ROUSSEAU, DEMOCRACY, AND HIS IDEOLOGICAL INTENTIONS: CONCEPTUAL ARRANGEMENTS AS POLITICAL DEVICES

I. INTRODUCTION[Up]

Besides Rousseau’s insistence on the unity of his thought, there is a long-standing debate regarding the multiple contradictions, variations, and tensions all over his works. Indeed, “scholars can be divided between those who accept Rousseau’s frequent claims of consistency and a larger group who stress the many apparent tensions in his thought and life” ( ‍Kelly, C. (1991). The Systematic Rousseau - Arthur M. Melzer: The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s Thought. The Review of Politics, 53 (4), 725-727. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500016429Kelly, 1991: 725)^‍‍[1]. This article continues this line of research focusing on Rousseau’s contradictory use of the word ‘democracy’ in connection with ‘monarchy’ and ‘republic’^‍‍[2].

The conceptual structure concerning the various forms of government as presented in The Social Contract may be briefly sketched. In a republic, which is the only legitimate regime, the people are the sovereign and they exert the legislative power as such. However, a government is needed to execute the laws they pass. This government may be established as a monarchy (“a single magistrate”), as an aristocracy (“a small number, so that there are more private citizens than magistrates”), or as a democracy (“whole people or to the majority of the people, so that more citizens are magistrates than are mere private individuals”)^‍‍[3]. Each of them is legitimate, and their convenience depends on contextual factors (The Social Contract: Book III, chap. 3; henceforth SC III:3;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 53).

Nonetheless, several inconsistencies spring up all over Rousseau’s work regarding the words ‘democracy’, ‘republic’ and ‘monarchy’. From this random usage, one might simply conclude that he was just quite unsystematic. Although I agree with Fralin ( ‍Fralin, R. (1978). The evolution of Rousseau’s View of Representative Government. Political Theory, 6 (4), 517-536. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591778006004051978) and O’Hagan ( ‍O’Hagan, T. (2004). Taking Rousseau Seriously. History of Political Thought, 25 (1), 73-85.2004) that some of Rousseau’s contradictions can be understood as the reflection of “truth-giving tensions”^‍‍[4], the following pages will show that, in this matter, his beliefs remained fundamentally unitary and stable over time.

Rousseau understood that no people could be free without a widespread belief in popular sovereignty as the only legitimate way of organising the state, but neither if popular sovereignty was confused with popular government; that is, with the people directly taking and performing executive decisions. This article claims that Rousseau intended to play an active part in spreading these ideas resorting to a rhetoric change in his taxonomy of government, in a movement that can be referred to as ideological. To this end I will present an analysis of his main writings, of his historical context, and of the several and contradictory intentions he may have had while writing.

These intentions become particularly manifest when comparing the differences between the taxonomies of political regimes presented in The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and in The Social Contract, as section VI will show: while the former taxonomy seems to have felt more natural or spontaneous to Rousseau, the latter is more coherent with his political aims. However, ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’ reappear once and again along his work conveying the different meanings they were given in each taxonomy, producing the conundrum this article intends to unravel.

I will argue that such an account provides a more comprehensive explanation for Rousseau’s failure to remain faithful to his own definitions than previous ones. In particular, the article will discuss the account provided by James Miller ( ‍Miller, J. (1984). Rousseau: Dreamer of democracy. Michigan: Yale University Press.1984), who had already described some of these inconsistences in a markedly erudite style and concluded that Rousseau was an advocate of “democracy” in the terms of The Social Contract. A more analytic approach to Rousseau’s use of the word ‘democracy’ will show that Miller’s conclusions need reconsideration in order to avoid misunderstanding Jean Jacques’ beliefs and intentions.

II. THREE CONTRADICTIONS: DEMOCRACY, REPUBLIC, AND MONARCHY[Up]

Rousseau’s basic conceptual structure is indeed stated in very clear terms in The Social Contract: “I therefore give the name ‘Republic’ to every State that is governed by laws, no matter what the form of its administration may be: for only in such a case does the public interest govern […]. Every legitimate government is republican” (SC II:6;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 31). He resorts to a footnote in that same page to insist on this idea: “I understand by this word [‘Republic’], not merely an aristocracy or a democracy, but generally any government directed by the general will, which is the law. To be legitimate, the government must be, not one with the Sovereign, but its minister. In such a case even a monarchy is a Republic”. These same principles are upheld in Emile, where The Social Contract is summarised (Emile, or on Education: Book V Chap. “On Travel”; henceforth Emile V;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1979). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 13): Emile, or on Education (Includes Emile and Sophie, or the Solitaries). Translated and edited by C. Kelly and A. Bloom. New York: Basic Books.Rousseau, 1979: 640-‍663).

There are three incongruences in the use of these words that motivate this piece of work. First, Rousseau sometimes gives the name ‘democracy’ to what he defines as a ‘republic’ in The Social Contract. There, it is affirmed that: “[The] Republic or body politic […] is called by its members State when passive, Sovereign when active […]. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power [...]” (SC I:6;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 13)^‍‍[5]. A very different conceptual arrangement appears, for example, in his Letters written from the Mountain: “In every State the Law speaks where the Sovereign speaks. Now in a Democracy where the People is Sovereign [...]” (Letters written from the Mountain Seventh Letter; henceforth LM 7;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 240). Suddenly, the word “democracy” seems to occupy the place where “Republic” should be. Moreover, both words are made the same after some lines: “it is in a Republic, it is in a Democracy [...]” (LM 8;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 263). This is not just a one-time mistake: in his Letter to D’Alembert, Rousseau wrote: “In a monarchy […]. But in a Democracy, in which the subjects and sovereign are only the same men considered in different relations [...]” (Letter to D’Alembert;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2004). The collected writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (vol. 10): Letter to D’Alembert and writings for the theater. Translated and edited by A. Bloom, C. Butterworth and C. Kelly. Bristol: Dartmouth College Press. Rousseau, 2004: 336)^‍‍[6].

