

**BLENDING NETWORKS IN TRANSLATION****WANG Bin***University of Shanghai for Science and Technology***LANGUAGE: TRIGGER OF CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE**

The falsification of the general view that conceptual structure is encoded by the speaker into a linguistic structure, and the linguistic structure is decoded by the hearer back into a conceptual structure in the processes of meaning construction in language communication muffles constructing and reconstructing of meaning in communication where the formal linguistic structure provides only sparse and efficient prompts for constructing a conceptual structure. Language communication is a process of constructing relation between formally integrated linguistic structures and conceptually integrated structures built by the speaker or retrieved by the hearer. The conceptual integration is detailed and intricate while the formal integration gives only the briefest indication of a point from which the hearer must begin constructing this conceptual integration, which means that language communication begins with the finding and constructing relations between linguistic formal structures and conceptual structures by the speaker, and ends with the same process by the hearer. Either on speaker's part or on hearer's part, there is much room in the process of meaning construction in which conceptual integration networks may be manipulated.

Non-set relation between linguistic form and conceptual structure makes language more flexible in meaning construction in basically four ways (Gille Fauconnier and Mark Turner 2002:119-135): simplex networks, mirror networks, single scope networks and double scope networks. The speaker uses linguistic forms to build up conceptual structures that convey communicative modes of a culture in which the intended information is embedded in schemata of a communicated event, the generic space of conceptual integration network. If the hearer, through reading the communicative mode builder, the linguistic form offered by the speaker, diagnoses the intended communicative modes and builds up the relation between communicative modes and schemata of communicated event embedded in them to get the supposedly shared information if they are in the same culture or different cultures but with similar backgrounds, then the communication is accomplished.

Due to the flexibility of relations between linguistic form and conceptual structure in meaning construction, at the beginning of communication, the speaker uses some blending networks to apply linguistic forms in building up communicative modes intending to convey his schemata of communicated events, which may probably be read by the hearer with different kinds of blending networks to build communicative modes that convey quite a different intended schemata of communicated events not proposed by the speaker, even though the communicative modes built in

communication are the same for both speaker and hearer. That explains why the same speech can be understood in quite different ways even in the same context within the same culture. See Fig. 1.




Fig. 1 Reading message

On the one hand, one grammatical structure can be realized in language by different conceptual structures. For examples:

Noun phrase [NP] + verb [V] + noun phrase [NP] + Prepositional phrase [PP] can be realized by different conceptual structures in language:

- a). causal agent's action (conceptual structure: CS)

Gogol sneezed the napkin off the table.  
[NP] [V] [NP] [PP]

- b). object's motion (CS)

Junior sped the toy car around the Christmas tree.  
[NP] [V] [NP] [PP]

- c). causality (CS)

Sarge let the tank into the compound.  
[NP] [V] [NP] [PP]

...

Different realizations show that the relation between grammatical structures and conceptual structures are very flexible. There is no one to one relation between the two.

On the other hand, one conceptual structure can also be realized by different cultural communicative modes. For example:

The conceptual structure *envy*, represented by the *grass is always greener on the other side of the fence* can also be realized by different images, the underlined parts representing cultural communicative modes:

Grass always seems greener in foreign fields.

Grass is always greener away form home.

Grass is always greener on the other side of the stream.

Grass is always greener on your neighbor's lawn.

...

Different representations show that the relation between conceptual structure and communicative mode of a culture is also very flexible. No set correspondence is observed.

In reading text, a reader ploughs through grammatical structures to dig out conceptual structures, then, to integrate communicative modes of the text language and at last to get a complete schemata of communicated events conveyed by the text. Yet, one communicative mode can also be realized by different schemata of communicated events, for example:

*Grass always seems greener in foreign fields* can indicate

- a). Living conditions in USA are better than those in China.
- b). Technologies in Spain are more advanced than those in China.
- c). John's wife is more beautiful than Benjamin's
- d). Foreign ideas are more innovative than domestic ones

...

