This article reviews to what extent the EU integration process has had an impact, although unintended, in the consolidation of pro-independence movements across Europe. The article will show that, due to global trade and the legal norms against aggression put in place after WWII, it is now easier being an independent small state than it was before 1945. It will be shown that this is particularly true in the European context. Moreover, European regions play a very limited role in the EU governance and the EU remains predominantly a matter for states and the EU’s own institutions, which provides an additional incentive for those seeking statehood. The examples of the Scottish and Catalan pro-independence movements are taken into account to show that the European dimension played a pivotal role in their consolidation. However, the article also nuances this statement and points out the ambivalent position of the EU: although the EU might be providing a unique economic (legal, as well) framework for the feasibility of new small states in Europe, it has also shown resilient support in favour of EU Member States legal orders. In this sense, it emerges as an additional layer of difficulties for any non-consensual and unlawful independence process.
Este artículo analiza en qué medida el proceso de integración europea ha podido tener un impacto, aunque involuntario, en la consolidación de movimientos independentistas en regiones europeas. El trabajo constata que después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial el escenario internacional es particularmente propicio para el surgimiento de Estados pequeños independientes y que las condiciones que lo posibilitan son especialmente idóneas en el contexto europeo. Se toman en consideración los movimientos independentistas en Escocia y Cataluña para comprobar que en ambos casos la dimensión europea juega un papel relevante en su consolidación. Sin embargo, el artículo también revela una paradoja: aunque la UE pueda ofrecer un marco económico y jurídico que rebaja las incertezas de cualquier proceso de independencia, al mismo tiempo se ha erigido como garante del orden constitucional de los Estados miembros y, en este sentido, emerge como una capa adicional de dificultades si el proceso de independencia que se lleva a cabo no es consensuado y no se adecúa al ordenamiento jurídico del Estado en cuestión.
Today, being
This article proceeds in four parts: the first one explains why today being a small state is easier than it used to be. This is basically due to two reasons (
It should be noted that this article is not concerned with the moral legitimacy or the political convenience of pro-independence movements in well-functioning democracies. It assumes as a fact that in a few European regions there are strong pro-independence movements challenging the territorial
Interdependence has made the distinction between large and small states less relevant. In fact, almost all European countries are becoming small since their influence in world affairs is decreasing (
Today the minimum consensus seems to revolve around two ideas: a) small states must adapt to their environment, rather than affect or, needless to say, dominate it and b) small states seek influence through membership of multilateral organizations (
Another common characteristic of small states is that they tend to promote external trade and favour free trade arrangements (
Does size matter when it comes to the viability of a state? Now it seems that the size of the state is not as important as it used to be in order to be viable in the international stage. Historically, there were important advantages of large size among states. “The larger state can allow the realization of more gains from trade by providing a larger free trade area, and per capita defence costs should tend to fall because of simple geometry — doubling the area of a state usually less than doubles the border needing defence and so more resources are available per linear mile” (
The debate about the optimal size of the state from an economic point of view was vigorous at the end of the 20th century. In
Later, the work of Alberto Alesina (colleague of Barro at Harvard University) and Enrico Spolaore became seminal for the literature on the “optimal size of nations”. Alesina and Spolaore argue that free trade and the fall of transport costs have almost turned irrelevant (to some extent) the size of the state. Thus, one of the reasons to explain why there are almost 200 states in the world is the international economic integration (
Needless to say, the main historical reasons to explain that the number of UN country members has risen from nearly 50 to about 200 are the end of colonialism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, this economic literature pretends to highlight the fact that in a world of an open economy like the current one there is no clear relationship between size and GDP growth. In effect, these authors consider that in an open economy the size of the country is not as important as in a closed economy because the territory does not determine the size of the market anymore. “Thus, the “economically viable” size of countries depends on the trade regime. While small countries may not be viable in a world of trade barriers, they may be prosperous in a world of free trade and global markets” (
In general, a country’s market will be given by its domestic market and
That is why “[t]he benefits of large countries are less important if small countries can freely trade with each other”. (
In other words, states can afford to be small as long as they are open. Small states are especially aware of the need to be open to international trade and embrace globalization to a higher extent than larger countries. Donald Wittman shares this opinion about feasibility of small states in an open economy and considers that “[a]n international regime of free trade among nations allows for smaller scale political units because economic production is not limited by the demand and supply of domestic markets” (
With these references, it is not implied that international economic openness is the only (or the main) reason to explain the change in the territorial size of countries. There are other variables to be taken into account to predict the size of nations, as for instance the political regime type or the level of homogeneity, and it is not clear either whether such variables are wholly satisfying (
In their concluding remarks, Alesina and Spalaore (
Catalonia is a region that may not “need” Spain if it were to become a member of the European Union. To put it differently, once a region is a member of a large common market, including even a common currency area, and can enjoy free trade, the incentives for the region to seek independence or autonomy increases. The national government is much less important for the economy of the region. […] the cost of being politically small is decreasing with economic integration. In Europe, we see that many regions can afford to be independent if they enjoy the benefits of the European common market.
