Today, being a small state is easier than before and being a small state within the EU is even easier. It will be shown that the EU is not merely a passive witness of European pro-independence movements, but to a certain extent (unintendedly) it provides a unique framework for the feasibility of new states in Europe. The EU alters the traditional calculus of opportunities of secessionist movements. While public international law does not offer either incentives or disincentives to secession, the EU, instead, offers very clear prospects of what membership offers. In other words, one could argue that the EU has created a “safety net that makes it easier for [those with statehood aspirations] to contemplate independence” (Connolly, 2013: 54). The EU umbrella would permit carrying out a risky project (independence, by definition, implies uncertainties) with a lifeboat (i.e. EU). But EU position is also ambivalent. It has proven to be an additional difficulty for those pro-independence movements eagerly seeking independence. The EU lack of support in the 2014 Scottish referendum and the 2017 EU fierce opposition to the Catalan pro-independence revolt have shown that the EU can also emerge as a guarantor of Member States’ constitutional legal orders. It can also “complicate the process of secession” (ibid.: 54).

This article proceeds in four parts: the first one explains why today being a small state is easier than it used to be. This is basically due to two reasons (Fazal and Griffiths, 2014): a) growth of economic interdependence and b) changes in the security environment for states. Then, the position of small states within the EU will be described, highlighting the fact that the European integration strengthens the abovementioned factors and becomes an almost ideal security organization for its Member States (Wivel, 2005: 394). The third part outlines the role played by the regions in the EU making clear that for those with national aspirations the regional policy of the EU is far from satisfactory, which turns into an additional incentive for seeking statehood. The fourth part will discuss the importance of EU membership for both Scottish and Catalan independence movements, that through their slogans and manifestos have stated a continuous desire of remaining inside the EU (although EU responses to the 2017 Catalan crisis outbreak might have altered popular support to EU membership among those in favour of secession from Spain). In this part, however, the article will also show the ambivalent position of the EU, since it has proven to be an additional layer of difficulties if the secession attempt is carried out against the will of the EU Member State concerned.

It should be noted that this article is not concerned with the moral legitimacy or the political convenience of pro-independence movements in well-functioning democracies. It assumes as a fact that in a few European regions there are strong pro-independence movements challenging the territorial status quo and intends to highlight how certain systemic changes and, particularly, the EU have played a role in the consolidation of these pro-independence movements. But, at the same time, the EU has proved to be a powerful tool in the hands of the EU Member States to prevent non-consensual and unlawful secession.

Before the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 war was the norm in the European soil (Linde Paniagua, 2013: 22). After some centuries where the physical survival of European states was under threat due to the European great powers wars, “the European integration project emerged as an almost ideal security organization for the region’s small states […] providing a bulwark against the instability and conflict characteristic of European great power relations prior to the cold war” (Wivel, 2005: 396). Within the EU framework, the peaceful resolution of conflicts approach replaced the superpowers “as the primary source of order” (ibid.: 397) As has been affirmed, the legal norm against aggression has been mainly honoured throughout the world. The record of accomplishment, though, lies in the Western Hemisphere. The EU has been a successful story of peace for all its members (thanks, of course, to the NATO and the US collaboration). Thus, if today’s world is a safer world for small states’ survival, the EU arena (with its large single market and the free movement provisions) adds an additional layer of certainties.

Bearing in mind that no organization can turn upside down the world’s power relations, small states understand that “within the EU they can exert more influence and achieve more than they would outside it” (Antola, 2002: 74). Small states in Europe have seen that “their relative standing on the international scene has been strengthened (as a result of EU membership and its amplifying effects for a member’s voice) while norms they have championed (emphasis on the civilian and cultural projection of identity, on international law and institutions, and so on) have to a large extent become distinguishing features of the Union’s own international identity” (Lavdas, 2010). According to Wivel, “[s]mall state influence is protected by formal EU institutions making traditional power capabilities less important and by codifying what is deemed acceptable behaviour within the EU” (Wivel, 2010: 23). The strengthening of their voice (Lavdas, 2010) is due also to “the formal equality of small and big Member States, including the lack of a European equivalent to the UN Security Council” (Wivel, 2005: 399), which ensures a unique voice opportunity for everyone in the decision-making process. Particularly because in the EU most of the decisions are reached through consensus. In effect, “[s]mall state influence is protected by the consensus culture of EU decision-making” (Wivel, 2010: 23).

