

# BORDÓN

## Revista de Pedagogía

NÚMERO MONOGRÁFICO

Gobierno y gobernanza de la universidad:  
el debate emergente

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y Roberto Rodríguez Gómez  
(coords.)



Volumen 66  
Número 1  
2014

**SOCIEDAD ESPAÑOLA DE PEDAGOGÍA**



# GOVERNANCE THROUGH THE MARKET AND THE STATE: POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION IN ARGENTINA

## *Gobernanza a través del mercado y el estado: el caso del posgrado en Argentina*

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DOI: 10.13042/Bordon.2014.66104

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**INTRODUCTION.** Most higher education systems in developing and developed countries have experienced changes in their governance structure. In postgraduate education in Argentina those changes signaled a move towards an increasing role of the state as a steering agent and of the market to enhance competition. In both cases such reinforcement has been at the expense of traditional academic power. **METHOD.** A regulatory space approach analysis based on archival research of the postgraduate education regulatory framework coupled with data on programs. **RESULTS.** The data analysis shows sharp differences between Argentina's pre-regulatory and post-regulatory reality. Regulation through accreditation is devised to tackle information asymmetry and to inform students who are conceived of as individual "clients". This is implemented through the official, voluntary ranking of postgraduate programs. The state plays an increasing role as regulator for competition, modifying existing patterns of governance in the higher education system, mostly at the postgraduate level. **DISCUSSION.** In a context of increasing changes in higher education governance there is growing evidence that despite national variations, systems are moving toward more reliance on market-friendly strategies. Still, little is known about the manner in which the institutions at the postgraduate sub-level are responding to recent challenges brought about by these new governance structures.

**Key words:** *Higher education, Governance, State regulation, Argentina, Latin America, Public policy.*

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### **Changing relationships in Argentine postgraduate education**

The 1990s was a decade of critical reforms in the education arena in Argentina and higher education was not an exception. The national government promoted the discussion and development

of what finally became the first regulatory framework encompassing the entire Argentine higher education system, in both university and non-university institutions (Krotsch, 2001). Universities contested the introduction of this new regulatory framework as an attack on their autonomy. This positioning against governmental

regulation was in part a result of direct intervention during periods of military dictatorship and a longstanding legacy of autonomy traced to the 1918 Cordoba reform. In that context, one of the most salient features of the Higher Education Law enacted in 1995 was the establishment of a quality assurance agency, a development that institutions perceived as a possible threat to academic and institutional autonomy.

Besides establishing an accreditation agency, the 1995 law officially recognized for the first time the existence of postgraduate education as a sub-level. This is crucial for our topic since regulation of the sub-level would come to make for a stark contrast between undergraduate and postgraduate governance. While the former continues to rely mostly on academia, the latter is increasingly coordinated by the market and the state. Regulatory policy for the postgraduate level follows a similar path as private higher education growth: lack of regulation (pre-1995) followed by strongly reactive policies, constituting what Levy (2006) names as delayed regulation, in this case instrumented through accreditation.

The omission of the postgraduate level in previous policies relates to the fact that it is a relative new level, and most of its growth has taken place since the 1990s. As shown in table 1, in 1994, circa 793 postgraduate programs were running and 14 years later 3,129, an increment of almost 300% (Lvovich, 2009). In all types, programs created by private institutions outpaced those in the public institutions. The gap between the number of programs in public and private universities widens if we focus on those related to the market. Thus, the growth of specializations and master's was considerably faster in private institutions than in their public counterparts. It strikes that even at the doctoral level growth of the private sector outpaced the public one. Still, public institutions are offering 62% of the postgraduate level programs available.

The unregulated growth of the sub-level gave place to a "grafted" structure, introducing the

"US model" in the higher education system within a prevailing, as Bernasconi (2008) would categorize it, Latin American model. Its creation did not follow any specific policy from the national government. Moreover, due to the lack of central planning at the national level, its growth has been rapid and without a sense of orientation, and it has taken place, in a context of discontinuity and fragmentation (Krotsch, 1996). Resembling the US model, planning is driven by the demand, and programs do not follow a single pattern of development. This model gives a great emphasis to the diversification, in terms of levels of quality, type of programs, etc. (Clark, 1983). In this sense, doctoral programs had traditionally followed the German structure, without a fixed curricular structure based on mentorship while more recently created Master's programs are based in the American type (García de Fanelli, Kent Serna, Álvarez Mendiola, Ramírez García & Trombetta, 2001). To that diversity, we can add that recent doctoral programs have also been created on the basis of a fixed curricular structure, in an American style.