This is what Michael Keating (
In fact, in a 2014 Credit Suisse report, both the potential independent states of Catalonia and Scotland would rank higher than Spain and the UK in the Human Development Index. Since the report does not specify the political status of those independent countries and it does not refer to the EU membership issue, one has to assume that their calculations have been made considering that those states, once (and if ever) independent, would remain within the EU.
To conclude, let us clarify one point. The abovementioned arguments are not implying nor suggesting the inevitable success of small entities. Success, of course, requires many factors (e.g. political stability, the strength of the institutional framework and the Rule of Law, research and development capabilities, etc…). What is merely being highlight here with the focus on trade openness and world’s markets integration capacities is simply that the current scenario (despite some signals pointing at globalization in reverse) is more favorable to small states (if they know how to manage it) than it used to be in the past.
Another important characteristic of today’s world that permits the secure existence of small states is the legal framework against conquest. Today aggression across recognized borders has become unacceptable. But this was not the case until the second half of the 20th century. Until then the Thucydides teachings from the Melian dialogue (“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”) proved to be accurate. It was the legitimacy of conquest’s era. At the end of World War II the Allied Powers decided to strongly support the norm of integrity of interstate boundaries (
In effect, since 1945 “the major powers have refrained from interventions to carve up a previously recognized state to make new states without the consent of the state. In marked contrast to prior great power politics, the major powers since the 1950s have stuck to the norm of “no border changes imposed by force” with very few exceptions” (
Let us just compare the security feelings (especially within the EU) with the concerns of European national communities at the beginning of the 20th century. According to Bartkus (
At the turn of the century, even though they suffered repression, weaker distinct communities in Europe did not normally contemplate independence as a remedy for their grievances. An investigation of Czech demands for reform and devolution within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Empire reveals an acute awareness on the part of Czech leaders that they would surely face the prospect of even worse subjugation if they were to secede. Furthermore, a short examination of the events leading to the creation of Yugoslavia indicates the extent to which concerns for security preoccupied the Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities. Yugoslavia’s hasty creation was to a great extent due to each community’s similar judgment that its own particular interests would be better defended by integration into a larger and more powerful state of their creation.
In today’s world (at least in the Western hemisphere) no one fears the territorial invasion of a neighbouring country.
These two reasons (i.e. growth of free trade and the increasing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries) might help to explain why small statehood is today more viable than it used to be (
of all the regional and global economic international organizations existing today, the European Union appears to provide the biggest gain for its members. And indeed, newborn European states are quick to apply for EU membership, although gaining membership is a long road. The European Union is viewed as an extremely important organization to join by European proto-states such as Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders.
Here Fazal and Griffiths point out two distinct cases. On the one hand, the cases of those states emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union, eager to join the EU and to adapt the Copenhagen criteria (i.e. the EU as an incentive to foster Rule of Law, democracy and respect for human rights, among other requirements) and on the other hand the cases of regions within Member States seeking independence.