Secondly, democracy is sometimes held in very high regard, as the system in which he would rather be born. This is the case of the dedicatory in A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, also known as Second Discourse (henceforth SD;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 145). However, in other passages it is depicted as disastrous and impossible: since “[i]t is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them”, he concludes in The Social Contract that “[w]ere there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men”. In fact, it is more “subject to civil wars and intestine agitations” than the others and, in any case, “[i]f we take the term in the strict sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there never will be” (SC III:4;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 54-‍55).

As a third contradiction, Rousseau tends to present ‘monarchy’ and ‘republic’ as opposites (although the former was supposed to be a subtype of the latter). This could be noticed at the conceptual level in the previous quotation of the Letter to D’Alembert: “In a monarchy […]. But in a Democracy [...]” (where “Democracy” would mean republic). Surprisingly, this use is present in The Social Contract itself: “An essential and inevitable defect, which will always rank monarchical below republican government, is that in a republic the public voice [rarely fails to raise enlightened men to the higher positions]” (SC III:6;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 60)^‍‍[7].

The confusion between ‘republic’ and ‘monarchy’ is related to ‘democracy’ through contradiction one. Hence, it could be argued that this third contradiction is merely a consequence of that first one: once the words ‘republic’ and ‘democracy’ are used interchangeably, it would seem normal finding ‘monarchy’ in contrast to the word ‘republic’ (as a synonym of democracy; that is, as a different type of government from both monarchy and aristocracy). However, this cannot be the case: otherwise, Rousseau could not have presented the word ‘monarchy’ and the concept of republic as opposites (instead of treating one as a class of the other) as he frequently did; for example, in the following quotation: “In fact, the more we reflect, the more we find the difference between free and monarchical States to be this: in the former, everything is used for the public advantage” (SC III:8;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 65)^‍‍[8]. Moreover, at the end of that same paragraph, monarchy is made the same as “despotism”.

Indeed, his attacks against monarchy for being the entire antithesis to a republic are many—and quite colourful. Therefore, it is not the word ‘republic’ which is referring to two different concepts (as Aristotle’s ‘politeia’ was in Politics)^‍‍[9], but the words ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’ which change their meanings. ‘Monarchy’ stands for two different concepts: first, it means what Rousseau explicitly states in The Social Contract: when the government of a republic is held by a single citizen. Secondly, it is applied to the despotic regime par excellence: absolute monarchy. ‘Democracy’ appears sometimes to denote the government by the larger part of society and, sometimes, as a synonym of republic.

Before assuming that Rousseau was simply not careful enough in his wording, or that he lied about the stability of his beliefs, it would be interesting (and fair) to consider if he may have had a political or ideological agenda that could explain his rhetorical choices. Since the common meaning of ‘philosophical’, ‘ideological’, ‘rhetorical’, ‘truthful’ or ‘sincere’ may lead to confusion, I will dedicate the next section to defining and drawing out the differences between these intentions that may motivate a political thinker^‍‍[10].

III. PHILOSOPHERS AND IDEOLOGISTS. RHETORICAL AND POLITICAL INTENTIONS[Up]

There is a name clearly associated to the search for intentions behind political thought: Quentin Skinner ( ‍Skinner, Q. (1969). Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas. History and Theory, 8 (1), 3-53. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.2307/25041881969)^‍‍[11]. Skinner put this concept in the centre of historical research in order to avoid anachronisms and misinterpretations, promoting a contextual approach. However, this work will not provide a first-hand contextual research of the way Rousseau conceived his work. The definitions provided should therefore be considered more as a map than as a meticulous description of the way Rousseau thought of his own work. In any case, I will show the validity of this definitions resorting to the work of other researchers who have paid a closer attention to the way Rousseau could have conceived his own intentions.

For example, Starobinski ( ‍Starobinski, J. (1983). Jean-Jacques Rousseau. La transparencia y el obstáculo. Madrid: Taurus.1983: 23) argues that we can see in Rousseau’s works, as a result of his “unitary intention” of preserving transparency, both a moral advice for private life and an invitation to social reform through effective political action. Nowadays, a word springs to mind talking about the diffusion of ideas for political reasons: ‘ideology’. Following Freeden ( ‍Freeden, M. (1996). Ideologies and Political Theory: A conceptual approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.1996, 6: 54), by ‘ideologies’ I refer to “particular patterned clusters and configurations of political concepts” meant to “guide practical political conduct”; “the macroscopic structural arrangement that attributes meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts”. When the intention is to persuade a group of people for political reasons, content and form will depend heavily on those group’s structures of ideas, affecting how “essentially contested concepts” are decontested^‍‍[12]. Additionally, the actual limitations of actual people (in the plural) as well as matters of probability are consubstantial to politics, which leads to the introduction of prudential considerations. In this respect, political horizons differ from the paradises of perfection philosophy can offer. Besides, ideologists may have to segment their discourse if their audience is heterogeneous, probably falling as a result into self-contradictions. This was Rousseau’s case according to Strauss ( ‍Strauss, L. (1947). On the intention of Rousseau. Social Research, 14 (4), 455-487.1947) or Miller ( ‍Miller, J. (1984). Rousseau: Dreamer of democracy. Michigan: Yale University Press.1984: 66).

