
Who are the losers of the economic crisis? Explaining the vote for right-wing populist parties in Europe after the Great Recession

*¿Quiénes son los perdedores de la crisis económica?
Hacia una explicación del voto a partidos populistas
de derecha en Europa tras la Gran Recesión*

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Abstract

Right-wing populist parties (RWPP) have obtained outstanding electoral results during the Great Recession in Europe. While some authors have adopted a macro level approach to explain this success highlighting the relevance of the context of crisis, others have focused on micro explanations to analyse how the “losers of globalization” (the elderly, less educated and lower class) comprise the main electoral base of these parties. However, RWPP have performed much better in countries less affected by the crisis and, in certain contexts, the so-called “losers” of globalization have not been their main electoral base. Using individual data for 12 Western European countries provided by the European Election Studies (2014) database, in this paper we demonstrate that the combination of these two sets of explanations (at the macro and micro levels) is necessary not only for empirical reasons, but also for conceptual ones to understand the phenomenon. While the general profile of this family of voters tend to be older, less educated and belonging to the lower class, in countries most affected by the crisis RWPP voters tend to be younger and better educated.

Keywords: Great Recession, immigration, populist parties, right-wing populism, electoral behavior.

Resumen

Los partidos populistas de derecha han obtenido unos resultados electorales sin precedentes durante la Gran Recesión en Europa. Mientras que algunos autores han adoptado una aproximación a nivel agregado para explicar su éxito, subrayando la importancia del contexto de crisis, otros se han centrado en explicaciones a nivel micro para analizar cómo los «perdedores de la globalización» (los mayores, con menor nivel educativo, y de clase social baja) comprenden la principal base electoral de estos partidos. Sin embargo, el éxito de estas formaciones ha sido mayor en los países menos afectados por la crisis y, en ciertos contextos, los llamados “perdedores” de la globalización no han sido la base electoral de estas formaciones. Utilizando datos individuales de doce países de Europa Occidental, provenientes de la base de datos *European Election Studies* (2014), en este trabajo demostramos que la combinación de estos dos conjuntos de explicaciones (a nivel macro y micro) es necesaria no solo por razones empíricas, sino también conceptuales, para poder entender el fenómeno. Mientras que el perfil general de esta familia de votantes tiende a ser de mayor edad, con menor nivel educativo y perteneciente a clases sociales bajas, en los países más afectados por la crisis los electores de los partidos populistas de derechas tienden a ser más jóvenes y con un nivel educativo más alto.

Palabras clave: Gran Recesión, inmigración, populismo, partidos populistas de derecha, comportamiento electoral.

INTRODUCTION

Social scientists have been interested in right-wing populist parties (RWPP) for a long time (Betz, 1994). According to Cas Mudde, “the populist radical right constitutes the most successful party family in post-war Western Europe” (2013: 1-19). Three waves of populism have been identified in Europe, with the third one taking place in the eighties (Beyme, 1985). These three consecutive impulses are at the roots of an extensive literature on the study of these parties. Numerous works have focused on the supply side, analysing the complex concept of populism (Laclau, 1977: 172-173; Canovan, 1999: 3; Mudde, 2004: 543), or the speeches made by populist parties and leaders (see, for instance, the recent study of Kriesi and Pappas, 2015), while others have paid attention to the demand side describing RWPP voters’ electoral behavior or attitudinal profile (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2017; Bakker *et al.*, 2016).

The recent electoral advance of this set of parties in Europe during the Great Recession has revived interest in the discipline. Parties such as the National Front (FN) in France, the Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom, the Danish People’s Party (DF), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Alternative for Germany (AfD), or the Golden Dawn (XA) in Greece, have been some of the most recent successful recent examples. One of the main interests of this last boost in the literature on populism has been in the macro explanations behind the success of these parties (Brückner and Grüner, 2010; Funke *et al.*, 2015; Hernández and Kriesi, 2016). Although there are case-specific explanations of these triumphs, such as the change in

the discourse and leadership in the French FN (Stockemer, 2017) or the Eurosceptic discourse in times of crisis by UKIP in the UK (Kaufmann, 2017), these individual explanations do not cast light on the macro explanation of this success across Europe.

According to some of these works, the economic crisis Europe experienced since 2008 following a period of economic expansion, generated an increase in economic voting that firstly led to punishment of national governments (Bartels, 2012; Bermeo and Bartels, 2014; Magalhaes, 2014). After that first phase, the decrease in support for democratic institutions —parliaments, governments, and parties, among others— led to support for fringe parties, with RWPP among them (Mudde, 2010: 1175; Mudde, 2014: 218). However, the best electoral results achieved by these parties did not occur in the countries most affected by the economic crisis, but in Austria, Denmark, and Germany, among others. If we take this into account, what has been the impact of the economic crisis on the voters' electoral behavior.

While some of these contributions have focused on macro explanations, some other authors have highlighted the role played by sociodemographic and attitudinal profiles of certain voters in these parties' success (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Evans, 2005). In this respect, these works have evinced that the sociodemographic sectors of the population most affected by modernization (the “losers of globalization”¹, see Kriesi *et al.*, 2006; 2008; 2012; Bornschier, 2010; Teney *et al.*, 2014) are the biggest supporters of these parties. Thus, the least educated, people belonging to the lower classes and the least wealthy would be among the electoral base of these parties. However, while during the Great Recession in some countries the main electoral support for these parties is found among the oldest and those without university education (this is the case of Denmark and United Kingdom, see Rooduijn, 2017: 11; Ford and Goodwin, 2014), in other countries these supporters are the youngest and best educated (as in Greece and France, see Teperoglou *et al.*, 2016: 348-350; Stockemer, 2017).

How can these counterintuitive and/or contradictory findings at the contextual and individual levels be explained? Our main argument relies on the unequal distribution of the economic consequences of the Great Recession across countries and voter profiles. Previous works have demonstrated that globalization has especially affected the middle-aged, less educated and low skilled workers, given their position of vulnerability in a complex and global labor market (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015: 214). These citizens could find appealing the RWPP discourses that seek to defend labor security in traditional sectors of the economy against the pressures of migrations and globalization (Kriesi *et al.*, 2006: 929). Not only RWPPs have a discourse against immigrants, Ivarsflaten finds that “restrictive immigration and asylum policies are

1. The term “losers of globalization” refer to those voters (the elderly, less educated, and lower class) that resulted most affected by the modernization and denationalization process that most of the Western European countries experienced in the recent decades.

believed to be a way of preserving cultural unity also where no elites are around to make that case” (2005: 41).

However, macro data shows that among the countries hardest hit by the 2008 economic crisis, the traditional “losers of globalization” have not suffered the worst effects of the economic recession and, as a consequence, could conform a different profile of RWPP voters.² The labor market flexibility and the relevant increase in the temporary contracts and unemployment for the younger in poorer countries (such as Greece or Italy) contrasted with Austria, and Germany, with moderate temporary contracts, lower levels of unemployment and legislations favoring school-to-work transition (O’Reilly *et al.*, 2015). In the latter group of countries, the younger and better educated people improved their situation in the labor market during the Great Recession, whereas in the former group of countries these people worsened significantly their positions (O’Higgins, 2012: 407). This marked deterioration among the younger and better educated in contexts where the crisis was deeper, could have attracted this profile of voters to populist discourses, generating an alternative electoral base for RWPP. Following this argument, can we assume that the classical explanation about the “losers of globalization” being the main electoral supporters of RWPP is still valid in the context of the Great Recession in Europe?