In another characteristic of the US model (Clark, 1983), education at the postgraduate level is not fully subsidized by the national government, so the students at that level have to pay tuition and fees, following a pattern completely different from the prevailing at the Argentine undergraduate level (García de Fanelli *et al.*, 2001). There are subsidies from national, provincial, and institutional sources, mostly targeted to doctoral students pursuing a degree in accredited programs, but most specialization and master's programs are self-funded.

Starting as an unregulated sub-level, postgraduate education became highly regulated by the state, in part, as an attempt to bring more homogeneity. That resulted in a change of the governance structure. A series of policy developments preceded the enactment of the 1995 law that created the accreditation agency, and most of them focused on the postgraduate level as 'guinea pigs' for changes that the federal

government introduced in the overall system afterwards. In fact, the first accreditation round had postgraduate rather than undergraduate programs as the targeted group. The government established the Commission on Accreditation of Postgraduate Programs (CAP), which carried out the first call for postgraduate programs “voluntary” accreditation. A large number of programs participated in that first round of accreditation because those accredited programs could participate in projects funded by the Fund for University Quality Improvement (FOMEQ). Afterwards, the law mandated the newly created accreditation agency to be in charge of carrying out the accreditation of some undergraduate programs and all postgraduate programs, in both public and private institutions, undertaking the functions of the CAP (García de Fanelli *et al.*, 2001).

Considering the upsurge of postgraduate programs in the last two decades, accreditation is serving the purpose of regulating an existent market that is understood as highly diversified because of the way that it was developed. Postgraduate level emerged and rapidly expanded as a way to meet “client” demands. That resulted in two different outcomes. While universities were able to create programs that were adapted to the necessities of those requiring higher levels of specialization, the drastic expansion of offer that was evidenced from the early 1990s to the current situation provoked a concern over the quality of the programs.

In Latin America, accreditation agencies mushroomed in the 80s and 90s, mainly promoted and established by national governments. In Argentina, the creation of an accreditation agency represents more governmental involvement in the higher education system, to regulate a system with still ample institutional autonomy and, at the postgraduate level, highly linked to market demands. The mid-1990s regulatory framework for the postgraduate sub-level establishes a new way governance is understood, with its source in the market and the state. Thus, the

establishment of new quality assurance regulatory framework has changed, to a certain degree, the source of authority from academia to both the market and the state in Argentina.

Higher education research on governance tends to build on sophisticated analyses of state-university relationships but not relying on findings and interpretations of regulatory theory (King, 2007a). The ensuing sections bring central conceptual frameworks from the regulatory space approach to the analysis of changes in governance of postgraduate education in Argentina in two time-framed stages: pre-regulation and post-regulation. To that end, this article proceeds to analyze main regulatory frameworks through archival research. By the analysis of key legislation and actors’ behavior, this method permits to recognize main actors involved in the regulatory space as compared to an aggregated quantitative approach.

### **Regulatory space approach to study postgraduate education governance**

One of the contemporary theoretical tools to understand the role of the regulatory state is the *regulatory space approach*, which proposes a more comprehensive understanding of regulation than traditional approaches. As Levi-Faur (2011) states, the regulatory space approach connects widely with the research agenda on governance and regulatory state, where elements of steering and plural forms of regulation are emphasized in the effort to capture the plurality of interests and sources of control around issues, problems, and institutions.

From a regulatory space approach, regulation is “any process or set of processes by which norms are established, the behavior of those subject to the norms monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms for holding the behavior of regulated actors within the acceptable limits of the regime” (Scott, 2001: 331). The definition leaves open the role of the

state and private activities to the analysis carried out in a specific regulatory space.