Michael Freeden tried to distinguish between ideologies and political philosophies: the division is “far from clear”—he admitted—and “on the sole basis of the morphology of political argument […] it is difficult to separate ideologies from political philosophies” ( ‍Freeden, M. (1996). Ideologies and Political Theory: A conceptual approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Freeden 1996, 28, 41)^‍‍[13]. His close analysis of this complex relationship is so insightful that it ironically led to deconstructing the opposition without intending to. However, the fragility of these deconstructed boundaries does not imply that authors, as Rousseau himself, could not use these categories as guides for their actions; that is, it does not prevent the existence of “philosophical” and “ideological” intentions.

Focusing on intentions allows to think of the difference between philosophy or ideology regardless of the readings and uses the texts under analysis may have suggested. E.g., Rousseau’s work may be very funny, and some people may laugh at it, but this does not make him a humourist^‍‍[14]. However, when there are sound reasons to be suspicious of an author’s words on his own intentions, we step into quicksand. This should not prevent political theory from elaborating tentative interpretations, especially if the author provides permission as it is implicitly the case here: after all, Rousseau himself talked about Machiavelli’s hidden intentions in The Social Contract, arguing that his love for liberty had been encrypted (SC III:6:  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 59-‍60).

The difference between philosophies and ideologies runs parallel to that between information (aimed at communicating facts) and persuasion (at changing beliefs). This pair should not be understood merely as the ideal extremes of a continuum on which the different types of communication can be situated (from a political pamphlet to the weather forecast), but as radically impossible opposites. In fact, the difference between persuasion and information can also be deconstructed resorting to very intuitive arguments. On the one hand, there is no information without the previous persuasion to start reading or listening, or even to recognise me as myself^‍‍[15]. On the other, information will always try to persuade of being just information, of being true and transparent. In fact, its being thought of as ‘information’ (that is, not persuasion) is dependent on its success in persuading others of being so (its condition of possibility is, at the same time, its condition of impossibility). Persuasion, on its behalf, must “inform” about something in order to affect decision-making processes. Nonetheless, persuasion and information are not one and the same. There is definitively a difference between having the intention to provoke changes in the attitudes of a reader, and not having it at all.

Besides, the idea of information seems to conflate two different intentions. On the one hand, the will to convey truth; on the other, the intention to be sincere or transparent. These should not be confused, since a lie or a fiction may help to teach a truth, as literature frequently does^‍‍[16]. In the real world, saying things in the way one thinks them, or saying all the things one believes in, may lead others to embrace all the contrary; that is, what one considers to be falsehood. However, sincerity does not warrant in any way the truthfulness of those beliefs conveyed.

Messages may transpire either more spontaneously or after a hard work of preparation. As a first impossible extreme, communication may happen for the mere act of expression, regardless of the effects it may have on others (sometimes, even without the physical presence of another). At the other extreme, some sources may be very careful to deliver their message in the most effective way. Accepting that content and form are deeply intermingled, the changes introduced in the natural way of speech production will affect not only the structure of the message, but also the content it conveys. The language chosen can hide or bring to the fore certain ideas or make some more attractive than others. “Rhetorical intentions” is probably the best phrase to name this preoccupation for the way a message is delivered.

The different intentions I have outlined may overlap, particularly in the means they require to succeed: ideological formulations are stronger when they are carefully prepared for their receivers and represent truths in a sincere way. However, they may sometimes collide. Not every ideological statement is carefully prepared, or sincere, or tries to represent any truth at all; and this may be to its advantage, since partiality, spontaneity, lies, and falsehood also play their part in the real world.

Now I can translate the main argument of this paper into these terms. My claim is that behind the already highlighted contradictions we can find Rousseau’s rhetorical work at the service of his political intention: to convince his multiple audiences of his “great truths which would make for the happiness of the human race, but above all for that of my native land” (The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Book IX; henceforth Confessions IX;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1953). The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by J. M. Cohen. London: Penguin Books.Rousseau, 1953; 377). Those truths, revealed to him in an epiphany on the road to Vincennes, concerned the “government best fitted to create […] the best people”, which “by its nature always adheres closest to the law” (Confessions IX;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1953). The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by J. M. Cohen. London: Penguin Books.Rousseau, 1953: 376). Such a transcendent truth would deserve his sacrificing both intra and intertextual coherence, as well as wholesale transparency.

As Starobinski ( ‍Starobinski, J. (1983). Jean-Jacques Rousseau. La transparencia y el obstáculo. Madrid: Taurus.1983: 174-‍184) argued, Rousseau was as eager to reach transparency as aware of its impossibility: once the state of nature is left behind, human beings require the distorting mean of “conventional language” to convey their thoughts and feelings. Nonetheless, I agree with Derathé ( ‍Derathé, R. (1988). Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps. Paris: J. Vrin.1988: 60-‍61) that The Social Contract is not a political manifesto, but an abstract work following the style of previous treaties on natural right. However, Rousseau understood that the definitions we give to our words and their connotation in common language inevitably have political consequences, so bad choices could hinder the principles he intended to communicate. This helps to explain why he “conceived his theoretical work as a conceptual elaboration” ( ‍Bernardi, B. (2014). La fabrique des concepts. Recherches sur l’invention conceptuelle chez Rousseau. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur.Bernardi, 2014: 23, 545).