Before the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 war was the norm in the European soil (
Bearing in mind that no organization can turn upside down the world’s power relations, small states understand that “within the EU they can exert more influence and achieve more than they would outside it” (
One of the many historical examples of small states influences within the EU, highlighted by the former leader of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) Alex Salmond, was the 1992 Danish referendum. After the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was rejected, the then still European Community provided Denmark with some exceptions that eventually led to a ratifying popular vote. That fact “enabled the SNP to point to the crucial role played by a small nation within the EC. Alex Salmond pointed to the fact that the Danish referendum result ‘finally crushed the claim that small nations can have no influence in the European Community’” (
This approach enables them to work with the Commission to get their favoured issues acted on in the Council. In effect, small states have built a special relationship with the Commission as they see it as a neutral institution that at least takes into consideration the views of all member states. Thus, small states have opted for cooperation (probably because only large states can pay the price of confrontation), becoming very active only when necessary to avoid damaging consequences (
An historical example of the beneficial effects of EU integration process in small states is to be found in the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Despite the peaceful and amicable agreement to divide the country, bilateral trade between the two new entities declined significantly. Thus, in 1991, around 50% of Slovakia’s trade was with the Czech Republic and this figure dropped to about 25% in 1991. Czech trade with Slovakia declined from around 30% in 1991 to about 10% in 1997. However, “integration with the EU mitigated the impact of the break-up to some extent, as much of the decline in Czech-Slovak trade reflected the growth in trade with other countries, in particular with the EU” (
Let us now turn to examine the representation and voice the EU offers to Europeans regions. As it is well known, the European integration process has shifted Member States competences upwards. Thus, in the case of decentralized Member States, some current EU competences set rules for implementation in the fields of competences formerly exercised by regions in the domestic arena. Since the EU remains predominantly a matter for States and the EU’s own institutions (
Compensation mechanisms to this erosion are limited and they vary considerably between Member States (
Despite the initial optimism, Maastricht reforms (i.e. the creation of the Committee of the Regions, the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity and the legal possibility for regional ministers to join or even lead national delegations at the Council of Ministers) gave only a limited recognition to regions (
Irrelevance within the EU institutional architecture because of its limited advisory role: the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament must consult the CoR when drawing up legislation on matters concerning local and regional government. However, since CoR opinions are not binding, very frequently the EP and the Council just ignore them. (
The diverse and asymmetric membership (ranging from regions with legislative powers, regions that are administrative units, provinces and city councils) blurs the status of those who consider their regions as stateless nations. Representatives of regions with legislative powers have refused to engage actively in the CoR, since they do not want to be treated like local entities or administrative units (
There are better routes for regions to make their voice heard. For instance, many regions have established offices in Brussels in an effort to improve their access to the EU decision-making. This shouldn’t be a surprise either. One of the dramas for sub-national entities is that it is even difficult to merely track what is being discussed at EU level. (
The Lisbon Treaty did strengthen the role of the CoR by providing standing before the European Court of Justice whenever it considers the principle of subsidiarity has been violated. However, the CoR still remains far from the European Parliament’s second chamber once envisioned. As for the principle of subsidiarity and the regional dimension, it seems that since the Lisbon Treaty there was a sort of redefinition. Before, it was mainly read as limiting the scope and influence of the EU and preserving EU Member States’ position (
Regarding the possibility of opening the state delegations at the Council to regional Ministers (which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and was not been modified by the Lisbon Treaty), it should be noted that this is an option that depends entirely on the political will of the Member State. In the case of Spain, for instance, it is possible to incorporate in the state delegation (in five of the nine formations of the Council) a regional Minister as the AC’s representative (
Regions have also created informal networks to advance their interests: for instance, the Conference of European regions with Legislative Power (REGLEG), an informal network dedicated to achieve a greater role in the EU for legislative regions. Its demands included enhancing their role in the Council, an appropriate involvement of regional parliaments and the right to bring actions before the European Court of Justice where the prerogatives of the regions are threatened. Interesting to note that they do not have activities since 2013. This type of international activity carried out by sub-state actors has been described as “paradiplomacy”.