The goal of this paper is to analyse the demand side of the of RWPP’s success³, using a combination of two sets of explanations: those related to the context (how the 2008 economic crisis affected to different countries) and those related to the voters’ sociodemographic profile (to what extent the “losers of globalization” are the main supporters in each of those contexts). By doing so, we shed some light on the individual traits of citizens who, among the broader ‘party supply’ of right-wing parties in a particular context, decide to vote for a RWPP. Thus, after the Great Recession, in places where the economy is improving, the losers of globalization are RWPP’s main supporters (the oldest, belong to the working class, and have lower levels of education). However, where the economy is in decline (with a notable increase in unemployment rates), the main electoral support for RWPP does not come from the losers of globalization, but from the young people, those who belong to the middle classes and are more educated.

2. See, for instance, the Council Recommendation on April 2013, for a “Youth Guarantee”. Online Access: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:120:0001:0006:EN:PDF>.

3. It is relevant to clarify that by “RWPP” (Right-Wing Populist Parties) we are not referring to “radical right parties”, “radical right populist parties”, “far-right parties” or “extreme right parties”. We refer to a set of parties that share both a rightist and an anti-elite leaning, emphasizing issues related to the defence of their culture with a discourse against immigration. The main characteristics of these parties are their populist message and their position in the right wing of the ideological spectrum, being more or less extreme in different countries and cases. Although every classification is questionable, we consider the one of Mudde (2007:44) well established in the literature and follow his criteria. We also justify the inclusion of each one of these parties with previous literature at the bottom of table A1.

This article is structured as follows: the next section reviews the literature and outlines the hypotheses; secondly, we present the data and methods; then, we comment and discuss the results of the empirical analyses; and finally, we end up with some conclusions.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS

A broad range of definitions of populism have been provided by different authors, although the one proposed by Cas Mudde (2004) is probably the most extended in the literature. Mudde offers a general definition of populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (*ibid.*: 543). Despite most of definitions of populism consider that the ideology of these parties is weak, the RWPP conform to a widely accepted party family with its own characteristics (Betz, 1993: 413). In this sense, and as Rydgren (2007: 244) has pointed out, these new parties are characterized by the priority given to sociocultural issues; in particular, their core message revolves around feelings against immigration as a threat to national identity —not in vain, the study conducted by Ivarsflaten (2008) has pointed out that only immigration results a key explanatory factor to understand populist right parties’ success. Among these features, their nationalist and nativist profile is often highlighted, and they are thus conceptualised as authoritarian and xenophobic parties (Mudde, 2007: 15-20).

The specialized literature has not been consistent on the use of these concepts, placing the same parties under different labels —parties that Funke *et al.* (2015) label as radical parties, are considered populists by Hernández and Kriesi (2016) or “extreme right” by Carter (2005), while Treib (2014) classify them as Eurosceptic. In fact, and assuming that these interchangeable labels may have introduced noise in the study of populism, it seems necessary to clarify here that we understand populism 1) as a discourse, strategy, or style, and 2) as an ideology (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013). As a discourse, populism is “an anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign people” (Aslanidis, 2016: 96) and a “manichaeic discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite” (Hawkins, 2009: 1042). As an ideology, the above mentioned definition by Mudde is the most commonly used in the literature.

However, what is the “window of opportunity” for the electoral success of these populist parties? Following Mudde (2004: 547), this kind of parties can only experience success with a combination of political resentment and a perceived challenge to “our way of life”⁴. The Great Recession, with its combination of economic crisis,

4. Mudde also mentions the presence of “an attractive populist leader”, although the analysis of the supply side (such as the study of RWPP leaders); discourses; or the presence of other populist parties in the party system, is not the goal of this article.

widespread political distrust and migratory pressure provides an excellent opportunity to test this argument. This environment creates a context where some citizens perceive immigration as a problem for the economy and a threat to the “national way of life”, generating the perfect breeding ground for these parties.

According to this argument, support for RWPP should be higher in contexts most affected by the economic and political consequences of the Great Recession, such as Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy and Spain, where ‘political resentment’ is higher if we consider indices such as support for democracy and confidence in political institutions (Cordero and Simón, 2016). However, the best results of RWPP are concentrated in some of the economies least affected by this crisis, such as Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, among others. Although the idea of a positive relationship between a profound crisis and the rise of populist parties may sound intuitive, there is no widespread agreement on this fact in the literature. Not in vain, only a few empirical studies have shown a positive relationship between crises and the growth of populism (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Hernández and Kriesi, 2016; Dalio *et al.*, 2017), while others find a weak relationship (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) and some even find an absence of correlation (Mudde, 2007: 206). Most of these works have analysed the effects in RWPP support of aggregate economic variables, despite the fact that some recent studies show that it is the perceptions of the relative evolution of the economy that matter most in the development of populist attitudes (Anduiza and Rico, 2016). Some other authors have analysed not only the evolution of the economic situation, but also its relationship to unemployment levels and the presence of immigrants to explain the success of these parties, especially those with an anti-immigration discourse most of which, as we know, fall within the RWPP category (Boomgaarden and Vliengenthart, 2007: 414; Jesuit and Mahler, 2004).

Mols and Jetten (2016) use an experimental approach to demonstrate that RWPP are also appealing in times of economic prosperity. This approach is especially relevant to explain why these parties are successful in contexts affected by the economic crisis but, in relative terms, among the least affected by the Great Recession. According to Mols and Jetten, RWPP leaders can “turn objective relative gratification into perceived relative deprivation” (2016: 275). Following this argument, in a situation of economic hardship people tend to blame particular minorities who compete for (real or perceived) access to scarce resources. In fact, both authors have more recently found no relationship between economic downturn (measured by GDP per capita and unemployment) and support for populist anti-immigrant parties (Mols and Jetten, 2017: chapter 4). Indeed, as they argue, RWPP can do remarkably well in times of economic prosperity, as well as among voters with *above-average* incomes.

As we have discussed, analyses of the contexts that facilitate the success of the populist parties remain inconclusive. Is this lack of satisfactory explanation at macro level also present at individual level? Or, on the contrary, is there a general pattern by which people with a specific sociodemographic profile tend to vote for RWPP? Until the “third wave” of populism in Europe in the eighties, the profile of the RWPP voter used to be defined as older, belonging to the *petit bourgeois*, and well educated. However,

since the eighties these parties have become successful thanks to a change in their voter's profile, as it is younger people, blue collar and self-employed who have changed their vote (Mudde, 2007). Some other authors have pointed to a change not only in sociodemographic profiles, but also in values generating a new cleavage due to different processes such as globalization, denationalization and the opening of national borders (Kriesi, 2010: 677). However, despite some attempts by the previous works, the findings are far from unanimous (Rooduijn, 2017). This inconsistency is clear at least referring to the sociodemographic factors. Thus, while some authors find a "U shape" effect on age, with the youngest and the oldest most likely to vote for RWPP (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006), others have found that only the youngest are among these voters (Evans, 2005) and, more recently, Inglehart and Norris (2016) have demonstrated that, against the previously held view, age has a positive effect on this vote. Neither is there widespread agreement on the effect of education and social class. The most widespread conclusion on the effect of this variable shows that those without university education and those belonging to the lower and middle class show higher percentages of support for these parties (Bornschieer and Kriesi, 2012; Oesch and Rennwald, 2010; Evans, 2005).