My argument, therefore, is that Rousseau did not succumb to falsehood: on the contrary, he thought himself to be defending a (unitary) truth leading to justice. In this sense, he could have considered himself as a “true philosopher” in his own terms ( ‍Bernardi, B. (2014). La fabrique des concepts. Recherches sur l’invention conceptuelle chez Rousseau. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur.Bernardi, 2014: 14). However, his conceptual elaboration was deeply influenced by his political aims, which matches the definitions provided for “ideological” intentions. The textual analysis will show that, even if Rousseau was not exhaustively transparent or informative about the ideological nature of his famous taxonomy, it cannot be claimed that he resorted to lies. Neither is it fair to claim that Rousseau was unclear in his mind, although he certainly fell back onto his more spontaneous “language” once and again. Unfortunately, a more straight-forward style could have undermined his political goal. After all, “[t]he democratic Constitution is certainly the Masterpiece of the political art: but the more admirable its contrivance is, the less it belongs to all eyes to penetrate it” (LM 8;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 257).

IV. SOME CONTEXT AROUND ROUSSEAU’S INTENTIONS: DO NOT SAY DEMOCRACY[Up]

There are several facts, both textual and contextual, that support this interpretation of Rousseau’s intentions. On the one hand, blood was spilled in Geneva due to the clash between “a widespread ideology of popular sovereignty and an actuality of oligarchy” in 1707, 1734-‍38, and 1768 ( ‍Bertram, C. (2012). Rousseau’s Legacy in Two Conceptions of the General Will: Democratic and Transcendent. The Review of Politics, 74 (3), 403-419. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670512000514Bertram, 2012: 413). Rousseau’s strong feelings for his birthplace are well known and therefore, the political tensions between the popular party and the ruling aristocrats of the Small Council of Geneva become relevant. On the other, he felt that a revolution was upcoming in his unwillingly beloved France^‍‍[17]. The influence of these circumstances has already been presented in depth by authors like Miller (1984: Chap. II and IV), and so I will mainly focus now on a rhetorical factor: the negative connotations of the word “democracy” in his time.

Democracy has become a major source of legitimacy in our days, but this was not always the case. In fact, ‘democracy’ carried dense negative connotations for centuries and until recently. As Palmer ( ‍Palmer, R. R. (1953). Notes on the Use of the Word ‘Democracy’ 1789-1799. Political Science Quarterly, 68 (2), 203-226. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.2307/21449671953: 204-‍205) states: “It is rare, even among the philosophers of France before the Revolution, to find anyone using the word ‘democracy’ in a favourable sense in any practical connection”. Pure democracy was considered a utopia, only possible in small states with simple cultures. “At the most, democracy was a principle, or element, which might profitably enter into a mixed constitution” ( ‍Palmer, R. R. (1953). Notes on the Use of the Word ‘Democracy’ 1789-1799. Political Science Quarterly, 68 (2), 203-226. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.2307/2144967Palmer, 1953: 204-‍205).

As James Miller ( ‍Miller, J. (1984). Rousseau: Dreamer of democracy. Michigan: Yale University Press.1984: 41) recalls, “for most political theorists before him [Rousseau], [democracy] had spelled only disorder and decay, licence and tyranny”. It was connoted as “urban chaos” in contrast with the “rural simplicity” Rousseau pictured. Later, in the 1790s, conservatives used the word ‘democracy’ in much the same way as ‘communism’ was used negatively during the cold war ( ‍Palmer, R. R. (1953). Notes on the Use of the Word ‘Democracy’ 1789-1799. Political Science Quarterly, 68 (2), 203-226. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.2307/2144967Palmer, 1953: 208). In fact, important theorists argue that today’s acceptance of the word has only happened at the price of changing its meaning ( ‍Lively, J. (1975). Democracy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lively, 1975;  ‍Manin, B. (1997). The principles of representative government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511659935Manin, 1997).

Rousseau was already considered quite extravagant, and declaring his love for democracy—no matter what his understanding of the word was—could not help to spread his ideas. Moreover, defending democracy may have appeared to be a way of taking part in the internal dispute of Geneva in favour of the popular party before the eyes of the Small Council ( ‍Miller, J. (1984). Rousseau: Dreamer of democracy. Michigan: Yale University Press.Miller, 1984: 15). The effect that the dedicatory of the Second Discourse had in Geneva, as Rousseau tells in his Confessions, “was unfavourable to” him (Confessions VIII;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1953). The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by J. M. Cohen. London: Penguin Books.Rousseau, 1953: 368)^‍‍[18]. Such a disappointment may have inspired a change of strategy.

Although Rousseau’s intention for The Social Contract was “to employ solely the power of reason, without any vestige of venom or prejudice” (Confessions IX;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1953). The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by J. M. Cohen. London: Penguin Books.Rousseau, 1953: 378 [footnote]), he understood that language is not innocent. For example, he knew that “[t]he word Government does not have the same meaning in every country, because the constitution of States is not the same everywhere” (LM V;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001; 201). If words do not stand for essential contents, then their meaning can be related to both their context and the interests they further. In this sense, Rousseau mentions in the Letters written from the Mountain the existence of “the language of Monarchies”. “In general, the Leaders of Republics are extremely fond of employing” it, wrote Rousseau in a clear reference to Geneva. “Under cover of terms that seem consecrated, they know how to introduce little by little the things that these words signify” (LM 5;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 201-‍202).