One of the many historical examples of small states influences within the EU, highlighted by the former leader of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) Alex Salmond, was the 1992 Danish referendum. After the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was rejected, the then still European Community provided Denmark with some exceptions that eventually led to a ratifying popular vote. That fact “enabled the SNP to point to the crucial role played by a small nation within the EC. Alex Salmond pointed to the fact that the Danish referendum result ‘finally crushed the claim that small nations can have no influence in the European Community’” (Lynch, 1996: 48). Another similar and more recent example are the legal guarantees offered to Ireland to secure a “Yes” vote in the 2008 second Lisbon Treaty referendum (Pech, 2009). Besides, according to Thorhallsson, small states are focused on a narrow set of economic interests, being only rigid on matters of economic priority and offering flexibility and willingness to compromise on all others. This makes them very successful agents in negotiations: “The administrations of the smaller states concentrate solely on the sectors where they have important interests as they are trying to maximize their benefits for them. They are active in pressing for their interests in these sectors, whereas decisions in other sectors are left for the other states to decide” (Thorhallsson, 2000: 69). Lavdas (2010) agrees: “small states in Europe have generally been able to pursue successful and influential strategies of international adjustment, based on a clearer focus on a narrow set of economic interests and objectives”.

This approach enables them to work with the Commission to get their favoured issues acted on in the Council. In effect, small states have built a special relationship with the Commission as they see it as a neutral institution that at least takes into consideration the views of all member states. Thus, small states have opted for cooperation (probably because only large states can pay the price of confrontation), becoming very active only when necessary to avoid damaging consequences (Thorhallsson, 2000: 151-155). Furthermore, being small provides another advantage when it comes to negotiate and later implement the decisions adopted at the EU level. “Smallness provides the advantage of effective national policy co-ordination” (Antola, 2002: 73). In the 90s, for instance, “small member states [were] at the forefront in transposing internal market legislation” (ibid.: 81). This is not only a sign of effectiveness, but also of political enthusiasm and eagerness to cooperate with EU institutions. Also, the presumed overrepresentation in the Council voting system and in the European Parliament has been a recurrent argument when considering the advantages of small states within the EU (Katzenstein, 2003: 25). It is true that the existing system is seen by larger member states as containing an over-representation of smaller states. However, institutional changes since the Nice Treaty (2001) have diminished the weight of small member states (Antola, 2002: 77). In any event, the practical relevance of that assumed advantage has also been put into question, since the logics of the decision-making both in the Council and the European Parliament go beyond the concrete number of votes (before November 2014) or seats (Moberg, 2002: 277-278), given the consensus-culture within the EU framework. And, again, as has been already stated, this culture of consensus gives some advantages to small states: “under consensus decision-making, losers are compensated to some degree and cannot necessarily simply be outvoted and ignored” (Heisenberg, 2005: 81).

An historical example of the beneficial effects of EU integration process in small states is to be found in the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Despite the peaceful and amicable agreement to divide the country, bilateral trade between the two new entities declined significantly. Thus, in 1991, around 50% of Slovakia’s trade was with the Czech Republic and this figure dropped to about 25% in 1991. Czech trade with Slovakia declined from around 30% in 1991 to about 10% in 1997. However, “integration with the EU mitigated the impact of the break-up to some extent, as much of the decline in Czech-Slovak trade reflected the growth in trade with other countries, in particular with the EU” (Credit Suisse, 2014). With these remarks, we are not neglecting nor are we avoiding the challenges of small states. The aim of these lines was simply to highlight the sheltering umbrella the EU represents for new small states, particularly those emerging out of a former dictatorship. Here the remarks of professor Weiler (2012) when affirmed that the EU cannot end up providing an incentive for political disintegration, since there is a fundamental difference in the welcoming into the Union of a Greece, a Portugal or a Spain out of dictatorships and Catalonia, Scotland or Flanders, already part of a functioning democracy. For him, providing these regions with incentives to EU membership would mean “betraying the very ideals of solidarity and human integration for which Europe stands”.