The idea of a regulatory space is not completely new in the studies of regulation. Hancher and Moran (1989) adapted the idea of public space to the language and range of regulatory issues subject to public decision. Conceived as a space, it contains certain spatial characteristics: 1) it is available for occupation; 2) it can be unevenly divided between actors; 3) it is suitable for the analysis of a particular community as well as individual sectors; 4) it can be augmented by similar images, for instance, it is possible to replace it with the notion of regulatory arena. According to Hancher and Moran (1989), the analysis of power is central to the study of regulatory policies paying attention to the relationships between organizations that at any time play a role in a specific regulatory space.

This approach finds its analysis in the idea that resources relevant to holding of regulatory power are dispersed or fragmented, and thus those resources are not only concentrated in a formal, state authority based on legislation or contracts, but also information, wealth, and organizational capacities of non-state actors play a critical role. In this sense, the regulatory space approach distinguishes between formal and informal authority. In other words, capacities to influence or control are not necessarily derived in a hierarchical way within the space, regulator over regulate (Scott, 2001). This is a critical step moving toward the study of higher education governance. Higher education systems, mostly in the US and the Latin American models, have relied on independent regulatory bodies instead of conventional bureaucratic ownership (King, 2007a).

In a broad comparison between classic and contemporary approaches, the former have been paralleled to the hierarchical understanding of regulation, following a logic of vertical imposition between regulator (the state) and regulate (private activity). On the other hand, as its

shown in table 2, non-hierarchical approaches tend to be more comprehensive and incorporate a greater number of agents actively engaging in the regulatory landscape. Relations between the different organizations within the space are conceived as complex, dynamic, involving negotiated interdependence rather than a top-down approach.

### **Postgraduate governance in the pre-regulatory stage: academia and market**

The analysis of Argentine postgraduate education follows a series of developmental stages. First, a pre-regulatory phase identified in the origins of postgraduate education in traditional public universities driven by disciplinary complexity comprehending doctoral programs. For instance, the oldest university in Argentina, the *Universidad Nacional de Córdoba*, established its first doctoral programs in Economics and Philosophy between 1936 and 1940. Doctoral programs monopolized the scene until 1955, when the university created the first specialization programs mainly to train medical doctors in specialized areas (Ares Bargas, Escudero, and Salto, 2010). Academia, what Clark (1983) denominated academic oligarchy, dominated the scene in the first steps of postgraduate education in Argentina. It created the programs through grassroots development, set the academic and administrative requirements (coursework, thesis, etc.), and charged tuition to students.

A second stage presents two growth-driven rationales. Supplementing the institutional and disciplinary needs of the previous moment, this stage is characterized by an unanticipated explosion of postgraduate programs in both the public and private sector where market-driven growth began to play a greater role. As in every stage delimited in this analysis, the change is a matter of degrees, signifying that market-driven growth does not obscure parallel academia-driven growth. By 1994, public and private

universities created a total of 246 masters' programs (Lvovich, 2009), a type of program that tends to relate more to market demands than to academia and disciplinary needs. From 1985 and until the Higher Education Law was enacted, academia continued playing an important role, but the market began shaping the supply of postgraduate programs in an increasing pace. The state only played a minor role, in funding scholarships for PhD students.

The unregulated nature of postgraduate education led to a market-based governance structure, where students are conceived as "clients". In sharp contrast to overall higher education governance, postgraduate students are regarded as individual consumers more than organized actors within the university. It locates close to the role of students in the US model, characterized by a mix between both conceptions, but with a prevalence toward considering the student as an individual consumer, based on the different possibilities or choices that the higher education "market" gives to students in that model. Organized participation implies group initiative and activity with respect to university government. It refers mainly to the capacity of students organizations for protesting, or the existence of formal mechanisms in recognized governing bodies (Epstein, 1974). Latin American universities and specifically Argentine public ones have a tradition in political participation and student representation in governing boards (ranging from departmental advisory councils to positions in the university council that deals with critical concerns such as the election or removal of Rectors). However, at the postgraduate level the political participation is mostly limited to consumer choices, since postgraduate students are hardly represented in core advisory bodies at the institutional level. This clear-cut contrast between undergraduate and postgraduate student participation in institutional spheres of decision making show how governance myriad realities of the time. At the moment when collegial participation in public universities was proposed, postgraduate education as we understand it today did not exist.