Different indications show that the relation between cultural communicative mode and scheme of communicated event is hard to pin down as well.

Language (words and grammatical structures) functions only as a trigger to trigger conceptual structures that may be integrated in different ways by people to construct schemata of communicated events.

#### **EVENT: PAY OFF OF CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION (BLENDING)**

In integrating conceptual structures, online meaning constructions, there are four basic ways according to Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002:119-135):

*Simplex Networks*

*In a simplex network, the relevant part of the frame in one input is projected with its roles, and elements are projected from the other input as values of those roles within the blend. The blend integrates the frame and the values in the simplest way. The frame in one input is compatible with the elements in the other: There is no clash between the inputs, such as competing frames or incompatible counterpart elements. As a result, a simplex network does not look intuitively like a blend at all. But it is a perfectly regular integration network, predictable in kind from the theoretical principles of blending. A sentence in English that will prompt the construction of this blend is “Paul is the father of Sally.”*

The grammatical construction *X is the Y of Z* shows that there are two inputs: input of family frame (roles of family members: father, mother and kids) and input of elements (Paul and Sally). The cross-space mapping between the two inputs is a frame-to-value connection, an organized bundle of role connectors.

In language communication, if the event is integrated in this way, that is if the communicative mode is dug out from conceptual structure and is constructed in a one-to-one cross-mapping in integrating communicated event, the relations among grammatical structure, conceptual structure and communicative mode are stable. The grammatical structure will not be realized in alternative ways until the communicated event as illustrated above. Only one event is observed as a last realization. Paul is the father of Sally: only relation of the father and daughter. There are no other interpretations.

*Mirror networks*

*A mirror network is an integration network in which all spaces –inputs, generic and blend– share an organizing frame. The organizing frame provides a topology for the space it organizes; that is, it provides a set of organizing relations among the elements in the space. When two spaces share the same organizing frame, they share the corresponding topology and so can easily be put into correspondence. Establishing a cross-space mapping between inputs becomes straightforward.*

The Buddhist Monk, the Debate with Kant and Regatta (Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, 2002: 39-65) represent good examples to illustrate the Mirror Networks. As stated in last paragraph, in mirror networks, the relations among grammatical structure, conceptual structure and communicative mode are straightforward, which means that there is no alternative interpretation in hierarchical generation of meaning construction from grammar to event as illustrated in Fig. 1. “At this point, *Great American II* is 4.5 days ahead of *Northern Light*.” in Regatta can only be understood as a boat races but nothing else.

*Single-Scope Networks*

*A single-scope network has two input spaces with different organizing frames, one of which is projected to organize the blend. Its defining property is that the organizing frame of the blend is an extension of the organizing frame of one of the inputs but not the other.*

The scenario of two men boxing gives us a vibrant, compact frame to use in compressing our understanding of two CEO's in business competition. We say that one CEO landed a blow but the other one recovered, one of them tripped and the other took advantage, one of them knocked the other out cold. This construal of the situation builds up a conceptual integration network. There is a cross-space mapping between the boxing input and the business input that maps, for example, each boxer to a CEO, a punch to an effort by one of the CEOs, a blow to an effective action, and staying in the fight to continuing the business competition. (Gille Fauconnier and Mark Turner, 2002 : 126-131)

The organizing frame comes from boxing; CEOs play by the boxing regulations in their business competition, a typical example of conceptual metaphor. Business competition is understood in terms of the boxing game. The point is that one conceptual structure, like *business competition*, can be represented by different communicative modes (image schemata). *Business competition* can be understood in or compared to *love affairs* and *fencing* too. If the organizing frame is not shared by all spaces, alternative interpretation occurs. No one - to - one relation is observed in the chain generating of the communicated event, for, in the procedure from grammatical structure to conceptual structure to communicative mode to schema of communicated event, any consecutive phase can be mapped to the next and vice versa. One communicative mode will yield different events, because different event organizing frames can be mapped onto the communicative mode (target domain). That is why misunderstanding (intentional or not) happens, for, in single scope network, we can always map another way.