Thus, the RWPP voter's profile before the eighties was very different from the one since the nineties. It was at this point that the third wave of populism took place in Europe, when this family of parties obtained unprecedented electoral results. As Kriesi *et al.* (2006; 2008) pointed out, a social divide generated two groups of voters: "The 'losers' and the 'winners of globalization'". According to Hernández and Kriesi (2016: 208) this division is still valid to explain the vote for RWPP during the Great Recession in Europe: "[...] the low-skilled, nationalistic 'losers of globalization', are mainly mobilized by parties of the populist right, whereas high-skilled, cosmopolitan winners of globalization, are mainly mobilized by green, liberal and centre-left parties". By doing this, the Great Recession may have intensified this social division between "winners" and "losers" of globalization, and new and existing parties (most of them belonging to the RWPP category), have renewed this *cleavage* since 2008.

However, we cannot take for granted that these voters are homogeneous across Europe. The Great Recession affected different European countries in very diverse ways, and the severity of the crisis was not homogeneous in these countries. While among the wealthier countries the consequences of the economic crisis especially negatively affected those who were worst positioned in the global labor market (the "losers of globalization"), in those countries hardest hit by the crisis the profile most affected by the recession has been the young and more educated population⁵. This is why we argue that the "losers of globalization" are not the main electoral support of RWPP in every context during the Great Recession. According to Eurostat,⁶

5. See the ECB report: "The Impact of the Economic Crisis in Euro Area Labour Markets". Online Access: <https://bit.ly/2ytWjuH>.

6. See the Eurostat reports for 2008 <https://bit.ly/2Pncvaw> and 2010 <https://bit.ly/2PMvPLf>. See Bell and Blanchflower (2011) for a detailed analysis.

unemployment trends were more pessimistic for those with tertiary education in the poorest countries. In Greece and Italy, the probability of being unemployed for those with tertiary education was, respectively tripled and doubled between 2008 and 2014, while in Germany this probability decreased and remained stable in Sweden and the UK. A similar story can be told if we analyse the relationship between age and employment. While between 2008 and 2014 the employment prospects of the population under 25 improved (Germany) or remained stable (Austria and Sweden) in the richest countries, the rate of unemployment among the youth population increased dramatically in Greece (35.4; while unemployment of the older population increased by 18.0) Italy (24.8, vs. 5.4 among the older) and Belgium (9.8 vs. 1.0). In this context of deep recession, the population who suffered or felt most threatened by the poor work and economic conditions (the younger and better educated) could feel attracted by populist discourses, generating a different profile of RWPP.

According to Mudde (2007: 201), the combination of macro and micro explanations is necessary to understand the object and avoid problems of ecological fallacy. This seems compelling if the unequal effects of the economic crisis among countries and profiles are considered, since such a diversity could generate different losers depending on their economic environment. That is why we also argue that explanations at micro and macro level should be combined in order to analyse the success of RWPP.

This article tries to assess the extent to which RWPP voters during the 2008 Great Recession are what the existing literature has defined as “losers of globalization” in different countries (Kriesi *et al.*, 2008; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). In this respect, our main objective is to examine the contexts where the RWPP voter tends to coincide with the above-referred profile or otherwise; and we do so by combining explanations at individual and aggregate levels.

In this sense, and following Roberts’ recent contribution (2017: 228), according to which “it is possible [...] that the anti-immigrant [...] ‘welfare chauvinism’ of far-right, nativistic populism is more likely to emerge in contexts of unified labor markets, universalistic welfare states and prosperous economies”, it might be expected that the so-called “losers of globalization” would be attracted by RWPP in the context of a relatively prosperous economy. From here, a first hypothesis can be derived as follows:

H1. In contexts with a better economic situation the elderly, people with a lower level of education and belonging to the working class will be more prone to support RWPP rather than other right-wing parties.

Following our previous argumentation, we expect that the RWPP voters will not be the “losers of globalization” under contexts of poor economic conditions. As macro-data demonstrates, people who suffered the worst economic conditions in countries most affected by the Great Recession were younger and better educated. Thus, the younger and better educated people (not the traditionally considered ‘losers of globalization’) could also feel attracted by populist discourses, which in turn generated a

different RWPP voter profile in certain countries. As some case studies have demonstrated, in Greece and France —both countries experienced a deep downturn on their economies during the Great Recession— the main RWPP supporters were the youngest and best educated (Teperoglou *et al.*, 2016: 348-350; Stockemer, 2017). For that reason, a second hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

H2. In contexts where the economy is performing poorly, young people and those with high education or belonging to the middle and higher classes will be more prone to support RWPP rather than other right-wing parties.

DATA AND METHODS

As dependent variable, we use vote recall in the last National Elections from the European Election Studies database (EES-2014)⁷ for all the 12 Western European democracies with RWPP⁸. In this sample are included countries where the 2008 economic crisis was deeper (Finland, Belgium, The Netherlands, France, Greece and Italy) as well as countries where recession was less pronounced (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Although populist parties can also be found on the left and centre of the ideological spectrum, the goal of this article is to analyse parties located on the right side of this scale. More specifically, our strategy of analysis is to study the vote for RWPP compared with other centre-right and right-wing parties⁹.

Recent works have analysed how the shifts to the economic left of radical right parties had serious consequences for the composition of their electorate, because former center-left and left voters comprised the electoral support of these parties (see Hartevelde, 2016). This would lead us to include former left-wing voters in our dependent variable. However, it is not the aim of this article to analyze the electoral origin of these voters. The categorization of our dependent variable is more specific, given that our goal is to discover the features that can help to distinguish between voters for right-wing parties from voters who end up voting for RWPP. An alternative approach could be to analyze the vote for populist parties in general —without distinguishing between left and right— (Van Kessel, 2015; Inglehart and Norris, 2016) against the vote for non-populist parties, or the vote for right populist parties against other voters (Rooduijn, 2016).

7. Online access to EES: <http://europeanelectionstudies.net/european-election-studies>.

8. We are conscious that the framing time of analysis could affect our results. Nevertheless, all of the general elections included in our analysis took place after the explosion of the Great Recession (2008), being the best scenario to answer to what extent the economic crisis conditioned voters' electoral behavior. Further analyses could develop to what extent the profile of RWPP remain constant.

9. For the sake of simplicity, we will henceforth refer to these parties as “right-wing parties”.

Nevertheless, we replicate the analyses implemented in this article by using the alternative dependent variable with values 1 for RWPP voters and 0 for other parties' voters (also including centre-left and left parties) and abstainers. When using this broader and less conservative categorization, we obtain consistent results (see table A2 in the Appendix).

Table A1 shows the list of references that we have used to design our category of RWPPs. Vote recall¹⁰ in the last National Elections has been selected as a dependent variable in the EES 2014 wave. The set of independent and control variables is presented in table 1. All the variables at individual level included in the models have been normalized (range from 0 to 1) to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients. In our models we have included four sets of variables. Among the usual sociodemographic factors (age, gender, work status, social class, educational level and habitat) we have also introduced individual economic and political variables. The economic evaluations (prospective and retrospective), and the main problems in a country (political, economic, unemployment, and immigration) are important factors that determine the support for a RWPP; thus, we include these in our models. As political factors we introduce political interest, ideology (from 0, left, to 1, right), confidence in the national parliament and party identification. Finally, we test the impact of economic contextual factors, GDP growth and unemployment growth¹¹, in support for RWPP. In addition, we introduce the growth in the rate of immigration¹² in the country and the type of electoral system (proportional or majority) as control variables at the contextual level.