## **Transition from pre-regulation to post-regulation of postgraduate education**

Changes in higher education governance, in this case at the postgraduate level, always reflect modifications as a matter of degrees. A critical step from a regulatory space approach consists in distinguishing the different actors and organizations in the space and their interaction toward the establishment of a new regulatory policy in what we call a period of transition.

Studies on the 1995 higher education reform have generally highlighted the opposition of universities to changes that were advanced by the national government (Carlino & Mollis, 1997; Krotsch, 2001; Marquis, 1994). The main reason that Carlino and Mollis (1997) give to explain that opposition is that university rectors, mainly in the public sector, were skeptical of the assessment process because it was developed outside academia. In fact, the first movement toward the introduction of systematic quality assurance processes was the *Subproyecto 06*, a project developed by the Ministry of Education (ME) in 1991 and funded by the World Bank. According to Marquis (1994) this project had the purpose of discussing a methodological framework to assess universities. The project involved university administrators from the public and private sector, and staff of the ME under the coordination of an ad hoc team of experts.

This introductory example shows the intertwined relationships between different actors and organizations in the development of the quality assurance regulatory policy. As the regulatory literature establishes, within a specific space, other actors and organizations, besides governments, possess resources. The possession of organizational resources constitutes the tools that actors may use to dominate rule-formation, rule-enforcement or processes by which sanctions are applied in which they possess no formal authority (Scott, 2001). An important enterprise in the

analysis of regulatory space is the identification of the main actors and organizations involved in a specific space, in this case postgraduate education.

### **Ministry of Education (ME) and Secretariat of University Policies (SPU)**

Preceding the enactment of the Higher Education Law in 1995, the national government through the ME, had a limited formal role in higher education governance and an even a lesser role in postgraduate education. However, different studies (Carlino and Mollis, 1997; Krotsch, 2001, 2002) coincide on the actual centrality of the national government in the advancement of a pro-reform agenda between 1985 and 1995 that first involved the creation of the Fourth-Level Inter-university System (SICUN), and the National Inter-University Council (CIN) a few months later. In 1985 the national government created by executive decree the SICUN, to promote the discussion and certain policy coordination between public universities toward the postgraduate level, at that time labeled as “fourth level”. According to Marquis (1998) the SICUN attempted to develop an assessment mechanism of postgraduate programs, but it was unsuccessful and programs continued growing without any control.

A major change came into effect in 1993, with the foundation of the SPU within the ME, the first secretariat within the national government sphere to develop policies for the university sector (Krotsch, 2001). This public agency was in charge of introducing the discussion related to university-level quality assurance and it was responsible for the establishment of the first commission in charge of accrediting postgraduate programs. The expansion of the bureaucratic coordination also involved the establishment of a quality assurance agency, CONEAU.

To sum up, the role of the national government increased dramatically in a period of 10 years

(1985-1995), and the government came to be the one of the main organizations involved in the design of a new regulatory framework for postgraduate education. In addition to passing the 1995 law, the national government was strategic in developing a series of institutions (CIN, SICUN, CAP, and CRUP) and programs (FOMEC) that allowed reaching the necessary consensus on the reforms introduced to postgraduate education regulation. Rather than being the only actor involved, the national government promoted discussion with other organizations in the regulatory space that shaped the main outcome: the CIN and the CRUP<sup>1</sup>.