Despite some evidence that regions have had “some” impact on debates within the EU (
Not surprisingly, failed regionalization of the EU might have had an impact on demands for independence. Within a true Europe of the regions the independence of subnational regions might have looked like a meaningless prospectus. A traditional demand of Catalan nationalism shares this analysis by arguing that it is false to think that the Europe of regions that we effectively have is an equivalent to the European recognition of stateless nations. For them, today, stateless nations are almost invisible for European institutions. (
So far, it has been underlined that the EU integration process (with all its safety nets that reduce the uncertainties of a small sovereign State and its inability to recognize an important role for regions) provides those who seek for independence with arguments and incentives. This section will test the accuracy of such argument and will show that it has to be nuanced. To what extent the European dimension and the EU membership debate have played a role in the Catalan and Scottish pro-independence movements? For instance, has the European dimension (e.g. EU membership after independence debate) any impact in the popular support towards independence? Although Scotland is abandoning the EU together with the rest of the UK, the Scottish example is still a relevant historical case to assess the impact of the EU within the pro-independence process of a European region.
Let’s start with the Catalan case. The classic work of Donald L. Horowitz about the logic of secessions in economically regional advanced groups gives a first good explanation of the phenomenon. Needless to say, the following explanations are not sufficient to understand a complex process like a pro-independence movement. However, they do have a strong connection with the European integration phenomenon and that is why they deserve to be pointed out. Horowitz observes that advanced regional groups in advanced nations “are likely to have a regional economic grievance. Advanced regions usually generate more income and contribute more revenue to the treasury of the undivided state than they receive. They believe that they are subsidizing poorer regions” (
Yet, Horowitz also sees that secessions have countervailing considerations: “Such groups are likely to export surplus capital and population outside their region. Their prosperity generates investment that does not respect regional boundaries” (
Under ordinary circumstances, secession could imperil the strong economic ties (among which export statistics is only a single indicator) between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. But as Connolly (
The EU, however, changes the calculus for advanced regions such as Catalonia (or Flanders, or the Basque Country or Veneto): following independence, if EU membership were secured, Catalans would still enjoy access both to Spanish markets and the markets of other EU member states. Thus, the EU may be viewed as eliminating an important brake on the separatist aspirations of economically advanced regions.
This statement, however, needs to be specified. First, EU membership after independence cannot be taken for granted, on the contrary, given the unanimity rule (Article 49 TEU). Second, one thing is the legal access to Spanish markets and the other thing (difficult to anticipate) is the frontier effect that could harm the economic perspectives of Catalan products and services in the rest of Spain due to anger and frustration because of the secessionist move (at least in the short term) (
In the Scottish case, where Scottish GDP per capita is similar to that of the UK as a whole, some would argue that economic arguments in line with Horowitz’s position cannot help to explain Scotland’s nationalist surge. However, pro-independence support has grown, among other reasons, “by the discovery, in the late 1960s, of big oilfields under the North Sea. It gave the nationalist more to be angry about —and an argument for why Scotland would be better off alone” (
Needless to say, Scotland maintains strong economic links with the rest of the UK, even stronger than in the Catalan case. In the Scottish case, the economic ties with the rest of the UK are outstanding. For example, around 64% of Scottish exports go to the rest of the country, while Scots exports to the EU do not represent more than 19% of the Scottish trade (
Both the former Scottish Prime Minister Alex Salmond and the current one, Nicole Sturgeon, have always underlined that an independent Scotland would necessarily remain within the EU and that the Scottish independence would be based on interdependence not only with the rest of the UK, but also with Europe. So, the idea to link independence and EU membership has been a constant trend in the most recent Scottish pro-independence movement. For instance, before and during the 2014 referendum campaign, the Scottish government insisted the “smooth transition to full EU membership can take place on the day Scotland becomes an independent country” (
The SNP, however, has not always showed this same level of Europeanism. Before the 1970s, the SNP did not pay a particular attention to Europe. In the 1975 British referendum on continued membership the SNP campaigned in favor of “No” in order to separate politically Scotland from the rest of the UK. With a “No” in Scotland and a “Yes” in the rest of the country, the “Westminster government would appear illegitimate in Scotland through endorsing continued membership of the EC when it had been rejected in Scotland” (
In the 1980s there was a definitive shift within the party. For Lynch (
the new European policy was cautious in tone but clearly promoted Scottish membership of the EC as an aid to secession from the UK which would shield the Scottish economy from the disruption that political change could bring. [In 1983] Gordon Wilson described the new policy as a first-class way of pushing the advantages of political independence without any threat of economic dislocation. “Within the common trading umbrella the move to independence can take place smoothly and easily.”