The main goal of our paper is to combine macro and micro explanations to determine the extent to which different contexts generate different profiles of RWPP voters, as proposed in hypotheses 1 and 2. For this reason, we make interact the variables at macro level (change in GDP and unemployment,) and the main socio-demographic variables at individual level (age, social class, and educational level). To do so, we run a multilevel logistic regression. The results of this model are shown in table 2 in the results section. Being aware that 12 countries may be few cases at the upper level for this kind of regression —despite we cover all the Western European countries with right-wing populist parties and although other studies using less than 12 cases in the upper level (Stegmueller, 2013:749)—, we run the same models (including the

10. Year of National Election by country: Austria 2013, Belgium 2014, Denmark 2011, Finland 2011, France 2012, Germany 2013, Greece 2012, Italy 2013, Luxembourg 2013, Sweden 2010, The Netherlands 2012 and UK 2010 (EES data was collected in June 2014).

11. Information about GDP and unemployment growth provided by Eurostat (see: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home>). We calculate the differences between the levels of economic and social indicators between 2008 (the beginning of the Great Recession) and 2014 (when the EES interviews were conducted).

12. Information about immigration growth provided by Eurostat (see: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home>). We calculate the differences between the percentage of immigration by country between 2008 (the beginning of the Great Recession) and 2014 (when the EES interviews were conducted).

TABLE 1.
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE MODELS

Variable	N	Mean	S.D	Min	Max
RWPP vs RP	4520	0.17	0.37	0	1
Age	13463	0.42	0.22	0	0.98
Female	13481	0.52	0.50	0	1
University	12408	0.37	0.48	0	1
Unemployed	13481	0.07	0.26	0	1
City	13471	0.28	0.45	0	1
Working class	12900	0.32	0.47	0	1
Economy Retrospective	13219	0.46	0.26	0	1
Economy Prospective	12934	0.51	0.24	0	1
Problem Unemployment	11573	0.25	0.43	0	1
Problem Economy	11573	0.18	0.38	0	1
Problem Immigration	11573	0.08	0.27	0	1
Problem Political	11573	0.01	0.10	0	1
Political Interest	11573	0.53	0.32	0	1
Ideology	11700	0.50	0.24	0	1
Confidence Parliament	13148	0.60	0.49	0	1
Party Identification	13481	0.38	0.49	0	1
Δ GDP	13481	0.17	1.55	-3.20	4.20
Δ Unemployment	13481	3.13	5.08	-2.40	18.70
Δ Immigration	13481	0.10	1.09	-0.8	3.8
Proportional Electoral System	13481	0.81	0.40	0	1

Source: own elaboration based on EES 2014.

interactions) using logistic regressions obtaining the same findings (see table A3 and table A4 in the Appendix).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Is there a common RWPP voter profile among countries most and less hit by the Great Recession? The Additive Model (Model 0) in table 2¹³ shows that men, the

13. In order to prevent collinearity among our independent variables, both at the aggregate and at individual level (one of the assumptions of regression models), we have computed their correlations (see table A5 in the Appendix). While the threshold is usually considered to be 0.70, the highest correlation among our independent variables is 0.58 (“economic prospective” and “economic retrospective”).

youngest, those with higher education levels, the unemployed, those from urban areas and those who belong to the working class show a high probability of supporting RWPP rather than right-wing parties in National Elections. RWPP voters were especially critical of the political situation, showing lower levels of confidence in the National Parliament than right-wing party voters. In addition, the retrospective and prospective sociotropic economic variables are significant to vote for a RWPP against a right-wing party. This group of voters express more negative evaluations of their past economic situation than right-wing voters. “Considering immigration a problem for the country” is another significant factor explaining the vote for RWPP versus right-wing parties. All these results are consistent with the findings shown in table A2, where we use an alternative dependent variable that includes voters for centre and left-wing parties as well as abstainers.

TABLE 2.

EXPLAINING THE VOTE FOR RIGHT WING POPULIST PARTIES VERSUS RIGHT PARTIES IN 12 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS WITH INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS^a

	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age	-0.58*	-0.56+	-0.56+	-0.57+	-0.13	-0.55+	-0.57+
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.29)
University	0.25*	0.23+	0.23+	0.24*	0.23+	0.10	0.23+
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Female	-0.60***	-0.60***	-0.60***	-0.60***	-0.60***	-0.60***	-0.60***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Unemployed	0.55*	0.52*	0.54*	0.55*	0.53*	0.53*	0.54*
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
City	0.21+	0.23+	0.22+	0.21	0.23+	0.22+	0.20
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Working class	1.03***	1.06***	1.05***	1.05***	1.05***	1.05***	1.19***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Eco. Retrospective	-0.86**	-0.88**	-0.85**	-0.85**	-0.86**	-0.84**	-0.85**
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Eco. Prospective	-0.88**	-0.90**	-0.86**	-0.88**	-0.89**	-0.86**	-0.90**
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Pr. Unemployment	-0.23	-0.23	-0.22	-0.22	-0.24	-0.22	-0.22
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Pr. Economy	-0.28+	-0.30+	-0.28+	-0.27+	-0.29+	-0.28+	-0.27+
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)

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	Aditive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Pr. Immigration	0.56** (0.19)	0.55** (0.19)	0.57** (0.19)	0.57** (0.19)	0.56** (0.19)	0.57** (0.19)	0.56** (0.19)
Pr. Politics	-0.91 (0.78)	-0.98 (0.78)	-0.94 (0.78)	-0.90 (0.78)	-0.94 (0.78)	-0.92 (0.78)	-0.89 (0.78)
Political Interest	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.07 (0.20)	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.19)
Ideology	0.22 (0.29)	0.20 (0.29)	0.19 (0.29)	0.22 (0.29)	0.21 (0.29)	0.19 (0.29)	0.24 (0.29)
Confidence Parl.	-1.29*** (0.13)	-1.27*** (0.13)	-1.30*** (0.13)	-1.28*** (0.13)	-1.28*** (0.13)	-1.29*** (0.13)	-1.27*** (0.13)
Party Id.	0.18 (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)	0.19+ (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)	0.19+ (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)
Δ GDP	-0.92+ (0.52)	-1.24* (0.54)	-0.88+ (0.52)	-0.95+ (0.52)	-0.94+ (0.53)	-0.93+ (0.52)	-0.92+ (0.52)
Δ UNEMPL	-0.20+ (0.11)	-0.21+ (0.11)	-0.20+ (0.11)	-0.19+ (0.11)	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.21 (0.11)	-0.18 (0.11)
Δ IMMIG	-0.34 (0.50)	-0.33 (0.51)	-0.34 (0.50)	-0.35 (0.50)	-0.33 (0.51)	-0.34 (0.50)	-0.34 (0.50)
Pr. SYSTEM	-0.19 (1.11)	-0.19 (1.12)	-0.26 (1.11)	-0.15 (1.11)	-0.21 (1.12)	-0.21 (1.11)	-0.17 (1.11)
Age*Macro		0.68** (0.22)			-0.12* (0.05)		
Univ*Macro			-0.16+ (0.09)			0.04+ (0.02)	
W. Class*Macro				0.10 (0.09)			-0.04+ (0.02)
Cwwonstant	1.03 (1.17)	1.03 (1.17)	1.10 (1.17)	0.97 (1.16)	0.84 (1.18)	1.10 (1.17)	0.93 (1.17)
Constant	0.18 (0.23)	0.19 (0.23)	0.18 (0.23)	0.18 (0.23)	0.19 (0.23)	0.18 (0.23)	0.18 (0.23)
Observations	3536	3536	3536	3536	3536	3536	3536
N	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Log lik.	-1134.44	-1129.45	-1132.65	-1133.79	-1131.69	-1132.87	-1132.79
BIC	2448.63	2446.83	2453.23	2455.51	2451.31	2453.67	2453.52
AIC	2312.87	2304.90	2311.31	2313.58	2309.38	2311.74	2311.59

^a Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

As discussed above, the best electoral results for RWPP are not found among people most hit by the economic crisis. However, the coefficient of the increase in GDP when predicting the vote for RWPP is negative (see Additive Model) —these parties have received substantial electoral support in countries which experienced relative (but not severe) economic contraction, such as Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands—as Kriesi and Pappas (2015: 323) pointed out: “During the Great Recession populism in Europe increased notably”. In the same vein, countries that experienced an improvement in their labor market (with a reduction in the unemployment rate) are the countries where the RWPP obtained their highest probability of vote.