#### *Double-Scope Networks*

*A double-scope network has inputs with different (and often clashing) organizing frames as well as an organizing frame for the blend that includes parts of each those frames and has emergent structure of its own. In such networks, both organizing frames make central contributions to the blend, and their sharp differences offer the possibility of rich clashes. Far from blocking the construction of the network, such clashes offer challenges to the imagination; indeed, the resulting blends can be highly creative.*

Consider the familiar idiomatic metaphor “ You are digging your own grave.” It typically serves as a warning that (1) you are doing bad things that will cause you to have a very bad experience, and (2) you are unaware of this causal relation. In this blend, the organizing frame comes from both inputs. The frame structure of agents, patients, and sequence of events, and the intentional structure come from the “ unwitting failure” Input; the concrete structure of graves, digging, and burial, is from the “digging the grave” input. In the construction of blend, a single shift in causal structure - *The existence of a grave causes death*, instead of *Death causes the existence of a grave*- is enough to produce emergent structure, specific to the blend: undesirability of digging one's grave, exceptional foolishness in being unaware of such undesirability, and correlation of depth of grave with probability of death.

Double-scope network creates emergent structure, a brand new conceptual structure emerging from both inputs but not found in either of them. This means in reading a text the communicative mode (in Fig.1) may produce new meanings not intended by the author; like a poem, it can be digested in various ways beyond the author's imagination.

Therefore, any event from text is the pay off of a painstaking mental process.

## TRANSLATION: TWO-WAY BLENDS

So is the case in translation but with more complicated features. Translation, a cross-cultural communication, conveys more sophisticated relations in connecting linguistic forms and conceptual structures. Translation takes two-way blends in mental processes. In reading source text, the blending process goes in a reverse way as illustrated in Fig.1 above. After getting the schemata of communicated event from source text, the translator tries to find, in the target culture, the proper communicative mode that can convey the source event, then transfer it into conceptual structure represented by the target language that is grammatical in the target culture, another round of blending. Yet different cultures use different communicative modes represented by different relations in linguistic forms and conceptual structures in language communication causing cultures to clash with each other. In reading source text, language communication happens between translator and author; the translator tries to trace what the author did in building connections between linguistic forms and conceptual structures in the source language to recognize communicative modes used by the author to convey the intended schemata of communicated events if the translator is competent in the source language communication. By acquiring schemata of communicated events, the translator tries to communicate with readers in the target language in which he is supposed to be competent as well. The translator uses target linguistic forms to build connections with target cultural conceptual structures that convey communicative modes in which the acquired schemata of communicated events can be embedded. See Fig. 2.




Fig. 2 SCE: schemata of communicated events;  
 CMC1: communicative modes of source culture;  
 CMC2: communicative modes of target culture;  
 ST: source text  
 TT: target text

The problem is that source language and target language do not always share the same kinds of communicative modes, though sometimes they do (the overlapping part of CMC1 and CMC2 in Fig.2) in conveying the schemata of intended communicative events; more often than not, they divert from time to time. Given the impacting elements outside the text such as ideology, patronage etc. are the same, there is much to say about the way translator builds up communicative modes that can imbed the acquired schemata of communicated events in the target language which may lead to the watershed in translating principles: domestication or foreignization.

When communicative modes are built through simplex networks or mirror networks in the source language and the modes built happen to be shared by the target language in conveying the same schemata of the intended communicated events, neither domestication nor foreignization can make any changes in the transference of text meaning, and that is where “equivalence” comes from. Yet, when communicative modes are built in a source text through single scope networks or double scope networks, translating becomes more complicated. Usually communicative modes built in these two ways are not shared by the target language culture because, in chain mappings as illustrated in Fig. 1, mappings in the two ways are more dynamic. Alternative results are yielded. Domestication and Foreignization have a lot to do in the area and they produce quite different translated versions. If the translator sticks to domestication, he/she would apply the organizing framework used in a single scope network but the organizing structure comes not from the source text but rather from the target language, which means the translator uses target language communicative modes in conveying the acquired schemata of intended communicated events; if he/she sticks to foreignization, the organizing framework comes from the source text; source language communicative modes are applied through single scope network in translation. “Equivalence” is pondered in the air.