The reasons of this shift were diverse. Apart from the result of the 1975 referendum on continued membership, it should be taken into account that given the growing anti-Europeanism in the British government, there were also political benefits in playing a pro-European card, a way to show Scottish distinctiveness towards the rest of the country (
The victory of the pragmatic approach indicates a recognition that only in the EU would the self-governing polity survive (
Catalan nationalism, unlike the Scottish nationalist movement, has traditionally shown a particular attachment to the idea of Europe, historically inclined to strengthen ties with Europe (
One of the persons who has most vigorously promoted the link between Catalanism and Europeanism is Jordi Pujol, President of the Generalitat from 1980 since 2003. In a speech delivered in Aachen in 1985 he stated that Catalonia is the only Spanish people that was born linked to Europe and not, like the others, as a reaction against the Muslims. He insisted that the objective of the other Spanish peoples was to restore the Visigoth monarchy in Toledo, while the objective of Catalans, according to him, was to promote the Carolingian empire. He said that Catalonia was the first place in Spain where Europeanism took root. Coming to Aachen meant, in his mind, not going abroad, but to the origins, since Catalonia was the first place in Spain where Europeanism took root (
To sum up, in the case of Scotland the europeanism of the SNP has been labelled as utilitarian or instrumental, while the attachment to Europe lies at the heart of the Catalan nationalist movement not only because of economic convenience but also due to political and identity reasons. In both cases the only possible way to politically promote independence has been through affirming the will of maintenance of EU membership after secession. Otherwise, popular support for an independent Scotland or Catalonia declines.
However, the EU has also emerged as a key opponent of unilateral and unlawful secession attempts. Although during the first stage of the pro-independence process in Catalonia (from 2012 to 2014) the European Commission resisted all attempts to be drawn into the conflict, since 2014 (when it became clear that the Catalan government contemplated unilateralism) the new President Jean Claude Juncker responded firmly supporting the constitutional order of Spain. During those years, the Catalan government representatives were not even allowed to meet high-ranked EU civil servants at the European Commission (
After the Catalan revolt, it seems clear that in the event of non-consensual and unlawful secession, EU institutions will show a fierce opposition. In this sense, the European integration process proves to be an additional difficulty if the independence process is carried out non-consensually and unlawfully. And here we find the paradox: although on the one hand the EU framework, unintendedly, has enabled European pro-independence movements to sell a politically viable project of independence within Europe (i.e. low cost independence or with reduced uncertainties) and, therefore, it has facilitated their consolidation, on the other hand the EU also becomes a strong ally of EU Member States constitutional legal orders and a strong opponent of unilateral pro-independence attempts.
Statehood is relevant for pro-independence movements since, as Laible (
[Statehood] remains the sole means by which nationalists can be recognized as sovereign equals in the European political system. Regardless of the transformations of sovereignty that have occurred in EU member states over the past five decades, the state itself is still the primary means for some nationalists to achieve their goal: recognition under current EU norms as the legitimate authority over their respective territories.
In their view, statehood claims are claims for dignity, recognition and equality. In effect, nationalist parties argue that “EU integration has not erased the value of state borders and has not deprived states of so much authority that statehood has ceased to have meaning”. On the contrary, statehood still matters, because states remain dominant actors in many policy functions. Besides, states are “still recognized as the primary constitutive elements of legitimate political order in the EU and in the world system more generally” (
Today’s secessionist movements in West Europe have many causes and such analysis goes beyond the limits of this work. This article aims to highlight that without the perspective of the EU umbrella it is difficult to imagine some of these secessionist movements pushing so hard for independence. There is, at has been noted, a “growing attraction of the concept of ‘independence in Europe’” (
Note that I am not saying “becoming”, since I am not implying here that the process to become an independent sovereign State is a simple one.
Article 6 of the referred Protocol sets forth that “Any national parliament or any chamber of a national parliament may, within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, in the official languages of the Union, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. It will be for each national parliament or each chamber of a national parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers”.