According to Rousseau, this language of monarchies mainly involved the confusion between sovereigns and governments (LM V;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 201). When introducing this difference, however, Rousseau also transformed the meaning of the term ‘democracy’. While aware of the negative connotations of the shunned word, Rousseau may have intended for a quick sleight of hand that allowed him to criticise ‘democracy’ without ceasing in his defence of popular self-rule and the rule of law themselves. As Bernardi ( ‍Bernardi, B. (2014). La fabrique des concepts. Recherches sur l’invention conceptuelle chez Rousseau. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur.2014: 194) puts it, “the principle of popular sovereignty seems to be a determinant factor in the whole conceptual system that organizes the political philosophy of Rousseau”. Confirming my point will require tracing the use of the word systematically and chronologically along his main writings. This will show the vestiges of such a displacement of meaning.

V. DISASTROUS AND IMPOSSIBLE WHILE DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY[Up]

The occasion did not arise in his First Discourse [1750], but in the Discourse on Inequality or Second Discourse [1754], as mentioned, there is an example of the contradictions here analysed already in the dedicatory: “I should have wished to be born in a country in which the interest of the Sovereign and that of the people must be single and identical […]. And as this could not be the case, unless the Sovereign and the people were one and the same person, it follows that I should have wished to be born under a democratic government, wisely tempered” (SD Dedicatory;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913; 145)^‍‍[19]. There, “democracy” comes across in a positive way (contradiction 2), apparently as a synonym of republic or rule of law (contradiction 1).

Later, in his Discourse on Political Economy [1755], Rousseau repeats twice “legitimate or popular government”, assuming them as synonymous. Here ‘government’ seems to mean sovereignty ( ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 255, 269), so Rousseau would still be employing the language of monarchies. In any case, the possibility of confusing “democracy” and “republic” does not emerge there.

Then we get to Rousseau’s masterpieces: Emile and in The Social Contract [1762]^‍‍[20]. The conceptual rift between democracy and republic persists across these books, but now ‘democracy’ is rejected in the renowned terms. In contrast, two years after that, the Letters written from the Mountain [1764] are published and, in the same lines where Rousseau defends himself from his critics, contradiction one (republic = democracy) appears: democracy is presented as an actual possibility. This happens again in his Plan for a constitution for Corsica [1764-1768], where Rousseau speaks of “democracy” as a possible type of republic. He recommends it, but hopes that his advice helps to change living conditions so that Corsica can soon enjoy “a more brilliant administration”. However, the plan for Corsica is eventually described as “a mixed Government”, half aristocratic and half democratic, “in which the people is assembled only in parts and in which the depositaries of its power are often changed” ( ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2005). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 2): The plan for perpetual peace, On the government of Poland, and other writings on History and Politics. Edited by C. Kelly and translated by C. Kelly and J. Bush. London: University Press of New England.Rousseau, 2005: 128)^‍‍[21]. Finally, ‘democracy’ appears only once in his Considerations on the government of Poland [1771-1772], next to the word “tumultuousness” ( ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2005). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 2): The plan for perpetual peace, On the government of Poland, and other writings on History and Politics. Edited by C. Kelly and translated by C. Kelly and J. Bush. London: University Press of New England.Rousseau, 2005: 194).

How could he “wish” to live in a democratic state, only to state next that such a thing, besides being inconvenient, is an impossible utopia? This is especially surprising after Rousseau affirmed that “[a]ll that is challenging in The Social Contract had previously appeared in the Essay on Inequality” (Confessions IX;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1953). The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by J. M. Cohen. London: Penguin Books.Rousseau, 1953: 379). Did his opinion evolve contrary to this claim? In fact, we know for certain that his initial beliefs somehow may have persisted, since the first meaning of ‘democracy’ (positive) was revisited not only in the Letter to D’Alembert [1758], but also in his Letters written from the Mountain [1764], two years after the publication of The Social Contract [1762], or in the Letter to Mirabeau [1767], where Rousseau tragically regrets:

At this point, it should be clear that Rousseau’s words need a careful reading if we are to understand him. When Rousseau claims in The Social Contract that there has never been a real democracy “in the strict sense” (SC III:4;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 54-‍55), it implies that other sense can be thought of; a sense in which democracy is possible, maybe even desirable^‍‍[23].

This is what is found in the Second Discourse. There the Genevan thinker tells us how “the differing degrees of inequality” resulted in the different types of governments: monarchy, republic, and democracy. All of them had the obligation to respect the fundamental laws that the people agreed upon in the contract “between the people and the chiefs chosen by them”. However, in this same piece of writing he insinuates that only a democratic government (the one he says there to prefer) can keep the rule of law alive: “It was discovered in process of time which of these forms suited men the best. Some peoples remained altogether subject to the laws; others soon came to obey their magistrates” (SD;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 214). Thence, “rule of law” (a characteristic of any republic according to The Social Contract) and “democracy” appear defined as different things, and under different words, although interconnected: the rule of law would not survive long without democracy.