Let us now turn to examine the representation and voice the EU offers to Europeans regions. As it is well known, the European integration process has shifted Member States competences upwards. Thus, in the case of decentralized Member States, some current EU competences set rules for implementation in the fields of competences formerly exercised by regions in the domestic arena. Since the EU remains predominantly a matter for States and the EU’s own institutions (Weatherill, 2005: 29), the consequence is the erosion of the regional scope of autonomy and political decision. This widely known problem has existed since the beginning of the EU integration process, but it became particularly acute in the 1970s and 1980s. First, because of the political decentralization trends in many European countries. At the start of the European integration process only Germany had a federal structure. This changed with the decentralization of Belgium and Italy in the 1970s. Second, with the entry of new decentralized Member States in the 1980s like Spain and then in the 1990s with the decentralization process (devolution) in the United Kingdom.

Compensation mechanisms to this erosion are limited and they vary considerably between Member States (Jeffery, 2005: 34). In fact, it could be argued that by now the regional participation in the EU decision making depends more on the Member States’ willingness than on EU law provisions (Castellà, 2008: 83). However, what matters here is to underline the limited presence of the regional dimension in policy-making at the European level. In the 1980s German Länder were pioneer in demanding greater regional control of European policy. Their complaints (also promoted by the European Commission who favored a greater regional participation) were partially satisfied with the Maastricht Treaty, which meant the biggest step so far in the regions’ fight for participation within the EU. During those years, it became popular to envision a “Europe of the Regions”. Some even thought that “a role for regions within the EU might be a useful mechanism for accommodating nationalities” (Keating, 2004: 375), a way to counter-act pro-independence movements turning their demands into obsolete pretensions.

Despite the initial optimism, Maastricht reforms (i.e. the creation of the Committee of the Regions, the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity and the legal possibility for regional ministers to join or even lead national delegations at the Council of Ministers) gave only a limited recognition to regions (Jeffery, 2005: 35). And subsequent Treaty reforms like the Lisbon Treaty (2007) only added modest impetus to a regionalized Europe. The study of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) is a good example of a failed attempt to provide regional recognition. The CoR is an advisory political body that provides the regional and local levels with a voice in EU policy development and EU legislation. From the perspective of those regions with national aspirations the CoR has some important flaws:

The Lisbon Treaty did strengthen the role of the CoR by providing standing before the European Court of Justice whenever it considers the principle of subsidiarity has been violated. However, the CoR still remains far from the European Parliament’s second chamber once envisioned. As for the principle of subsidiarity and the regional dimension, it seems that since the Lisbon Treaty there was a sort of redefinition. Before, it was mainly read as limiting the scope and influence of the EU and preserving EU Member States’ position (Davies, 2006: 66). Now it looks that this idea of vesting the authority over any given policy at the lowest possible political level should necessarily include regions, not just Member States. This approach is justified, among others, by Article 4.2 TEU, which included for the first time the respect to regional and local self-government structures as a duty of the EU, and by Article 10.3 TEU, which establishes that “decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen”. Furthermore, the early warning system mechanism, introduced by Protocol No 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, requires national Parliaments to consult regional Parliaments with legislative powers when assessing EU legislative draft. However, practice has showed the limited effects of this mechanism.

Regarding the possibility of opening the state delegations at the Council to regional Ministers (which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and was not been modified by the Lisbon Treaty), it should be noted that this is an option that depends entirely on the political will of the Member State. In the case of Spain, for instance, it is possible to incorporate in the state delegation (in five of the nine formations of the Council) a regional Minister as the AC’s representative (Castellà and Kölling, 2015: 271). That representative works under the supervision of the head of the Spanish delegation (Morata, 2010: 141). In the case of Belgium, on the contrary, regional Ministers are able to represent by his own the Belgian state in many Council formations. Although this possibility does not apply to those meetings concerning matters that are exclusively federal: general affairs, ECOFIN, budgetary negotiations, justice, telecommunications policy, development aid and civil protection (Swenden, 2010: 24).

Regions have also created informal networks to advance their interests: for instance, the Conference of European regions with Legislative Power (REGLEG), an informal network dedicated to achieve a greater role in the EU for legislative regions. Its demands included enhancing their role in the Council, an appropriate involvement of regional parliaments and the right to bring actions before the European Court of Justice where the prerogatives of the regions are threatened. Interesting to note that they do not have activities since 2013. This type of international activity carried out by sub-state actors has been described as “paradiplomacy”.