Thus, in line with previous works, our findings found no clear correlation between macroeconomic indicators and RWPP’s success (Mudde 2007). As discussed above, our results also coincide with those revealed by Mols and Jetten (2016), who explain RWPP’s success in contexts affected by the economic crisis only in relative terms, where their supporters “turn objective relative gratification into perceived relative deprivation”, and blame particular minority groups for their economic situation.

However, the goal of our paper was to analyse the extent to which the Great Recession generated different RWPP voter profiles in countries most and least hit by the economic crisis. Following our argument, it seems necessary to examine the interaction between variables at macroeconomic and individual levels.


In table A2, models ranged from 1 to 3 show the interaction between our selected sociodemographic variables and GDP growth. Those ranged between 4 and 6 show the interaction between unemployment growth and age, educational level and social class¹⁴. For the sake of simplicity, we show here the graphical representation of the statistically significant interactions of the model. Firstly, Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities for an elector to vote for a RWPP (vs. a right-wing party) by interacting age and educational level with GDP growth.

Figure 1 (left side) shows that the effect of age is moderately positive (see the interaction in Model 1, table 2). During the Great Recession, when the GDP grows the probability to vote for a RWPP in National Elections is higher among older voters. On the contrary, in a context of a fall in GDP, the youngest tend to support RWPP to a greater extent than they support right-wing parties. In the right side of figure 1, the interaction between educational level and GDP growth is negative and significant at the 0.10 level: with negative values in the GDP growth, voters with university education tend to support RWPP to a greater extent than those with lower levels of

14. We have estimated the same models shown in this article by excluding the “extreme cases” (see table A6 in the Appendix). Using the “extreme” command, developed for Stata by Nicholas J. Cox (2003), we can identify and drop from our sample the extreme (highest and lowest) cases (in this case, those belonging to Luxembourg and Greece). Results partially confirm H1 and H2. The additional multilevel models’ results highlight that in a context of GDP growth the older are more prone to support RWPP whereas younger voters are attracted by RWPP in a context of unemployment increase (both interactions show a high coefficient and gains statistical significance). This underlines Ronald Ingleharts’ (1971) thesis that suggests age as a new social divide.

FIGURE 1.

INTERACTION BETWEEN AGE AND EDUCATION AND GDP GROWTH




education. On the contrary, the least educated people tend to support RWPP in countries with a better economic situation.

The interactions between the same socio-demographic variables (age and education) with the rate of unemployment at country level complements this profile, as shown in figure 2. The left side of the figure illustrates the interaction term between age and unemployment growth (model 4 in table 2): the effect of unemployment on age is negative, where unemployment has grown during the crisis, younger voters are more likely to vote for a RWPP. In this sense, in those countries where the economic crisis had a direct effect on unemployment rates, the “losers of globalization” and those more prone to support a party with a populist discourse are the young and not the old, as the literature has conventionally argued. The right side of the figure shows that the interaction between unemployment growth and educational level is positive: voters with a higher educational level in a context of unemployment growth show a greater propensity to give their support to a RWPP than to a right-wing party (see the interaction in model 5, table 2). Under these economic circumstances, voters with a high educational level are attracted by RWPP and tend to cast their vote for them.

Thus, figures 1 and 2 confirm our first and second hypotheses, complementing the previous literature on the profiles of RWPP parties. Where economic conditions have worsened during the Great Recession, the young and those with a higher educational level are more prone to support RWPP versus right-wing parties. Nevertheless, when economic conditions improve, the older and those with a lower level of education tend to support RWPP. Following the previous literature, globalization divided the electorate into two groups: the younger and high skilled voters (or “winners of globalization”), on the one hand and the older and low skilled voters (or

FIGURE 2.

INTERACTION BETWEEN AGE AND EDUCATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT GROWTH



“losers of globalization”), on the other. However, the Great Recession affected in a different way to these two profiles in different contexts. While in some countries (such as Denmark and Austria) the latter have been the main supporters of RWPP, in other countries (such as Italy, Greece, or the Netherlands), the former have comprise the electoral base for these parties.

These findings complement recent literature by pointing to the relevance of the contextual economic variables that necessarily interact with the voter’s characteristics to determine their electoral behavior. In general terms we show that during the Great Recession, in contexts of economic growth the older, those belonging to the working class and those with lower levels of education were more prone to cast a vote for a populist right-wing party than for a right-wing party, while where the economy was in decline, it was the young voter with university education who supported this kind of party, rather than other right-wing parties (interaction results shown in table 2 remain significant and with the same sign in table A3 using a logistic regression). Thus, unlike other previous studies, we demonstrate that during the Great Recession the traditionally considered “losers of globalization” have been the main electoral supporters of RWPP only in certain countries, while in those contexts most affected by the Great Recession this assumption is not valid.

CONCLUSIONS

Works studying RWPP have been numerous in recent years and have had new impetus since the success of this party family during the Great Recession. This literature has focused on explaining the demand side of the phenomenon from

explanations at micro (such as the characteristics and attitudes of their voters) and macro level (exploring various economic factors of success or failure of these parties). However, the combination of both types of explanatory factors as elements conditioning the vote for populist parties has been neglected so far.

Faced with this context, this article shows that focusing on either one of these sides provides only partial explanations and can lead to misleading conclusions. In this sense, we argue that studies stating that RWPP's success during the Great Recession was possible thanks to the electoral support of the "losers of globalization" forget the fact that different economic contexts may generate different voter profiles. Specifically, in countries where GDP declined and unemployment increased, the younger and more educated (namely, people who suffered the deepest consequences of the crisis) showed a greater propensity to support RWPP. In such contexts of relative economic deprivation, loosening the labor conditions for young and well-educated people may generate a new RWPP voter profile, who may feel attracted by these parties' populist discourses, moving thus away from traditional right-wing parties. On the other hand, support for RWPP is higher among the elderly and less educated people in countries less affected by economic recession, where these profiles correspond to the traditional "losers of globalization".