### **National Inter-University Council (CIN)**

As briefly analyzed above, the CIN had a pivotal role in the discussion of a new law for the higher education level, and specifically in the debates on the establishment of overall quality assurance mechanisms. It would not be audacious to state that the CIN played a shaping role in the final outcome (Carlino and Mollis, 1997). The role of the CIN in the regulatory space can be traced back to 1992<sup>2</sup>, when the CIN discussed the role of SICUN and expressed a concern about what they called its limited success. Regardless of the limited role the SICUN played in its initial and official mandates, this institution was supposed to be strategic to develop consensus among public university rectors on postgraduate education assessment. The results from those discussions were submitted to the ME (before 1993) and the SPU (after its creation, in 1993), such as delimitation of postgraduate programs by types (specializations, masters' and doctorates), and establishment of minimum requirements (number of credits, thesis, etc.)<sup>3</sup>. This account of SICUN shows how intertwined were the relationships between the two organizations (SPU and CIN) in the development of the regulatory policy.

After tracing documents published by the CIN from 1991 to 2008, Nosiglia (2011) concludes that the documents published before

the enactment of the law (1995) show a position of clear opposition to the debates promoted by the ME and SPU. The resistance to the general procedure to assess universities and programs was less clear regarding postgraduate programs accreditation. The analysis of the meetings and agreements reached within the CIN shows that there were already concerns related to the quality of postgraduate programs due to what it called an unregulated proliferation of programs. In 1992, by releasing a public statement on “the importance of postgraduate education, the necessity to preserve its stature”, the CIN requested the ME to control the establishment of postgraduate programs in non-university institutions due to their diversified nature, dissimilar academic requirements, and the inexistence of an official agency or legal framework to certify the quality of the programs offered by those institutions. What the document does not state is that public university rectors were concerned about private non-university institutions offering *diplomados*, short-term specialized training advertised as being postgraduate programs. CIN’s request to the ME for more control does not imply that public rectors would be favoring the establishment of an accreditation agency by the national government, but it points out a shared concern in a highly influential group of rectors. In a typical response from the public sector, it attempts to restrict the competition with the private sector by advocating for strict control over licensure or accreditation in the name of quality assurance (Levy and Zumeta, 2011). As a result of this outcry, the higher education law included article 83, which explicitly authorizes only university institutions to provide postgraduate education, and delimited the type of postgraduate programs to three categories: specializations, master’s and doctorates, leaving *diplomados* aside.

Following a regulatory space approach, it is possible to state that the CIN responded in different ways to the establishment of a new regulatory framework, not only regarding the public and private differentiation, but also in making a clear

difference between undergraduate and postgraduate programs accreditation. This may assist on understanding that SPU decided to implement the first pilot accreditation program on postgraduate education rather than undergraduate or institutional assessment of universities.

### **Postgraduate governance in the post-regulatory stage: market and state**

The first two stages feature an unregulated postgraduate level where the state played a minor role, mostly restricted to providing financial aid to doctoral students. As analyzed, the transition toward a regulated postgraduate level is followed by a third stage dominated by the role of the accreditation agency. As pointed out earlier, it can be argued that postgraduate programs proliferated in a similar way demand-absorbing institutions were in private higher education. As a result, the state followed a “delayed regulation” rationale (Levy, 2006). By 2008, specializations and masters’ programs dominated the postgraduate education landscape, multiplying almost four times its size when compared to 1994. Accreditation may serve not only as a way to inform the market but also and increasingly to restrict the establishment of new programs.

In the context of the new regulatory framework, universities in Argentina, mostly at the postgraduate level, became increasingly accountable to the state and to the market, by strengthening the authority of the top of the system and by giving more prevalence to student choice, and thus eroding the power of faculty chairs at the bottom of the system. However, institutional assessment and accreditation of programs heavily relies on faculty peer-review mechanism. Thus, the power of the academic oligarchy did not disappear at that level either.

An integral part of regulatory space approach deal with monitoring and enforcement activities that include sanctions and incentives. By law, all

postgraduate programs are required to be accredited through CONEAU. The accreditation process follows certain steps that include a peer-review stage. The programs that are not accredited cannot continue granting degrees (García de Fanelli *et al.*, 2001). Postgraduate programs can also voluntarily request a category that will rank them in terms of fixed standards of quality. Their purposes being legitimacy in academia and especially in the market.

Instead of regulating through public ownership (Majone, 1996), the state became a mediator between institutions and the market by adopting a regulation for competition strategy (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004). The state provides incentives to postgraduate programs by subsidizing the demand through two main agencies: the National Council for Scientific and Technological Research (CONICET) and the National Agency for Scientific and Technological Promotion (ANPCYT)<sup>4</sup>. Both agencies follow a demand-based funding approach that promotes student choice and competition among doctoral programs in order to attract those funds.