Yet the translator may use double scope networks as well. When communicative modes built in the source text are an application of double scope networks, and the communicative modes built are not shared by the target language culture (even new in the source language), organizing framework in translation turns out to be even more complicated; it comes not just from any single side but from both sides of source and target languages. Much creation or deviation happens here. Maneuvering arts pop up. You can say nothing about equivalence. The communicative modes built in these kinds of networks are blended ones from two cultures that still embed the intended schemata of communicated events, which may or may not be diagnosed by the readers.

## BLENDING NETWORKS IN TRANSLATION

In simplex and mirror networks, mapping relations are confined; chain generating yields only one result. *Paul is the father of Sally* can only be translated as: *Baoluo shi Shali de fuqin (Chinese)*. No other version can be possible within the family frame. “At this point, *Great American II* is 4.5 days ahead of *Northern Light*” can only be translated as: *Zai zhedian shang, dameizhou erhao bi beijixinghao kuaile sidianwu tian (Chinese)*. No alternative version is possible in the boat racing frame. The organizing frames of both networks are shared by source and target cultures (overlapping part in Fig.2). Equivalence finds its home there.

Yet, when CMC1 clashes with CMC2 (non-overlapping parts in Fig.2), the translator has two choices: adopt either single-scope network or double-scope network.

There are two ways to apply a single-scope network. If the translator uses CMC1 (non-shared part) as the organizing framework in translated versions, foreignization happens:

*Jie ze er yu* (Chinese) will be translated into English as

a) *to drain a pond to catch all fish*  
instead of

b) *to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs*. A more like counterpart in English.

More examples:

*Da cao jing she* (Chinese )

a) *to stir up the grass and alert the snake*

b) *wake a sleeping dog*

*Yi ru fan zhang* (Chinese)

a) *to be as easy as turning over one's hand*

b) *as easy as falling off a log*

*Wan huo zi fen* (Chinese)

a) *to get burnt by the fire kindled by oneself*

b) *fry in one's own grease*

*Hui jin ru tu* (Chinese)

a) *to spend money like dirt*

b) *to spend money like water*

*zhang shang ming zhu* (Chinese)

a) *a pear in the palm*

b) *the apple of one's eye*

*Shou kou ru ping* (Chinese)

a) *to keep one's mouth closed like a bottle*

b) *to keep a still tongue in one's head*

*xue zhong song tan* (Chinese)

a) *to send charcoal in snowy weather*

b) *to help a lame dog over a stile*

*Dui niou tan qing* (Chinese)

a) *to play a lute to a cow*

b) *to cast pearls before swine*

*huan she tian zu* ( Chinese)

a) *to draw a snake and add feet to it*

b) *to paint the lily*

If the translator uses CMC2 ( non-shared part ) as an organizing framework in translation, version b)s will be chosen in the above ten examples. Domestication is observed. Which CMC is chosen depends on the translator, a matter of choice only. Foreignization uses image schemata of communicative modes in the source language to construct the organizing framework in the target



version, given source text and target text form a cross-mapping. On the contrary, domestication applies image schemata of communicative modes in the target language to construct the organizing framework in the target version. Image scheme plays the key role.

However, the translator may use a double-scope network in constructing the target organizing framework of the translated version as well. The point is, it's more time consuming to illustrate the process. The following shows what happens in this network translation.