Despite some evidence that regions have had “some” impact on debates within the EU (Burrows, 2010: 124), the SNP continues to argue that “only with statehood could “regions” exercise effective voice at the European level” (Laible, 2008: 207). According to nationalist voices within European regions, the EU has made very limited steps to accommodate the participatory demands of certain sub national entities. “European strategies tend to underestimate the importance of regional governments in delivering on key strategic goals” (Burrows, 2010: 122). The EU, they argue “bolsters the significance of statehood by limiting full participation in its institutions to member states” (Connolly, 2013: 54), and by doing that it has given supporters of independence an additional reason (or excuse) to claim that only statehood guarantees full political participation in Europe. This emphasis on nation-states has been seen by some analysts as a way of placing a premium on becoming a state (Keating, 2004: 383). Scully and Wyn Jones (2010: 243-245) conclude that because some European regions have not come to play the sort of role they envisaged, there has been a “gradual cooling attitude toward the European regional policy”.

Not surprisingly, failed regionalization of the EU might have had an impact on demands for independence. Within a true Europe of the regions the independence of subnational regions might have looked like a meaningless prospectus. A traditional demand of Catalan nationalism shares this analysis by arguing that it is false to think that the Europe of regions that we effectively have is an equivalent to the European recognition of stateless nations. For them, today, stateless nations are almost invisible for European institutions. (Mira, 2007: 72-73)

So far, it has been underlined that the EU integration process (with all its safety nets that reduce the uncertainties of a small sovereign State and its inability to recognize an important role for regions) provides those who seek for independence with arguments and incentives. This section will test the accuracy of such argument and will show that it has to be nuanced. To what extent the European dimension and the EU membership debate have played a role in the Catalan and Scottish pro-independence movements? For instance, has the European dimension (e.g. EU membership after independence debate) any impact in the popular support towards independence? Although Scotland is abandoning the EU together with the rest of the UK, the Scottish example is still a relevant historical case to assess the impact of the EU within the pro-independence process of a European region.

Let’s start with the Catalan case. The classic work of Donald L. Horowitz about the logic of secessions in economically regional advanced groups gives a first good explanation of the phenomenon. Needless to say, the following explanations are not sufficient to understand a complex process like a pro-independence movement. However, they do have a strong connection with the European integration phenomenon and that is why they deserve to be pointed out. Horowitz observes that advanced regional groups in advanced nations “are likely to have a regional economic grievance. Advanced regions usually generate more income and contribute more revenue to the treasury of the undivided state than they receive. They believe that they are subsidizing poorer regions” (Horowitz, 2000: 249-250). In fact, one of the example Horowitz employs is Catalonia. It should not surprise that, at least at the beginning of the Catalan pro-independence process in 2012, one of the complaints of the movement was the Catalan taxpayers “unreasonable” contribution to the Spanish poorest regions (Bel, 2013: 165). In fact, one of the battle cries of the Catalan nationalist movement used to be “Madrid ens roba” (Madrid is robbing us), a slogan imported from Italy, popularized in the 1990s by the Lega Nord (“Roma Ladrona”). In effect, exacerbated by a context of recession, some narratives stress that Catalonia has disproportionally contributed to central state budgets and receives low public investment in return. (Della Porta et al., 2020: 163).

Yet, Horowitz also sees that secessions have countervailing considerations: “Such groups are likely to export surplus capital and population outside their region. Their prosperity generates investment that does not respect regional boundaries” (Horowitz, 2000: 250). In other words, advanced regions also take advantage of domestic markets. This might have been a traditional scenario in Catalonia, when in the past Catalan industry was sheltered by a high Spanish protective tariff (Laitin, 1989: 300). Things have changed greatly, of course, and in the EU context protectionism is not a possible policy anymore. In the last decades, Catalan industry has evolved and there is an increasing internationalization of Catalan products with the most relevant partners located within the EU. However, still today the Spanish market represents around 35% of Catalan exports (Comerford et al., 2014: 89). As Horowitz explains, the prosperity of advanced regions depends on a web of interregional economic relations. According to him “the lure of interests and opportunities throughout the undivided state is enough to ward off the possibility [of secession]” (Horowitz, 2000: 253).

Under ordinary circumstances, secession could imperil the strong economic ties (among which export statistics is only a single indicator) between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. But as Connolly (2013: 94) clearly points out:

This statement, however, needs to be specified. First, EU membership after independence cannot be taken for granted, on the contrary, given the unanimity rule (Article 49 TEU). Second, one thing is the legal access to Spanish markets and the other thing (difficult to anticipate) is the frontier effect that could harm the economic perspectives of Catalan products and services in the rest of Spain due to anger and frustration because of the secessionist move (at least in the short term) (Linde Paniagua, 2013: 38). And third, the EU single market cannot still be compared with a national market. Barriers to trade remain between EU Member States, particularly in the services sector. In any event, there is a general consensus (and it is also the perception among the Catalan population) that EU membership, if kept, would alleviate at least some of the economic burdens secession could entail.