Thus, we have emphasized that RWPP voters have different sociodemographic profiles in different contexts, depending on the effects of the Great Recession. While in some countries the effects of the crisis were more dramatic for the more educated and youth population, in other places the elderly and less educated became the main victims of recession. As a consequence, during the Great Recession, the traditional "losers of globalization" have remained the key RWPP electoral base only in countries less harmed by the crisis, while the RWPP voter profile was the opposite in countries more hit by the economic situation. These findings shed new light on the explanation of voting for RWPP parties in contexts of economic crisis. And they underscore the need to combine individual and contextual explanations and the need to apply different explanations to different contexts to understand RWPP's success.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A1.
LIST OF PARTIES BY FAMILY^a

	Right-wing parties	RWPP
Austria	The New Austria (NEOS)	Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO)
Belgium	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld)	Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang-VB)
	Reformist Movement (MR)	
	Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V)	
	Humanist Democratic Centre (cdH)	
	People's Party (PP)	
Denmark	New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)	
	Radical Party	Danish People's Party (DF)
	Venstre-Liberals (V)	
	Liberal Alliance (I)	
Finland	Conservative People's Party (C)	
	Christian Democrats in Finland (KD)	True Finns (FS)
	National Coalition Party (KOK)	
	Centre Party of Finland (KESK)	
France	Swedish People's Party (RKP)	
	Union for a Popular Movement (UDF)	National Front (FN)
Germany	Free Democratic Party (FDP)	Alternative for Germany (AfD)
	Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	
Greece		Independent Greeks (ANEL)
	New Democracy (ND)	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)
		Golden Dawn (GD)
Italy	Union for Christian and Centre (Udc)	The People of Freedom (PdL)
		Brothers of Italy (Fdl)
Luxembourg	Democratic Party (DP)	Alternative Democratic Refor (ADR)
	Christian Social People's Party (CSV)	
Netherlands	Democrats '66 (D'66)	Party of Freedom (PVV)
	People's Party for Freedom and (VVD)	
	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	
Sweden	Liberal People's Party (L)	Sweden Democrats (SD)
	Christian Democrats (KD)	
	Moderate Coalition Party (M)	
	Centre Party (C)	

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	Right-wing parties	RWPP
United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats	British National Party (BNP)
	Conservative Party	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
	Party of Wales	Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

Source: own elaboration based on Mudde (2007: 44) for the cases of FPÖ, VB, DF and FN; Mair (2013) for the case of BZO; Rensmann, de Lange and Couperus (2017: 155,156) for the cases of FS, AfD, ANEL, LAOS, PVV, SD, UKIP; Bobba and Roncarola (2018) for the cases of PdL (also Pappas, 2016:34) and EdL; van Kessel (2015) for the cases of ADR and the BNP and Toloudis (2014) for the case of Greek GD.

TABLE A2.

ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS WITH A DIFFERENT DEPENDENT VARIABLE. EXPLAINING THE VOTE FOR RIGHT WING POPULIST PARTIES VERSUS OTHER PARTIES AND ABSTAINERS IN 12 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS WITH INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS^a

	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Age	-0.05 (0.25)	0.04 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.25)	-0.03 (0.25)	0.33 (0.31)	-0.03 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.25)
University	0.10 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.13)	0.09 (0.10)
Female	-0.47*** (0.10)	-0.46*** (0.10)	-0.47*** (0.10)	-0.47*** (0.10)	-0.47*** (0.10)	-0.47*** (0.10)	-0.47*** (0.10)
Unemployed	0.04 (0.19)	0.01 (0.19)	0.04 (0.19)	0.05 (0.19)	0.03 (0.19)	0.04 (0.19)	0.05 (0.19)
City	0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)
Working class	0.47*** (0.10)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.47*** (0.10)	0.51*** (0.11)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.60*** (0.13)
Eco. Retrosp.	-0.87*** (0.26)	-0.88*** (0.26)	-0.86*** (0.26)	-0.86*** (0.26)	-0.88*** (0.26)	-0.86*** (0.26)	-0.87*** (0.26)
Eco. Prosp.	-0.46+ (0.26)	-0.45+ (0.26)	-0.45+ (0.26)	-0.47+ (0.26)	-0.46+ (0.26)	-0.45+ (0.26)	-0.46+ (0.26)
Pr. Unemmpl.	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.13)
Pr. Economy	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)

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	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Pr. Immigration	0.71*** (0.16)	0.70*** (0.16)	0.71*** (0.16)	0.71*** (0.17)	0.71*** (0.16)	0.71*** (0.17)	0.71*** (0.17)
Pr. Politics	-1.07 (0.74)	-1.10 (0.74)	-1.07 (0.74)	-1.07 (0.74)	-1.08 (0.74)	-1.07 (0.74)	-1.06 (0.74)
Political interest	0.12 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)	0.13 (0.16)
Ideology	3.25*** (0.21)	3.26*** (0.21)	3.25*** (0.21)	3.25*** (0.21)	3.26*** (0.21)	3.25*** (0.21)	3.25*** (0.21)
Confidence Parl.	-0.99*** (0.11)	-0.99*** (0.11)	-0.99*** (0.11)	-0.98*** (0.11)	-0.99*** (0.11)	-1.00*** (0.11)	-0.98*** (0.11)
Party Id.	0.38*** (0.10)						
Δ GDP	-0.58+ (0.30)	-0.80* (0.31)	-0.56+ (0.30)	-0.62* (0.30)	-0.58+ (0.30)	-0.58+ (0.30)	-0.58+ (0.30)
Δ UNEMPL	-0.12+ (0.07)	-0.13+ (0.07)	-0.13+ (0.07)	-0.12+ (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.14* (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)
Δ IMMIG	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.30)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.04 (0.30)	-0.03 (0.31)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.03 (0.30)
Pr. SYSTEM	0.11 (0.66)	0.11 (0.66)	0.09 (0.66)	0.16 (0.67)	0.11 (0.67)	0.11 (0.66)	0.13 (0.67)
Age*Macro		0.47** (0.18)			-0.10* (0.04)		
Univ* Macro			-0.08 (0.07)			0.03+ (0.02)	
W.Class* Macro				0.12+ (0.07)			-0.03+ (0.02)
Constant	-3.53*** (0.71)	-3.56*** (0.71)	-3.50*** (0.70)	-3.61*** (0.71)	-3.69*** (0.72)	-3.48*** (0.70)	-3.61*** (0.71)
Constant	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.35 (0.24)	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.33 (0.24)	-0.35 (0.24)	-0.34 (0.24)
Observations	8939	8939	8939	8939	8939	8939	8939
N groups	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Log lik.	-1716.52	-1712.78	-1715.83	-1715.08	-1714.11	-1714.88	-1715.10
Bic	3633.19	3634.82	3640.93	3639.42	3637.48	3639.02	3639.46
Aic	3477.03	3471.56	3477.67	3476.16	3474.22	3475.77	3476.20

^a Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

TABLE A3.

EXPLAINING THE VOTE FOR RIGHT WING POPULIST PARTIES VERSUS RIGHT PARTIES IN 12 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: A LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSES WITH INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS^a