During the 1992 presidential primary campaign, candidate Tom Harkin criticized the incumbent, President George Bush, with the comment:

*He's a guy who was born on third base and thinks he hit a triple.*

Most Americans will easily understand Harkin's analogy as pointing out the contrast between the perceived and the actual cause of Bush's success as a politician. While Bush perceives his success to be a function of his intrinsic abilities and hard work, Harkin points to Bush's privileged heritage and implies his success is undeserved. Harkin thus uses concepts and terminology from the domain of baseball to discuss Bush's success. Moreover, the cross-domain mapping between the sports domain and the social domain is not a single-scope mapping, but rather combines information from both the source domain and the target. Understanding Harkin's blend, however, requires a certain amount of American cultural knowledge about both input domains.

First, Harkin's comment requires understanding the terms "triple" and "third base" in relation to the institution of baseball. Baseball, of course, requires the batter to hit the ball and run around a series of four bags(bases) arranged in a diamond. Each base is labeled according to the order in which base-runners are required to touch them. The base where the batter hits the ball and begins base-running is called home plate. The first base the runner runs toward after hitting the ball is called first base, the next is second, and the next is third base. Upon hitting the ball the batter will run towards first base while the defensive team attempts to field the ball so as to get the batter out, or, at least to stop his progress around the bases. If the batter is able to get back to home plate without being put out, his team receives one run.

It is customary in baseball to label a batter's hit by the number of bases he was able to tag before his initial progress was stopped. If he gets to first base, it is called a single; if he gets to second base it is called a double; if he gets to third base, the hit is called a triple; and, if he gets all the way around the bases his hit is called a home run. Thus a player who hits a triple will end up on third base. While there are many different ways to arrive at third base (e.g., a batter hits a single and is advanced to third by other batters), hitting a triple, by definition, results in the batter standing on third base. Moreover, a batter who hits a triple winds up on third base largely as a result of his own efforts.

As mentioned above, complete understanding of the meaning of Harkin's statement depends not only on knowledge of baseball, but also on knowledge of the American cultural model of success. As children, Americans are indoctrinated with the notion that any deserving American-born citizen can become president. Another product of American cultural transmission is the story of Abraham Lincoln who was born into a poor family but managed through hard work and ingenuity

to become the 16th American president. The story is meant to highlight the virtues of the protagonist as well as those of the American system that afford his rise from rags to riches.

The word of success is reminiscent of the word invoked to describe paid labor. You earn success through hard work, just as you earn money through hard work. Moreover, the two domains share inference schemas. You deserve money that you earn; you don't deserve money that you don't earn. Similarly, you deserve success that you earn; you don't deserve success that you don't earn. Because wealth is one of the main properties of American success (power is the other), there is a metonymic connection between success and money that motivates the extensive array of entrenched mappings between domains of success and paid labor. And it often results (as it has here) in shared vocabulary between the two domains.

Furthermore, the familiarity and structure of the frames for paid labor can be fruitfully employed to conjecture about the more abstract concept of success. In the idealized model of paid labor, a person who works earns money for his labor. Moreover, the amount of money earned is proportional to the efforts exerted and/or skills deployed. This model can be used to discuss why a particular person might or might not deserve the money that he has. This same model can be mapped onto the domain of success, via a mapping between money and success. A person who works achieves success as a result of his labor. The amount of success achieved is proportional to the effort exerted and/or the skills deployed.

According to the Idealized-Success model, the equality of opportunity reputedly engendered by the American politico-economic system allows Americans to succeed at a level proportional to their ability. The level of one's success is, then, an indicator of the level of one's ability. It is a function of this cultural model that we evaluate successful people favorably, and unsuccessful people unfavorably. Successful people are successful because they earn success through hard work. On the other hand, unsuccessful people are unsuccessful because they are unable or unwilling to earn success.

Of course, this is not the only American cultural model of success. We realize that success is more difficult to achieve for some than for others. Part of the appeal of the Lincoln story is that the protagonist is able to advance from the bottom rung of society to the top in the course of a life time. The achievement is portrayed as admirable, not only because it indicates hard work on the part of the protagonist, but because the climb is all the more difficult from the bottom than it is from the top.