This relation by necessity between democracy and republic helps to unravel contradiction one (republic = democracy). If we now come back to the crucial quotation of the dedicatory in the Second Discourse (“I should have wished to be born under a democratic government, wisely tempered”), we now have to stop thinking that ‘democracy’ simply substituted “republic” there. It is more precise to say that, if I want to live in a republic (sovereign = subjects; rule of law) that endures as such, “it follows” that I will need to live in a “democracy”. Rousseau’s prudential considerations can therefore explain the apparent contradiction in that quote.

Moreover, the meaning of ‘democracy’ in this Second Discourse was compatible with some very counter-intuitive affirmations: e.g. Rousseau stands that in his ideal system the right to propose laws “should belong exclusively to the magistrates”. He also wishes not to live in a place where people imagined “themselves in a position to do without magistrates”, “imprudently [keeping] for themselves the administration of civil affairs and the execution of their own laws” (SD;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 147). Consequently, Rousseau was already criticising in the Second Discourse (under the idea of a “wisely tempered democracy”) what in The Social Contract would be despised (and called “democracy”): the people directly exerting the executive power. This means his political preference in the Second Discourse is consistent to this extent with The Social Contract. Regarding this fundamental aspect, the change occurs in the words, not in his opinions.

VI. FROM THE SECOND DISCOURSE TO THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: DISPLACEMENT OF MEANING AND MILLER’S ACCOUNT[Up]

In this section I will continue defining this displacement of meaning that happened between the Second Discourse and The Social Contract together with the suggestive and detailed work by James Miller, who identified some of the contradictions here analysed, but arrived at some different conclusions. Besides Miller’s wonderful work on contextualisation, I find that a more analytic reading of the passages he himself quotes leads to important clarifications.

On the one hand, Miller ( ‍Miller, J. (1984). Rousseau: Dreamer of democracy. Michigan: Yale University Press.1984: 72), as I do, accepts that the system Rousseau defended over his life was fundamentally the same, but he also claims Rousseau did not truly believe his critiques against “democracy”: “Democracy, even as a form of government, would seem to possess many estimable merits [for Rousseau]”. Miller thinks that Rousseau’s defence of a direct election of magistrates would show such a thing, and considers that Rousseau would “cast doubt” upon the idea in The Social Contract that “a true democracy has never existed”, for he would think humans lived originally in democracies: “For Rousseau, the saga of decay is the story of a disappearing democracy” ( ‍Miller, J. (1984). Rousseau: Dreamer of democracy. Michigan: Yale University Press.Miller, 1984: 68, 118) Coherently, Miller’s book is called Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy.

This account, which implies Rousseau was hiding his real opinions, can be highly misguiding. Mainly, it forgets Rousseau’s explicit intention in The Social Contract to take men “as they are”—not as the “gods” they are not. It is irrelevant for this matter what men were in an irrecoverable state of nature, since The Social Contract is a treatise on the “Principles of Political Rights”: that is, for political times. In this sense, Miller confuses Rousseau’s philosophical absolute ideal with his analysis of political right, which takes into account real people as they appear in real political history and, therefore, has to include prudential considerations. Rousseau sees “unimaginable that the people should remain continually assembled”; moreover, as soon as commissions were appointed, they would rapidly gather power, modifying the form of government (SC III:4;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913).

As mentioned, Miller’s interpretation relies on the fact that some “democracy” (as a form of government) enters into play each time a government is appointed in The Social Contract’s account, since this act is of executive nature ( ‍Miller, J. (1984). Rousseau: Dreamer of democracy. Michigan: Yale University Press.Miller, 1984: 117; SC III:17 and IV:3;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913). However, the executive nature of appointments only comes to confirm Rousseau’s insight that every government is mixed; that “[s]trictly speaking, there is no such thing as a simple government” (SC III:7;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913;  ‍Bernardi, B. (2014). La fabrique des concepts. Recherches sur l’invention conceptuelle chez Rousseau. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur.Bernardi, 2014: 143). Ultimately, if Rousseau had intended to advocate for a full democracy according to the way the word was understood in his time, he would have defended sortation as the best system for the selection of magistrates, which he only advises for the impossible democracies of The Social Contract and for the appointment of life-rulers (SC IV:3;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913)^‍‍[24].

Rousseau did surely not refer to a metaphysical impossibility when he claimed that a real democracy has never existed, since the possibility of a democratic sovereignty is mentioned here and there: “At first the Legislative power and executive power that constitute sovereignty are not distinct. The Sovereign People wills by itself, and by itself it does what it wills” (LM 7;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 238). Moreover, in a Lockean fashion, Rousseau claimed there that “in every country in the last resort [the fundamental law] arms the Sovereign with the public force for the execution of what it wills” (LM 8;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 268)^‍‍[25]. However, this could barely be called a regime; it would just constitute a mere fleeting revolutionary moment. Full democracy as a form of government (the people are the only executors of their own will) is impossible if “possible” means viable in the long run. Spreading the belief of its impossibility can subsequently be considered as a prudential move seeking the preservation of liberty. Therefore, a democratic government cannot be considered Rousseau’s political ideal, as Miller argued.

Finally, Miller (1984: Chap.V) is right to claim that Rousseau used the word “democracy” both as 1. a type of government (mainly, in The Social Contract) and 2. a type of sovereignty (mainly, in the Second Discourse). Indeed, Rousseau insists on how important it is for “democracy” to distinguish “the Sovereign from the Government, the legislative Power from the executive. There is no State in which these two powers are so separate, and in which people have so affected to mix them up” (LM 8;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 257).