Accreditation is coupled with ranking of individual programs. For instance, programs gain more reputation when they are categorized “A” or “B” rather than “C” or not categorized. The research agencies have legitimized the ranking of postgraduate programs. Busto Tarelli (2007) mentions that the first three calls for proposals (1997-1999) of ANPCYT required that the student have chosen a program accredited and categorized. That policy was changed in 2000, switching the compulsory requirement to a preference. So, students have to preferably enroll in an accredited program. This reality indicates an increasing role of the state in strengthening governance through the market. CONICET also used to depend on rankings, by granting scholarships to those students enrolled in programs ranked “A” or “B”. Nowadays, that agency only restricts applications to postgraduate students that want to pursue their degree in an accredited program. These policies linking accreditation

results to funding were clearly designed as a way to inform the market about the different options and promote quality enhancement through competition.

Programs follow various rationales when they request to be ranked, and most of them are related to financial reasons. For instance, certain international cooperation programs promoted by the national government through the Secretariat of University Policies (SPU) legitimize the official ranking of postgraduate programs, because the eligibility to compete for funding is based on the category assigned.

If we now add and overlap analysis of higher education governance to analysis of the regulatory state we get a useful framework to comprehend main developments involving the spread of regulatory agencies in this level of education. Regulatory literature highlights different types of regulatory states overlap with the main studies on higher education systems coordination and accountability. The so-called Clark (1983) triangle has the state, market and academic oligarchy built-in the analysis of higher education systems. The differentiation between the US and the Continental (European) model is one of the major assets in the study of comparative higher education governance. While this differentiation was built to analyze different organizational trajectories in the relationship between state, market, and academic oligarchy (Clark, 1983), it is suitable to consider the role of the state and the market, and thus the relative prominence of regulatory policies in this educational sector.

As analyzed above, the three stages represent regulatory changes overtime. Table 3 exhibits the interaction between regulatory and organizational analysis. The columns contain the differentiation between types of competition and regulation (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004), and the rows show various types of coordination (Clark, 1983).

Table 3 shows in perspective the changes noted earlier. Postgraduate education moved from a

first stage characterized by a (state) unregulated sector, with self-regulating institutions where academia was preeminent. From 1985 and until the Higher Education Law was enacted, academia continued playing an important role, but the market began shaping the supply of postgraduate programs in an increasing pace. The state only played a minor role, in funding scholarships for PhD students. Finally, from 1995, postgraduate education became (state) regulated and thus, the state increased its coordination through a fundamental regulation-for-competition strategy: the accreditation and ranking of postgraduate programs. Both academia and markets lost some coordination by conceding some autonomy over the creation of new postgraduate programs and control of minimum academic and administrative requirements.

At this point, it is necessary to highlight a critical difference in the way state regulation differs by sub-level. Both, undergraduate and postgraduate programs are subject to accreditation. It would be precarious to directly link program accreditation reports to market information and the rise of a regulation-for-competition strategy. As Krzykowski (2012) indicates, reports developed by accreditation agencies are not targeted to students, parents, usual stakeholders referred as “market” in market-based systems. Nevertheless, the accreditation system for postgraduate education incorporates a ranking system as an innovation to inform the market, a feature that is missing in undergraduate programs accreditation. In this way, the state through the accreditation agency promotes and legitimizes market competition among postgraduate programs.

To sum up, Argentine universities have an increasing share of governance from the market and the state through accountability procedures. It strengthens the authority of the top of the system and gives more prevalence to student choice, eroding the power of faculty chairs at the bottom of the system. However, accreditation relies on faculty peer-review, so the power of the academic oligarchy has not disappeared at that level either.