In the Scottish case, where Scottish GDP per capita is similar to that of the UK as a whole, some would argue that economic arguments in line with Horowitz’s position cannot help to explain Scotland’s nationalist surge. However, pro-independence support has grown, among other reasons, “by the discovery, in the late 1960s, of big oilfields under the North Sea. It gave the nationalist more to be angry about —and an argument for why Scotland would be better off alone” (The Economist, 2014). The early 1970s rallying cry “It’s Scotland’s oil!” provided the SNP with a key electoral impetus. It partially explained, for instance, the exceptionally good electoral results of the SNP in the February and October 1974 general elections, in which popular support increased to around 30% from around 12% in 1970.

Needless to say, Scotland maintains strong economic links with the rest of the UK, even stronger than in the Catalan case. In the Scottish case, the economic ties with the rest of the UK are outstanding. For example, around 64% of Scottish exports go to the rest of the country, while Scots exports to the EU do not represent more than 19% of the Scottish trade (Export Statistics Scotland, 2018). These ties, unlike in Catalonia, seems not to be put fundamentally at risk in the event of an independent Scotland, since it does not seem that such scenario would trigger large resentment among the rest of the country. At least this was the situation back in the 2014 referendum, for the British and the Scottish governments had already reached an agreement on holding a legal referendum. However, today this is unclear, since the new Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, has refused to allow for a second referendum, which could lead to a major confrontation (Brooks, 2020).

Both the former Scottish Prime Minister Alex Salmond and the current one, Nicole Sturgeon, have always underlined that an independent Scotland would necessarily remain within the EU and that the Scottish independence would be based on interdependence not only with the rest of the UK, but also with Europe. So, the idea to link independence and EU membership has been a constant trend in the most recent Scottish pro-independence movement. For instance, before and during the 2014 referendum campaign, the Scottish government insisted the “smooth transition to full EU membership can take place on the day Scotland becomes an independent country” (Scotland Government, 2013: 13). However, EU institutions did not show that very same enthusiasm. The EU representatives did not encourage pro-independence Scots through easy accession promises. In February 2014, the then European Commission President, José Manuel Durao Barroso, said that it would be “difficult, if not impossible” for an independent Scotland to join the EU (Syal, 2014). As López Basaguren points out (2014: 82), what was particularly striking about the Scottish Government position was their lack of reference to the difficulties of Scotland remaining in Europe, for they were very well aware, first, of the need of unanimity among the rest of EU Member States and, second, of the fact that some EU Member States were willing to show strong resistance. The EU kept a highly precautionary position (if not a clear disdain), with no promises of quick and easy Scottish membership and that had an impact on Scottish population. In fact, one of the factors deciding the 2014 referendum in favor of remaining within the UK was the risk of being left out of the EU. In effect, “uncertainty remained about what was possible and about the conditions for membership. This lack of clarity enabled the pro-UK camp to make border checks and immigration key issues in the referendum campaign” (Berbéri, 2016: 28). Equally, the decisive reason that explains the new surge of the Scottish pro-independence movement is, precisely, the UK withdrawal from the EU (Sim, 2020).

The SNP, however, has not always showed this same level of Europeanism. Before the 1970s, the SNP did not pay a particular attention to Europe. In the 1975 British referendum on continued membership the SNP campaigned in favor of “No” in order to separate politically Scotland from the rest of the UK. With a “No” in Scotland and a “Yes” in the rest of the country, the “Westminster government would appear illegitimate in Scotland through endorsing continued membership of the EC when it had been rejected in Scotland” (Lynch, 1996: 32). However, it was not only a strategic position. There was a wide sector within the party that had taken a negative view of the EC. According to them the then EC had an undemocratic and centralist dimension (ibid.: 33) In any event, the SNP message was ambiguous. In fact, there were already voices within the party making the case for Scottish independence within the EC. In the 1970s Jim Sillars, who later joined the SNP, but was then the leader of a new party, the Scottish Labour Party, took the view that “the EC removed the negative aspects formerly associated with separatism and made independence for Scotland within the EC a more fruitful constitutional option” (ibid.: 36). At the end, in the 1975 referendum, none of the regions of Scotland voted against continued membership. The result moved the party in a more pro-European direction, emphasizing its commitment to gaining a strong role for Scotland within Europe.