Yet closer attention to the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘government’ in the Second Discourse and in The Social Contract is needed to clarify such a claim, since each text provides slightly different sets of definitions. Moreover, an analysis of the differences between the model he promoted at each moment (the wisely tempered democracy and the aristocratic republic) will reveal how Rousseau’s fundamental truth moulded them. I count at least four of these differences:

According to the Second Discourse, “in these different governments, all the offices were at first elective” (SD;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 214). Therefore, in that model freedom (as self-rule) is presented as possible even in a “monarchy” (under a sovereign king). However, Rousseau informs us with subtlety that freedom in monarchies and aristocracies would barely last in real life. The Genevan thinker already realised that the notion of a limited sovereign meant trusting in self-limitation, which is not quite a secure basis for liberty. Even though philosophically or theoretically conceivable, the political risk it implied recommended the changes he introduced in his taxonomy of governments. Otherwise, cases of limited slavery (such as the “aristocratic” England he so bitterly criticised in The Social Contract^‍‍[33]) could have been easily legitimised. This would have undermined his political quest for popular sovereignty and against absolute monarchy.

VII. CONSISTENCY AND ABSOLUTE MONARCHY[Up]

This article does not claim Rousseau remained coherently faithful to his new definitions; rather that his misuse of those can be better explained by reconstructing his intentions. When Rousseau boasted about being consistent after such a large disparity between different texts, I understand the Genevan thinker meant he was consistent in his main ideas, his final aims and truths, not in the exact terms of his contractualism. The textual analysis has shown this consistency, even though it must be admitted that the change in the way his truths were expressed had an impact on some non-essential parts of the content conveyed. Accepting that Rousseau’s opinions evolved in the fundamental would not allow us to explain the persistent reappearance of both meanings of ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’ but as a mere lack of mental clearness.

However, it remains a conundrum why Rousseau resorted to both meanings of “democracy” after defining his republican vocabulary, even in The Social Contract itself. Once the “strict sense” of this word was defined and the requirements of freedom were saved into the word ‘republic’, there may seem to be no point in his using their previous meanings. Aside from pure and simple mistakes, Rousseau may have felt the necessity to use the common meaning of these words in order to be properly understood; a common meaning that surely felt more natural and spontaneous to him and that could reach a broader audience.

The convenience of alternatively resorting to both systems is especially clear regarding his use of the word ‘monarchy’. Once ‘democracy’ was limited to those elements that Rousseau disapproved of, then the meaning of ‘monarchy’ was necessarily affected, for both are defined at the same logical level (as types of republic). When examined the other way around, “monarchy” had to change its referent if so-called republics (wisely tempered democracies according to his previous vocabulary) were to become the only legitimate regimes. In Rousseau’s opinion, “legitimate monarchy” (meaning a sovereign monarch who provided liberty, rule of law, etc.) should be understood as an oxymoron; an impossibility.

A footnote to The Social Contract states: “It is true that Aristotle […] distinguishes the tyrant from the king by the fact that the former governs in his own interest, and the latter only for the good of his subjects […] but also it would follow from Aristotle’s distinction that, from the very beginning of the world, there has not yet been a single king” (SC III:10;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 72 [footnote 1]). A king that governs following the general interest may be philosophically or theoretically possible, but politically it appears to Rousseau as a chimera, if not a sheer lie meant for political domination. Therefore, an absolute monarchy would not even deserve a particular name in his republican language but those of tyranny and despotism. Rousseau had to admit that, once “the government” is regarded as nothing but the “minister” of the sovereign, “even a monarchy is a Republic” (SC II:6;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau, 1913: 31). However, he would not have been ready to stop criticising present absolute monarchies by their popular name, since this was the most effective way to convey his political stance to his well-appreciated “common readers”. Again, his political rejection of monarchies had to take into account the rhetorical context; the success of his work as an ideological dispositive depended on it.

VIII. TO END WITH: A SINGLE CRITERION OF LEGITIMACY[Up]

This article examined Rousseau’s republican alternative to the language of Monarchies in The Social Contract: a republican ideology. Surely, the main feature of this new language is its bringing to the fore the difference between sovereignty and government. “This distinction is very important in these matters. In order to have it thoroughly present in one’s mind one ought to read with some care the first two Chapters of the third Book in The Social Contract, in which I attempted to fix by means of a precise meaning expressions that they artfully leave uncertain” for their own political interest (LM 5;  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (2001). The collected writings of Rousseau (vol. 9): Letter to Beaumont, letters written from the mountain, and related writings. Translated by C. Kelly and J. R. Bush. Edited by C. Kelly and E. Grace. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.Rousseau, 2001: 201-‍202). However, this conceptual device also includes an important amount of Rousseau’s prudential wisdom about the conditions of freedom, and about what democracy can and cannot be. Such an account provided a more compelling way to understand Rousseau’s multiple contradictions around the words ‘monarchy’, ‘republic’, and, above all, ‘democracy’.