	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Age	-0.88** (0.27)	-0.83** (0.28)	-0.87** (0.27)	-0.87** (0.27)	-0.68** (0.32)	-0.86** (0.27)	-0.88** (0.27)
University	0.09 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)	0.08 (0.13)	0.08 (0.11)
Female	-0.54*** (0.11)	-0.54*** (0.11)	-0.55*** (0.11)	-0.54*** (0.11)	-0.54*** (0.11)	-0.54*** (0.11)	-0.54*** (0.11)
Unemployed	0.37 (0.23)	0.34 (0.23)	0.35 (0.23)	0.36 (0.23)	0.36 (0.23)	0.34 (0.23)	0.35 (0.23)
City	0.20+ (0.12)	0.21+ (0.12)	0.21+ (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)	0.20+ (0.12)	0.20+ (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)
Working class	0.74*** (0.11)	0.75*** (0.11)	0.76*** (0.12)	0.76*** (0.12)	0.74*** (0.11)	0.76*** (0.12)	0.89*** (0.13)
Eco. Retrospective	-1.54*** (0.27)	-1.57*** (0.27)	-1.53*** (0.27)	-1.54*** (0.27)	-1.54*** (0.27)	-1.52*** (0.27)	-1.53*** (0.27)
Eco. Prospective	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.46 (0.28)	-0.43 (0.28)	-0.42 (0.28)	-0.46+ (0.28)
Pr. Unemployment	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)
Pr. Economy	-0.22 (0.15)	-0.23 (0.15)	-0.23 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.15)	-0.23 (0.15)	-0.23 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.15)
Pr. Immigration	0.43* (0.17)	0.42* (0.17)	0.44* (0.17)	0.42* (0.17)	0.43* (0.17)	0.43* (0.17)	0.42* (0.17)
Pr. Politics	-0.85 (0.78)	-0.90 (0.78)	-0.88 (0.78)	-0.83 (0.78)	-0.86 (0.78)	-0.85 (0.78)	-0.82 (0.77)
Political Interest	-0.22 (0.18)	-0.21 (0.18)	-0.22 (0.18)	-0.24 (0.18)	-0.22 (0.18)	-0.23 (0.18)	-0.23 (0.18)
Ideology	0.67* (0.27)	0.67* (0.27)	0.63* (0.27)	0.70* (0.27)	0.68* (0.27)	0.63* (0.27)	0.70* (0.27)
Confidence Parl.	-1.36*** (0.11)	-1.35*** (0.11)	-1.37*** (0.11)	-1.35*** (0.11)	-1.36*** (0.11)	-1.37*** (0.11)	-1.34*** (0.11)
Party Id.	0.30** (0.11)	0.30** (0.11)	0.31** (0.11)	0.30** (0.11)	0.30** (0.11)	0.31** (0.11)	0.30** (0.11)

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	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Δ GDP	-0.28** (0.09)	-0.51*** (0.12)	-0.24** (0.09)	-0.32*** (0.09)	-0.28** (0.09)	-0.29*** (0.09)	-0.28** (0.09)
Δ UNEMPL	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.08 (0.02)
Δ IMMIG	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.21** (0.07)	-0.22** (0.07)
Pr. SYSTEM	0.48* (0.20)	0.50* (0.20)	0.39* (0.20)	0.54** (0.20)	0.48* (0.20)	0.46* (0.20)	0.50* (0.20)
Age*Macro		0.52** (0.19)			-0.06 (0.05)		
Univ* Macro			-0.20** (0.08)			0.05* (0.02)	
W. Class* Macro				0.15+ (0.07)			-0.04* (0.02)
Constant	0.09 (0.34)	0.05 (0.34)	0.19 (0.35)	0.02 (0.35)	-0.01 (0.35)	0.19 (0.34)	0.01 (0.35)
Observations	3536	3536	3536	3536	3536	3536	3536
Pseudo R2	0.183	0.186	0.186	0.185	0.184	0.186	0.185

^a Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

TABLE A4.

ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS WITH A DIFFERENT DEPENDENT VARIABLE. EXPLAINING THE VOTE FOR RIGHT WING POPULIST PARTIES VERSUS OTHER PARTIES AND ABSTAINERS IN 12 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: A LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS WITH INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS^a

	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Age	-0.18 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.25)	-0.16 (0.25)	-0.16 (0.25)	0.01 (0.30)	-0.16 (0.25)	-0.16 (0.25)
University	0.01 (0.10)	0.00 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.12)	0.01 (0.10)
Female	-0.44*** (0.09)	-0.44*** (0.10)	-0.44*** (0.09)	-0.44*** (0.09)	-0.44*** (0.09)	-0.44*** (0.10)	-0.44*** (0.09)
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.18)
City	0.05 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)

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	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Working class	0.37*** (0.10)	0.39*** (0.10)	0.39*** (0.10)	0.40** (0.10)	0.38*** (0.10)	0.39*** (0.10)	0.47*** (0.12)
Eco. Retrospect.	-1.07*** (0.24)	-1.08*** (0.24)	-1.05*** (0.24)	-1.06*** (0.24)	-1.08*** (0.24)	-1.05*** (0.24)	-1.06*** (0.24)
Eco. Prosp.	-0.14 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.24)
Pr. Unempl.	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)
Pr. Economy	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)
Pr. Immigration	0.59*** (0.16)	0.58*** (0.16)	0.59*** (0.16)	0.58*** (0.16)	0.59*** (0.16)	0.59*** (0.16)	0.58*** (0.16)
Pr. Politics	-0.98 (0.74)	-1.00 (0.74)	-0.98 (0.74)	-0.98 (0.74)	-0.98 (0.74)	-0.98 (0.74)	-0.98 (0.74)
Political interest	0.16 (0.16)	0.15 (0.16)	0.16 (0.16)	0.16 (0.16)	0.15 (0.16)	0.16 (0.16)	0.16 (0.16)
Ideology	3.38*** (0.21)	3.39*** (0.21)	3.38*** (0.21)	3.39*** (0.21)	3.40*** (0.21)	3.38*** (0.21)	3.39*** (0.21)
Confidence Parl.	-1.01*** (0.11)	-1.01*** (0.11)	-1.02*** (0.11)	-1.00*** (0.11)	-1.01*** (0.11)	-1.03*** (0.11)	-1.00*** (0.11)
Party Id.	0.44*** (0.10)						
Δ GDP	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.46** (0.11)	-0.23** (0.08)	-0.29*** (0.08)	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.27*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)
Δ UNEMPL	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Δ IMMIG	0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)
Pr. SYSTEM	0.57*** (0.17)	0.57*** (0.17)	0.52** (0.17)	0.61*** (0.17)	0.57*** (0.17)	0.56** (0.17)	0.58*** (0.17)
Age*Macro		0.42** (0.16)			-0.07+ (0.04)		
Univ* Macro			-0.13+ (0.07)			0.04** (0.02)	
W.Class* Macro				0.10 (0.06)			-0.02 (0.02)
Constant	-4.03*** (0.29)	-4.06*** (0.29)	-3.99*** (0.29)	-4.08*** (0.29)	-4.15*** (0.30)	-3.96*** (0.29)	-4.09*** (0.29)
Observations	8939	8939	8939	8939	8939	8939	8939
Pseudo R ²	0.150	0.152	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.152	0.151