In the 1980s there was a definitive shift within the party. For Lynch (ibid.: 38),

The reasons of this shift were diverse. Apart from the result of the 1975 referendum on continued membership, it should be taken into account that given the growing anti-Europeanism in the British government, there were also political benefits in playing a pro-European card, a way to show Scottish distinctiveness towards the rest of the country (ibid.: 39) Also, new leaders with innovative political ideas brought a change in the position of the SNP towards the European integration (Laible, 2008: 87). So, the new slogan (in fact, in track since 1988) was ready: “Scotland Future: Independence in Europe”. As has been indicated, the adoption of such pro-European position involved “strategic considerations about making independence a safe constitutional option” (Lynch, 1996: 50). In other words, the SNP advocated instrumental support for the European Union by encouraging their supporters to view the EU as the means by which independence becomes feasible (Haesly, 2001: 97).

The victory of the pragmatic approach indicates a recognition that only in the EU would the self-governing polity survive (Laible, 2008: 206). This is consistent with recent empirical work on regional political party positions on Europe (with a particular study of the SNP) which suggests that “regional political parties are likely to be strongly supportive of European integration because market integration makes small states or autonomous regions more viable economic entities” (Kincaid Jolly, 2007: 112).

Catalan nationalism, unlike the Scottish nationalist movement, has traditionally shown a particular attachment to the idea of Europe, historically inclined to strengthen ties with Europe (Vicens Vives, 1958: 298). Assuring and strengthening the links with Europe has always been a powerful way of reaffirming Catalan identity against Spanish nationalism (Mira, 2007: 70). The European destiny was a concern for Catalan intellectuals since the beginning of the 20th century. For instance, after the outbreak of World War I, Eugeni d’Ors, one of the most relevant Catalan intellectuals of the time, published a Manifesto in Journal de Genève entitled “Pour l’Europe. Un manifest des écrivvains et de penseurs de Catalogne” (De Pedro and Solé, 1999: 45). Some Catalan federalist believed that Europe would be the solution for historic regions and in the interwar period many of them took part in the Minority Congresses promoted by the League of Nations (De Pedro and Solé, 1999: 46). Then, in the aftermath of the World War II the European integration process was seen as the opposite to the Franco regime. It kept its appealing effect among Catalan nationalists.

One of the persons who has most vigorously promoted the link between Catalanism and Europeanism is Jordi Pujol, President of the Generalitat from 1980 since 2003. In a speech delivered in Aachen in 1985 he stated that Catalonia is the only Spanish people that was born linked to Europe and not, like the others, as a reaction against the Muslims. He insisted that the objective of the other Spanish peoples was to restore the Visigoth monarchy in Toledo, while the objective of Catalans, according to him, was to promote the Carolingian empire. He said that Catalonia was the first place in Spain where Europeanism took root. Coming to Aachen meant, in his mind, not going abroad, but to the origins, since Catalonia was the first place in Spain where Europeanism took root (Pujol, 2018). In 2007, also in Germany when the region of Catalonia was the guest of honour at that year’s Frankfurt Book Fair, remembering those words, Pujol added that for Catalonia, Europe always meant modernity, progress, pluralism, democracy and peaceful coexistence of languages and peoples. This supposedly close link between Catalonia and Europe is the vision that has been promoted by the Catalan nationalist movement and that has been widely delivered in Catalonia —also by the Basque nationalist narrative (Jáuregui, 2006: 253)—. In effect, in the last decades the different Catalan nationalist political parties have been almost without contestation vigorous defenders of the European integration process. “Catalonia, next independent State in Europe” used to be one of the slogans of the Catalan pro-independence movement. Throughout these years, polls consistently have indicated that those in favour of an independent Catalonia are significantly reduced in the event the independence process expels Catalonia from the EU and that an overwhelming 70% supports remaining within the EU in case of independence (Ubieto, 2017). It is true, however, that since October 2017 and given the clear support offered by the EU institutions in favour of the Spanish legal order, there has been a certain feeling of European disenchantment among Catalan nationalists (Pujol, 2018). Yet, Catalan nationalists have also received with joy the refusal of several European arrest warrants against former Catalan political leaders (in the context of European judicial cooperation) or the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Junqueras case (C-502/19 ECLI:EU:C:2019:1115), whereby the Court decided the immunity of the elected Members of the European Parliament. Although the former Catalan Vice-President Oriol Junqueras has not been able to enjoy the benefits of the Court decision, it “has not been entirely pointless for other pro-independence politicians” like former Catalan President Carles Puigdemont and former Catalan Conseller Toni Comín, who were admitted as MEPs following the judgment (Sarmiento, 2020).