Aristocracy—and not democracy—was considered “the best and most natural” of all governments in The Social Contract (SC III:5:  ‍Rousseau, J. J. (1913). The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole. London: J. M. Dent and Sons.Rousseau. 1913: 57). For his words, Rousseau seemed now even more elitist than the Genevese Small Council itself, which regarded Geneva as an “aristo-democracy” ( ‍Miller, J. (1984). Rousseau: Dreamer of democracy. Michigan: Yale University Press.Miller, 1984: 17, 73). In The Social Contract, Rousseau unexpectedly yielded to the negative connotation of the word which was general at his time and condemned democracy as an impossible and undesirable option. However, the “democracy” he repudiated now did not include, by definition, the fundamental elements he found necessary to preserve freedom: popular legitimacy and popular participation^‍‍[34] were safe in the word ‘Republic’—a word that effectively became victorious during the revolutions that were to come ( ‍Manin, B. (1997). The principles of representative government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511659935Manin, 1997;  ‍Palmer, R. R. (1953). Notes on the Use of the Word ‘Democracy’ 1789-1799. Political Science Quarterly, 68 (2), 203-226. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.2307/2144967Palmer, 1953). Moreover, Rousseau used this negative connotation to protect his “reasonable populism” ( ‍Cohen, J. (1986). An Epistemic Conception of Democracy. Ethics, 97 (1), 26-38. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1086/292815Cohen, 1986) (the people’s sovereignty through legislation) from the danger of a self-defeating popular executive, a tumultuous and instable form of government, now the only meaning placed into the word ‘democracy’.

Rousseau’s ideal political constitution undoubtedly includes moments when the people would hold both the legislative and the executive power: this would happen in revolutions, and also each time a government is elected in a republican aristocracy. Nevertheless, these exceptions should not lead us into thinking (along the lines of James Miller) that Rousseau considered “ideal” a government which no man could desire without considering himself an omnipotent god; a government that could not last long. Such a wish implied too much of an idealisation for Rousseau’s political judgement, even if he may have found a democratic government appealing in philosophical terms.

Rousseau’s ideological move is of extreme relevance for the History of Western Political Ideas. As Kingsley Martin wrote, Rousseau’s “real influence cannot be traced with precision because it pervaded all the thought that followed him” (quoted in  ‍Dent, N. (2005). Rousseau. New York: Routledge.N. Dent, 2005: 210). Quoting G.D.H Cole ( ‍Cole, G. D. H. (1913). Introduction. In J. J. Rousseau. The Social Contract and discourses. Translated and edited by G. D. H. Cole (pp. 7-64). London: J. M. Dent and Sons.1913: xx): “Rousseau unites the absolute Sovereignty of Hobbes and the ‘popular consent’ of Locke into the philosophic doctrine of popular Sovereignty, which has since been the established form of the theory”. As Bernardi ( ‍Bernardi, B. (2014). La fabrique des concepts. Recherches sur l’invention conceptuelle chez Rousseau. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur.2014: 203) explains, through developing of the concept of popular sovereignty Rousseau “forms the modern concept of democracy”^‍‍[35]. Against Bernardi, however, I do not think Rousseau’s choosing of the word ‘republic’ to convey this content was a mere question of “terminology”, but a very clever ideological and rhetorical move.

Strongly democratic ideas came to be regarded as the principles that any state should embody in order to be legitimate. Popular sovereignty and the need for some constitutional guarantees that make popular sovereignty effective have become common sense, no matter how much real conditions dramatically limit our capacity to make our institutions embody these principles. Moreover, the praised idea of a mixed government changed meaning too, referring now to mixed governments and never again to a mixed source of legitimacy ( ‍Bernardi, B. (2014). La fabrique des concepts. Recherches sur l’invention conceptuelle chez Rousseau. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur.Bernardi, 2014: 127-‍128;  ‍Derathé, R. (1988). Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps. Paris: J. Vrin.Derathé, 1988: 49;  ‍Villaverde, M. J. (1987). Rousseau y el pensamiento de las luces. España: Tecnos.Villaverde, 1987: 239). Since sovereignty cannot be divided, the democratic principle could no longer be combined with the monarchic or aristocratic principles. No compromise is possible at the sovereignty level under the Hobbesian conceptual arrangement presented in The Social Contract.

Rousseau revisited the common meanings of the words ‘republic’, ‘democracy’, and ‘monarchy’ repeatedly after publishing The Social Contract, either out of political interest, spontaneity, or sheer mistake. Fortunately for democrats, his far-reaching ideological aim was achieved besides all of Rousseau’s contradictions; contradictions that, in some cases, may have furthered instead of hindered his aims.

However, the success of the Rousseaunian ideological device should be neither over-emphasised nor taken for granted. Principles opposed to those here analysed have also had a strong appeal in history. As a clear example, remember the following quotation from The Federalist Papers: “The true distinction between these [the purest democracies of Greece] and the American government lies in the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration of the former” ( ‍Madison, J. (1961b). No. 63: Probably Madison. In A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and J. Jay. 1964. The Federalist papers. New York: New American Library.Madison, 1961b: 387 [No. 63])^‍‍[36].

The Genevan ideologist would have surely condemned Madison’s words for the sake of participation; that is, of freedom^‍‍[37]. In his opinion, the people had to ratify periodically the form of government, their rulers and any new law if they were to remain free. There fore, he would have also strongly rejected the prohibition of referenda in the constitutional amendment process, which was ratified by the United States Supreme Court in 1920^‍‍[38]. Yet the fact that Madison had to defend his positions in the name of “popular government” ( ‍Madison, J. (1961a). No. 10: Madison. In A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay. 1964. The Federalist papers. New York: New American Library.Madison, 1961a: 80 [No.10]) makes clear Rousseau’s success in determining the frame with which even adversaries had to handle, as well as its limits and fragility. May a better understanding of the origins of our beliefs help us to foster political freedom in the present times of uneasiness.