte le aspettative di Lampedusa e dei residenti terrorizzati dalla possibilità di essere contagiati. Lampedusa invasa da immigrati infetti: "Ora basta sbarchi"

**@francescatotolo**: 'A breve, io e @ChiaraNews partiremo per #Lampedusa. Faremo un reportage unico, svelando ancora una volta il business dell'immigrazione che il governo #Conte sta favorendo con i #portiaperti. Aiutateci a fermare la nuova invasione di immigrati →

**@francescatotolo**: 'Dei 350 #migranti saliti a bordo della nave quarantena #GnvAzzurra lunedì scorso a #Lampedusa, ben 12 sono positivi al #COVID19 e 6 casi sono incerti. Che attendibilità hanno i tamponi effettuati quando gli immigrati sono sbarcati a Lampedusa? #Lamorgese #Conte

**@matteosalvinimi**: 'Nave Azzurra, 273 immigrati a bordo, in viaggio fra Lampedusa, Trapani e Augusta da giorni, coi sindaci (PD e 5Stelle) che negano lo sbarco. SEQUESTRATORI anche loro???

**@GiancarloDeRisi**: 'I poliziotti non ne possono più: "Lampedusa scoppia di immigrati: il Governo si è arreso all'invasione e scarica tutto sulla polizia lasciandola sola, in prima linea e con pochi mezzi a disposizione"

**@LegaSalvini**: 'PAZZESCO. IMMIGRATI INDESIDERATI O CONDANNATI TORNANO A LAMPEDUSA, 44 ARRESTI DALL'INIZIO DEL MESE

**@LegaSalvini**: '🔥 LAMPEDUSA, SI SONO UNITI TANTI CITTADINI E ORA PASSERANNO LA NOTTE BLOCCANDO LA STRADA CONTRO L'INVASIONE DI IMMIGRATI CLANDESTINI NELL'ISOLA. Pacificamente, gandhianamente. Onore a voi, lampedusani coraggiosi: tantissimi italiani sono con voi!

**@GiancarloDeRisi**: '#Lampedusa in #rivolta, dopo gli ultimi arrivi: "Non vogliamo più #sbarchi, non vogliamo immigrati sul nostro suolo, il vaso è colmo. Non vogliamo più essere complici di nuovi #schiavi. Questa gente deve rimanere in Africa"

## Observable change of the accounts

2020

← **Rubén Pulido**   
1,382 Tweets




**Rubén Pulido**   
@rubnpulido

Analista político •  Pacto de Marrakech •  Agenda 2030 •  En @gaceta.es •  
Tu regere imperio fluctus Hispanie memento •  • rpulido@gaceta.es • 

 Sevilla  Madrid  [gaceta.es/author/rpulido/](https://gaceta.es/author/rpulido/)  
 Se unió en noviembre de 2008

9,222 Siguiendo 60,7 mil Seguidores

← **Francesca Totolo**  
67,2 mil Tweets




**Francesca Totolo**  
@francescatotolo

Scrittrice e collaboratrice de @IlPrimoN. Agitatrice culturale, allergica al femminismo tossico. #InfernoSpa altafortedizioni.it/prodotto/infer...  
[Traducir la biografía](#)

 [ilprimonazionale.it/author/francesca...](https://ilprimonazionale.it/author/francesca-totolo/)  Se unió en enero de 2015

711 Siguiendo 26,1 mil Seguidores

2025

← **Rubén Pulido**   
9,316 posts




**Rubén Pulido**   
@rubnpulido

Analista político •  10 años en FFAA •  Mérito y Sacrificio •  En la @gaceta.es • Tu regere imperio fluctus Hispanie memento •  • rpulido@gaceta.es •

 Influenciador en redes sociales  España  
 [buymeacoffee.com/rubnpulido](https://buymeacoffee.com/rubnpulido)  Se unió el noviembre de 2008

9,546 Siguiendo 125,3 mil Seguidores

← **Francesca Totolo**   
44,1 mil posts




**Francesca Totolo**   
@fratotolo2

Scrittrice e collaboratrice de @IlPrimoN. Agitatrice culturale, allergica al femminismo e alla dittatura woke ➡ [altafortedizioni.it/francesca-toto...](https://altafortedizioni.it/francesca-totolo/)

 [francescatotolo.it](https://francescatotolo.it)  Se unió el mayo de 2021

403 Siguiendo 58,5 mil Seguidores