To sum up, in the case of Scotland the europeanism of the SNP has been labelled as utilitarian or instrumental, while the attachment to Europe lies at the heart of the Catalan nationalist movement not only because of economic convenience but also due to political and identity reasons. In both cases the only possible way to politically promote independence has been through affirming the will of maintenance of EU membership after secession. Otherwise, popular support for an independent Scotland or Catalonia declines.

However, the EU has also emerged as a key opponent of unilateral and unlawful secession attempts. Although during the first stage of the pro-independence process in Catalonia (from 2012 to 2014) the European Commission resisted all attempts to be drawn into the conflict, since 2014 (when it became clear that the Catalan government contemplated unilateralism) the new President Jean Claude Juncker responded firmly supporting the constitutional order of Spain. During those years, the Catalan government representatives were not even allowed to meet high-ranked EU civil servants at the European Commission (Molina, 2019). Despite some criticism, because of the manner in which the Spanish police enforced court rulings when trying to prevent the 1^st October referendum from happening, the European Commission did not consider that Spain was violating values contained in Article 2 TEU. Neither has the European Commission put into question the criminal procedures in Spain against the political leaders responsible for the organization of the unlawful referendum and the unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia. Weiler (2019: 1305) explains that “the EU and its member states have turned a cold shoulder to the secessionist claims… [because the] very ethos of European integration discourages the Union, as such, from welcoming these movements and encouraging them by the promise of easy accession”.

After the Catalan revolt, it seems clear that in the event of non-consensual and unlawful secession, EU institutions will show a fierce opposition. In this sense, the European integration process proves to be an additional difficulty if the independence process is carried out non-consensually and unlawfully. And here we find the paradox: although on the one hand the EU framework, unintendedly, has enabled European pro-independence movements to sell a politically viable project of independence within Europe (i.e. low cost independence or with reduced uncertainties) and, therefore, it has facilitated their consolidation, on the other hand the EU also becomes a strong ally of EU Member States constitutional legal orders and a strong opponent of unilateral pro-independence attempts.

Statehood is relevant for pro-independence movements since, as Laible (2008: 23) underlines,

In their view, statehood claims are claims for dignity, recognition and equality. In effect, nationalist parties argue that “EU integration has not erased the value of state borders and has not deprived states of so much authority that statehood has ceased to have meaning”. On the contrary, statehood still matters, because states remain dominant actors in many policy functions. Besides, states are “still recognized as the primary constitutive elements of legitimate political order in the EU and in the world system more generally” (ibid.: 205).

Today’s secessionist movements in West Europe have many causes and such analysis goes beyond the limits of this work. This article aims to highlight that without the perspective of the EU umbrella it is difficult to imagine some of these secessionist movements pushing so hard for independence. There is, at has been noted, a “growing attraction of the concept of ‘independence in Europe’” (Crameri, 2015: 425). But the relatively good status of small states in the EU and the lack of EU recognition towards regions might be just sophisticated arguments to justify a simpler position: they wish independence from Spain or Italy or Belgium, but they do not know what it would be like outside. However, if at least EU membership is assured (which of course is dubious due to the unanimity rule provided for in Article 49 TEU), uncertainties are reduced. As said at the beginning of the article, the EU umbrella permits carrying out a risky and uncertain process like independence with a lifeboat (i.e. the EU). If today’s world is a safer world for small states’ survival, the EU arena (with its large single market and the free movement provisions) adds an additional layer of certainties. However, not any type of independence process can receive the supporting umbrella of the EU. The paradox lies precisely here. Although on the one hand the EU provides a unique framework for the feasibility of small States, it also guarantees the respect of the constitutional legal orders of the EU Member States. Thus, if the independence process is carried out without the consent of the parent State and against its legal order, the EU reinforces the position of its members and adds difficulties to the independence process.