## **Conclusions**

Notwithstanding national variations in governance structures, regulation in various higher education systems that traditionally relied on strong academic foundations are switching toward more involvement of the market and the state (King, 2007b). Thus, postgraduate regulation in Argentina is likely less a unique or even aberrant development than it is consistent with worldwide tendencies. The movement from spontaneous growth in an unregulated period was recent and took place in a short period of time. Regulation through accreditation is an intended step toward increasing the role of the state to tackle information asymmetry. However, in this passage toward more governmental and market involvement, academia still plays a substantial yet different role. Closer to a state-steering role, the governance system incorporates academia as a core feature in the quality assurance process (peer-review).

The regulatory space approach aids in the analysis of the role of different actors in different moments of policy development. The approach depicts a complex and intertwined relationship among various actors in the system. It highlights the diverse and sometimes even contradictory relationships between institutional, governmental and non-governmental actors. In other words, the approach uncovers the importance that both state (ME and SPU) and non-state (CIN and CRUP) actors had in the establishment of the new regulatory framework.

The study of regulatory policy at the postgraduate sub-level still lacks understanding of how higher education institutions are processing the governance changes. Little is known about institutional responses to regulatory policies at the postgraduate sub-level and how much change took place in universities and programs. This is a critical step since various studies on higher education accountability have shown that to a greater or lesser extent, even in cases where there is a strong state action, the results from

grand governance initiatives have often been rather limited (Cerych and Sabatier, 1986; El-Khawas, 1998).

Finally, although this study has been able to demonstrate changes in overall patterns in

governance, data on the evolution of postgraduate education in Argentina over time limits the possibilities to fully analyze the scope of change and to what extent the new regulation in place has provoked any substantive changes in the sub-level.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Due to lack of information, the regulatory analysis does not include the role of the Private University Rectors Council (CRUP).

<sup>2</sup> Communication No. 57/1992 of the CIN.

<sup>3</sup> Communication No. 155/1994 and 204/1995 of the CIN.

<sup>4</sup> CONICET and ANPCYT grant merit-based scholarships exclusively to pursue doctoral studies at both public and private institutions.

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## Appendix

**TABLE 1. Postgraduate programs in Argentina, by type of program and sector (1994, 1998, 2008)**

Type of program	Sector	1994		2002		2008		Percentage increase (1994-2008)
Doctoral	Public	153	62.2%	242	76.3%	300	60.2%	96.1%
	Private	93	37.8%	75	23.7%	198	39.8%	112.9%
	Subtotal	246	100.0%	317	100.0%	498	100.0%	102.4%
Master	Public	151	61.4%	534	72.2%	694	59.7%	359.6%
	Private	95	38.6%	206	27.8%	469	40.3%	393.7%
	Subtotal	246	100.0%	740	100.0%	1163	100.0%	372.8%
Specialization	Public	214	71.1%	627	70.9%	964	65.7%	350.5%
	Private	87	28.9%	257	29.1%	504	34.3%	479.3%
	Subtotal	301	100.0%	884	100.0%	1468	100.0%	387.7%
<b>Total</b>		<b>793</b>		<b>1941</b>		<b>3129</b>		<b>294.6%</b>

Source: Lvovich (2009) and own calculations.

**TABLE 2. Hierarchical vs. non-hierarchical approaches to regulation**

	Hierarchical regulation (e.g. public interest and capture approaches)	Non-hierarchical (e.g. regulatory space approach)
Scope	Focus on public agency (regulator) and private activity (regulatee)	Public agency and private activity, in interdependent relationship (regulator & regulatee)
Type of regulation	Preeminence of legal regulation	Legal regulation as only one tool within the regulatory policy
Macro-micro relationships	Dual outcomes: compliance-non compliance	Multiple outcomes in terms of degrees of compliance
Role of normative framework	Emphasizes the role of legislation in regulation, hindering other facets	De-emphasizes the role of law in regulation
Foci	Legislation and governmental action as the main agents to be studied	Allows for wider range of actors, both involved state and non-state

Source: Author's own elaboration based on Christensen (2011); Levi-Faur (2011); Moran (2002); Scott (2001).