Thus we supplement the American cultural model of success with an alternative model that takes into account the circumstances a person is born into. A person who comes from a wealthy family has advantages that a person from a poor family does not. Moreover, these advantages allow the kids of rich parents to start their pursuit of success from a higher level than the kids of poor parents. So, on the Idealized-Success model, one's level of success is a *prima facie* indicator of one's abilities and hard work, on the Silver-Spoon model, an individual is not given credit for success gleaned from advantages of birth, but only for advancement beyond that level.

Harkin's seemingly simple statement thus appeals to frames from the domain of baseball, both of the idealized models of success, and a frame which blends the social and the sports domains. The phrase "born on third base" evokes a double-scope frame network with Baseball and Success as

input domains. In the domain of baseball, one can be on third base, but one cannot be born on third base.

Of course, it's physically possible for a baby to be born on third base; however, such an event is not covered by the rules of baseball. If it did occur, it would not be considered part of the baseball game proper, but a bizarre event which occurred during the course of a game.

Similarly, in the target domain of success, one can be born into a wealthy family, but not onto a base. It is only in the blended space of the frame network where it is permissible for George Bush to be born on third base (an emergent structure).

Further, the connective "and" in the statement links "born on third base" with "thinks he hit a triple" and signals that the two are connected descriptions. The verb "thinks", because it produces an opaque context, sets up a parallel frame network to represent Bush's beliefs. Elements and relations in the Thinks Network can be linked to counterparts in the initial frame network in a way which allows speakers to understand contrasts between the actual and the counterfactual state of affairs. In the generic domain, for example, the agent thinks he's advanced to Point-a (the third base, so to speak), and in fact, he started out at point-a. In the baseball domain Bush is on third base and thinks he hit a triple. Note that in baseball input, there's nothing particularly amiss in being on third base and thinking you've hit a triple. The Bush in the baseball input is not necessarily deluded as to how he got to third base.

However, the Bush in the blended space most assuredly is deluded as to how he got to third. Similarly, the Bush in the Success input is deluded as to how he earned his success. The rhetorical force of Harkin's statement comes from the contrasting causes of being on third base in the blended space in the two frame networks, and the way in which those causes map into the target domain of Success. The blended domain involves an effect (being on third base) and two competing causes, one of which is an "actual" cause in which Bush was a passive participant, and one of which is the counterfactual cause where Bush is an active participant.

The structural relationship between the elements in the blended spaces parallels that constructed between the elements in the Success input spaces. Moreover, it parallels the relationship which exists between the two success models, Idealized-Success and Silver-Spoon. Bush thinks his success is due to his own hard work and ingenuity. Therefore he deserves the success he has earned. However, the actual cause of Bush's success derives from the fact that he was born into wealth; his success, then, is neither earned nor deserved. The actual cause of Bush's success derives from the fact that he was born into wealth and appeals to the Silver-Spoon model. However, Bush's belief about the cause of his success is governed by the Idealized-Success model.

The import of the contrast between the perceived and the actual cause of Bush being on third base is derived largely from the contrast between the two success models. We seem to fault Bush, not only for unearned success, but for his use of the Idealized-Success rather than Silver-Spoon model. In the domain of baseball, it matters little whether or not the player knows how he got to a particular base. In fact it's rather implausible for a baseball player not to know how he got to a particular base. So, while baseball provides a domain with which Harkin can exaggerate Bush's delusions of grandeur, the rhetorical force of the statement derives from the socio-cultural import of the target domain frames. Nevertheless, the particular configuration of success frames that the

listener constructs on hearing the statement are mapped from the models built on the blended spaces.

The models evoked in the blended spaces thus play a critical role in the construal ultimately constructed by the culturally competent listener. The model built in the blended space makes for a better contrast between the actual and the counterfactual spaces than contrasts that are available in the realistic baseball domain. Moreover, the use of the word “born” in this context evokes the Silver-Spoon model and helps to constrain the mappings between the blend and the target.