^a Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

TABLE A5.
CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES^a

	Age	Univer- sity	Female	Unem- ployed	City	Working Class	Eco. Retros- pective	Eco. Pros- pective	Prob. Unem- ployment	Prob. Economy	Prob. Immi- gration	Prob. Politics	Political Interest	Ideology	Confi- dence	Party ID	Δ GDP	Δ Unem- ployment	Δ Immi- gration	Pr. System	
Age	1.0000																				
University	-0.0854*	1.0000																			
Female	0.0175*	-0.0118*	1.0000																		
Unemployed	-0.1168*	0.0172*	0.0001	1.0000																	
City	-0.0625*	0.0132*	-0.0019	-0.0121*	1.0000																
Working Class	0.0693*	-0.0651*	-0.0040	0.1207*	-0.0764*	1.0000															
Economic Retrospective	-0.0108*	0.0229*	-0.0594*	-0.0706*	0.0354*	-0.1255*	1.0000														
Economic Prospective	0.0008	0.0217*	-0.0497*	-0.0670*	0.0180*	-0.1212*	0.5858*	1.0000													
Prob. Unemployment	-0.0161*	0.0065	0.0345*	0.0978*	-0.0666*	0.0458*	-0.0733*	-0.0319*	1.0000												
Prob. Economy	-0.0139*	0.0359*	-0.0120*	-0.0027	0.0055	-0.0171*	-0.0214*	-0.0200*	-0.2137*	1.0000											
Prob. Immigration	0.0285*	0.0230*	0.0053	-0.0210*	-0.0095*	-0.0069	0.0618*	0.0452*	-0.1133*	-0.0675*	1.0000										
Prob. Politics	-0.0222*	0.0158*	-0.0065	0.0069	0.0439*	-0.0141*	0.0214*	-0.0131*	-0.0881*	-0.0501*	-0.0156*	1.0000									
Political Interest	0.1360*	0.0101*	-0.1474*	-0.0813*	0.0493*	-0.1781*	0.1430*	0.1363*	-0.0651*	0.0127*	-0.0009	0.0363*	1.0000								
Ideology	0.0128*	-0.0041	-0.0135*	-0.0207*	-0.0094*	-0.0870*	0.0566*	0.0668*	-0.0362*	-0.0064	0.0287*	-0.0032	-0.0050	1.0000							
Confidence Parliament	0.0566*	-0.0334*	-0.0264*	-0.0878*	-0.0022	-0.1677*	0.2390*	0.2558*	-0.0452*	-0.0478*	0.0220*	0.0357*	0.2161*	0.0444*	1.0000						
Party ID	0.1188*	-0.0339*	-0.0490*	-0.0287*	0.0054	-0.0645*	0.0616*	0.0668*	-0.0171*	-0.0015	0.0359*	0.0165*	0.2731*	0.0052	0.1206*	1.0000					
Δ GDP	-0.0560*	-0.0656*	-0.0048	0.0109*	0.0673*	0.0528*	0.1539*	0.0717*	-0.1560*	-0.2214*	0.0335*	0.0264*	0.0367*	0.0594*	0.1121*	0.0249*	1.0000				
Δ Unemployment	-0.0005	0.0221*	0.0125*	0.0695*	0.0434*	0.0736*	-0.1136*	-0.0637*	0.1459*	0.1950*	-0.0500*	-0.0235*	-0.0576*	-0.0458*	-0.2303*	0.0038	-0.5263*	1.0000			
Δ Immigration	-0.0069	-0.0921*	0.0003	-0.0678*	-0.0170*	0.0545*	0.0360*	0.0216*	-0.0971*	-0.0850*	0.0851*	-0.0384*	-0.0381*	-0.0145*	0.1613*	-0.0123*	0.4299*	-0.4755*	1.0000		
Pr. System	-0.0016	-0.0085	-0.0187*	-0.0961*	0.0380*	-0.0604*	0.0536*	0.0525*	-0.0658*	-0.0136*	-0.1004*	-0.0327*	0.0400*	0.0216*	0.0716*	0.0441*	-0.2096*	0.1898*	0.0152*	1.0000	

^a * p value < 0.05.

TABLE A6.

EXPLAINING THE VOTE FOR RIGHT WING POPULIST PARTIES VERSUS RIGHT PARTIES IN 10 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS WITH INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS WITHOUT EXTREME CASES^a

	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Age	-0.38 (0.31)	-0.78* (0.34)	-0.39 (0.31)	-0.40 (0.31)	0.31 (0.48)	-0.37 (0.31)	-0.37 (0.31)
University	0.14 (0.13)	0.16 (0.13)	0.15 (0.14)	0.14 (0.13)	0.16 (0.13)	0.22 (0.19)	0.14 (0.13)
Female	-0.54*** (0.12)	-0.54*** (0.12)	-0.54*** (0.12)	-0.54*** (0.12)	-0.53*** (0.12)	-0.54*** (0.12)	-0.53*** (0.12)
Unemployed	0.46+ (0.26)	0.46+ (0.26)	0.46+ (0.26)	0.46+ (0.26)	0.48+ (0.26)	0.46+ (0.26)	0.49+ (0.26)
City	0.21 (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	0.23 (0.14)
Working class	1.18*** (0.14)	1.18*** (0.14)	1.18*** (0.14)	1.29*** (0.15)	1.17*** (0.14)	1.18*** (0.14)	0.89*** (0.20)
Eco. Retrospective	-0.84** (0.32)	-0.89** (0.32)	-0.84** (0.32)	-0.84** (0.32)	-0.85** (0.32)	-0.84** (0.32)	-0.85** (0.32)
Eco. Prospective	-0.67* (0.33)	-0.69* (0.34)	-0.67* (0.33)	-0.69* (0.33)	-0.67* (0.33)	-0.67* (0.33)	-0.66* (0.33)
Pr. Unemployment	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.17)
Pr. Economy	-0.31+ (0.17)	-0.32+ (0.17)	-0.31+ (0.17)	-0.31+ (0.17)	-0.31+ (0.17)	-0.31+ (0.17)	-0.30+ (0.17)
Pr. Immigration	0.55** (0.19)	0.54** (0.19)	0.55** (0.19)	0.55** (0.19)	0.56** (0.19)	0.55** (0.19)	0.56** (0.19)
Pr. Politics	-0.88 (0.78)	-0.92 (0.78)	-0.88 (0.78)	-0.91 (0.78)	-0.85 (0.78)	-0.88 (0.78)	-0.95 (0.78)
Political Interest	-0.15 (0.20)	-0.13 (0.21)	-0.15 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.20)	-0.14 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.21)
Ideology	0.15 (0.31)	0.13 (0.31)	0.15 (0.31)	0.18 (0.31)	0.15 (0.31)	0.15 (0.31)	0.16 (0.31)
Confidence Parl.	-1.25*** (0.13)	-1.24*** (0.13)	-1.25*** (0.13)	-1.25*** (0.13)	-1.25*** (0.13)	-1.25*** (0.13)	-1.24*** (0.13)
Party Id.	0.20+ (0.12)	0.21+ (0.12)	0.20+ (0.12)	0.21+ (0.12)	0.21+ (0.12)	0.21+ (0.12)	0.20+ (0.12)

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	Additive		Δ GDP		Δ Unemployment		
	Model (0)	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Δ GDP	-0.36 (0.44)	-0.86+ (0.47)	-0.35 (0.44)	-0.27 (0.45)	-0.35 (0.44)	-0.36 (0.44)	-0.38 (0.44)
Δ UNEMPL	0.32* (0.16)	0.32* (0.16)	0.32* (0.16)	0.33* (0.16)	0.50* (0.18)	0.34* (0.16)	0.27+ (0.16)
Δ IMMIG	-0.70+ (0.37)	-0.70+ (0.36)	-0.70+ (0.37)	-0.72+ (0.37)	-0.67+ (0.37)	-0.70+ (0.37)	-0.73* (0.37)
Pr. SYSTEM	0.44 (0.83)	0.48 (0.83)	0.43 (0.83)	0.37 (0.85)	0.45 (0.83)	0.44 (0.84)	0.40 (0.84)
Age*Macro		1.11** (0.40)			-0.38+ (0.20)		
Univ*Macro			-0.05 (0.16)			-0.05 (0.08)	
W. Class* Macro				-0.31+ (0.17)			0.17* (0.08)
Constant	-0.31 (0.95)	-0.16 (0.95)	-0.30 (0.95)	-0.24 (0.97)	-0.70 (0.98)	-0.35 (0.96)	-0.13 (0.96)
Constant	-0.21 (0.24)	-0.22 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.24)	-0.19 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.24)	-0.20 (0.24)
Observations	3157	3157	3157	3157	3157	3157	3157
N	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Log lik.	-1015.84	-1011.86	-1015.79	-1014.20	-1013.95	-1015.66	-1013.67
Bic	2208.94	2209.04	2216.90	2213.71	2213.23	2216.64	2212.67
Aic	2075.68	2069.72	2077.58	2074.39	2073.91	2077.32	2073.35

^a Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

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