TABLE 3. Regulatory stages in Argentine postgraduate education

		Period		
		Pre 1985	1985-1995	Post 1995
	Type of competition	(State) unregulated	(State) unregulated	(State) regulated
	Type of regulation	Self-regulating academic oligarchy	Self-regulating markets	Regulation for competition
Coordination	State	Low (by financial aid to PhD students)		Medium-High (by law/agencies)
	Academic oligarchy	High (creating the programs without necessity of governmental approval)		Medium (necessity of governmental approval; participation of academic peers in the accreditation process)
	Market	Low	High (market-driven supply)	Medium-High (state regulation designed to strengthen the market)

Source: Authors' elaboration based on Clark (1983); Jordana & Levi-Faur (2004).

## Resumen

### *Gobernanza a través del mercado y el estado: el caso del posgrado en Argentina*

**INTRODUCCIÓN.** La mayoría de los sistemas de educación superior en los países desarrollados y en desarrollo han experimentado cambios en su estructura de gobernanza. En la educación de posgrado en Argentina esos cambios marcaron un movimiento hacia un papel creciente del Estado como un agente directivo y del mercado para fortalecer la competencia, ambos a costa del poder académico tradicional. **MÉTODO.** Análisis del enfoque del espacio regulador basado en investigación de archivo del marco regulador de la educación de posgrado aunado a información sobre los programas. **RESULTADOS.** Se observan diferencias tajantes entre la realidad pre y posregulatoria de Argentina. La regulación mediante la acreditación es concebida para abordar la asimetría en la información e informar a los estudiantes a los que se considera como “clientes” individuales. Esto se cumple por medio de la clasificación jerárquica intencional y oficial de los programas de posgrado. El Estado juega un papel creciente como regulador para la competencia que modifica los modelos existentes de gobernanza en el sistema de educación superior, principalmente en el nivel de posgrado. **DISCUSIÓN.** En un contexto de cambios crecientes en la gobernanza de la educación superior existe una evidencia cada vez mayor de que, a pesar de las variaciones nacionales, los sistemas están apuntando hacia una mayor dependencia de las estrategias favorables al mercado. Aun así, poco se sabe acerca de la manera en que las instituciones del subnivel de posgrado están respondiendo a los nuevos desafíos que plantean las estructuras emergentes de gobernanza.

**Palabras clave:** Educación superior, Gobernanza, Regulación del Estado, Argentina, América Latina, Política pública.

## Résumé

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### *La gouvernance et l'État : l'enseignement au troisième cycle en Argentine*

**INTRODUCTION.** La plupart des systèmes d'enseignement supérieur des pays développés et en voie de développement ont connu des changements de structure de gouvernance. Au niveau du troisième cycle, en Argentine, le rôle de l'État se manifeste de plus en plus comme étant un agent directif et de marché dans le but de renforcer la concurrence aux dépens du pouvoir académique traditionnel. **MÉTHODE.** L'analyse de la perspective de l'espace régulateur, qui se base sur la recherche dans les archives du cadre régulateur de l'enseignement en troisième cycle à laquelle s'ajoute l'information relative aux programmes. **RÉSULTATS.** On observe des différences nettes qui existent entre la réalité pré et post-régulatrice en Argentine. La régulation intervenant par l'accréditation a pour but d'aborder l'asymétrie de l'information et d'informer les étudiants qui sont alors considérés comme des "clients" individuels. Ceci s'opère par le biais de la classification hiérarchique intentionnelle et officielle des programmes de troisième cycle. L'État joue un rôle croissant comme régulateur de compétence, ce qui modifie les modèles qui existent déjà en matière de gouvernance au sein de l'enseignement supérieur, en particulier au niveau du troisième cycle. **DISCUSSION.** Dans un contexte de changements croissants de gouvernance dans l'enseignement supérieur, il existe une évidence qui se détache de plus en plus : malgré les variations nationales, les systèmes visent une plus grande dépendance des stratégies favorables au marché. Pourtant, on est encore peu informé sur la manière dont les institutions de niveaux inférieurs au troisième cycle répondent aux nouveaux défis que ces nouvelles structures de gouvernance entraînent.

**Mots clés:** *L'enseignement supérieur, Gouvernance, Régulation de l'État, Argentine, L'Amérique latine, Politiques publiques.*

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