While the model in the blended space is unique, the interpretation of the statement is considerably constrained by conventional mappings. Identification of the target domain is aided in this case because success is often characterized metaphorically as progress along a path. Political success in particular is often discussed with sports metaphors. Existing pervasive metaphoric connections between source and target domains aid the native speaker in the identification of the appropriate mappings between spaces. Without knowledge of the source input (baseball) it is difficult for the listener to formulate a coherent mapping to the blend or the target domain. Further, without knowledge of the success models, the relevance and implications of this structural relationship are simply lost on the listener.

The meaning of the statement is constructed through the recognition of particular relationships which exist between culturally constituted and shared cognitive models rather than referencing the outside world directly. Moreover, understanding the statement involves more than a mere allusion to particular cultural models. It involves exploiting particular structural relationships which exist both within components of models and between the different models invoked. It is the apprehension of these relationships and our ability to map them across disparate domains that result in the transfer of inference schemas from one domain to another. Importantly, Harkin does not simply exploit preexisting concepts from the domain of baseball in order to evoke disparate cultural models of success. Rather he prompts the listener to construct a novel frame in the blended space which is, in turn, mapped onto target domain frames so as to suggest a particular construal of Bush’s success.

Conceptually speaking, the statement is a double-scope network with different organizing frames from baseball domain and success domain. And the image schematic structure created by this double-scope network is absent in Chinese culture. To translate this statement, if we do not adopt, in Chinese, the image schematic structure, there will only be a paraphrase of the statement, not translation:

*He’s a guy who was born on third base and thinks he hit a triple.*

Paraphrased as: zhe jia huo sheng lai ming hao, que zi ming bu fan (literally:

*He is a guy born fortunate but too self-conceited.)*

In this translation (paraphrase), image schemes in source text are lost in target text. In fact, no image scheme is applied in translated version. Yet, this statement can be translated by double-scope network too. It can be translated as:

Zhe jia huo yi chu sheng jiou zai san lei shang, que ren wei shi ta zi ji da shang qu de (*chinese*).

In this way, in the translated version, the organizing frame comes from both inputs. From the source language, the organizing frame inherits concrete framework of baseball, Silver Spoon vs. Idealized Success model, and coherent cross-mappings between the models. From the target language, the organizing frame inherits Jade vs. Idealized Success ( *shi nian han chuang* ) model, Lei tai (martial contest) model and coherent cross-mappings between the models as well. Bao yu, protagonist in *A Dream of Red Mansions* authored by Cao Xue-qin, was born with a *jade* in his mouth, counterpart of *silver spoon* in English literature. *Shi nian han chuang* means *to be successful through hard learning and struggle*. In Lei tai model, if the boxer wants to hold the winner position, he has to fight with (“da” in Chinese) any competitors in his time and beat them down cold. It is a brand new way to talk about politics in terms of baseball an emergent structure in Chinese. The translated version doesn’t induce any misunderstandings but introduces into the Chinese culture a new way of constructing conceptual structure (baseball game mapped onto other social life); therefore it benefits Chinese culture. And this explains why translation readers, in their readings, often encounter strange sayings that look so familiar but, as a matter of fact, are alien. An example is *kubi (chinese)*, a new phrase in Chinese composed of two of Chinese characters but the phrase means nothing in Chinese language history. *Ku (chinese)* has nothing to do with *cool* whatsoever in English, but it shares the similar sound with *cool*, and *kubi* means literally anything *so cool that it kills (bi in Chinese), a dead cool*, and has been mapped onto other aspects in social life. *Kubi* is an emergent structure with its organizing frame coming from both languages: *sound* and *kill* from both languages, but *implicature* from English. More examples like *si kao le vs. scholar, bang bao shi vs. pampers, etc.*

Any text consists of different conceptual structures, as is translation. Meaning construction happens in many possible ways. Translation, in its nature, is an emergent structure. We use target language texture as a concrete grammatical and conceptual frame to integrate with an intentional or causal frame from the source language, and, therefore, we always have emergent frames in the translated versions. That’s why we say:

**A translated version is in a second language but a third culture.**

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